appellant was wholly unqualified to be trusted; the title was taken in the name of her father; that by the will of appellant's father the sum that after his death it was discovered that in of $125,000 was bequeathed in such manner | his will she had been given the one half interest that she was entitled to receive the income in them, and her two sisters one-half interest; therefrom, amounting to $6,000 per annum; that the two sisters afterwards conveyed to her that appellant "is the owner of a large amount all title or interest they had in the properties in of property, as herein before alleged, and the York county. And the answer continued: plaintiff is possessed of but little means and That prior to the beginning of this action has but little annual income, and he is unable the said plaintiff, by a certain indento perform manual labor, as he is afflicted ture, duly executed, signed, witnessed, acwith what is commonly known as hip-joint knowledged, and delivered with and to one disease,' and is unable to support himself by Thomas Kays as the trustee and agent of this reason thereof, and the defendant absolutely defendant, for a good and valuable considerarefuses to convey that which is justly due him, tion, released, relinquished, and conveyed to and or to contribute anything to his support.' for the use of this defendant all his claim, right, The prayer of the petition was as follows: title, or interest, or pretended claim, right, title, The plaintiff therefore prays that he may be or interest, in or to several tracts of land, and divorced from the defendant, and that he may every of them, and thereby, upon considerabe given the custody of the said minor tion as aforesaid, expressly admitted and acchildren, and that the defendant be decreed to knowledged that this defendant was the true pay him reasonable alimony, and to convey to and only owner of all the same, as her own him each and every part of the lands herein- separate estate and property, free from all inbefore described, and for such other and terest, title, or control of said plaintiff, whereby further relief as equity may require." In her this defendant avers that this plaintiff is esanswer the appellant set forth the purchase of topped to assert or maintain that he has, or has the properties in and near York as having been had since the 24th day of July, 1885, any right, made with money furnished by her father; title, claim, lien, or interest in or to said lands, that they were so purchased for her, but that' or any of them. All of which matters were erty, thus impliedly denying that any claim may be made by the husband against the wife's estate. shall also be entitled to her personal estate in pos- | property, and also fix the status of the wife's propsession or in action. Section 3331 provides that on divorce for adultery of the wife she cannot alienate any of her lands, and at her death they shall be distributed as though she had died intestate. New York Rev. Stat. (1896, Birdseye) p. 893, § 18, subs. 3, provides that where an action for divorce is brought by the wife, and the plaintiff is the owner of any real or personal property, or has in her possession any personal property left with her by the defendant or acquired by her own industry, or given to her, or if she may become entitled to any property by the decease of a relative intestate, the defendant shall not have any interest therein. Section 19, subs, 2, provides that when an action is brought by the husband the judgment dissolving the marriage does not affect the plaintiff's interest in and to any real or personal property which the defendant owns or possesses when the judgment is rendered. Maine Rev. Stat. 1883, chap. 60, § 10, provides that when a divorce is decreed to the husband for adultery of the wife, he may hold her personal estate of which she was seised during marriage, during his life, if they had children born alive during marriage, otherwise during her life only if he survives her; but the court may make an allowance out of her property as is necessary for her subsistence. This does not apply to the wife's property held under chap. 61, which chapter provides for the rights of married women to obtain, acquire, and dispose of property in their own name. Sayles's Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 2864, provides that on a decree of divorce the court shall order a division of the estate of the parties as shall seem just, but nothing herein contained shall be construed to compel either party "to devest him or her self of the title to real estate." Arizona Rev. Stat. § 2114, provides that the court in a decree of divorce from the bonds of matrimony, shall order a division of the estate of the parties in such a way as to the court shall seem just and right, having due regard to the rights of each party and their children, if any,provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to compel either party to devest him or herself of the title to separate property. The following statutes provide for restoration of Starr & C. Illinois Statutes, chap. 40, § 17, provides that when a decree of divorce is granted, and it shall appear that either party holds the title to property equitably belonging to the other, the court may compel conveyance thereof to be made to the party entitled to the same. Arkansas Dig. Rev. Stat. 1884, § 2568, provides that in every final judgment for divorce from the bond of matrimony an order shall be made that each party be restored to all property not disposed of at the commencement of the action, which the other party obtained from or through the other during the marriage and in consideration or reason thereof. Maine Rev. Stat. 1883, chap. 60, § 9, provides that when a divorce is decreed for impotence, or is decreed to the wife for the fault of the husband, the wife's real estate shall be restored to her, and the court may enter judgment for her for so much of her personal property as came to her husband by marriage, as is reasonable. Maryland Pub. Laws, art. 16, § 37, provides that in all cases where a divorce is decreed, the court shall have full power to award to the wife such property or estate as she had when married, or the value of the same, or of such as may have been sold or converted by the husband, having regard to the circumstances of the husband. Howell's Mich. Stat. 1882, § 6240, provides that on a divorce from the bonds of matrimony, except that of adultery by the wife, and when the husband shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life, and on a decree from bed and board, the wife shall be entitled to the immediate possession of all her real estate, as if her husband were dead. Section 6287 provides that upon a divorce from bed and board the wife shall have the same rights in respect to her real and personal property as an unmarried woman. Minnesota Stat. 1894 provides whenever a decree is made of a nullity of marriage or a divorce from the bond of matrimony, for any cause except adultery by the wife, and when the husband is sentenced to imprisonment for life, and upon every divorce from bed and board, the wife shall be en and are at issue between these same parties in an action pending in the district court of York County, Nebraska, between the same parties as in this action, which other action was pend. ing at the time this action was commenced, and has ever since been and is now so pending, as herein before set forth." One portion of the answer was in the nature of a cross-petition, and contained, among others, allegations of appellee's cruelty toward appellant and his family, and his unfitness to have the custody and control of the children. Appellant asked that she be granted a divorce, that she be awarded the custody of the children, and that the title to the properties in controversy be quieted and confirmed in her, and some other relief, which need not be particularly noticed. To this answer and cross-petition the appellee filed a denial of each and every allegation of new mat ter therein contained. The appellant filed a supplemental answer, in which it was pleaded that of the action to which reference was made in the former answer as pending in the district court of York county between the parties hereto, and in regard to the title of the lands and property herein involved, there had been a trial, and a judgment therein favorable to appellant, by which she had been awarded the titled to the immediate possession of all her real estate and personal property as if her husband was dead. Indiana Code Civ. Proc. 1043, provides that a di vorce decreed on account of the misconduct of the husband shall entitle the wife to the same rights, so far as her real estate is concerned, as she would have been entitled to by his death. Wyoming Rev. Stat. 1887, § 1585, provides that on a divorce, except for the wife's adultery, the wife shall be entitled to the whole or a reasonable part of her personal estate that shall have come to the husband by marriage, or the value thereof. 1 Mo. Rev. Stat. 1889, § 4509, provides that when the wife shall obtain a divorce from the bonds of matrimony all property which came to the husbaud by means of the marriage, that is undisposed of at the time of filing the petition, shall revert to the wife and children. Ohio Rev. Stat. (Giauque), 7th ed. $$ 5699, 5700, provide that when a divorce is granted for fault of the husband or wife the effect of the judgment shall be to restore to her the whole of her lands, tenements, or heriditaments not previously disposed of. Okla. Code, § 4550, is to the same effect. Taylor's Kan. Stat. § 4756, provides that on a divorce for fault of the wife the court shall order restoration to her of the whole of her property owned by her before marriage, or separately acquired by her after marriage, and not previously disposed of; and the court may set apart such portion of the wife's property as is necessary for the support of the children. Section 4757 provides that a divorce shall bar the party for whose fault it was granted against any claim in or to the property of the other, except for fraud. Alabama Civ. Code, § 2337, provides that a divorce deprives the husband of all control over the separate estate of his wife. Clay's Alabama Dig. 170, § 8, providing that on a decree of divorce the court shall order a division of the estate of the parties, providing that nothing shall be construed to compel either party to devest him or her self of the title to real estate, evidently was repealed, as the same does not appear in the present Code. ownership and title of the real estate drawn into controversy, and that the cause of action in that case was the same as in the case at bar. To this supplemental pleading the appellee replied, admitting the other action, and that it had run its course to judgment, but alleged that the sole issue in that case was whether a contract upon which it was predicated had been made by appellant under duress This reply was further a general denial of the allegations of the supplemental answer, except such as were specifically admitted. Of the issues joined there was a trial. Appellant was granted a divorce and the custody of the children. There were further findings and decree as follows: "The court further finds that the plaintiff has an equitable interest in the following described real estate, which real estate appears on the records as the property of the defendant, to wit, has an interest in lot 11, block 58, in the city of York, York county, Nebraska, according to the original plat of the town of York, and that said interest is of the value of $1,400. The plaintiff has also an equitable interest in the S. W. of the S. E. of Sec. 31, T. 11 N, of R. 2 W., 6th P. M., in York county, the title to which also appears of record in the name of defendant, III. Alimony pendente lite. There are but few decisions directly on the question of alimony pendente lite to the husband, although in some of the cases supra alimony generally was claimed. Under some of the statutes supra it seems that on a proper showing, alimony pendente lite would be granted to the husband. In an Illinois lower court case, and in an Iowa case, allmony pendente lite was allowed, although there was no statute to that effect in Illinois, but there was in Iowa. An order was made directing the wife to pay into court for the use of the plaintiff, to pay his attorney, $25. This was affirmed although the court upon final hearing found against the plaintiff, and in favor of the defendant on her cross-petition, and that she was entitled to a divorce from the plaintiff. The lower court allowed him $300, which included $50 in attorney fees altogether, but this was set aside on appeal except as to the allowance of $25. Barnes v. Barnes, 59 Iowa, 456. (The Iowa Code authorizes such an allowance. See Small v. Small, 42 Iowa, 111.) In the circuit court of Cook county, Illinois, in the absence of any statute, and admitting there was no precedent, an allowance of alimony pendente lite was made to the husband where he was old and a confirmed invalid, unable to support himself, and his wife had an estate from which she derived an income, and she had brought suit for a divorce for his misconduct, the court holding that since the status of married women has been changed, the same rule should be applicable to the wife as to the husband, and both should be placed upon an equality. Groth v. Groth, 28 Chicago Leg. News, 348. IV. English cases. Under the various English statutes the court has power to alter settlements on granting divorce, and, where the wife has been guilty of adultery, to give such part of the wife's income to the husband as the court shall see proper. On a decree nisi dissolving the marriage on account of the wife's adultery, where the wife's income was £1,140 a year from property under the will of her father, and the husband's income was and that the interest of said plaintiff in said premises is of the value of $3.000, and the said sum of $1,400 is a valid lien on said lot, and the said sum of $3,000 is a valid lien on said S. W. of S. E. 1, Sec. 31, T. 11, R. 2 W. It is further ordered and adjudged by the court that the plaintiff have and recover of the defendant, Rachel B. Greene, the sum of $4,400, the value of his equitable interest in the property herein before described, and that said sum be a lien on said premises in the order named." From this latter portion of the decree this appeal has been prosecuted. One of the questions presented is, Can ali mony be allowed to the husband? 'Alimony " is defined in 351, vol. 2. Bishop, Mar. & Div. 6th ed. as follows: Alimony, in divorce law, is the allowance which a husband pays, by order of court, to his wife, while living separate from him, for her maintenance; or it may be a like provision ordered for the sustenance of a woman divorced from the bond of matrimony, out of her late husband's estate-the latter branch 66 66 £350 derived from his business, the court ordered her to settle £250 for life on her husband, and £60 on each child, and refused to make the allowance variable according to the possible valuation of the wife's property. 20 & 21 Vict. § 45, provided that on divorce for adultery of the wife, where she had property, the court could order such settlement of such property for the benefit of the innocent party and their children. Midwinter v. Midwinter [1893] P. 93. And under this statute, where the wife was guilty of adultery, the court allowed to the busband on divorce such a portion of her settled property as would place him somewhat in the status in which he would have been had the union continued. of the definition denoting a form of alimony known only to the modern law, not to the ancient. It may be for the wife's use during the pendency of a suit, called alimony pendente lite, or after its termination. known as permanent alimony." See also further definition in note 1 on same page. In § 469, in the same volume, the author observes: "If a husband is obliged to seek divorce from his wife, and the property of the two is mainly or entirely vested for her separate use, it will, under special circumstances, be impossible to do justice without transferring to him some of this property. And perhaps there may be statutes in some of our states under which something approximating this can be done. But it cannot generally. Nor, where the commonlaw rules of property prevail, are the circumstances numerous in which it ought to be; because these rules put what justly belongs to the wife as well as to the husband into his hands, to be used by him for the family support as well as his own. Yet legislation in some of a settlement amounted to £1,050 a year. Farrington v. Farrington, L. R. 11 Prob. Div. 84. And a husband was awarded a settlement out of the wife's income to be held for him and his children, where she was guilty of adultery, but the court held that it could only deal with property to which she was entitled in possession or reversion. Milne v. Milne, L. R. 2 Prob. Div. 295. And a husband was awarded half the wife's present and reversionary income, for himself and his children, where the marriage was dissolved for adultery of the wife. Noel v. Noel, L. R. 10 Prob. Div. 179. But the court refused to award the husband the money due to a wife on a settlement out of her father's estate, and gave the property to their children on account of her adultery. After a final decree the court could not make a retrospective order under 22 & 23 Vict. chap. 61, § 5, as to divi order. Paul v. Paul, L. R. 2 Prob. Div. 93. March v. March, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 439. So, a husband who had accepted an allowance under a deed of separation, and subsequently had grounds for dissolution of marriage, was allowed an increased provision out of his wife's income un-dends due and payable before the date of the der 22 & 23 Viet. chap. 61, § 5, providing that the court after a final decree of nullity of marriage may inquire into settlements and make such orders as to the court shall seem fit. Benyon v. Benyon, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 447, 45 L. J. P. 96, 24 Week. Rep. 950. And the court refused to change an order of settlement so as to give the husband use of the property settled on the wife, until she should produce their child, which she had abducted, having been permitted access to the child by an not intended to be used for a collateral purpose. Symonds v. Symonds, L. R. 2 Prob. Div. 447. On a motion subsequently made in this case to re-order of the court. 22 & 23 Vict. chap. 61, § 5, was duce the allowance on account of the depreciation of the securities and estate of the respondent, the court refused to make any change. An order made is not liable to change on account of subsequent circumstances. Benyon v. Benyon, L. R. 15 Prob. Div. 29, 54. Under 22 & 23 Vict. chap. 61, § 5, the court had power to order a variation of the settlement, where a decree of dissolution of marriage was granted on the husband's petition and there had been a settlement in contemplation of marriage under the Scotch law. Nunneley v. Nunneley, L. R. 15 Prob. Div. 186. And where a wife refused to obey a decree of res- | titution of conjugal rights the court ordered her to settle a permanent maintenance on her husband under Mat. Causes Act 1884, § 3, providing that where the application for restitution of conjugal rights is by the husband, and the wife is entitled to property or earnings, the court may order a settlement for the benefit of the petitioner and their children. Swift v. Swift, L. R. 15 Prob. Div. 118. A marriage settlement was varied allowing the husband £300 a year during the joint lives of the husband and wife, where the wife's income under As to varying marriage settlements where there are no children, 22 & 23 Vict. chap. 61, § 5, was amended (41 Vict. chap. 19, § 3), and under the amendment they may be varied. Yglesias v. Yglesias, L. R. 4 Prob. Div. 71, 40 L. T. N. S. 37, 27 Week. Rep. 482. The court refused to vary a settlement by amending the clause giving to the wife an income of the settled property, and adding, should be received by the petitioner dum sola et casta vixerit. Gladstone v. Gladstone, L. R. 1 Prob. Div. 442, 45 L. J. Prob. 82, 35 L. T. N. S. 380, 24 Week. Rep. 739. And under 22 & 23 Vict. chap. 61, § 5, providing that after a final decree of dissolution of marriage the court may make such orders in regard to the property settled, either for the benefit of the chil dren of the marriage or their respective parents, as to the court shall seem fit, the court cannot make an order favorable to the husband as to such settlement, where the children are all dead, as when there are no children there can be no parents. rance v. Corrance, L. R. 1 Frob. Div. 495. Cor I. T. the states is setting strongly in a direction ulti- | support the findings and decree of the court. mately to exhibit the spectacle of rich wives To this attorneys for appellee answer that there supporting poor husbands; and of husbands was testimony offered and received at the trial defrauding their creditors while wealth em in the district court which was not made a part braces them in the arms of their wives. This of the bill of exceptions, and is not presented condition of things is for the legislatures, not in this court, and that it is the established rule, the courts; but the courts, seeing these things, when such is the existent condition of the recmay also see a reason why they should not feel ord, that the question of the sufficiency of the compunction when, in a proper case, they evidence to sustain the findings and judgment withhold all allowance of alimony to the wife.' will not be examined. The record in this case "Alimony is allowed the wife in recognition of discloses that the bill of exceptions was prethe husband's common-law liability to support | pared and presented to the attorneys for apher. Therefore, in the absence of legislation pellee for examination and amendment, and readjusting domestic relations and allowing it, was returned to the attorney for appellant inthere being no corresponding liability on the dorsed, "I herewith return this draft of a bill wife's part to support her husband, alimony of exceptions in the case of Charles Greene v. cannot be granted to him. In several of the Rachel B. Greene, submitted to me on thestates, however, alimony, or an allowance from day ofthe wife's estate in the nature of alimony, is allowed the husband by statute." 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. p. 92. "An action for alimony cannot be maintained by the husband against the wife." Somers v. Somers, 39 Kan. 132; Nelson, Div. & Sep. 904. ron 1893, and propose no amendments thereto." It was said by this court in deciding the case of Cattle v. Haddox, reported in 14 Neb. 59: "Where a bill of exceptions purporting to contain all the testimony is submitted to the adverse party for amendment, and such party certifies that he has no amendUnless allowed by our statute, the husbandments to propose to the same, the court will could recover no alimony. It is argued that presume that such bill contains all the eviby virtue of the provisions of 10, chap. 25, dence, notwithstanding the certificate may not Comp. Stat. 1895, entitled Divorce and Ali- fully so certify.” But in Missouri P. R. Co. v. mony, the right to recover alimony was con- Hays, 15 Neb. 231, it was stated: "Where all ferred upon the husband. The section reads of the evidence used on a trial is not before us as follows: "A petition or bill of divorce, ali- we cannot say that the finding was unsupmony, and maintenance may be exhibited by ported. It is true that the certificate to the a wite in her own name, as well as a husband; bill of exceptions is to the effect that it is comand in all cases the respondent may answer plete and contains all the evidence produced such petition or bill without oath; and in all on the trial. But we find within the bill itself, cases of divorce, alimony, and maintenance, in the questions and answers especially, inconwhen personal service cannot be had, service testable proof that it does not. Where such by publication may be made as is provided by is the case the certificate will not be taken as law in other civil cases under the Code of Civil conclusive on that point." In the bill of exProcedure." Before the enactment of this sec- ceptions we find the following statement: tion a wife was obliged to commence the ac- "Plaintiff now reads in evidence depositions of tion by a representative, by her next friend, Aaron Kisselbach, Euphrennia Cramer, Fanny and the evident intent of the enactment was to C. Widenor, Nicholas Harris, Howard Barallow her to commence the suit in her own The depositions which the recname, without the interposition of a "next ord refers to are not in the bill of exceptions, friend," and the addition of the words "as well and where the fact that evidence was used as a husband" was meant to and does convey which is not incorporated in the record apno other meaning than that the wife may com- pears, as it does here, it must be noticed, notmence an action in the same manner as a hus- withstanding the certificate to the bill and the band; and they do not reach back and connect presumption arising from the indorsement of with the words "alimony and maintenance," counsel herein before quoted, and, where the and confer upon the husband the right to ali- bill does not contain all the evidence used on mony and maintenance in an action of divorce, the trial, the objection that the finding and either of which, unless given by this section, decree of the trial court are not supported by he could not obtain in the action. The words the evidence cannot be considered. That it were but used as a part of the description of would not be fair or right to do so is too apparthe action which the lawmakers gave the wife ent to need argument in its support. Chamthe right to institute in her own name. It berlain v. Brown, 25 Neb. 434; Aspinwall v. would be a strained construction which would Sabin, 22 Neb. 73: Nelson v. Jenkins, 42 Neb. give them the force of raising in the husband 133. The record before us does not disclose the new right to obtain alimony and mainte- any objection made to the litigation of the Dance in an action of divorce. Wood v. Wood, question of the appellee's rights, if any, in the Wend. 357. The rights of the appellee to re- property, in this, an action of divorce. The ceive any of the property, then, could not be question was presented by the pleadings, and, predicated upon his claim for alimony and as shown in the record, was fully submitted maintenance, but must be derived from such to the trial court; hence we need express no equities as accrued in his favor from the man- opinion on it at present. Somers v. Somers, 39 ner of the original purchase of the property Kan. 132; Sherwin v. Gaghagen, 39 Neb. 238, and the subsequent improvement thereof, and and cases cited. his participation therein and contributions thereto. In relation to this branch of the case, it is asserted by appellant that there is no evidence, or at least not sufficient evidence, to It is urged by counsel for the appellee that the appeal from the branch of the case in respect to the property by the appellant presents the whole decree here, and that the action of the trial cours, in any and all particulars, is open to examination and reversal or modifica tion at the instance of either party to the cause; and he further contends that there was not sufficient evidence to sustain the findings made, on which is based the decree of divorce in favor of appellant. Without discussion or decision of the presentation of this subject at this time, in an appeal which in terms was limited to one branch of the case by the party successful in the portion of the decree sought to be attacked by the opposing party, it will suffice to say that it has developed that the evidence is not all contained in the bill of exceptions, and hence the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of the trial court is not open to consideration. It follows from the views herein before expressed, and the conclusions reached, that the decree of the District Court will be affirmed. MISSOURI SUPREME Agnes FUCHS, Appt., v. City of ST. LOUIS et al., Respts. (133 Mo. 168.) 1. The fact that gases form from crude petroleum oil upon its subjection to heat will be judicially noticed by the courts. 2. The fact that a sewer blows up is entitled to consideration upon the question of care on the part of a municipality in respect to its management. 3. The jury must be permitted to pass upon the question of due care by a municipal corporation which in midsummer turns a large quantity of crude petroleum into a public sewer the natural outlet of which is obstructed, and leaves it four days without taking any precautions to avoid a resulting explosion. 4. An oil company from whose premises crude petroleum escapes during a conflagration not shown to be due to its negligence is not liable for injuries caused by an explosion of a public sewer into which the oil was turned by the municipal authorities after it had left the premises of the oil company and without its knowledge, for the purpose of checking the spread of the conflagration. (Sherwood, Burgess, and Robinson, JJ., dissent.) (May 28, 1895.) COURT (In Banc). constant duty of inspection so that the pipes may be kept in proper condition. Lee v. Vacuum Oil Co. 54 Hun, 157. The chief of the fire department is an officer of the city designated by the charter, and is the agent of the city in all matters connected with his department, including the inspection of all buildings which are in the course of construction. Scheme and Charter, Rev. Stat. 1889, art. 4, § 11, 2134. There is also a sewer commissioner of the city. İd. Rev. Stat. 1889, art. 4, §§ 36, 2109. Both of these officers were required by the charter to devote their entire time to the duties of their respective positions. Id. Rev. Stat. art. 4, 11, 2134. The municipality is liable like any individual for the negligent use of its property. Flori v. St. Louis, 3 Mo. App. 231, 69 Mo. 341, 33 Am. Rep. 504; Carrington v. St. Louis, 89 Mo. 212, 58 Am. Rep. 108. The duty of a city to keep its sewers in proper condition is a ministerial one, and for its breach an action will lie at the instance of the injured party. 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. 3d ed. § 1049, and cases cited: Thurston v. St. Joseph, 51 Mo. 510, 11 Am. Rep. 463; Fink v. St. Louis, 71 Mo. 52; Smith v. New York, 66 N. Y. 295; Gilluly v. Madison, 63 Wis. 518, 52 Am. Rep. 299: Kranz APPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of v. Baltimore, 64 Md. 491; Hitchins Bros. v. the Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis in favor of defendants in an action brought to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's husband, which was alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence. Reversed as to the city. Affirmed as to the other defendant. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Lubke & Muench, for appellant: The state has recognized the business of handling petroleum and its products to be dangerous to human life, and has put it under regulation by providing for the appointment of inspectors commonly known as coal oil inspectors. Rev. Stat. 1889, chap. 8, § 1323; St. Louis County Ct., Jenks, v. Fassett, 65 Mo. 418. When the safety of human life is in question a high degree of care is required in conducting a business in itself lawful. And when in that business pipes are used to carry oil there is a NOTE.-As to negligence in the manufacture or storage of explosives, see Judson v. Giant Powder Co. (Cal.) 29 L. R. A. 718, and note. Frostburg, 68 Md. 100. of maintaining it and keeping it in proper con- cited in note 1. There was sufficient evidence to connect the Waters-Pierce Oil Company as a principal with the wrong here complained of. That company owned the dangerous article and knew it was being carried off into the sewer for the better protection and preservation of the company's other property. It received directly the benefit of the wrong done and is a joint tort feasor with the city. Cooley, Torts, 1st ed. 127, 136; Canifax v. Chapman, 7 Mo. 175; Page v. Freeman, 19 Mo. 421; Allred v. Bray, 41 Mo. 484, 97 Am. Dec. 283; Me Mannus v. Lee, 43 Mo. 206, 97 Am. Dec. 386; Murphy v. Wilson, 44 Mo. 313, 100 Am. Dec. 290. |