General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., to the Right Hon.
Lord William Bentinck.

MY DEAR LORD,

⚫ Camp before Badajoz, 24th March, 1812. "The Secretary of State has sent me a copy of your dispatch to him, marked "secret and confidential," of the 25th January, and a copy of his dispatch to you, marked secret, of the 4th March, and has written me a letter on the 5th of March, of which I enclose a copy to your Lordship.

The most essential object on which the troops under your command could be employed on the Eastern coast of Spain, would be the siege of Barcelona, or, if that could not be undertaken, the siege of Tarragona, in order to give General Lacy a point of communication with the fleet.

I am not very well acquainted with the state of affairs on the Eastern coast. I believe, however, that Barcelona is a place of the first order, but very insufficiently garrisoned, by only 5000 men. This force, indeed, is considered only sufficient to keep the population of the city in order.

"In forming a plan for attacking a strong place, it will not answer to reckon upon the exertions of the population within against the garrison, at the same time that the inclination of such a population as there is at Barcelona must not be thrown aside entirely.

Upon the whole, however, I should doubt the sufficiency of your Lordship's force, even with the assistance which General Lacy and Admiral Sir E. Pellew could give, to undertake such an operation as the siege of Barcelona. It may be depended upon that the enemy will make every effort to relieve the place; and I doubt the possibility of your being able to effect your object with such a force as you will have against so formidable a place, even weakly garrisoned, before the enemy will have time to come to its relief.

'You are certainly much more equal to the attack of Tarragona, which is garrisoned, I understand, by 2000 men; and it is not, I understand, a place of great strength.

• In considering and deciding on this subject, I request you to observe, that if you should attempt and fail at Barcelona, you will not be able afterwards to attack Tarragona. On the other hand, if you should succeed at Tarragona, your success will end there, as you may depend upon it that the enemy will immediately collect a superior force in Catalonia.

I do not recommend any operation to you in Valencia, as your success in Catalonia, and possibly even your landing upon the coast of that principality, will occasion the evacuation of Valencia. There would be no difficulty in seizing the city of Valencia at any time, even if you should fail at Barcelona or Tarragona. I do not believe that any of the fortified posts on the coast of Valencia are of a nature to make a vigorous or protracted resistance against an attack by 10,000 men, well equipped with cannon.

The great object in all sieges is to gain time. The preparation and collection of materials for a siege necessarily takes many days, which might be employed in carrying on the operations, if those materials were collected and prepared beforehand.

'Whatever may be the point which you may determine to attack, it is obvious that you must reach it by sea, and there can be no inconvenience in transporting with you all the materials which you may require.

• I would therefore recommend to your Lordship to send an officer of engineers, at an early period in the summer, to Minorca or Majorca, in order to prepare large quantities of fascines and gabions, sand bags, platforms, &c., which you should bring with you. Intrenching tools you will of course bring from Sicily or Malta; and I conclude that you will depend upon the fleet for ordnance and stores.

In all the sieges which I have carried on in this country, I have used only the fire of guns, principally from entertaining an opinion that the fire of mortars and howitzers has an effect upon the inhabitants of a town alone, and that a French garrison, in a Spanish or Portuguese town, would be but little likely to attend to the wishes or feelings of its inhabitants. By this measure I have diminished considerably the expense and difficulty of these operations: and, at all events, whether successful or not, I have done no injury to the Spanish or Portuguese inhabitants. If your Lordship should be inclined to try the effect of a bombardment, I imagine that it will be necessary that you should bring the ordnance and stores for it from Sicily or Malta.

In regard to my own operations, I invested this place on the 16th instant, and I expect to be able to open our fire against it on to-morrow. I hope that I shall succeed in taking

it, notwithstanding the badness of the weather, as I think the enemy cannot collect in time a force sufficient to oblige me to raise the siege.

If I should succeed, much will depend upon the plan adopted by the enemy. Marmont appears inclined to carry on operations to the northward, and I may be obliged to remove the army again to that quarter. My wish is to oblige Soult to evacuate Andalusia, which I should effect if I could be sure of the Spaniards holding their ground in Galicia.

I have the honor to be, &c.

"The Rt. Hon. Lord W. Bentinck.'

"WELLINGTON.

General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., to Lieut. General
Sir T. Graham, K.B.

'MY DEAR SIR,

The river yesterday did us so much mischief, that we cannot commence our fire till to-morrow morning.

General D'Urban arrived here in the night with your letter, and it appears to me to be very uncertain where Drouet is. It is obvious from the intercepted letters which you transmitted, that he wishes to protect the communication with Cordova; and I think it probable that if he has collected a force upon Don Benito, it is with a view to protect the junction of Foy by the bridge of Medellin. I believe that Foy intended to pass the Guadiana by the Barca at Castil-blanco, but the swelling of the river, which has been so troublesome to us, will probably oblige him to come by Medellin; still we cannot prevent, although we may delay the junction, which is a very great object for several reasons.

We are not within 20,000 men so strong on the left of the Guadiana as we ought to be; the troops are arrived and arriving every day, but unfortunately our bridge was carried away the day before yesterday. I had directed that the planks and bearers might be taken off every night, and we have saved every thing, and in two days it will be as good as ever; but if the river should continue in its present state, and the bad weather should continue, we cannot be certain of passing by our standing bridge, and I have therefore ordered the troops to commence their march by Merida. This will take

some days, and it would be desirable to gain a few days for this object only, as well as for others. If the Guadiana should fall, and I can put down the bridge, the troops will lose nothing by marching up the right of the river.

On this ground, therefore, I think it desirable that an effort should be made to remove Drouet, Darricau, &c., from Zalamea, Don Benito, &c. I do not think there is any thing to be apprehended from the high road to Seville, as it is obvious that every thing coming from the South will pass by one of the roads from Cordova.

Upon talking over roads and distances with General D'Urban, it appears to me that the cavalry, and your right divisions, should arrive at Zalamea and Quintana on the day that your left division, from Almendralejo, should arrive at Oliva, and General Hill at Medellin ; Sir R. Hill should send a regiment of cavalry to General Clinton, to look out in his front, and enable him to communicate with his right and left. We shall thus force the enemy back from the best communication across the Guadiana, and from the communication with Soult, and we shall gain some time at all events.

It must be observed, however, that we cannot long maintain the position which we shall thus have assumed, as Soult will be on the right flank certainly, and, if he chooses, on the rear of your troops.

I shall either send General Hill a copy of this letter, or write to him to the same purport; and if you should not hear of any movement of Soult's, which would render it inexpedient to undertake this operation, I request you to let General Hill know when you move, in order that he may regulate his movements accordingly.

I am not certain whether Sir Rowland Hill could move upon Medellin by the left of the Guadiana; if he could it would give more security to the whole operation, but I should doubt his being able to make the march at this season.

I have letters from - of the 21st, and from Salamanca of the 20th, but there is nothing new; they talk of Marmont going to Avila on the 22nd.

◄ I have received a letter of the 21st from Lieut. Blanckley, from Truxillo, who states that Foy is at Castil-blanco, and that the enemy had left Don Benito.'

General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., to Lieut. General
Sir R. Hill, K.B.

'MY DEAR HILL,

• Camp before Badajoz, 24th March, 1812.

5 P.M.

'I enclose the copy of a letter which I wrote this morning to General Sir Thomas Graham, on a plan for obliging the enemy to retire upon Zalamea, Don Benito, &c. I shall be much obliged to you if you will be ready to march in execution of this plan when you shall hear from Sir Thomas Graham.

"I should prefer your going to Medellin by the south of the Guadiana, if you can. If you cannot, you must go by the As well as I recollect, we marched the distance in one march; but I believe it is six leagues.

north of that river.

'Lieut. General

Sir R. Hill, K.B.'

Believe me, &c.

WELLINGTON.

SIR,

General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., to General

Don Carlos de España.

'Camp before Badajoz, 24th March, 1812. 'I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letters to the 21st instant.

It appears to me to be quite impossible for the enemy to make any impression upon Ciudad Rodrigo without the assistance of a battering train, if there should be 3000 men in the place determined to defend themselves. As the pressing inconvenience and danger now is the want of provisions, I would recommend to you to withdraw 1000 of the 4000 men you state, in your letter of the 20th, to be in the place, leaving 3000 men, upon which I always calculated.

'If you have had as bad weather as we have had, I conceive the blockade to be now out of the question.

'I beg to refer you to what I had the honor of telling you in repeated conversations, and particularly in my letter of the 5th instant regarding the navigation of the Douro above St. Joao da Pesqueira.

I beg leave to recall to your Excellency's recollection, that