Crabtree, the agent, to the trunk, telling him the covered platform, near the baggage-room who had sent it to the train, and when it was door, he called my attention to it, and told me going off, and that Crabtree said, "All right," whose trunk it was, and what train it was goor something of that sort. It is true that Crab ing off on. I do not remember what reply I tree testified that the trunk was not delivered made to him, but I did not object in any way to him, and that he did not receive it, yet, on to his leaving it there."-leave no room to cross-examination, he shows, by stating that doubt that there was a good delivery to and ache so swears because he did not check the ceptance by him of the trunk, which comtrunk, that he was merely expressing an erro-pleted the performance of the defendant's conneous legal conclusion. His further statements tract. It was expressly made known and unthat "the trunk was deposited at the proper derstood, at the time of the making of the conplace set apart and designated by me, as the tract of carriage, that the trunk could not be railroad company's baggage agent, for the de- carried the next morning to meet the 8 o'clock livery of baggage to me as baggage agent, and train, on which the plaintiff expected to take at the place at which I check all baggage, and passage, for the reason that the dr ver had to have received and checked all baggage continu- go at that time to another depot to take the ously for the railroad for the last three years;" mail; and, in view of this, it was expressly and that "when Joe Lindsay put the trunk on agreed that he should go at once, that after 137 N. Y. 599, the court reached a similar conclu- | loss by fire, and also for an amount exceeding that sion, the plaintiff not having assented to the terms of the special contract limiting the defendant's liability, no such contract arising as a matter of law from the mere acceptance of such a receipt. In that case the plaintiff's trunk and baggage were delivered to the company to be transferred from the peer at which plaintiff had landed to the city, and were damaged by falling into the river through the defendant's negligence. Again, in Blossom v. Dodd, 43 N. Y. 264, 3 Am. Rep. 701, the question of limitation of liability on the part of the express company arose, and was decided against the defendants, no assent to or knowledge of the restriction being shown on the plaintiff's part. The facts showed that plaintiff delivered his baggage check to the agent of the defendant company on the car, which was badly lighted and received a receipt which contained a limitation of liability, and was badly printed. The company was held liable for the baggage which was lost or stolen in transit. In Madan v. Sherard, 73 N. Y. 329, 29 Am. Rep. 153, the facts and circumstances were very similar to those in the case of Blossom v. Dodd, except that the receipt, which the plaintiff neglected to read but folded up and put in his pocket, was printed in large type and upon larger paper. The court held that the mere fact that he did not read the paper was not per se evidence of negligence, and no assent being proved on the part of the plaintiff to the special contract, the defendant was liable for the loss of the trunk in question, the plaintiff having a right to regard the paper as a voucher to enable him to follow and identify the goods, no notice to the contrary being given him. And in Staub v. Kendrick, 121 Ind. 226, 6 L. R. A. 619, where the appellant, engaged in the transportation of trunks and baggage to and from the various hotels and depots in his town, was sued by the appellee for the value of a valise and its contents, and damages resulting from its loss. In affirming the decision of the court below, it was held that one engaged in the business of transporting baggage was liable for the value of articles, necessary for use in traveling, contained in a valise delivered to his agent for transportation, and lost solely through such agent's negligence, even though the defendant posted notices that he would not be responsible for valises, and instructed his agents not to receive the same, the owner of the valise being ignorant of such notice. specified "upon any articles unless specially agreed in writing on this check receipt, and the extra risk paid therefor." The notice was not read by plaintiff until after notice from defendant that his trunk was lost. The court held that the plaintiff was to be considered as having notice of the terms, the same being printed in large type, and that the same was therefore to be taken as a qualification of such liability. In the above case the question arose as to whether upon the construction of such notice the carrier was only liable for the amount specified therein, or whether he was liable for such amount upon every article lost, except those expressly exempted, provided it was of such value. The court held the latter to be the just construction of the notice, upon the ground that the notice, not being clear, was to be construed strictly against the carrier, the terms used being "any article" thus indicating a liability to such extent upon any article contained in the trunk as baggage. IV. When not liable. Before the company or defendant can be held liable, the baggage must be delivered to him, and there must be a breach of the contract to deliver on his part. Such a company is not liable for the jewelry of a third person carried in a traveler's trunk as merchandise, where it is not made known to the company, the same not being baggage in the ordinary sense. Richards v. Westcott, 2 Bosw. 589. In Manheim v. Carr, 62 Me. 473, the plaintiff sued to recover for value of baggage alleged to have been lost through the defendant's negligence in delivering the same to the express company at the depot, to be forwarded by an early morning train, pursuant to plaintiff's instructions given to the hotel proprietor upon leaving his hotel. It was held that the defendant, having taken and left the baggage at the depot, with other baggage pursuant to his contract, to be forwarded as instructed, was not liable for its loss. The direct question of the liability of city expressmen or baggage transfer agents arose in the case of Hensbaw v. Rowland, 54 N. Y. 242. The facts showed that the plaintiff delivered a trunk to the defendant to be taken to the depot and delivered there for the plaintiff by a certain time, the plaintiff intending to take a train later in the day. The baggage was duly delivered by the de The contrary view would appear to have been fendant at the depot, but upon plaintiff's calling taken by the courts in some cases. In Hopkins v. Westcott, 6 Blatchf. 64, the facts showed that upon receipt of the baggage check by defendants they handed plaintiff a paper containing the number of the check and also a notice exempting them from liability for jewelry, and for for same it could not be found. It was held, in an action against the expressman to recover the value of the trunk and its contents, that he having fulfilled his contract, which was to deliver the trunk at the depot, and not to deliver it there to the plaintiff, the latter could not recover. noon, and take the trunk to the depot. The idea that, after then taking it, the defendant was to keep it in its custody until the next morning, and then deliver it to the plaintiff, at the depot. where she was ready to take the train. is expressly excluded by the very fact which rendered necessary its immediate carriage. The plaintiff's agent and witness, Robinson, testifies that he knew the defendant had no place to store baggage, that it had no warehouse, and that storing baggage was not a part of its business, so that we are convinced that the plaintiff received the very performance of the contract which the parties understood would be made. South & North Ala. R. Co. v. Wood, 66 Ala. 167, 41 Am. Rep. 749. This case is essentially unlike that of Southern Exp. Co. v. Armstead, 50 Ala. 350, relied upon by In Aikin v. Westcott, 123 N. Y. 363, the only question was whether the defendant company actually received into its custody the plaintiff's trunk. It was assumed that the trunk in question reached the railroad company's depot in advance of an employee and agent of the plaintiff, who checked them on the journey and stopped over. The trunks were taken off the train on its arrival by employees of the defendant company and left at the depot at the incoming baggage room, under the railroad company's control. The plaintiff's agents still had the checks, of which the defendants became possessed the following day for the purpose of delivering the trunks at the plaintiff's place of business. The baggage was not forthcoming. The court, in an action against the defendant company, held that the trunk was not formally delivered to the defendant nor was it in its control, and that the fact that the cars were unloaded by the defendant's agent did not alone render him liable, as the goods never passed out of the control of the railroad company. appellee. There, the express company's agent knew that the railroad agent had refused to allow the express company to deposit goods in its depot at the point of destination, and yet he left the package on the platform, merely calling the attention of the depot agent to it, as the property of the plaintiff. The railroad agent had no duty to perform in regard to it, and, under the circumstances, the action of the expressman was held to be gross carelessness, entitling plaintiff to recover for the loss. The loss of the trunk in this case cannot be attributed to any fault of the defendant. The plaintiff was not entitled to recover, and hence the judgment of the city court must be reversed, and a judgment here rendered for the defendant. Reversed and rendered. been lost or stolen. In an action to recover its value, wherein the railroad company sought to free itself from liability on the ground that they had adopted a rule that a person intending to become a passenger should purchase a ticket or pay a fare before the company could receive baggage and become responsible, the court held that the compary might make such a rule, but that if it did not adopt it, or if having adopted it, it pursued a different practice by accepting baggage relying upon the good faith of the owner, it would be liable whether the loss occurred before or after the arrival and departure of the train, or before or after the purchase of a ticket or fare, if the owner intended to become a passenger, and that the baggage agent was the company's agent for the receipt of such baggage. In that case the agent had received the baggage in the same manner as on previous occasions, and the expressman or transfer company had fulfilled his contract by delivering the baggage at the depot pursuant to his contract and the custom. So, in Green v. Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. 38 Iowa, 100, where the plaintiff's baggage, according to custom, was sent by her through a drayman to defendant's depot the evening before her departure, and was left in the company's waiting room by the The case of Patten v. Johnson, 131 Mass. 297, was one in which the defendants were proprietors of a hack stable and owners of hacks, which they furnished with horses and drivers for the transportation of persons with their baggage from one part of the city to another. The plaintiff, whose bag-carrier, it was held that the railroad company was gage was heavy, hired of defendant a hack and driver for transportation purposes and refused other help, taking only the hack driver along. The facts showed that he assisted in the delivery of the baggage and assented to the method of delivery employed by the driver. In an action to recover damages for the loss of a trunk the court held the carrier was not liable. liable for its loss, the custom being established and the baggage accepted by them. And in the case of Henshaw v. Rowland, 54 N. Y. 242, the court also recognized the custom in such cases, which showed that it was the usage to send baggage to the depot ahead of the owner, to be left there until the owner thereof should call for the same to be placed on the train on which he had See also cases infra, V., and Hopkins v. West- taken his passage, and therefore the transfer comcott, 6 Blatchf. 64, supra, III. V. The effect of a custom. It often becomes a question whether a baggage transfer company which receives baggage to be carried and delivered at a railroad depot, in advance of the intended passenger, is liable for the loss of such baggage when the same is lost or stolen from the depot before such passenger applies for it. Upon this point it would seem that such companies are free from responsibility for the loss of baggage, where they deliver it according to their contract and to the usual custom. In Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Foster, 104 Ind. 293, 54 Am. Rep. 319, the appellee sent a trunk to appellant's railroad by an expressman the night before she took her ticket and traveled over the appellant's railroad, and on her producing her ticket to the baggage master and demanding her trunk to be sent upon the train, found that it had pany having delivered according to the custom was free from liability. In Rogers v. Long Island R. Co. 1 Thomp. & C. 396, Affirmed 56 N. Y. 620, action was brought against defendant as a common carrier to recover the value of a trunk and its contents alleged to have been lost by its negligence at the depot. The facts showed that an expressman took the trunk to the depot at the plaintiff's request and placed it beside a baggage crate at the same time informing the agent in charge of the depot where the trunk was, such agent saying it was all right and instructing two men in the depot to take charge of it, whereupon the expressman left. On plaintiff's arriving later in the day and purchasing his ticket and applying for a check for his baggage, the trunk was missing. The court held that under the evidence the company was responsible for the safe delivery of the property, there having been a sufficient delivery thereof to it by the expressman E. W. INDIANA SUPREME COURT. CLEVELAND, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO, | constitute negligence on the part of the com& ST. LOUIS RAILWAY, Appt., v. William T. MONEYHUN, Guardian of 1. The failure of a carrier to furnish a (October 21, 1896.) A the Superior Court for Madison County in PPEAL by defendant from a judgment of favor of plaintiff in an action brought to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence. tersed. pany. Baltimore & Y. Turnp. Road v. Cason, 72 Md. 377; Siner v. Great Western R. Co. L. R. 4 Exch. 123: Dublin, W. & W. R. Co. v. Slattery, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 1155; Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R. Co. v. Coultas, 67 Ill. 398; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Green, 81 Ill. 19, 25 Am. Rep. 255; Malcom v. Richmond & D. R. Co. 106 N C. 63; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Hazard, 26 Ill. 373; Bemiss v. New Orleans City & L. R. Co. 47 La. Ann. 1671. Appellee's ward was guilty of contributory negligence. Goodwin v. Boston & M. R. Co. 84 Me. 203; Worthington v. Central Vermont R Co. 64 Vt. 107, 15 L. R. A. 326; Camden & A. R. Co. v. Hoosey, 99 Pa. 492, 44 Am Rep. 120: Fisher v. West Virginia & P. R. Co. 39 W. Va. 366, 23 L. R. A. 758. It is negligence to stand and ride upon the platform of a commercial railroad car while it is in rapid mo ion. Alabama & G. S. R. Co. v. Hark, 72 Ala. 112, 47 Am. Rep. 403; Jackson v. Crilly, 16 Colo. 103; Paterson v. Central R. & Bkg. Co. 85 Re-Ga. 653; Bemiss v. New Orleans City & L. R. his favor. Co. supra. The appellee's ward at the time he was injured had reached the age when an infant is presumed to understand danger as well as an adult. 39 Am. Rep. 413; Tucker v. New York C. & H. 195. Messrs. Goodykoontz & Ballard for 2 Elliott, Gen. Pr. § 933; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Martin, 13 Ind. App. 485; Mitchell v. Brawley, 140 Ind. 216; Noblesville Gas & I. Co. v. Loehr, 124 Ind. 79; Housworth v. Bloombuff, 54 Iad, 487; Buchanan v. Milli-appelice. gan, 108 Ind. 433; Albion v. Hetrick, 90 Ind. 545, 46 Am. Rep 220; Dixon v. Dke, 85 Ind. 434: Vinton v. Baldwin, 95 Ind 433. Where negligence and contributory negli gence are in question, and more than one inference can reasonably be drawn, the special verdict must find both the specific facts and the inference or ultimate fact of negligence and freedom from contributory negligence. Jordan, J., delivered the opinion of the court: This action was commenced and prosecuted in the lower court by appellee, William T. Moneybun, as guardian of Charles Moneyhun, a minor under the age of twenty-one years. The action arises out of injuries sustained by said ward, while a passenger upon a train of cars operated by the appellant, by reason of the alleged negligence of the latter. Upon the trial there was a special verdict returned by the jury, and upon the facts therein found the court adjudged that appellee was, as such guardian, entitied to recover damages for the said injuries for the benefit of the ward, and NOTE.-For contributory negligence of a passen-lant for $5,000, the amount mentioned in the rendered judgment accordingly against appelger, see Mitchell v. Southern P. R. Co. ((al.) 11 L. Cincinnati, I. St L. & C. R. Co. v. Grames, 136 Ind. 39; Smith v. Wabash R. Co. 141 Ind. 92: Blomington v. Rogers, 13 Ind. App. 121; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Costello, 9 Ind. App. 462. The fact that there are jerks and sudden starts in the movement of the train does not R. A. 130; also a considerable number of other cases in the note thereto; likewise see Upham v. Detroit City R. Co. (Mich.) 12 L. R. A. 129. verdict. The legal proposition submitted by the parties to this appeal arise under the facts embraced in the special finding of the jury. The following facts are all which we deem it | he was riding, he would not have been injured; necessary to set out in order to present the that it was not safe, but dangerous, for him to mooted questions of law herein involved: leave the car and go onto and stand upon the Appellee is the father and the duly appointed car step,' as he did while the train was runguardian of Charles Moneyhun; the latter having at the rate of 25 miles per hour. The ing no estate, either real or personal. This jury further found that "it was not safe for a ward at the time he sustained the injuries in person to stand where he did, even if the ran question was a boy of average size, intelligence, smooth and did not jerk." The cars were so and education for one of his age, being at the vestibuled as to render it safe for a passenger time nearly fifteen years of age. On June 9, to pass from one car to another, and on the car 1895, after advertising the same, the railroad door there was a printed notice forbidding pascompany (appellant herein) ran an excursion sengers to ride upon the platform of the car, train over its road from Anderson, Indiana, to but, owing to the door being at the time swung Benton Harbor, Michigan, and return; the back, it was thereby obscured from view. train being composed of two sections, and the The injuries sustained by appellee's ward concars thereof being vestibuled. Appellee's ward, sisted of several fractures of both the right and Charles Moneyhun, with the knowledge and left leg, and dislocation of his left ankle. consent of his father, purchased a ticket and These injuries are found to be permanent. boarded said train as a passenger, at Anderson,| The inquiries arising under the above facts for the purpose of being carried as such to embraced in the special verdict are those which Benton Harbor. He entered one of the coaches usually arise under the issues in actions based of the second division, and seated himself upon negligence: First, is the injury in questherein. When said train arrived at Alexan- tion the result of the negligence of appellant? dria, a station about 12 miles from Ander- Second, is the ward of appellee chargeable son, the coach in which said Moneyhun was with contributory negligence? At the very seated was detached from the train, and left threshold of these questions counsel for appelupon a side track, because of a hot box, which lant challenge the right of the guardian to was occasioned by reason of the box being worn maintain this action upon the ground that it and not properly packed. The passengers in could be brought only in the name of the inthis coach, including young Moneyhun, were fant by his next friend, under §§ 256, 257, Rev. informed by the conductor in charge of the Stat. 1894, Rev. Stat. 1881, § 255, 256. Sectrain that they must leave this car and go tion 29 of the Code of 1881, Rev. Stat. 1894, into others. On entering the car to which he§ 267, and Rev. Stat 1881, § 266, provides that and other passengers had been transferred, he "a father, or in case of his death or desertion of found all of the seats occupied and the aisle his family, or imprisonment, the mother may thereof and other places therein filled with maintain an action for the injury or death of passengers who were standing, and he was a child, and a guardian for the injury or death unable to find a seat upon the train, and for of his ward. But when the action is brought this reason accepted standing room in the car by the guardian for an injury to his ward, the which he entered. After detaching the car damages shall inure to the benefit of his ward." from the train for the reason stated, appellant In the case of Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. did not replace it by another in order to Goodykoontz, 119 Ind. 111, this court on page accommodate the passengers on the train with 113 interpreted this section as follows: "If a seats. Moneybun, after standing in the aisle minor under guardianship sustains an injury of the car until the train was near the city of to his person from the wrongful conduct of Warsaw, Indiana, became sick. What made another, his guardian may maintain an action him sick, however, is not disclosed by the and recover for the benefit of the ward preverdict. Believing that he would be com- cisely as the latter might have recovered pelled to vomit, by reason of nausea, and in through the intervention of a prochein ami in order to avoid soiling the car and persons stand-case he had not been under guardianship. ing near him, he voluntarily left the car in which This is so whether the ward's father or mother be was riding, and passed out through the door be living or not. The pain and suffering enof the vestibule, and went down on the lower dured and the permanent injury resulting from step of the steps, leading from the ground to the wounding or maiming of a minor are perthe car, and stood upon this lower step for sonal to himself, and damages for such pain a short time, bolding to the railing. While so and injuries are always recoverable for his standing upon this step his back was towards benefit." We yield adherence to the above the platform of the car, and his head was lean- interpretation of the statute and are of the ing forward and outward. The train at the opinion that it clearly authorizes a guardian of time he left the car, and while he was standing an infant who has received a personal injury upon said step was running at a speed of as the result of a wrongful act of omission or 25 miles per hour; and while so standing commission by another to sue and recover he was thrown off the train, by reason of from the wrongdoer such damages as are perthe engineer suddenly, unnecessarily, and with-sonally sustained by his ward. The contenout warning, applying steam, which caused the car to give a sudden jerk. By being thrown from the train in the manner stated. Money bun was severely injured, being the same in jury complained of by appellee. The jury also find that there was ample room in the car where he was for him to ride, without going upon the platform or steps, and, had he remained upon the inside of the coach in which tion of appellant upon this proposition must therefore be denied, and the action of the appellee in instituting this suit as the guardian of the injured minor is sustained. The special verdict does not find that the ward of appellee was without fault, or free from contributory negligence upon his part, at the time the injury occurred. As freedom from fault or negligence at the time of the accident upon the part of the latter is an essential factor | contributory negligence. While it is true that which must exist in order to entitle the appel it was a duty incumbent upon the railroad lee to recover in this action, we may therefore company to furnish a seat within its car for assume, without deciding, that appellant, under each passenger taken aboard of its train, and the circumstances, is chargeable with actiona- not merely standing room in the aisle of the ble negligence, and address our inquiry first to car, the mere fact, however, that he was comthe question of contributory negligence, which pelled to accept standing room would not counsel for, appellant so strenuously insist, jusify him in voluntarily leaving a place of under the facts, must be imputed to appellee's safety and going to one of peril. The jury ward. It is conceded by appellee that under found that there was ample room in the car in the facts his ward must be deemed to have which he was riding, and in other cars upon been, at the time he sustained the injury, capa- the train, and that there was no necessity for ble of being guilty of contributory negligence. him to go upon the platform or car steps, and The absence of contributory negligence upon that, had he remained inside of the car, be the part of the injured party at the time he re- would not have sustained the injuries which ceived his injuries was in issue, as well as he did; that it was unsafe and dangerous for the alleged negligence of the appellant, and him to leave the car when the train was runthe burden rested upon the appellee to estab-ning at the rate of 25 miles an hour, and stand lish inter alia both of these requisite facts be- upon the steps as he was doing when the accifore he would be entitled to a recovery. The dent happened. The jury further found that rule is firmly settled that, if the special verdict the place where Moneyhun stood when injured of the jury or a special finding of the court was not a safe place to stand, "even if the omits to find any fact essential to support the train ran smooth and did not jerk." He was not judgment below, the latter cannot be sustained. content to step on the platform, but went upon No presumptions or intendments are available the lower step, and stood there with his back in favor of a special verdict, and the omission towards the platform and his head leaning to find a fact in favor of the party upon whom outward, as it is expressly shown by the verthe onus of proving it is cast is equivalent dict. We are of the opinion that the facts disto finding such fact against him. As a close a clear and undoubted case of contribu legal rule, that which is not proved is the tory negligence upon the part of appellee's same as that which does not exist. See Hous- ward, which cannot be controverted from any worth v. Bloomhuff, 54 Ind. 487; Buchanan v. legal standpoint. While it may be said, in the Milligan, 108 Ind. 433: Albion v. Hetrick, 90 sense of decency, that it was proper for this boy, Ind. 545, 46 Am. Rep. 230: Dixon v. Duke, when admonished of the fact that he was about 85 Ind. 434: Vinton v. Baldwin, 95 Ind. 433; to vomit, to make an effort to avoid befoulNoblesville Gas & I. Co. v. Lochr, 124 Ind. ing his fellow passengers, yet even under this 79: Mitchell v. Brawley, 140 Ind. 216; 2 view the law would not justify him in exposElliott, Gen. Pr. § 933. It is also a well- ing himself to peril, or excuse or mitigate his settled proposition in this state that whenever, negligence when he seeks redress in an action under the facts disclosed by a special verdict, for injuries sustained. The authorities cited the question is presented either as to the negli- by the learned counsel for appellee are, under gence of the defendant, or as to whether the the facts, distinguishable from the case at bar, plaintiff was without fault, and two inferences and lend but little if any support to his contenmay reasonably be drawn as to either of said tion upon the question involved. The conultimate facts,-one in favor and the other clusion reached is in harmony with and supagainst-then the determination of such fact ported by the following authorities: Goodwin is within the province of the jurors, and their v. Boston & M. R. Co. 84 Me. 203; Worthfinding will be accepted by the court as conington v. Central Vermont R. Co. 64 Vt. 107, trolling. Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Collarn, 73 15 L. R. A. 326; Camden & A. R. Co. v. Ind. 261, 38 Am. Rep. 134; Cincinnati, I. St L. & C. R. Co. v. Grames, 136 Ind. 39; Rush v. Coal Bluff Min. Co. 131 Ind. 135; Woolery v. Louiscille, N. A. & C. R. Co. 107 Ind. 381, 57 Am. Rep. 114; Smith v. Wabash R. Co 141 Ind. 92: Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Costello, 9 Ind. App. 462; Bloomington v. Rogers, 13 Ind. App. 121. But if the facts found are such that the court can adjudge as a matter of law that the injured party was or was not guilty of contributory negligence, then the finding of such ultimate fact, whatever it may be, will be disregarded by the court. Smith v. Wabash R. Co. supra. In the case at bar, however, there is but one reasonable inference to be deduced from the facts relative to the acts of appellee's ward at the time be sustained his injuries, and that is to the effect that his own negligence contrib uted to said injuries; bence a finding by the jury that he was free from fault could not have affected the legal result. It is manifest, we think from the facts shown, that the ward of appellee was thereunder chargeable with Hoosey, 99 Pa. 492, 44 Am. Rep. 120; Fisher v. V. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 58 N. Y. 248; Lofdahl v. Minneapolis, St. P. & 8. 8. M. R. Co. 88 Wis. 421: Butler v. Pittsburgh & B. R. Co. 139 Pa. 195; Ecliff v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. 64 Mich. 196; Patterson, Railway Acc. Law, § 272: Cincinnati, I. St. L. & CR. Co. v. McClain (Ind.) 44 N. E. 306; St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Rice, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 509; Scheiber v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 61 Minn. 499; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Car |