side of the Tagus, and I have put some of the troops in motion this day.

It is desirable that General Long's brigade should move forward to Villa Franca and Zafra, having posts of observa tion at Llera, Usagre, and Bienvenida, in order to relieve General Anson's brigade, which are following, and observing the enemy. Major General Long must take care not to engage himself in any affair of consequence, but must fall back upon you in case of necessity.

You will judge of the best place to put your corps in to fulfil the following objects, for the present. My own opinion is, that your infantry should be in Almendralejo, Azauchal, &c., and your light cavalry as above pointed out, and your Portuguese cavalry on the north side of the Guadiana; I propose, besides, to attach a brigade of heavy cavalry to Sir William Erskine's division, which should be in the best situation for forage, &c.

'My wish is to put Badajoz in a state of defence again as soon as possible, and Lieut. Colonel Fletcher is setting to work upon it, and that you should cover the place with your corps while the work will be going on. Either General Spry's, or General Power's brigade, and the 22nd Portuguese regiment, will be in the place as a garrison, and to work upon it, till Penne Villemur and Morillo shall return from the Condado, and two companies of Portuguese, and one of British artillery to set the ordnance, &c., to rights.

'Of course, if the enemy should attempt to play tricks with small corps, you will fall upon them: if they should advance in force, I recommend to you to occupy the place with the three regiments above mentioned, and with your corps to occupy the position of Sta Engracia, having your right protected by the redoubt Mon Cœur, or the French redoubt, which we re-established during the siege. You might have the ground looked at to see where you could place your left with advantage, and where it would be expedient to throw up works to enable you to defend the ground more easily; you might also have the ground opened to see how it would work, in order to determine whether it would be necessary to construct such works beforehand; and if it should not be necessary, it would always be an advantage to delay them to the last moment.

As it appears that it would be impossible for the enemy to assemble so large a corps in this country as to distress you in that position, without my having previous knowledge of their intention; and considering that you would be surrounded by strong places, and would have the choice of the use of either side of the river for your communications, I should wish that that position should be considered as one to be maintained, unless the enemy should be in such strength as to render the maintaining it very uncertain.

When Morillo and Penne Villemur shall arrive, the Spaniards will give the garrison of the fort, and General Spry's brigade, and 22nd regiment, might remove to Elvas, if not wanted for work, or encamp near the fort, if required for work by Lieut. Colonel Fletcher.

• I think also, that when you are in your position at Almendralejo, &c., it might be expedient to encamp one British brigade at Badajoz, on the dry ground near the breach, in order to assist in the work.

I leave in Badajoz camp equipage for 14,000 men, of which you will make such use as you please....

Let me have as soon as you can, returns of the number of masons, bricklayers, carpenters, sawyers, wheelwrights, miners, and smiths in each of the regiments, British and Portuguese, in the 2nd, and General Hamilton's divisions: ne I am going into Badajoz this day, and I shall set out for Portalegre, either the day after to-morrow, or the next day, according to the intelligence which I shall receive from Castello Branco.

.

•Lieut. General

1

Sir R. Hill, K.B.'

• SIR,

General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., to the Right Hon.

'On the morning that Badajoz fell, I desired General Alava to write to the Conde de Penne Villemur, to acquaint him with that event, and to desire him to communicate it to General Ballesteros. I likewise desired that the Conde de Penne Villemur might be prepared to march again into this province; a measure which I have since suggested to him in

a detter which I wrote to him on the 8th instant; and I requested that the Conde de Penne Villemur would apprize General Ballesteros of my opinion, that it was probable that the enemy would return into Andalusia immediately; and of the fact that, owing to the state of affairs on the frontiers of Castille, it was out of my power to follow them into that kingdom.

1 The enemy have since acted as I supposed. They had collected about 30,000 men at, and in the neighbourhood of Villa Franca, on the 8th instant; and they retired on the 9th, as soon as they heard of the fall of Badajoz.

1. You have been informed of the causes which render neces sary my return to the frontiers of Castille. The enemy have not only blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo, but they have moved some troops into Lower Beira. A small force could get the better of the latter; but I shall not be able to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo without taking with me such a proportion of the army as would leave too small a force for the expedition into Andalusia; to which I have to add, that I must collect a body of troops near this place to protect it till the breaches in its works shall be repaired, and to aid in the repair of the breaches.

I do not think it probable that I shall have another oppor tunity of relieving the Andalusias from the enemy, by the most certain mode, the movement of a superior body of troops into that kingdom. But I am convinced that the Regency will see the impossibility of attempting it at the present moment, and the causes which have led to that impossibility.

• If Ciudad Rodrigo had been provisioned as I had a right to expect, there was nothing to prevent me from marching to Seville at the head of 40,000 men, the moment the siege of Badajoz was concluded.

If I were to march there under existing circumstances, the formidable position which I have acquired with so many sacrifices would undoubtedly be lost, and, with that position, all the objects of the expedition into Andalusia. It remains then to be seen what is to be done under existing circum

stances.

First; I request you to inform the Regency, that it is absolutely necessary that a garrison should be provided for Badajoz without loss of time. I understand that the regiments

of Zamora, El Rey, Navarra, and the battalion del General, (now called of Cadiz) belonging to the 5th army, taken to Cadiz last year by the Captain General Blake, are still at that place, and it is desirable that they, and a body of 300 artillerymen, should be sent round to Setuval without loss of time, to become the foundation of the garrison, which should consist of 5000 men.

It is quite impossible for me to furnish any part of the garrison; and the place must be destroyed if the Spanish Government will not garrison it.

6

Secondly. It is desirable that General Ballesteros should keep himself in safety, under Gibraltar, &c.; but should be prepared to advance upon Seville, in case the enemy should move into this province in strength in order to attack Badajoz. Thirdly. It is absolutely necessary that the Conde de Penne Villemur and General Morillo should return into Estremadura, as well as the garrison for Badajoz; as otherwise, you will observe that there are no troops in this province to re-establish the authority of the Government.

But these measures will not be sufficient; as it may be depended upon, that notwithstanding all that I shall do to weaken the enemy as much as may be in my power, they will collect their forces when the harvest will be on the ground, and they will be certain of subsistence for their army, in order to remove the inconveniences which they will feel from our early successes; and it must be expected that they will be too strong for me.

Under these circumstances, it is most desirable that some diversion should, if possible, be made in my favor on the

eastern coast.

'I enclose the copy of a letter which I have lately received from the Secretary of State, enclosing one from Lord William Bentinck of the 25th of January; and the answer of the Earl of Liverpool, and my opinion on the proposed plan of operations on the eastern coast of Spain, in a letter to Lord William Bentinck, of the 24th of March.

Since I wrote that letter, Lord Frederick Bentinck has arrived here with other letters from Lord William Bentinck, and Admiral Sir Edward Pellew, of which I enclose copies.

I propose to urge Lord William Bentinck in the strongest manner to undertake the expedition to the coast of Catalonia.

'I am about to send my battering train of artillery to Gibraltar, to be put in order for him; and early in the month of June I will likewise send there British and Portuguese artillerymen, engineer officers, and such other assistance of every description as I can afford him.

'But I still fear that he will be too weak to undertake even the smaller object of the two recommended to his attention, and I have not the means of reinforcing him. I beg leave, therefore, to suggest to you the expediency of proposing to the Regency.

Fourthly. That 3000 men of General Roche's division at Alicante, and 3000 men of General Whittingham's division at Majorca, should be prepared to be embarked early in June, in order to join and co-operate on the Eastern coast with the troops under Lord William Bentinck, which will come from Sicily.

If the Spanish Government will consent to this proposal, I will take care that transports shall be at Alicante, and in Majorca early in June, to take these troops to their destination."

Lord Frederick Bentinck will return to Sicily in a few days, and I will desire him to go to Cadiz to receive from you the decision of the Government on this proposition, in order that he may carry to Lord William Bentinck the fullest information regarding the assistance to his operations which he may expect in the Peninsula,

If Lord William Bentinck should be made sufficiently strong, it is probable that we shall succeed in opening a communication between the fleet and the patriots in Catalonia, and the war will revive in that principality; and there is a chance of recovering Valencia. At all events, a diversion of the enemy's force must be created for my operations; without which, I shall have upon me the armies of Portugal, the South, and Centre, and that of Suchet.

. SIR,

'WELLINGTON.

General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., to General Victoria,

It is desirable that you should take measures to have brought into the fort, and lodged in the stores at Elvas, the shot, and other military stores, now at the flying bridge.