kingdoms of Europe. But the great bulk of the volume is occupied with nice disquisitions upon points of Chivalry and Military achievement. This book is enriched with a great number of Illuminations, done in outline by means of wooden blocks, and then highly and beautifully finished by the hand in colours.

Bonnor, who was prior of Salon, composed the work by order of Charles VIII, king of France, for the instruction of the dauphin. The original Binding remains, though in a very imperfect state. It consists of thick boards, covered with stamped leather. The leather is enveloped in strong brown silk (called Chemise), upon and through which the brass bosses are placed, at the corners and in the middle of each side. Sometimes this chemise, being elongated at the top, (as apparently in the present instance) was turned over, in order to keep the dust from penetrating. No lettering was put on the back; but at the top of one of the sides the title of the work, L'arbre des Batailles, is written and surrounded by a small oblong brass frame. When on the shelf, this side was placed in front, and not the back of the Book, which was left wholly unornamented. Before the invention of printing, such was the usual method of placing manuscripts on the shelves of a library, so that each of the volumes took up much room. The following extracts (translated from the original French) are given as specimens of the author's manner :-

1st. "If a knight dies in battle, whether we shall say his soul is saved or damned?

"I ask now, if a knight die in battle, whether we shall say that his soul is saved? And it seems not. For war and battle cannot happen without sin. Also (which is a stronger reason), if a knight dies in battle he ought not to be buried in a consecrated place, as a church or a church-yard. But again it seems the reason that his soul is not saved is this, that mortal man who dies in anger and ill-will, we believe to die in mortal sin. And so may we think of him who dies in battle. But

notwithstanding this argument, I come to three conclusions. The first is, that truly a knight or a man at arms, who dies in battle for the church, whether against unbelievers, or against the enemies of the Pope, or of the faith, but otherwise is not in mortal sin, he goes to Paradise. For thus says the Decretal xxiii. q. viii. c. "Quicunque." The second conclusion is, that if a man die in battle, in a just war, and maintaining a just quarrel, he also will be saved in Paradise. c. "Auferando" xxiii. q. v. et c. "fortitudo.” The third conclusion is, if he dies in battle maintaining an unjust quarrel, he is in the way to damnation. For we hold, according to our faith, that he who dies in mortal sin goes to hell."

2nd. "Whether a monk may defend himself against his abbot, who is wishing to kill him?

"What shall we say of a monk, who, if his abbot wishes to kill and murder him, wants to know whether he should defend himself? Upon which question it seems he should not. For such a person is counted dead as to the world, according to the Decretals. Decretal. c. "placuit" xvi. q. 1. And it is a clear thing that a dead man cannot defend himself. How therefore can a monk defend himself, since he is dead? Again a still more forcible reason is this, A monk has no will except as his abbot allows him to have one. Thus it is manifest enough, according to the aforesaid reasons, that he ought not to defend himself against his abbot. c. "nolo" et c. "non dicatis" xii. q. 1. Now, on this question I say thus, and conclude if the monk could not otherwise escape death, that he may certainly defend himself against his abbot, and against every other person without his leave in this case, for natural right, which his abbot cannot take from him, grants him this."

The paper for the evening, was Upon the Punishment of Death in cases of Murder, by THOMAS INMAN, Esq., M.D., of which the following is an abstract:--

He contended that the true end of punishment was not the

reclamation of the offender, except where the culprits were young and of comparatively tender years,-that experience showed that when individuals had attained a certain age, and had become habituated to crime, there was little chance of reforming them,—that the object of punishment was the safety of society, and that punishment was a satisfaction for an offence committed.

This last principle was practically carried out by our lawgivers, in assigning to each offence a penalty, considered by them to be partially equivalent to the crime.

In early times, when civilization was low, a money standard was adopted.

This had been changed as knowledge had increased, from the immunity it gave to the rich and powerful; but the principle was still retained in the fines charged for many civil offences.

The use of torture was now abolished, and the only way in which individuals could be punished, was by whipping, imprisonment (with or without hard labour-solitary and silent, or silent only, and for terms varying from weeks to years) and transportation (for seven, ten, twenty years, or for life).

Beyond these punishments it was not possible to go, unless the penalty of death were retained; and the question was whether this ought to be retained. He considered that it should, as being the penalty most dreaded, and the only one commensurate to the highest crime-murder.

Though criminal murder and what was called judicial strangling, had been often placed in the same category, there was the greatest possible difference between them in degree.

He believed that many were deterred from crime by fear of death, who would not be deterred by the dread of any lesser penalty. Many perpetrating a crime to which a long period of solitary and aimless toil was imposed as a penalty, would willingly commit murder to screen it, and thus hazard a few years more suffering, if, by so doing, they diminished the

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chances of being punished at all. The educated man might deliberately weigh the gratification of revenge, against a life spent in solitary confinement and hard labour, and elect the former. Were he certain of suffering the same as his victim, he would more certainly curb his fury.

In the former case there would always be the hope that some one of the many chapters of accidents might release him

-as the interest of friends, the lawyer's pleadings, an outburst of popular feeling, the conflagration of the prison, or a well-planned escape. In the latter, there would be no hope, -nothing to look forward to after conviction but an ignominious death.

There was no doubt, when we considered the number of mysterious murders and secret poisonings which occurred annually, that they were perpetrated by persons of an educated mind, who were capable of reasoning, and, most probably, did thus reason.

He thought there was ground for fear that the number of these crimes would be increased, were the penalty attending them diminished. There was always a certain number of impulsive murders which might probably be uninfluenced by the punishment inflicted. These were cases in which mercifulminded juries practically showed a sense of their criminal inferiority to premeditated guilt, by giving verdicts of manslaughter. It was to premeditated murder that death was most uniformly attached.

But it might be said that statistics had fully proved thatcrime increased, decreased, or remained stationary, in direct proportion to the certainty with which it was discovered and punished; and the amount of practical publicity given to the account of the offence, to its detection and its consequences. He referred to tables, showing that those counties which were best off as regards police and education, were precisely those in which no relative increase of crime had taken place during the last twenty years.

Whatever then made the infliction of the penalty of death doubtful was a direct encouragement to the perpetration of murder. It was notorious that many enormous criminals got off on the clearest evidence, from the dislike entertained by some persons, and the religious scruples of others, ever to bring in any man guilty of death.

Mischance was now confidently reckoned upon by deliberate murderers.

Such scruples it is said would not exist were the penalty of a lower order. It was argued therefore that such reduction ought to take place.

He fully allowed the force of the objection, but he could not consent to give it any practical weight. It was not the jury who condemned to death. They merely were required to give their opinion on the strength of the evidence laid before them whether it were conclusive, or otherwise.

If they knowingly violated their oath, and "laid perjury to their soul," he thought the sooner the constitution of juries was altered, the better. We had lately seen in a sister country the effect of this deliberate perjury in trials for treason.

Such intention arose not from repugnance to the penalty, but from sympathy with the offenders; and the general outcry was that the constitution of the juries required attention, not that the criminals should be pardoned.

The feelings, therefore, of a few individuals formed no reason for altering the deliberate conviction of the many.

If however the few increased in numbers and strength, if they continued practically to encourage murder by refusing to bear their share in its punishment-if they continued to spread their own views successfully amongst the ranks from which juries were principally taken-if they, in fine, persisted in obstructing the course of the law with increasing pertinacityhe was perfectly willing to allow that some alteration was demanded.

The people of England (in the persons of their legislators)