ployment of the master, and if he is driving | T. R. 125, was the proper action in which a coach and six, or a locomotive and train to try the liability of the master." [pp. 461, of cars, thereby acquires a special property in 462]. In that case the servant had committed the things, and is pro hac vice the owner and a trespass vi et armis in the course of his emdoing his own business, may sound plausible ployment. Wood, in his work on Master enough, perhaps, but we confess it seems to and Servant, after discussing the master's us unsound, although quoted from so ancient liability, says: "Thus, it will be seen that a date as Rolle's Abridgment, and adopted the question as to whether the master is li by so distinguished a judge as Lord Kenyon.able in trespass or case for an injury inflicted The truth is the whole argument is only a by a servant merely affects the remedy, and specious fallacy; and whether Lord Kenyon not the cause of action itself, and depends intended really to say that no action will upon the question whether the act is a natulie against the master in such case, or only ral, necessary, or probable incident of doing to say what the case required, that the master the act directed. If so, the master is liable is not liable in trespass, it is very obvious in trespass. If not, then he is not liable in the proper distinction in regard to the mas- trespass, but only in case. Wood, Mast. ter's liability cannot be made to depend & S. 596, 597. Judge Thompson, in his exupon the question of the intention of the cellent discussion of all these questions, both servant. The master has nothing to do, ei-under the old and the new doctrine, and after ther way, with the purpose and intention of contending, in his vigorous style, for the his servants. It is with their acts that he correctness of the new, considers (in § 10 of is to be affected, and, if these come within his observations on McManus v. Crickett) the the range of their employment, the master question of the proper form of action against is liable, whether the act be a misfeasance, the master. He says: "With respect to the or a non-feasance, an omission or commis- form of the action, whether trespass or case. sion. carelessly or purposely done. It will where the old system of pleading still prehappen, doubtless, that when the master is vails, the following may be stated as the fair under a positive duty to keep or carry things result of the cases: If the command of the safely, as bailee, or to carry persons safely, master is to do a lawful act, and the servant while he will be liable for the mere does it in an unlawful manner, so as to innon-feasance of the servant, the servant will jure another, then case, and not trespass, is not be liable to the same party for such non- the proper remedy." Here when the context feasance, there being no privity between the is considered it is evident the author meant servant and such party,- -no duty owing to by the term "unlawful manner" either a wilsuch person from the servant. But in such fully unlawful or a negligent act; for he had case the servant will be liable for his posi- just declared the master liable for the wil tive wrong, and wilful acts of injury, and fully unlawful act of the servant. He prothe master is also liable for these latter acts, ceeds: "But where the act which the master but not in trespass ordinarily, as the servant commands the servant to do is unlawful in is, but in case. This is the view itself, and the wrong does not result merely taken of this subject by Judge Reeve (Dom. from the manner of doing it, trespass will Rel. 358, 359, 360); and it is, we think, lie. It results that case, and not trespass. the only consistent and rational one, and the is the form of action for all injuries arising one which must ultimately prevail." Judge from the servant's negligence or unskilfulReeve, referring to McManus v. Crickett, says: ness, not authorized or commanded by the "The principle adopted in the case in East master. To illustrate: If a railway passenshows that when a servant does an injury ger refuses to pay his fare, and the conductor with violence, the very doing of it is an in ejecting him from the train, which he may abandonment of his master's service. It is lawfully do, puts him off while the train is said that there is a difficulty in framing a in motion, or uses excessive force, whereby proper action to remedy the injury, if one a cause of action accrues to the passenger, exists, or that the injury was immediate, the action against the company will be case. and therefore trespass, vi et armis, was the But if the company directs its conductors to proper action, if any; and that this action collect illegal fares of passengers, and a pasproceeds upon the ground of criminality, senger resists payment, for which cause the which would subject the master to a fine. conductor puts him off the train, the action Certain it is that the master is not liable, against the company will be trespass; and criminaliter. It does not follow, because the use of any excessive force beyond what the injury by the servant was an immediate was necessary to execute the unlawful order, injury, that the action against the master or any carelessness on the part of the conmust be trespass. It proves, indeed, if the ductor, whereby the passenger is specially action had been brought against the servant, injured, will go in aggravation of damages. it must have been trespass. I take it 2 Thomp. Neg. p. 890. The learned author's that when an immediate injury, with force, illustration of negligence in the foregoing is done by another, for whom his employer extract, it seems to us, is subject to the critiis liable, the action is trespass on the case; cism that the acts of the conductor therein and in perfect analogy in this case with that stated are acts of direct force or trespass, and when a man keeps a dog accustomed to bite, not mere negligence. The conclusion, howand on that account is liable. It is an action ever, that the master, in the case stated, is of trespass on the case, although the injury liable only in case, is, we think, correct. In is with force, and as immediate as if done St. Louis, A. & C. R. Co. v. Dalby, 19 11. by a man. I apprehend that the action on 353, 375, the court, after an elaborate discusthe case reported in [Savignac v. Roome], 6sion of a corporation's liability of the wil

ful trespasses of its servants, and holding to ing prevails, which hold that, in actions on the modern doctrine, says: "Much was said the case for negligence of the defendant's upon the agument of the hardship it would servants, the defense of contributory negli impose upon railroad companies should this gence is overcome by showing that the act action be sustained. It is supposed that it of the servant causing the injury was wilful would authorize trespass against the com- or intentional. It is an admitted rule of pany wherever it could be maintained against pleading that an action on the case cannot the servant, and that the action on the case, be maintained if the defendant's act was a which is now the usual remedy, would be trespass only. So that, if the unauthorized superseded for trespass. This apprehension | wilful act of the servant constitutes the masis not well founded. Hereafter, as hereto ter a trespasser, and suable as such, a replifore, the usual remedy for torts must be case, cation to the plea of contributory negligence and not trespass. Wherever the command to an action on the case for the negligence was to do only a lawful act, and the servant of the servant, setting up that the servant does it in an unlawful way, so as to injure wilfully committed the act, would, manianother, there case would still be the proper festly, be a complete departure from the decremedy. But where the act is un-laration. lawful in and of itself, and not from the mode of doing it, trespass would lie." And the court illustrated by the case in hand, which was where the conductor was required by the company to collect certain illegal fares, and to eject passengers refusing to pay. The court held the ejected passenger entitled sto maintain trespass against the company, for the obvious reason, as we have already laid down, that the company itself commanded the commission of the trespass. Under the principle announced by the court, as above quoted, it is clear that if the conductor had been required by the company to collect only legal fares, and eject those who refused to pay, and the conductor had wilfully demanded an illegal fare, and ejected the pas senger for his refusal to pay, or, in endeavoring to collect the legal fare, had wilfully, or even maliciously, inflicted an unnecessary and unlawful injury upon the passenger in ejecting him from the train, the remedy against the company would have been case, while, against the conductor, trespass would If this be sound law, it is decisive of the question before us.

lie.

The two remedies are of such different natures that, by common law, they cannot be joined in the same action even in separate counts. Mobile & M. R. Co. v. McKellar, 59 Ala. 458. But, when we consider the master's liability as consequential and in case, the decisions referred to are entirely reconcilable with this rule of pleading. The cases which appear to be adverse to our conclusion are either those in states where code systems have abolished common-law forms of action, or where the considerations we have adverted to were not in mind. Of the latter class is the case, in our own court, of Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Dancy, 97 Ala. 338 (an opinion delivered by the present writer).

The doctrines in respect of the relations of principal and agent, and master and servant, as applicable to the acts and contracts of corporations, are well established. It is not essential to an act or contract which binds a corporation that it be done or entered into or authorized by the corporate entity itself, as represented by the governing board or stockholders. It is well recognized in the law that corporations, in carrying out corporate functions, may, and of necessity do, create vice principals who, in respect of the departments of corporate business intrusted to their general control and management, partake of the corporate entity, and their acts and contracts, in execution of the functions they represent, are of the same effect and import as if done or entered into or directly authorized by vote of the governing board or stockholders. Thus, to illustrate: Suppose the defendant has confided to a general manager or superintendent the execution of its telephone business, in the city of Birmingham; endowed him with ample powers and means to carry on the business, to employ and discharge subordinate agents and servants, and generally to do what may be necessary to the general performance of its corporate functions in that district. Such a person, with reference to the public, is more than a mere agent acting under orders of a superior. He is pro hac vice a principal. He stands for, and represents, within the sphere of his authority, the corporate entity itself, and his acts are the direct acts of the corporation itself; and if, in his representative character, he commits a trespass, or comIt is only upon the principle which we mands or authorizes its commission by a servhere declare that the vast array of decisions ant under his orders, the corporation is suable in this and other courts can possibly be for the wrong in the action of trespass. Many maintained, where the common law of plead-o her illustrations might be given. It is

The correctness of the view we take in this opinion may be tested by a consideration of the law in respect of the liability of master and servant to a joint action. It is a familiar rule that there are no accessories in trespass. All who are guilty at all are cotrespassers, and may be jointly sued. See note to Kirkwood v. Miller, 73 Am. Dec. 140, 141: -Cooley, Torts, 133. Judge Thompson, in section 11 of his work, supra (page 891), shows clearly that by the weight of authority, where the liability of the master arises from an unauthorized trespass of the servant, committed in the performance of a lawful duty commanded by the master, a joint action against master and servant will not lie, for the reason that the action against the master is case, while that against the serv ant is trespass, and for the further reason that, the wrong proceeding directly from the servant, and not directly from the master, the latter, if compelled to pay the damages, would have an action over against the former, but he would not, at common law, be entitled to such an action where the judgment went against both as joint tort feasors.

thus, through agencies of this nature, that corporations may commit almost all manner of torts, such as assault and battery, malicious prosecution, libel, etc., and some classes of offenses for which they are indictable. It was never thought that a corporate vote was necessary to bind the corporations to these wrongs. As well might it be said that every contract should receive the express authority or assent of a corporate vote. But it would seem, upon plain principles, that a mere servant, working under the immediate control and orders of a superior, having no power or authority to do anything but perform the work he is employed and directed to do, can in no sense be deemed a vice principal, for whose tortious acts, as such, the corporation is responsible. The liability of the master, as we have endeavored to show,

is not for the tortious act in such case, but in consequence of the duty he owes the public, except fellow servants, to have in his employ only servants who will perform the services in a lawful way.

It is not our purpose now to undertake to lay down any general rule to govern all cases as to what circumstances or extent of power conferred are essential to constitute a vice principal, whose acts will be directly visited upon the corporation, within the principle above declared. Each case, as it arises, will be determined according to its peculiar facts.

With these views, we adhere to the opinion formerly delivered in these cases by Justice Thorington, and reverse the judgments of the city court, and order judgment to be entered in this court in favor of the defendant in each case. Reversed and rendered.

NOTE.-Injunctions against judgments for want of or where there was no service of process or an un

jurisdiction or which are void.

I. In general.

II. As to party.

III. As to time.

IV. As to venue.

V. As to amount.

VI. As to judge or court.

VII. Matters of process and service. a. Form.

b. Time and manner.

c. Fraud as to service.

d. Acceptance of service.

e. Party served.

f. Service on corporation.

g. Service on partners.

h. Service at residence.

i. Where there was no service as required by
law.

j. Where there was no notice.

VIII. On account of appearance.

IX. Pleading and practice.

authorized appearance.

An injunction was granted where an order of a court was void because in excess of the court's jurisdiction, although the order might have been valid if confined to matters within the jurisdiction of the court. White County Comrs. v. Gwin, 136 Ind. 562, 22 L. R. A. 402.

And in Landrum v. Farmer, 7 Bush, 46, it was said that if a judgment was void and might have been reversed on appeal, the circuit court which rendered the decision had power to adjudge it void, and to enjoin proceedings under it.

And in Estis v. Patton, 3 Yerg. 382, it was said that an injunction will be granted to restrain proceedings on a judgment that is void for want of jurisdiction in the court.

And in Earl v. Matheney, 60 Ind. 202, it was said that the execution of a void judgment will be enjoined, but the execution of a judgment merely voidable will not be enjoined.

Under Ga. Code, §§ 3319, 4083, providing for a

X. Where there was no judgment or it was set judgment on a replevin bond for the payment of aside.

the recovery, and not for the production of the property, a summary judgment without an action upon a bond conditioned alone for the forthcoming of the property was void as to the surety, and was enjoined. Clary v. Haines, 61 Ga. 520.

But in Geraty v. Druiding, 44 Ill. App. 440, it was held that "want of jurisdiction alone was no ground for relief in equity against the judgment, unless there was also disclosed a meritorious defense, which by loss of right to appeal bad become lost."

I. In general. Generally injunctions have been granted where judgments were void on account of venue, or in excess of jurisdictional amount, or if there was no service, or defective service, of process on corporations, or a return of service of process at "the residence," where the party did not live at that place, or where it was rendered without the notice required by law. But they have been refused when claimed on account of the form of the writ or summons, or time and manner of service (except Where a judgment was void for want of juriswhen service was made on Sunday), or for enticing diction, but did not so appear on its face, and a good into the state, or for misnomer of the defendant. defense to the action was not shown, the injuneThere is some conflict as to granting injunctions tion was refused. John V. Farwell Co. v. Hilbert against judgments void as to the time of rendition, | (Wis.) 30 L. R. A. 235; Pilger v. Torrence, 42 Neb. 93.

poration, or "any part thereof, shall be liable to execution and sale in the same manner as the property of individuals."

ERE

(June 17, 1895.)

RROR to the Court of Civil Appeals,
Fourth Supreme Judicial District, to re-

view a judgment affirming a judgment of the
District Court of Duval County in favor of de-
fendants in an action brought to enjoin the en-
forcement of a judgment. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.
Messrs. Dodd & Mullally, and J. O.
Luby for plaintiff in error.

So, where the statute in regard to garnishment | 133 U. S. 152, 33 L. ed. 586; Stockton v. Ransom, 60 was not followed, and the judgment was void but | Mo. 535. complainant did not show that he had not an adequate remedy by appeal, certiorari, or direct application to the court. Wingfield v. McClure, 48 Ark. 510.

In Harrison v. Crumb, 1 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. (White & W.) § 991, it was said that an injunction will not be granted against a void judgment in Texas, The party will be left to his remedy at law.

In Geers v. Scott (Tex.) 33 S. W. 587, it was said that if a judgment was void and would not support an order of sale, a seizure of property would be such a trespass as would give the complainant an adequate remedy at law; and an injunction was refused.

The Missouri cases are noted here in order to show their conflict, although some of them do not belong to this subdivision.

|

By an action against the attorney. Everett v..
Warner Bank, 58 N. H. 340; Bunton v. Lyford, 37
N. H. 512, 75 Am. Dec. 144; Piggott v. Addicks, 3 G.
Greene, 427, 56 Am. Dec. 547; Harris v. Gwin, 10
Smedes & M. 563.

By action against the marshal. Walker V
Robbins, 55 U. S. 14 How. 584, 14 L. ed. 552.
By action against the sheriff. Taylor v. Lewis, 2
J. J. Marsh. 400, 19 Am. Dec. 135.

By suit for damages. Connery v. Swift, 9 Nev. 39. By affidavit of illegality. Morris v. Morris, 76 Ga. 733.

By affidavit of illegality or motion to set aside. Hart v. Lazaron, 46 Ga. 396.

By appeal. Holman v. G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. (Tex.) 30 S. W. 1120; Herwick v. Koken Barber Supply Co. 61 Mo. App. 454.

In Missouri, on the question of granting injunctions against judgments void for want of jurisdiction, there is a conflict of authority, which is noted as irreconcilable in St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Low-court. Wingfield v. McLure, 48 Ark. 510. der, 59 Mo. App. 3.

By appeal or certiorari. Galveston, H. & S. A. R.. Co. v. Ware, 74 Tex. 47.

By appeal, certiorari, or direct application to the

So, in Jones v. Pharis, 59 Mo. App. 254, an injunction was granted where the judgment was void on account of venue, and there was danger of losing all legal remedy,-distinguishing St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Lowder, supra, on that ground.

So, where the judgment was void because service of process was not made on the proper officer of a corporation. United States Mut. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Reisinger, 43 Mo. App. 571.

By arresting process. Sanchez v. Carriaga, 31 Cal. 170.

By certiorari. Crandall v. Bacon, 20 Wis. 640, 91 Am. Dec. 451; Fleming v. Nunn, 61 Miss. 603; Kanawha & O. R. Co. v. Ryan, 31 W. Va. 364. On a constable's bond. Williams v. Hitzie, 83 Ind. 303.

By defending a suit to revive. Haynes v. Aultman, 36 Neb. 257.

By habeas corpus. Lance v. McCoy, 34 W. Va.

But an injunction was refused against a judg-416. ment void because rendered in vacation, as there was a remedy at law. Stockton v. Ransom, 60 Mo.

535.

So, where there was no jurisdiction for want of notice, process, or appearance, as there was a remedy by action of trespass. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Lowder, supra; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 89 Mo. 146.

And in Bear v. Youngman, 19 Mo. App. 41, it was said that an injunction will not be granted solely on the ground that the judgment is void.

In the main case of TEXAS MEXICAN R. Co. v. WRIGHT, Affirming 29 S. W. 1134, although a judgment was held void for want of jurisdiction of the defendant where a railway company was sued and the summons was issued against "W. H. V., agent of the Texas Mexican Railway Company at San Diego, Tex.," yet an injunction was refused because there was a remedy of certiorari.

This is in accord with the weight of authority, although there is some conflict. The majority of cases deny injunctions where there is a remedy at law: but some few cases grant injunctions although the remedy at law is clear; and some cases grant injunctions on the ground that there is no remedy at law. The weight of authority is clear that an injunction should be denied unless a valid defense to the action is shown, although some cases have granted injunctions without requiring this to be done, and some cases have allowed injunctions without reference to the question of valid defense. The following cases in this note denied injunctions on the ground that there was a remedy at law: Armsworthy v. Cheshire, 2 Dev. Eq. 234, 34 Am. Dec. 273; Harrison v. Crumb, 1 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. (White & W.) $ 991; Knox County v. Harshman,

By motion. Goolsby v. St. John, 25 Gratt. 146; Lyon v. Boilvin, 7 Ill. 629; Fullan v. Hooper, 19 N. Y. Week. Dig. 93, Affirming 66 How. Pr. 75; Mason v. Miles, 63 N. C. 564.

By motion or appeal. Whitehurst v. Merchants" & F. Transp. Co. 109 N. C. 344.

By motion to quash. Stockton v. Ransom, 60 Mo. 535.

By motion to recall the execution or motion to set aside, or by action against the plaintiff in the judgment. Wilkinson v. Rewey, 59 Wis. 554.

By motion to set aside. Comstock v. Clemens, 19 Cal. 77: Gates v. Lane, 49 Cal. 266; Lasselle v. Moore, 1 Blackf. 226; Luco v. Brown, 73 Cal. 3; Partin v. Luterloh, 6 Jones, Eq. 341.

By motion to set aside or by appeal. Petalka v. Fitle, 33 Neb. 756.

By motion to set aside or by writ of recordari. Gallop v. Allen, 113 N. C. 24.

By motion to stay the judgment. Critchfield v. Porter, 3 Ohio, 518.

By motion for a new trial. Hamblin v. Knight,. 81 Tex. 351; Woodward v. Pike, 43 Neb. 777.

By motion for a new trial or writ of error coram nobis, or suit in equity for relief. Hurlbut v. Thomas, 55 Conn. 181.

By opening the judgment. Hollinger v. Reeme, 138 Ind. 363, 24 L. R. A. 46.

By remedy to correct the same. Gould v. Loughran, 19 Neb. 392.

By defending on a replevin bond. Proctor v. Pettitt, 25 Neb. 96.

By action of trespass. Geers v. Scott (Tex.) 33 S. W. 587: St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Lowder, 29 Mo.. App. 3; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 89 Mo. 146.

Messrs. C. L. Coyner, S. H. Woods, and George B. Hufford, for defendant in error: A petition for injunction restraining the sale of real estate under a void judgment, which shows on its face that the amount of said judg

By action of trespass or trover. Davidson v. Floyd, 15 Fla. 687.

ment was over $20, and that at the time of making the application for injunction ninety days bad not elapsed from the date of the ren dition of said judgment, and which fails to show any reason why petitioner did not avail

not unite as where there was no statute authorizing such a judgment. Hoffman v. Shupp, 80 Md.

By writ of error. Alabama Ins. Co. v. Kingman, 611. 21 Ill. App. 493.

By writ of prohibition, or motion to set aside, or action against the sheriff. Stites v. Knapp, 2 Ga. Dec. 36.

The following cases granted an injunction although there was a remedy at law: Landrum v. Farmer, 7 Bush, 46; Wilson v. Montgomery, 14 Smedes & M. 205; Propst v. Meadows, 13 11. 157; Nelson v. Rockwell, 14 Ill. 375; Caruthers v. Hartsfield, 3 Yerg. 366, 24 Am. Dec. 580.

And the following cases granted an injunction on the ground that there was no adequate remedy at law: Jones v. Pharis, 59 Mo. App. 254; Bornschein v. Finck, 13 Mo. App. 120; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Rawlins, 80 Tex. 579; Ridgeway v. Bank of Tennessee, 11 Humph. 523; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Ware, 74 Tex. 47.

The following cases held that an injunction will be denied unless a valid defense is shown: Geraty `v. Druiding, 44 Ill. App. 440; John V. Farwell Co. v. Hilbert (Wis.) 30 L. R. A. 235; Pilger v. Torrence, 42 Neb. 903: Gould v. Loughran, 19 Neb. 392; Logan v. Hillegass, 16 Cal. 200; Waldrom v. Waldrom, 76 Ala. 285; Gregory v. Ford,14 Cal. 138,73 Am. Dec. 639; Williams v. Hitzie, 83 Ind. 303; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Manning, 23 Neb. 552; Wilson v. Shipman, 34 Neb. 573: Stewart v. Brooks, 62 Miss. 492; Jeffery v. Fitch, 46 Conn. 601; Secor v. Woodward, 8 Ala. 500; Sharp v. Schmidt, 62 Tex. 263; Masterson v. Ashcom, 54 Tex. 324; Cromelin v. McCauley, 67 Ala. 542; Colson v. Leitch, 110 Ill. 504; Burch v. West, 134 Ill. 258, Affirming 33 Ill. App. 359; State v. Hill, 50 Ark. 458; Janes v. Howell, 37 Neb. 320; Langley v. Ashe, 38 Neb. 53; Crocker v. Allen, 34 S. C. 452; Taggart v. Wood, 20 Iowa, 236; Winters v. Means, 25 Neb. 242; Fowler v. Lee, 10 Gill & J. 358, 32 Am. Dec. 172; King v. Watts, 23 La. Ann. 563.

And the following cases granted an injunction without requiring a valid defense to be shown: Bornschem v. Finck, 13 Mo. App. 120; Wilson v. Sparkman, 17 Fla. 871, 35 Am. Rep. 110; United States Mut. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Reisinger, 43 Mo. App. -571; San Juan & St. L. Min. & S. Co. v. Finch, 6 Colo. 214; Earle v. McVeigh, 91 U. S. 503, 23 L. ed. 398; Blakeslee v. Murphy, 44 Conn. 188; Mills v. Scott, 43 Fed. Rep. 452; Bell v. Williams, 1 Head, 229: White v. Espey, 21 Or. 328; Ridgeway v. Bank of Tennessee, 11 Humph. 523; Ryan v. Boyd, 33 Ark. 778 (Overruled in State v. Hill, 50 Ark. 458); Nicholson v. Stephens, 47 Ind. 185; Witt v. Kaufman, 25 Tex. Supp. 384.

II. As to party.

An injunction was granted where a judgment was fraudulently changed as to the parties after the term, and was entered against the complainant without notice. Byars v. Justin, 2 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. (Wilson) § 686.

And where a judgment was rendered by a justice in favor of the plaintiff, and on a second trial the defendant obtained judgment, and the justice erased the same without notice to the defendant, at the instance of the plaintiff, and issued an execution on the first judgment. Smith v. Chandler, 13 Ind. 513.

And where a default judgment on a note of a feme covert was void as against her separate estate. Griffith v. Clarke, 18 Md. 457.

And in case of judgment against a married woman alone on a note in which her husband did

But an injunction was refused in Russell v. Interstate Lumber Co. 112 Mo. 40, where the parties to a judgment of sale under a mechanic's lien, had no interest in the property and the court had no jurisdiction to order the sale. If void the sale would not affect the complainant.

So, in Wilkinson v. Rewey, 59 Wis. 554, an injunction was refused against executions upon two pretended judgments alleged to be no judgments because one had not been properly docketed and there were no parties to the other, as they could be set aside or vacated and the executions recalled on motion in the original actions, and such was a compiete remedy at law, and for the further reason that it was not alleged that the judgments were in substance inequitable.

And where the Federal court had no jurisdiction to render a judgment on account of the citizenship of the parties. Skirving v. National L. Ins. Co. 59 Fed. Rep. 742.

And where the plaintiff at law was not a corporation as alleged, but such objection was not made or excused before judgment. Mahan v. Accommodation Bank, 26 La. Ann. 34.

And where one of the parties to a judgment was dead at the time of its rendition, as there was a remedy by appeal. Holman v. G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. (Tex.) 30 S. W. 1120.

See also the main case of TEXAS MEXICAN R. Co. V. WRIGHT, refusing an injunction where process was issued against and served upon an agent of a corporation defendant, as there was a remedy by certiorari.

For injunctions on account of death of party, see note to Gum-Elastic Roofing Co. v. Mexico Pub. Co. (Ind.) 30 L. R. A. 700, Injunctions against judgments for errors and irregularities.

III. As to time.

As to an injunction claimed because the judgment was void or without jurisdiction on account of time, there is some conflict of authority. But injunctions on this ground have been generally refused where there was adequate remedy at law.

An injunction was allowed against a judgment where the summons required an appearance at an impossible time, as service on the 27th day of the month to appear on the 1st day of the same month. The question of valid defense does not appear to be discussed. Rice v. American Nat. Bank, 3 Colo. App. 81.

And where a garnishee was notified to appear at the pending term instead of at "the next term" as required by the statute, although the complainant appeared at the pending term but did not make a defense, as the court had temporarily adjourned and he believed that the adjournment was for the term, and judgment was rendered in his absence. Padden v. Moore, 58 Iowa, 703.

And where the justice of the peace had no power to enter judgment as the debt was not due. Kapp v. Teel, 33 Tex. 811.

And where the justice lost jurisdiction of the case by an adjournment. Iowa Union Teleph. Co. v. Boylan, 86 Iowa, 90.

But an injunction was refused against a judgment rendered at an improper time where it was not shown that complainant had not an adequate remedy at law by a suit for damages. Connery v. Swift, 9 Nev. 39.