APATHY OF THE PEOPLE.

111

to ascertain that any of the numerous diplomatists here, proffered a single word, or wrote one solitary line, to stay the proceedings or mitigate the sufferings of those selected for punishment, and who had been most active in opposing the French armies. No! not an effort was made to save the patriots, or prevent the irreparable disgrace which Ferdinand and his advisers were bringing so rapidly on royalty. Whereas, more than one is known to have fomented party animosities, and laboured to promote that ruin which had overtaken the people when recently liberated from the yoke of despotism and slavery.

112

A PARTY QUESTION STATED.

LETTER VI.

AFRANCESADOS and LIBERALES.-Treatment of the former, and Motives of their Political Conduct-Treaty of Fontainbleau.-Flight of Ferdinand.— New Changes recognized by Russia and Austria.-Imbecility of the reigning Family.-Bourbon Dynasty.-Motives for cultivating the Alliance of France. -Disinterestedness of the Afrancesados.-Suppression of the Holy Office.-Memorable saying of the EMPEROR NAPOLEON.-Enterprize against Spain compared with other Aggressions.-Congress of Vienna, &c.-Influence of NAPOLEON'S Policy on the Destinies of Mankind.-Extract from his Memoirs. Opinion of Marina.-Arguments in favour of King Joseph's Right to the Throne.- Reforms effected by the New Government.- Ministry nominated.-Popularity of the King. Assemblage of Nobility and Gentry at Bayonne.-Their Address.-Charges against the Afrancesados.-Their Reasens for Emigrating.-Probable Judgment of Posterity.- Broken Promises of Ferdinand-Invidious Distinctions.-Delusive Hopes.-Decree of May 30.-Its Consequences.-Refuted by Llorente.-Concluding Reflections.

Madrid, August, 1820.

ALTHOUGH, like most party questions, the long agitated dispute between the Afrancesados and Liberales must continue to be rather one of opinion than positive right, until the interests and prejudices which environ it are removed, you will perhaps be gratified to know some of the reasons alleged by the followers of Joseph Bonaparte, in justification of their political conduct, and which still render them scarcely less dissatisfied with the policy of the patriotic government and Cortes, than they are with that of Ferdinand and the servile faction.

DEFENCE OF THE AFRANCESADOS.

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Those who have defended the Afrancesados, or replied to the numerous charges brought against them, do not fail to cite that public law of Europe, which has of late years been more frequently a subject of philosophical meditation in the closet, than a rule of conduct to sovereigns or their ministers; and it is but justice to add, that every writer of celebrity, from Grotius and Puffendorf to Vattel and Burlemaque, seems to have fully justified the course adopted by this class of Spanish reformers. It is not, however, to be inferred, that the Liberales, in preferring national independence to the acknowledgment of a foreign Prince, were blameable: on the contrary, the adherents of King Joseph, while they admire the patriotism of their competitors in the cause of reform, merely contend that much more might have been effected for the interests and happiness of Spain, without those sacrifices of lood and treasure occasioned by the war. Equally anxious for the regeneration of their common country, the leaders of this party had long advocated the absolute necessity of a change, though they entertained no idea of altering the existing dynasty. Alike ignorant of the treaty concluded at Fontainbleau, in 1807,* or of those secret arrangements by which the Prince of the Peace and his friends had prepared Spain for the reception of

* Vide Appendix.

I

114

ON THE GROUNDS OF EXPEDIENCY.

its new allies, the Afrancesados made every effort compatible with allegiance and loyalty, towards enabling their sovereign to oppose the arms of Napoleon. But having been left without any means of resistance, and abandoned to their fate, they ask, if a people thus deserted and disarmed, should have wantonly excited the fury or resentment of a conqueror; and, as the King had saved himself and family by flight, whether they had not a right to save themselves and their country by submission ?*

After enumerating a variety of facts, and quot

* Considering the circumstances which attended the departure of Ferdinand, it is extremely difficult to call it by any other name than a flight. There is no doubt of his being fully informed of the secret understanding which existed between Napoleon and his immediate counsellors: it is even said, that he did not leave Madrid without a previous knowledge of what was to be the general result of his visit to Bayonne. It is well known, that young Hervas, son to the Marquis d'Almenara, and who accompanied General Savary to Madrid, before the King set out, communicated the probable consequences of the intended journey, while several efforts were made to prevent it on the road to Vittoria, particularly at Miranda de Ebro, and Burgos, where, Urquijo, who had been minister to Charles IV., expostulated with the Duke del Infantado and Escoiquiz, on the imprudence of Ferdinand's quitting the kingdom. When reminded of his inattention to these warnings, at Bayonne, the Duke excused himself on the plea, of his having acted from no motive but that of benefiting the nation, and he accordingly remained attached to the fortunes of King Joseph, till they received their first check at the battle of Baylen.

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF JOSEPH. 115

ing ample authorities, both sacred and profane, to prove that all the ties which bound them to the old family and government were broken asunder, the writers on this side of the question maintain that, to resist the armies of Napoleon, would have been in direct opposition to the proclamations both of Ferdinand, and Charles IV., while, as the result has shewn, it was sure of entailing the greatest misery on Spain. On the other hand, neither well authenticated assertions, nor positive proofs are wanting to show, that in accepting office to the exclusion of all foreign appointments, and otherwise co-operating with the new government, the Afrancesados not only consulted the best interest of their country, but greatly diminished the horrors of a contest which they regarded as altogether unnecessary.

The partisans of King Joseph might have felt somewhat less indignant at their subsequent persecution and sufferings, had not the whole nation, with the exception of Cadiz, Alicant and Carthagena, spontaneously yielded and sworn fealty to that Prince. Independently of the formal renunciations of the royal family, the circumstance of his being recognised and addressed by all the public bodies, ought surely to have been considered as a palliative, if it did not operate as an exemption from that punishment which has been so unsparingly inflicted on them for a period of more than ten years.

That the recent changes were agreeable to the