Rights of Professional Athletes: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session, on H.R. 2355 and H.R. 694 ... October 14, 1975

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977 - 135 sider
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Side 95 - Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof be construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of...
Side 96 - Black explained the appropriateness of, and the need for, per se rules: "[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.
Side 5 - ... no conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful con,y tract, and necessary to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by the other party.
Side 106 - Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining By Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage...
Side 93 - This kind of direct restraint on the business market has substantial anticompetitive effects, both actual and potential, that would not follow naturally from the elimination of competition over wages and working conditions.
Side 106 - The crucial determinant is not the form of the agreement — eg, prices or wages — but its relative impact on the product market and the interests of union members.
Side 101 - ... parties are far better situated to agreeably resolve what rules governing player transfers are best suited for their mutual interests than are the courts. See Kansas City Royals v. Major League Baseball Players, 532 F.2d 615, 632 (8th Cir. 1976). However, no mutual resolution of this issue appears withm the present record.
Side 114 - ... a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act as...
Side 97 - We do not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge to be certain. They may be too dangerous to sanction or they may be allowable protections against aggressive competitors or the only practicable means a small company has for breaking into or staying in business and within the "rule of reason.
Side 12 - I do not feel that I am a piece of property to be bought and sold irrespective of my wishes.

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