not of controlling influence. Our conclusion is that the alleged errors insisted upon by appellant are not well asigned. "If the tonnage of four thousand tons per annum, which was sold and transferred by appellant to H. B. Scutt and Co., Limited, was equitably an asset, and the property of the firm of H. B. Scutt & Co., composed of appellant and appellee, then, also, the remaining one thousand tons of yearly tonnage--they both being parcels of the five thousand tons of annual tonnage included in the license as amended--was also, equitably, an asset, and the property of the copartnership of H. B. Scutt & Co., composed of appellant and appellee. The evidence, as we understand it, shows that this one thousand tons of tonnage was at or about the time of the sale and delivery to H. B. Scutt & Co., Limited, and of the dissolution of the firm of H. B. Scutt & Co., of Joliet, appropriated and converted by appellant to his own use. It was included in the license for five thousand tons, which was on the 1st day of July, 1882, surrendered to the Washburn & Moen Company for cancellation, with a request a license for the one thousand tons should be issued to him, (Scutt.) This was done without the knowledge or consent of Robertson, and the fact it was or had been done was studiously concealed from the latter, notwithstanding his repeated inquiries for information. The license and its several amendments were in fact canceled, but no new license was issued to Scutt for the one thousand tons. The license or tonnage to the amount of the thousand tons, in some way or manner, or by some arrangement, which is not made clear by the evidence, remained in the hands of the Washburn & Moen Company, but Scutt got the benefit of it. On his direct examination, Scutt testified that the one thousand tons of tonnage is owned by him, and that he is still manufacturing under it. On his cross-examination, he said: That thousand tons still remains in my name. It is my individual property, and I am manufacturing under it to-day, and am reporting to Washburn & Moen Manufacturing Company my sales.' From his acts and his claim of exclusive ownership, it must be presumed, as against himself, that he has converted and appropriated it to his own use. If the thousand tons of tonnage was the property of the firm, and Scutt denied the title of his partner therein, and by his procurement, in disregard of the rights of his copartner, the license therefor was surrendered and canceled, and the benefits derived from such surrender and cancellation appropriated by him to his own individual use, it would seem he should, in equity, account for the value of such tonnage. The evidence is very clear that this tonnage was a salable property, and could readily and easily have been sold and disposed of for the benefit of the firm. In Ligare v. Peacock, 109 Ill. 94, it was held that if a partner, after dissolution of a partnership, retains the possession of partnership property, and appropriates it to his own use, he must account for it at a fair cash value. In Laswell v. Robbins, 39 Ill. 209, it was held that where a partner has been intrusted with partnership property, and has it under his control, he must be charged with its value, and to discharge himself, he must account for its disposition, and what he has done with the proceeds; and that, in such case, the one partner only has to show that the other received the property and its value, and the presumption then arises that he is liable, and, to discharge himself, he must show some legal defense. The master, in his first report, charged appellant with this one thousand tons, and found that said tonnage was of the value of $11,250, being the same value per ton as the price at which the four thousand tons were sold to H. B. Scutt & Co., Limited. The evidence of the witnesses, Lambert, Connell, Curtis, Bishop, Watkins, Collins, and Lord fully sustains the finding of the master in respect to the value of this tonnage. We think the circuit court erred in sustaining the exceptions of appellant to the twelfth special finding contained in the first report of the master, and in overruling the exceptions taken by appellee, in respect to the same matter, to the second report of the master; and we think the cross-error assigned by appellee in that behalf is well assigned, and that the final decree rendered by the court should have included the moiety of appellee in this $11,250, with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent. per annum from July 1, 1882, to the date of the decree. "In respect to the ruling of the court sustaining the exceptions of appellant to the eighth special finding of the master, we find no error. The testimony of appellee himself shows that it was with his knowledge and consent that Scutt made the arrangement with Stover by which the account of the firm against Stover was settled by the assignment of patent No. 164,947. "For the error of the circuit court in refusing to allot as a copartnership charge against appellant the item of $11,250, and interest thereon, for the conversion and appropriation to his own use of the one thousand tons of tonnage included in the license as amended, the decree of that court is reversed; and the cause is remanded to said court, with directions to enter a final decree in favor of Daniel Robertson, and against Hiram B. Scutt, not only for the several items of charge included in the decree hereby reversed, with interest computed upon said items in the manner allowed in the report of the master and said former decree, calculated to the date of the decree to be entered, but also including a further charge for the moiety of or equal one-half interest of appellee in said $11,250, with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent. per annum from July 1, 1882, to the date of the entry of the decree. And it is further ordered that the costs of this appeal be taxed to appellant Affirmed in part; reversed in part." After a careful examination of the voluminous evidence in this record, we arrive at the same conclusion as that reached by the appellate court, with one exception; and we therefore adopt the opinion of the court as our own, in the case, with such exception. The exception relates to "the remaining one thousand tons of yearly tonnage," spoken of in the opinion. The license was not transferable. It was granted to Hiram B. Scutt, with the privilege of associating with him under the license not to exceed three copartners in number, provided they should first subscribe to the terms and conditions of the license by a written obligation to that effect. The third clause of the license is as follows: Third. "The foregoing license, right, and privilege is granted upon the following express conditions, to be well and truly performed and complied with on the part of said Hiram B. Scutt, or Hiram B. Scutt and associate or associates, doing business as H. B. Scutt & Co. as conditions precedent to the continuance of said license." The twentieth is a like clause as to the associates. There are a great number of express conditions on the part of the licensee. James R. Ashley and appellee, Robertson, did execute the following agreement in writing: "Whereas, articles of agreement were entered into by Washburn and Moen Manufacturing Company, of Worcester, Mass., and H. B. Scutt, and duly signed by the above-mentioned parties, on the 18th day of December, 1878; and whereas, there is a certain clause in such agreement duly authorizing the said H B. Scutt to associate with himself three parties to engage in the manufacture and sale of the Scutt barbed wire; and, whereas, we, the undersigned, James R. Ashley and Daniel Robertson, desire to associate ourselves with the said H. B. Scutt, and to do business under the firm name of H. B. Scutt & Co.: Now, therefore, we, the said James R. Asuley and Daniel Robertson, do each acknowledge that we have read the above-mentioned contract or agreement between the Washburn and Moen Manufacturing Company and H. B. Scutt; that we are familiar with each and every detail of said agreement; and do hereby agree that we will be bound by said agreement, during the time that we are members of the firm of H. B. Scutt & Co., the same as though we were original parties to the same; and promise and agrce to execute each and every requirement, in good faith, for the term that we may be associated with the said H. B. Scutt in the business of manufacturing the said barbed wire. Dated, Joliet, Ill., December 31, 1878. JAMES R. ASHLEY. D. ROBERTSON." This was not satisfactory to the Washburn & Moen Manufacturing Company, and they sent back another paper to Ashley and Robertson to sign. This they refused to do, because, as Ashley said, there were conditions in it he was not satisfied to sign; one of which was to bind them to acknowledge the validity of these patents as long as the license continued, which they did not propose to do. But that is one of the conditions of the license. This testimony, with the paper they did sign, shows that they refused to bind themselves for the performance of the conditions of the license for any longer time than while they were associated with Scutt as partners. How could they expect to have any benefit from the license after they ceased to be partners with Scutt, and were not bound by the conditions of the license? The benefit of the license is, in most clear and express terms, limited to persons associated with Scutt as partners, and who should first have become bound by the terms and conditions of the license. These precise terms of the license were well known to Robertson and Ashley, and they acquiesced in the form of the license as taken, as satisfactory to them. Scutt had contributed individually to the consideration. He had assigned to the Washburn & Moen Manufacturing Company three patents which he owned individually; and he had given them the benefit of his inventive genius, there being a stipulation that the company should have the benefit of the inventions he might thereafter make. Robertson and Ashley appear to have acted upon the understanding that the license was for their benefit only while they were partners with Scutt. This is indicated by the writing they signed, limiting their being bound by the conditions of the license to the duration of the partnership, and refusing to be so bound as long as the license continued. At the time Ashley withdrew from the partnership only 10 months before the sale of this 4,000 tons of the tonnage for $45,000, an inventory was made of all the assets of the partnership. This license was not named among them, and he sold out for one-third of the value of these inventoried assets. He never got one cent, as he says, on account of the license. When Scutt and Robertson came to dissolve the partnership, the dissolution is by mutual consent, Robertson signs a writing for the sale of the machinery, etc., for manufacturing at a named price, nothing is said about manufacturing thereafter, or about the license. There was no indication of any expectation that Robertson was to have any benefit from the license thereafter. All this tended to show, as in the case of Ashley, that Robertson considered his interest in the license as ending with his ceasing to be a partner with Scutt. Scutt went on afterwards manufacturing under the license, as he had the sole right to do. Robertson was at liberty to go on and manufacture barbed wire, if he saw fit, and deny the validity of the company's patents, in accordance with his refusal to be bound to acknowledge their validity any longer than while the partnership continued. The license appears to have been a thing of value and benefit to Robertson and Ashley only while and so long as they were associated with Scutt as partners. What was realized from and on account of the license during the partnership, we think, should be considered as belonging to the partnership. The 4,000 tons of tonnage was sold for $45,000 on April 22d, which was before the dissolution of the partnership; and this may well be treated as an asset of the partnership. But, as to the remaining 1,000 tons which was not disposed of, we think that Robertson's interest in the license with respect thereto ceased upon the dissolution of the partnership, and that it should not be counted as property of the partnership. The judgment of the appellate court in respect of this particular, of 1,000 tons of tonnage, is reversed, and the decree of the circuit court will be affirmed. (124 III. 527) EVERINGHAM v. NATIONAL CITY BANK OF OTTAWA 1. EXECUTION-LIEN-RIGHTS OF SUBSEQUENT ATTACHING CREDITORS. On February 14th, B. obtained judgment, issued execution, and directed the sheriff to levy on certain realty which the debtor had previously conveyed, informing the sheriff that he was about to file a bill in aid of the levy, and did, the same day, file such bill, alleging the conveyance to be fraudulent, and the insufficiency of the personalty. On February 16th, B. directed the sheriff to levy the attachment in another suit by him against the same debtor on the personalty, and on March 11th directed a levy of the first execution on the same personalty. E. attached the same personalty on March 2d, and on March 16th obtained judgment and issued special execu tion, under which the personalty was sold. B.'s levy on the realty was released, and the bill in aid dismissed, March 25th. It not appearing that B. acted in bad faith, held, that he did not lose his prior lien on the personalty, and that his judgment should be paid in full out of the proceeds thereof, in preference of E.'s judg ment. 2. SAME-DISTRIBUTION OF PROCEEDS. Where plaintiff in a suit commenced by capias recovers judgment upon a promissory note executed for money to be afterwards advanced, and at the same term, in a suit in attachment, recovers another judgment for the money advanced, the latter judgment only, as against judgments in attachment suits recovered at the same term by other parties, is entitled to share in the distribution of the proceeds of the attached property, though the Illinois attachment act, § 37, provides that all judgments in attachment against the same defendant, returnable at the same term, and all judgments in suits by summons, capias, or attachment, against such defendant, recovered at that term, shall share pro rata in the proceeds of the property attached. Appeal from appellate court, Second district. Duncan, O'Conor & Gilbert, for appellant. D. B. Snow and Mayo & Widmer, for appellee. PER CURIAM. We have given careful consideration to the very full and exhaustive arguments, both oral and written, made in this case; and, having done so, we are satisfied that the following opinion of the appellate court states the points in contention, and the law applicable thereto, with such fullness and accuracy that no useful end can be subserved by writing another opinion; and for the reasons there given the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed: "BAKER, J. In February, 1884, William Butters executed to Ann Armour a mortgage upon 207 acres of land in La Salle county, to secure the payment of $3,000 in five years, with seven per cent. interest, and said mortgage is still a valid and subsisting lien upon said land. On February 9, 1887, the firm of Nash, Wright & Co. obtained a judgment by confession in the circuit court of La Salle county for $3,626.21, and costs, against said William Butters and James R. Butters, and on the same day execution was issued on the judgment, and levied on the real estate above mentioned; and at the date of the hearing in the circuit court of the matter at bar there was still due and unpaid upon said judgment the sum of $1,700. On February 11, 1887, said William Butters executed to one John H. Druitt a warranty deed to said land, for the expressed consideration of $12,000; which deed was duly filed for record on the next day. On February 14, 1887, the National City Bank of Ottawa recovered a judgment by confession in the circuit court of La Salle county against William Butters and James R. Butters for $3,102.22 and costs; upon which execution was issued on the same day, and placed in the hands of D. B. Snow, the plaintiff's attorney, who directed the sheriff to levy it upon said 207 acres of real estate, and informed the sheriff that he was about to file a bill in chancery in aid of the levy. No other directions were given to the sheriff concerning this execution until March 11, 1887, as hereinafter mentioned. On the same day the National City Bank, by the same attorney, filed a bill in chancery in the circuit court in aid of the levy, alleging that the title to this real estate had been in the defendant William Butters, but that said William Butters had made a fraudulent conveyance thereof to John H. Druitt. The bill also alleged that the defendants in the execution had no other property subject to execution of sufficient value to satisfy the judgment. The prayer of the bill was that the conveyance from Butters to Druitt be adjudged fraudulent and void, and that the land be subjected to sale under the execution. This bill was prosecuted until March 25, 1887, when it was dismissed without prejudice. On February 16, 1887, the National City Bank of Ottawa, by the same attorney, commenced a suit in attachment in the circuit court, returnable to the March term, 1887, against James R. Butters, for $1,000; and on the same day D. B. Snow, the plaintiff's attorney, delivered the writ of attachment to the sheriff, and directed him to levy it upon the personal property, the proceeds of which are now in controversy; which the sheriff accordingly did. Judgment for $1,000 and costs was duly entered against the defendant on the 22d day of March, 1887. On February 18, 1887, Lyman Everingham commenced an action of assumpsit by capias, in the circuit court, against. William Butters and James R. Butters, returnable to the March term, 1887, upon which such proceedings were had; that on March 21, 1887, the capias was quashed, and judgment entered against the defendants for $5,077.77 and costs, upon which execution was issued, and returned no property found or money made. The judgment was rendered upon a promissory note executed by the defendants January 11, 1887, as collateral security for moneys to be thereafter advanced by the plaintiff to James R. Butters; which moneys formed the consideration of the judgment next hereinafter mentioned. On March 2, 1887, Lyman Everingham commenced in the circuit court a suit in attachment, returnable to the March term, 1887, against James R. Butters; and the writ issued in that suit was on the same day levied upon the same personal property which had been levied upon under the attachment of February 16, 1887, in favor of the National City Bank. Judgment for $5,420 and costs was duly entered in this suit on March 16, 1887, and a special execution was issued, under which the property attached was sold. On March 11, 1887, the National City Bank, by its attorney, directed the sheriff to levy the execution of February 14, 1887, for $3,102.22, upon the personal property which had been levied upon under the writs of attachment; which the sheriff accordingly did, and the property was sold under that execution, as well as under the special execution in favor of Everingham, on the 26th day of March, 1887, the amount realized by the sale being $4,318.80; and, after deducting all costs and expenses, there was left in the sheriff's hands for distribution to the judgment creditors the sum of $4,174.16. On March 25, 1887, the attorney of the National City Bank directed the sheriff to release the levy on the real estate, and dismissed the bill in chancery without prejudice; and on March 26, 1887, Everingham filed his bill in chancery to set aside the sale of the real estate from William Butters to John Druitt, and to subject the land to the satisfaction of his judgment for $5,077.77 against William Butters and James R. Butters. "Upon the foregoing facts, it was claimed by Lyman Everingham that although the execution of February 14, 1887, for $3,102.22 in favor of the National City Bank was the first writ placed in the sheriff's hands, yet, by reason of the directions given to the sheriff by its attorney to levy on the real estate, the prosecution of the bill in chancery in aid of the levy, and the levy made February 16, 1887, upon the personal property, by direction of its attorney under its own writ of attachment, which was junior to its execution of February 14, 1887, the lien of the latter writ was voluntarily waived or suspended, and that the proceeds of the execution sale should therefore be applied pro rata upon the judgment of $1,000 in favor of the bank, and the judg ments of $5,420 and $5,077.77 in favor of Everingham, and that no portion of the proceeds should be applied upon the execution of February 14, 1887, for |