that are intuitively known, in order to deduce from them such as require proof.

"But I cannot reconcile this with what he says, (section 8th of the same chapter;) The necessity of this intuitive knowledge in every step of scientifical or demonstrative reasoning, gave occasion, I imagine, to that mistaken axiom, that all reasonings was ex præcognitis et præconcessis, which how far it is mistaken I shall have occasion to show more at large when I come to consider propositions, and particularly those propositions which are called maxims, and to show that it is by a mistake that they are supposed to be the foundation of all our knowledge and reasonings."*

The distinction which I have already made between elements of reasoning, and first principles of reasoning, appears to myself to throw much light on these apparent contradictions.

That the seeming difference of opinion on this point between these two profound writers, arose chiefly from the ambiguities of language, may be inferred from the following acknowledgment of Dr. Reid, which immediately follows the last quotation :

"I have carefully examined the chapter on maxims, which Mr. Locke here refers to, and though one would expect, from the quotation last made, that it should run contrary to what I have before delivered concerning first

* Essays on Int. Powers, p. 643, 4to edit.

principles, I find only two or three sentences in it, and those chiefly incidental, to which I do not assent."*

Before dismissing this subject, I must once more repeat, that the doctrine which I have been attempting to establish, so far from degrading axioms from that rank which Dr. Reid would assign them, tends to identify them still more than he has done with the exercise of our reasoning powers; inasmuch as, instead of comparing them with the data, on the accuracy of which that of our conclusion necessarily depends, it considers them as the vincula which give coherence to all the particular links of the chain; or, (to vary the metaphor) as component elements, without which the faculty of reasoning is inconceivable and impossible.†

* Essays on Int. Powers, p. 643, 4to edit.

+ D'Alembert has defined the word principle exactly in the sense in which I have used it; and has expressed himself (at least on one occasion) nearly as I have done, on the subject of axioms. He seems however on this, as well as on some other logical and metaphysical questions, to have varied a little in his views (probably from mere forgetfulness) in different parts of his writings.

"What then are the truths which are entitled to have a place in the elements of philosophy? They are of two kinds; those which form the head of each part of the chain, and those which are to be found at the points where different branches of the chain unite together.

"Truths of the first kind are distinguished by this-that they do not depend on any other truths, and that they possess within themselves the whole grounds of their evidence. Some of my readers will be apt to suppose, that I here mean to speak of axioms; but these are not the truths which I have at present in view. With respect to this last class of principles, I must refer to what I have elsewhere said of them; that, notwithstanding their truth, they add nothing to our information; and that the palpable evidence which accompanies them, amounts to nothing more than to an expression of the same idea by means of two different terms. On such occasions,

SECTION II.

Of certain Laws of Belief, inseparably connected with the exercise of Consciousness, Memory, Perception, and Reasoning.

1. It is by the immediate evidence of consciousness that we are assured of the present existence of our various

the mind only turns to no purpose about its own axis, without advancing forward a single step. Accordingly, axioms are so far from holding the highest rank in philosophy, that they scarcely deserve the distinction of be ing formally enunciated."

["Or quelles sont les vérités qui doivent entrer dans des elemens de philosophie? Il y en a de deux sortes; celles qui forment la tête de chaque partie de la chaine, et celles qui se trouvent au point de reunion de plusieurs branches.

"Les vérités du premier genre ont pour caractère distinctif de ne dépendre d'aucune autre, et de n'avoir de preuves que dans elles-mêmes. Plusieurs lecteurs croiront que nous voulons parler des axioms, et ils se tromperont; nous les renvoyens à ce qui nous en avons dit ailleurs, que ces sortes de principes ne nous ap prennent rien à force d'être vrais, et que leur evidence palpable et grossière se reduit á exprimer la meme idée par deux termes differens, l'esprit ne fait alors autrechose que tourner inutilement sur lui-même sans avancer d'un seul pas. Ainsi les axioms bien loin de tenir en philosophie le premier rang n'ont pas même besoin d'être enoncés.” -Elem. de Phil. pp. 24, 25.

Although, in the foregoing passage, D'Alembert, in compliance with common phraseology, has bestowed the name of principles upon axioms, it appears clearly, from a question which occurs afterwards, that he did not consider them as well entitled to this appellation. "What are then," be asks, “in each science, the true principles from which we ought to set out?" ("Quels sont donc dans chaque science les vrais príncipes d'ou l'on doit partir?") The answer he gives to this question agrees with the doctrine I have stated in every particular, excepting in this, that it represents (and in my opinion very incorrectly) the principles of geometrical science to be (not

sensations, whether pleasant or painful; of all our affections, passions, hopes, fears, desires, and volitions. It is thus too we are assured of the present existence of those thoughts which, during our waking hours, are continually passing through the mind, and of all the different effects which they produce in furnishing employment to our intellectual faculties.

According to the common doctrine of our best philosophers, it is by the evidence of consciousness we are assured that we ourselves exist. The proposition, however, when thus stated, is not accurately true; for our own existence (as I have elsewhere observed,†) is not a direct or immediate object of consciousness, in the strict and logical meaning of that term. We are conscious of

definitions or hypotheses, but) those simple and acknowledged facts, which our senses perceive with respect to the properties of extension. "The true principles from which we ought to set out in the different sciences, are simple and acknowledged facts, which do not presuppose the existence of any others, and which, of course, it is equally vain to attempt explaining or confuting; in physics, the familiar phenomena which daily experience presents to every eye; in geometry, the sensible properties of extension; în mechanics, the impenetrability of bodies, upon which their mutual actions depend; in metaphysics, the results of our sensations; in morals, the original and common affections of the human race."-" Les vrais principes d'ou l'on doit patir dans chaque science, sont des faits simples et reconnus, qui n'en supposent point d'autres, et qu'on ne puisse par consequent ni expliquer ni contester; en physique les phénomenes journaliers que l'observation découvre à tous les yeux; en géometrie les proprietés sensibles de l'etendue; en me chanique, l'impenetrabilité des corps, source de leur action mutuelle; en métaphysique, le résultat de nos sensations; en morale, les affections premières et communes à tous les hommes.”—pp. 26, 27.]

In cases of this sort, where so much depends on extreme precision and nicety in the use of words, it appears to me to be proper to verify the fidelity of my translations by subjoining the original passages.

* See, in particular, Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric.

↑ Philosophical Essays; p. 7.

G

sensation, thought, desire, volition: but we are not conscious of the existence of mind itself; nor would it be possible for us to arrive at the knowledge of it (supposing us to be created in the full possession of all the intellectual capacities which belong to human nature,) if no impression were ever to be made on our external senses. The moment that, in consequence of such an impression, a sensation is excited, we learn two facts at once ;-the existence of the sensation, and our own existence as sentient beings;-in other words, the very first exercise of consciousness necessarily implies a belief, not only of the present existence of what is felt, but of the present existence of that which feels and thinks; or (to employ plainer language) the present existence of that being which I denote by the words I and myself. Of these facts, however, it is the former alone of which we can properly be said to be conscious, agreeably to the rigorous interpretation of the expression. A conviction of the latter, although it seems to be so inseparable from the exercise of consciousness, that it can scarcely be considered as posterior to it in the order of time, is yet (if I may be allowed to make use of a scholastic distinction) posterior to it in the order of nature; not only as it supposes consciousness to be already awakened by some sensation, or some other mental affection; but as it is evidently rather a judgment accompanying the exercise of that power, than one of its immediate intimations concerning its appropriate class of internal phenomena. It appears to me, therefore, more correct to call the belief of our own existence a concomitant or accessory of the exercise of consciousness, than to say, that our existence is a fact falling under the immediate cognizance of consciousness, like the existence of the various agreeable