I should prefer to see an advanced guard upon it, and the main body on the Mondego behind. Have you used my magazine at Celorico? I enclose a letter for the Commissary there, and one for Don Carlos de España. Pray forward both; the former is to order forward fresh supplies to Celorico. Show this letter to General Bacellar; I do not write to him, as I have no Portuguese with me. • Believe me, &c. • SIR, General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., to Major General 'Castello Branco, 18th April, 1812. In consequence of your letter of the 13th instant, I think it proper to explain to you in what way you disobeyed my orders. 'The orders of the 5th March provided for two possible events, when the enemy should discover that the allied army had marched from the frontiers of Castille. 1st, That of the enemy moving to the southward: 2ndly, that of the enemy passing the Agueda. In case the enemy should make the movement first mentioned, you were to march with the 1st hussars, by easy marches, through Lower Beira; to cross the Tagus at Villa Velha, and to proceed to Elvas. 'In case the enemy should cross the Agueda, you were to fall back gradually through Lower Beira to Castello Branco. The instructions of the 5th March, besides, contain an injunction to you not to allow yourself to be diverted from what they contained by the operations of General Bacellar, or of Don Carlos de España, but you were desired "not to be in a hurry, and to give them your countenance as far as might be in your power; and to tell them that you were left in the front for a particular object, and that you had positive instructions for your conduct in the event of the occurrence of the enemy's movement to the Agueda." I afterwards wrote to you on the 26th and 27th March, to acquaint you that Don Carlos de España had informed me that he expected to be able to introduce a convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo on the 30th, and to request you "to endeavor to have those provisions introduced into the place;" and you were afterwards to carry into execution my instructions of the 5th of March. 'I now request you to advert to your conduct under these instructions. On the 29th you reported that the enemy were arrived in Tamames, and that it was your intention to fall back that evening to Ciudad Rodrigo, leaving piquets near Tenebron, On the 30th you wrote from Ituero; in which letter you acknowledged the receipt of one from me, I conclude that of the 26th or 27th, as I had not written to you before since the 19th. The enemy had that day arrived at Guadapero. On the 1st April you wrote from Nave, at 9 P.M., that the enemy had on the 31st a piquet of 40 cavalry at the ford of the Agueda, between Pastores and Zamarra; and that a regiment of infantry had marched to Martiago. You left Ituero that morning, the 1st of April, and marched to Nave; and the enemy on the same morning crossed the ford with two squadrons, and took possession of Pastores. The convoy for Ciudad Rodrigo was expected on the 1st April, from Aldea del Obispo. I beg leave to observe, that if you had assembled the 1st hussars at Pastores on the 30th of March and 1st April, the Agueda being then scarcely fordable for cavalry, and that ford being always the first that is practicable, sending your baggage, &c., away to Sabugal, you would have kept open the communication between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, and the convoy would, probably, have got into the latter place. At all events my instructions of the 26th and 27th March would have been obeyed. On the 2nd of April you wrote from Sabugal that the 1st hussars had arrived there, and that it was reported the enemy had recrossed the Agueda; and on the 3rd you marched to Val de Lobos, where you halted the 4th; on the 5th you marched to Pedrogao, and on the 6th to Castello Branco. Putting the instructions of the 26th and 27th March out of the question, it is obvious that the case had occurred adverted to in my instructions of the 5th March, viz., the enemy had crossed the Agueda; in which case "you were to fall back gradually, taking care not to commit yourself, upon Sabugal; and from Sabugal in the same manner by Penamacor on Castello Branco ;" and I would wish you to consider whether you did fall back gradually; whether there was any necessity of any description for your quitting Nave on the 2nd, or Sabugal on the 3rd; or whether to march twelve leagues in two days through Lower Beira can be deemed, in any sense of the word," falling back gradually." In fact, when you wrote on the 7th from Castello Branco, you knew nothing about the enemy; and instead of receiving from you, as I had expected under my instructions of the 5th March, a regular daily account of their operations, you knew nothing; and from the manner in which you made your march, all those were driven off the road who might have given me intelligence, and were destined to keep up the communication between me and Don Carlos de España. But this is not all; you were positively ordered by your instructions to go to Castello Branco, and no farther. The reason for this instruction is obvious. First, the militia of Lower Beira would have been there in the case supposed, and they were there. Secondly, as soon as I should be informed of the enemy's approach to the Coa, it would have been absolutely necessary for me to assemble a force at Castello Branco, of which the foundation would have been the 1st hussars. Yet, notwithstanding these orders and the reason for them, you marched from Castello Branco on the 8th, and crossed the Tagus on the 9th. Till I received your letter of the 7th April, I did not conceive it possible that you would have so far disregarded your instructions, otherwise I should certainly have prevented it; and the consequence of your conduct was, that I did not know that the enemy had crossed the Coa till the 10th instant. I am willing to believe, nay, I am certain, that the omission to obey my instructions was not intentional, and that it is to be attributed to that description of inattention which is too much the practice of the Service. If the instructions of the 5th March had been read with attention, and pains had been taken to understand them, and a plan had been considered for the mode of executing them, in case of the occurrence of the event for which they provided, it is impossible that the mistakes of which I complain could have occurred. I have the honor to be, &c.. WELLINGTON, • Major General General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., to Lieut. General MY DEAR SIR, 'Castello Branco, 18th April, 1812. 10 A.M. I enclose the last letters from General Bacellar and Don Carlos de España. The enemy were still at Pedrogao yesterday; but our patrole took a courier, who says they intended to retire last night. I had at first intended to bring the divisions across the Tagus two at a time. But the weather is so bad that it is impossible to bivouac the troops, and the cantonments on this side the Tagus will scarcely hold one division. I have, therefore, given the troops a second halt, in order to allow the 4th division to follow the 5th across the Tagus. 'I am much afraid that Major Grant is taken. He was at Idanha à Nova, and the man taken yesterday says that an officer was taken there by one of the enemy's patroles. I have not heard from him since the 15th. General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., to Lieut. General • MY DEAR HILL, 'Castello Branco, 19th April, 1812. It is necessary that some attention should be paid to the mowing of hay this year, otherwise I think there is great reason to fear that the cavalry will be but ill provided with forage during the winter. I believe the best places in Alentejo are Portalegre, Alpalhað, Gafete, Niza, Castello de Vide, Villa Viçosa, Estremoz, Crato, and all the villages along the Sor river. Mr. Routh should take early measures on this subject; some might be mowed on the left of the Guadiana, near where our bridges were, and between Badajoz and Talavera Real; the former stored at Elvas, the latter at Badajoz. The mode in which I propose to settle this matter in this part of the country, is to make arrangements with the magistrates of the villages to mow and stack the hay, for which they should be paid from 40 to 50 reas a truss, of from 12 to 15 pounds. The magistrates should then be held responsible to produce all the hay for cutting and storing which they should have been paid. The best season for cutting is the month of May, so that you see Mr. Routh has no time to lose. I recommend this arrangement in case of accidents, as I hope and believe we shall spend the winter out of Portugal yet. Believe me, &c. 'Lieut. General 'WELLINGTON. Sir R. Hill, K.B.' General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., to Lieut. General MY DEAR SIR, Sir T. Graham, K.B. Castello Branco, 20th April, 1812. 8 A.M. The enemy have continued to withdraw from this part of the country; and our piquets were yesterday in Penamacor; and from the Alpedrinha side, in Val de Lobos ; and I conclude that this day the whole will be across the Coa. The Light division and hussars are this day at St. Miguel and Pedrogað; the 3rd division and 11th, at Alpedrinha, &c. The 5th and 4th divisions will move to-morrow from hence; and I shall keep the front in movement gradually towards the Coa till the rear shall come up. We had an unpleasant report yesterday morning from Coimbra, of the 17th, that Trant had been defeated on Guarda, and his militia dispersed. The report was brought to Coimbra by an alferes of militia, and some non-commissioned officers; the day of the defeat not mentioned. We had heard from Trant on the 13th, at night; and there was a possibility that the affair had happened on the 14th. Guarda being 29 leagues from Coimbra, it appeared barely possible that it might have happened on the evening of the 15th, as the letter from Coimbra was dated at nine in the morning of the 17th. There are letters in this town from Celorico of the 15th, which do not notice this affair; and, therefore, it certainly did not happen on the 14th, and probably not on the morning of the 15th; and yet, if it was not then, it is scarcely possible that the alferes and non-commissioned officers could have gone the distance in the time. We have heard from Covilhao to the 17th, and have no accounts of this action; and the ordenanza are in all parts of |