XV. 1729. CHAP. difficult to come to an understanding with the Spaniards were the possession of Gibraltar, and the claim of the English to cut log-wood in the Bay of Campeachy. The latter had, for some years, been contested by the Spaniards; in 1717 the Marquis de Monteleon had delivered a memorial against it, which was met by a representation from the Board of Trade, proving that the practice was of old standing, and of just right. This representation was now laid before the House of Commons, together with numerous petitions complaining of Spanish depredations, and every art was used to inflame the public mind, and to represent the Minister as tamely submitting to insult and careless of the national wrongs. Gibraltar was a question nearly touching the Spanish pride. It is almost incredible what deep and deadly resentment had been raised in that haughty nation, who had extended their conquering arms so far, to see a fortress upon their own shores held and garrisoned by England. They viewed it with still more bitter feelings than the French had formerly our possession of Calais, and there was scarcely a Spanish statesman of this period who might not have applied to himself the saying of Queen Mary, and declared that when he died the word GIBRALTAR would be found engraven on his heart. They openly avowed, that until it was restored, there should be no amity with England -a truce, but no peace. Thus high is the spirit of the Spaniards, so keen are they to discern, and so fierce to resent, even the slightest approaches to CHA P. an insult! The obstacles to a friendly intercourse with Spain, so long as we retained Gibraltar, were most strongly felt by General Stanhope on his coming to power, and he was also impressed with the idea that the fortress was of small value to England. The Opposition which afterwards urged the opposite arguments was at first not less loud in inveighing against a "barren rock" and "useless charge." The garrison was the cause of an increase in our standing army. The expense of its establishment was great and ill-regulated. There was no English possession to protect in the Mediterranean except Minorca, which was fully adequate to its own defence. There was yet no precedent of one nation long retaining such a strong-hold on the shores of another. Under these circumstances, Stanhope formed a decided opinion as to the policy of yielding Gibraltar on certain conditions: he made this proposal to the King and to his colleagues, and obtained their acquiescence before he proceeded with it to Madrid in 1718. Yet, while allowing considerable weight to his arguments, I must maintain that our national glory demanded the preservation of this conquest; and it is evident that at a later period our national interests would have suffered by its loss. * Lord Bolingbroke to Lord Portmore, March 29. 1712. VOL. II. XV. 1729. CHAP. XV. It must be observed, however, that Stanhope never proposed an unconditional surrender; the 1729. doubt is only whether in 1718 he asked for any territorial equivalent, or whether he would have been satisfied with the accession of Spain to the Quadruple Alliance, coupled with (as was then required) large commercial advantages to our traders in South America.* Amidst the secrecy and obscurity of the negotiation, we cannot distinguish the exact terms of the offer. We find, however, that it was rejected by the Spanish Court; but that in the subsequent negotiations the French government, though without any express authority, again held out this tempting bait, and gave Philip hopes of prevailing on easy terms. Thus the honour of the Regent became in some degree engaged, and he warmly seconded the claim of Philip at the Court of England. But no sooner had Stanhope sounded the House of Lords upon the subject than the country caught the alarm. The cession on any terms became most unpopular - which in England is but another word for impossible. As Stanhope declares, in a letter to Sir Luke Schaub, from Paris, "We have made a motion in Par"liament, relative to the restitution of Gibraltar, "to pass a bill, for the purpose of leaving to the King the power of disposing of that fortress for "the advantage of his subjects. You cannot imagine the ferment which the proposal produced. 66 * See a note to the first volume, p. 465. "The public was roused with indignation, on the CHAP. simple suspicion that, at the close of a successful war, so unjustly begun by Cardinal Alberoni, we "should cede that fortress. One circumstance greatly contributed to excite the general indig"nation, namely, a report insinuated by the Oppo"sition, that the King had entered into a formal engagement to restore Gibraltar, which was "deemed a sufficient ground to attack the mi"nistry. Many libels have been published to "alarm the nation, and excite them rather to con"tinue the war, than to cede a fortress of such im"portance. We were accordingly compelled to yield to the torrent, and to adopt the wise reso"lution of withdrawing the motion; because if it "had been pressed, it would have produced a contrary effect to what is designed, and would per 66 66 haps have ended in a bill, which might for ever "have tied up the King's hands. Such being the "real state of this business, you will endeavour "to explain to the Court of Madrid, that if the "King of Spain should ever wish at some future day, to treat concerning the cession of Gibraltar, "the only method of succeeding, would be to drop "the subject at present. We are much concerned "that France should have interfered on this occa"sion; the extreme eagerness which she testified "was of great detriment. Some letters and "memorials on that subject seemed even to "threaten a rupture. The alarm was indeed so "strong, that people began to suspect France was XV. 1729. XV. CHAP. " meditating a change of system, and made Gib"raltar a pretext to adopt other measures; and "this was the cause of my coming to Paris."* 1729. Stanhope's journey proved successful: the Regent was convinced by his statements, and promised not to join Spain in urging its claims prematurely. But it was not so easy for Schaub to prevail with the Spaniards. Their impatience grew so uncontroulable, that though the question was referred to the Congress to 'be held at Cambray, Stanhope made another effort in England in the autumn of 1720. He wrote from Hanover to lay before the Lords Justices the expediency of exchanging Gibraltar on the footing of some adequate equivalent. The Lords Justices agreed to this plan; and the cession of Gibraltar seemed determined if the consent of Parliament could be obtained. the project was again marred by the perverseness of the King of Spain, who refused to give Florida, and wished to gain Gibraltar without any equivalent whatever. But At this period of the transaction ensued the deaths of Stanhope and Craggs, and the consequent change of the English administration. Townshend, however, into whose hands the affair now chiefly came, followed in this respect the footsteps of his predecessor. Like him he desired the cession of the fortress, like him he dreaded the resistance of To Mr. Schaub, March 28. 1720. + Earl Stanhope to Secretary Craggs, October 1. 1720. See Appendix. |