Equity will give effect to the intention and of party walls make it imposible now to perspirit of the restriction by restraining any im. ceptibly injure their properties in light and pairment of the light and air.

air by the erection of a building south of such Clark v. Martin, supra; Muzzarelli v. Hul walls. shizer, 163 Pa. 646; Ivory v. Burnx, 56 Pa. 300; Peek v. Matthews, L. R. 3 Eq. 514; Child v. St. Andreros Lutheran Church's Appeal, 67 Pa. Douglas, 5 De G. M. & G. 742. 512; Bald Eagle Valley R.Co. v. Nittany Valley R. Co. 171 Pa. 284, 29 L. R. A. 423; Wray v. Dean, J., delivered the opinion of the Lemon, 81* Pa. 273; Philips's Appeal, 93 Pa. court: 50; Groff v. Bird-in-Hand Turnp. Co. 144 Pa. In the year 1831, William Hause, being the 152.

owner of a lot of ground on the south side of The instrument, being the deed of the party Chestnut street, between Twelfth and Thirto be bound, must be taken most strongly teenth streets, fronting on Chestnut 74 feet, against him.

and extending back to Sansom street 235 feet, Beeson v. Patterson, 36 Pa. 27; Miner's Ap- divided it into three lots, giving the middle peal, 61 Pa. 283; klaer v. Ridgway, 86 Pa. 534. and western lot, each, a frontage on Chestnut

Many cases have been found where a build street of 25 feet, and the eastern one 24 feet on ing restriction bas been held to be invalid by the same street, all extending back at right reason of the changed conditions of tbe neigh- angles to Sansom street. On each of the two borhood, but for the most part these cases con outer lots he built a 3. story brick house, cov. tain conditions or restrictions which affected ering the entire front, these main buildings excither the person of the owner or the time to tending back 51 feei 11 inches; then, back, which they were limited, or relating to the buildings for dining room and kitchen, only character of the use and occupation of the two stories high, but extending 66 feet further premises,

back. These back buildings, however, were Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311; 5 feet 6 inches narrower than the main buildKeates v. Lyon, L. R. 4 Ch. 218; Peek v. Mat. ing, leaving that width between tbe walls and theus, L. R. 3 Eq. 517; Sayers v. Collyer, L. R. the lines of the middle lot. He also built a 24 Ch. Div. 180; Roper v. Williams, Turn. & house on the middle lot, the main building beR. 18; Page v. Murray, 46 N. J. Eq. 325; ing the same as the other two, but with no Duncan v. Central Pass. R. Co. 85 Ky. 525; back building, the kitchen being in the baseJewell v. Lee, 14 Allen, 145, 92 Am. Dec. 744; ment, the windows looking south towards SanDana v. Wentworth, 111 Mass. 291.

som street. On March 24, 1832, Hause conMessrs. Julius C. Levy and John G. veyed both the eastern and western lots to Johnson, for appellees, in support of petition Lindsay Nicholson and Rebecca H. Willing, for rehearing:

for the consideration of $19,000 for each lot. The construction of a party wall by one in the deeds was this condition: “Under the owner amounts to a premanent dedication of condition, nevertheless, that no building or such wall to the use of both owners as a part of a building, other than steps and rail' party wall.

ings, cellar doors, door frames, window shutIt avails nothing to the appellants to appeal ters, eaves, and corpices, shall hereafter be to the restriction.

| built or erected on the said hereby-granted lot By their own act they have done that which of ground within 5 feet of the south line of amounts to an extinguishment. When they the said Chestnut street. And the said William crossed the line and built the only wall permis- Hause, for himself, his heirs, executors, adsible, i. e., a solid one, they did an act utterly ministrators, and assigns, doth bereby coveinconsistent with the maintenance of the re- nant, promise, and agree to and with the said striction,

Lindsay Nicholson, his heirs and assigns, that Hoffstot v. Voight, 146 Pa. 635; Evans v. the bouse on the lot of ground adjoining to the Jayne, 23 Pa. 36. Childs v. Napheys, 112 Pa. west of the hereby-granted lot, now belonging 507; Kirby v. Fitzpatrick, 168 Pa. 437; Weig- to the said William Hause, shall be forever mann v. Jones, 163 Pa. 330; Western Nat. hereafter restricted from baving any building Bank's Appeal, 102 Pa. 183.

or part of a building attached to the said mes. The voluntary act of each of the appellants suage thereon erected of a greater height than in permanently obstructing the easement ex 10 feet from the surface of the yard." The tinguished the same.

numbers of these two lots are 1,206 and 1,210. Moore v. Rawson, 3 Barn. & C. 332; Corning The title to 1,206, by regular conveyances, all v. Gould, 16 Wend. 539; Taylor v. Hampton, duly recorded, and embodying the condition, 4 McCord, L. 96, 17 Am. Dec. 710; Wasbb. in 1888 became vested in this plaintiff, and in Easem, new ed. *559; Inpes, Easem. 85; Dyer 1888 that of 1,210 became vested in George v. Sanford, 9 Met. 395, 43 Am. Dec. 399; Matts Allen for the consideration of $125,000. On v. Ilawkins, 5 Taupt. 20.

November 10, 1832, Hause for the consideraThe erection by Allen of a party wall to the tion of $16,000, conveyed the middle lot, 1,208, full depth of his lot notwithstanding the fact to one Stewart, under whom defendants claim. that there are some openings therein in the In that deed, after mentioning that the lot is southern part entitles the appellees to the use bounded east by 1,206 and west by 1,210, is inof such party wall to any height.

serted the following condition: “Under the The act of each of the appellants in erecting condition, nevertheless, that no building. other solid party walls, even though they did not ex than steps and railings, cellar doors and door tend the whole depth of the lot, extinguishes frames, window shutters, eaves, and cornices, the restriction, wbich is invalid if not enforcea- shall bereafter be built or erected on the said ble to its full extent.

hereby granted lot of ground within 5 feet of The acts of the appellants in the construction the south line of the said Chestnut street; and subject to the condition that the house on the enant running with the land, so manifestly lot of ground hereby granted is, and shall be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the middle lot, forever, restricted from baving any building could not have been intended by the grantor; or part of a building attached to the said mes that the reasonable construction is, the obligasuage now erected thereon of greater height tion under it terminates with the removal of than 10 feet from the surface of the yard.” the house then upon the middle lot. That this In the warranty clause it is declared it is "uncovenant, if a perpetual burden, now most vexder the condition and subject as aforesaid." atiously restricts the owner of 1,208 in the en'There seems to be no doubt that in the inter-joyment of the property, and very greatly devening sixty-three years between 1832, the date preciates its value, may be conceded; and, if of the first conveyance, and 1895, when de such result had appeared imminent at the date fendants took their title, the owners and occu- of the conveyance, this argument would, perpants of the middle lot bad, in some particu: haps, not bave been without weight. It will lars, failed to keep within the strict terms of be noticed that, notwithstanding the restrictheir conveyance.

Structures had been put tion, the consideration for the middle lot in upon the Sansom street end of the lot higher 1832 was $16,000, and for each of the others than the limit prescribed in the deed, and some $19,000. The owner seems to have received, of the buildings on the lot in rear of the main in enhanced value of the two outside lots, by building were of a height slightly in excess of reason of the additional back buildings and the the allowable 10 feet from the surface; but no benefits accruing to them from the restriction hostility to right of plaintiffs was intended, in their favor on the middle one, $6,000. He, and there was no substantial interference with doubtless, at that day assumed this sum reprethe light and air enjoyable by 1,206 and 1,210 sented the value of the relative advantages and from a practically unobstructed middle lot disadvantages to the lots created by the restricfree from high buildings. The defendants, tion. But he did not foresee the comparatively the last purchasers of the middle lot, are near future any more than we see ours. In about to take down the old house erected our bargains, to the extent we judge probable, in 1832, with the view of putting upon it a we provide for and guard against proximate building 100 feet bigb, extending from Chest- future contingencies. As to the very remote, nut to Sansom, formerly George, street. The or what appears to us the very remote, we are plaintiffs file this bill to restrain them, alleging indifferent. The serious effect of the restricihat such a structure will be a palpable violation now, after the comparatively short period tion of their right under the covenants in the of sixty years, as affecting the enjoyment of prior deeds of their common grantor. The de. the middle lot, even if his intention had been fendants admitted the facts as we have stated to hold it for bimself and beirs, was not thought them, but denied that the building they in- probable by him or any other lot owner of that tended to put up was an illegal violation of the period. The present values of real estate in restriction. Further, they averred the charac- the present Philadelphia may have been ter of the locality had wholly changed since thought possible in a couple of centuries, but 1832, when the restriction was first imposed. not sooner. They knew the growth of the city At that time that part of Chestnut street was in the preceding century and a balf of its existtaken up by residences; now it is devoted to ence, and that it had then reached a populabusiness. řhe court below refused to enjoin tion of less than 200,000, but they had no readefendants, and plaintiffs appeal.

son to believe that in the next half century the We are of opinion the issue turns wholly on population would reach more than a million, the interpretation of the covenant in the deed and that new methods of communication and of March 24, 1832, from Hause to Nicholson, travel would then have placed other millions for lot 1,206. The grantor covenants for him- practically as close to them as was Lancaster self, his heirs, and assigns, with the grantee, county then. They bargained on a knowledge his heirs, and assigns, that the house on the of their future no more limited than ours as lot of ground adjoining to the west of the to our future, only much more limited than hereby-granted lot, now belonging to the said ours of theirs, because we are looking backWilliam Hause, shall be forever hereafter reward. Not one of us would hesitate to place stricted from having any building or part of a a perpetual burden on land we expected to building attached to the said messuage thereon hold in favor of land we wanted to sell, if erected of a greater height than 10 feet from thereby a present decided pecuniary benefit rethe surface of the yard.” Then the subsequent sulted, and po serious depreciation was probconveyance of the middle lot imposes on that able in that held for a century or two. To us, grantee and his assigns subserviency to the re- with no laws of entail, and no particular passtriction in favor of the grantees of the east and sion for perpetuating family landed estates in west lots. Does the covenant run with the land? city lots, that period suggests to the mind a If so, the power of the owner of the land out of practical “forever," and so it probably appeared which he carved three lots to burden the mid- to Hause when he burdened what he kept to dle one with such a continuing covenant cannot enhance the price of what he sold. It was not be questioned. It has been decided, as will be an absurdly bad bargain, tending to negative noticed from the cases hereinafter cited, that the intention of a continuing covenant, but was in equity the test by which to determine merely such an ignorance of a phenomenal whether a covenant in a deed runs with the land future as exists where men of good business is the intention of the parties. To ascertain capacity sell land one year which enhances in the intention, resort must be had to the words value, in some instances, the next year, one or of the covenant read in the light of the sur two hundred per cent. Of course, they would roundings of the parties and the subject of the not have sold if they had known, or had reason grant. It is argued, in substance, that a cov. I to believe, such appreciation probable, and Hause would not have placed the restriction on surroundings of the parties at the date of the the middle lot if he bad thought it probable conveyance, the subject of the contract, the that without it the lot would appreciate in purpose of it, and the words of it, we are of the value an average of 20 per cent annually, be opinion it was intended to place a restriction sides yielding the interest on his original in. upon the middle lot, running with the land, for vestment. Considering the surroundings, we the benefit of the eastern lot which should for. see nothing in the historical fact of the growth ever prevent the obstruction of light and air by in value and change of use of unencumbered buildings higher than 10 feet to the rear of the lots to negative the intention of the grantor as main building. As long as such restrictions indicated by his words. And this intention is are not unlawful, it is to no purpose to argue only the more clear when we consider the sub- that they seriously retard the improvement of ject of the contract. He had built the three the city. We can no more strike down by dehouses with a view to such a restriction. By cree a lawful restriction creating an easement the character of the structures he intended the than we can compel the lot owner to erect middle lot should be servient to the other two. buildings in accord with the best style of archiFor the depth of the main buildings they should tecture. Contracts such as this, whether conbe equal, but from these back the east and strued as covenants or conditions, since Spencer's west lots should be dominant. The middle Case, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 9th Am. ed. 174. shall have no building higher than 10 feet bave been enforced both at law and in equity erected upon it. For this one he provides a between the immediate parties to them and basement kitchen, so that the lot is unob their grantees, near and remote. And whether structed from all three main buildings to the they be personal to the grantor or be limited to rear. What was the purpose in baving the lot a period less than "forever" depends on the inthus unobstructed? Manifestly that, as tbus tention of the parties, as expressed in the writarranged by him, all three should enjoy light ten instrument. Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 297; and air. He then conveys the two outer lots Muzzarelli v. Hulshizer, 163 Pa. 646; Bald with an expressed intention conforming to the Eagle Valley R. Co. v. Nittany Valley R. Co. structures. These last measured the extent to 171 Pa. 284, 29 L. R. A. 423. We concede which the dominant lots should forever" en some of the cases decided in other states are in joy light and air; at the same time did not ex. apparent conflict with our decision. But what clude the occupant of the main building on this court has uniformly held, and now holds. the middle one from a like benefit. The lat. is that where the restriction, notwithstanding ter's right to the enjoyment of the surface of the change of use of the land and buildings, his lot for building purposes is alone restricted. still is of substantial value to the dominant lot. The parties were not dealing about houses as equity will restrain its violation, if relief, as houses, but concerning the future enjoyment here, is promptly sought. There may be, and of land, with light and air, as affected by the doubtless will occur, cases where the restric. plans and size of houses or buildings which tion has ceased to be of any advantage. In were then or might be thereafter erected upon such cases equity would not interpose and reit. The word used, "forever,” is not one ap- tard improvements simply to sustain the literal propriate to the limited existence of a house or observance of a condition or covenant. And other building, but to the durability of land. three of the cases relied on by appellees are of The expression, if intended only to restrict this very character, and therefore clearly diswhile the then house stood, is scarcely less tinguishable from the one before us. În Coawkward than if, intending to restrict only dur. lumbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311, the ing the life of the first grantee, the grantor had agreement was between owners of dwelling said, "And during the life of the said Lindsay houses that one of them would not erect, carry Nicholson the said Hause and his assigns shall on, or establish any stable, schoolhouse, engine be forever hereafter restricted.” A word is house, community house, or any kind of manused emphatically expressive of a continuance ufactory, trade, or business whatsoever on the beyond the duration of a life or the existence land. His grantees opened up and carried on of an artificial structure, which, if simply many kinds of business in violation of the origomitted, would have indicated the intent inal covenant. The purpose of the covenant claimed by appellees.

was, manifestly, to secure privacy and freedom The purpose to afford air and light to the from noise in the dwelling houses. But by the dominant lots could only be accomplished by construction of an elevated railroad its desiraan unlimited--as to time-restriction, and there bility for dwellings had been practically deis nothing to indicate that a change in the na- stroyed; privacy and quiet could no longer be ture of the occupancy should affect the ex. enjoyed." The court refused to enjoin the use pressed right under the covenant. It is probable of the land for business and manufacturing that deprivation of air is less endurable to the purposes, because, by the change consequent occupants of a dwelling than to those of a store upon the construction and operation of the or factory, and generally the latter are less dis- railroad, the purpose of the restriction had posed to resist such deprivation; but these ele- been defeated. Equity would not ledd its aid ments promote the health and comfort of one to the enforcement of a mere legal right, where class of occupants as fully as the other, and no damage resulted to plaintiff from nonenboth have the same right to insist on a restric-forcement. In Page v. Murray, 46 N. J. Ey. tion for their protection. No such change in 325, the restriction was to protect the land the use of the land as appears bere bas ever from cheap tenement buildings, and encourage been beld destructive of the original covenant its occupation by a superior class of residenis. in any of the adjudicated cases in this state; To this end it provided that for a period of nor, in our opinion, can such judgment be sus twenty years no building should be erected tained on sound legal principies. Taking the costing less than $3.000, and no hotel, tavern, lager-beer saloon, livery stable, etc., should be question as to whether the decree should be erected thereon. In the meantime buildings modified, and, if so, to what extent. This of a low class had been erected in all the sur- reargument was heard on the 27th of May, rounding neighborhood. The purpose to make 1896. As will be noticed in the reported case, the land desirable for another class of occu- Landell's lot is 1,206, the eastern one; the depants was thereby defeated, and this, together fendant's, 1,208, the middle one; and Allen's, with the fact that the twenty-years term had 1,210, the western one. It now appears on renearly expired, induced the court to refuse an argument, that as to Landell's lot either he or injunction to restrain violation of the condi. bis grantors, years prior to the filing of the tion. The court would not enjoin that which bill to restrain defendants, had built a solid could not damage the plaintiff. In Jewell v. wall 17 feet high, from the rear of the old Lee, 14 Allen, 145, 92 Am. Dec. 744, there was building on 1,208, south towards Sansom a condition in the grant, that the land border- street, a distance of not quite 19 feet, and then ing on the ocean should be used for no other continued the same kind of wall, at the height purpose than access to the water for bathing of 12 feet, 37 feet further. The defendant and boating, and low bath houses. It was calls this a party wall. There is no evidence held, from the facts in that case, that the inten- that it is such, or was so intended by the tion of the grantor was to create a restriction builder, except that it extends over the line of in favor of adjoining land which he continued | 1,206, and rests partly on 1,208. The characto bold; that, as this land had passed to other ter of the structure, 12 feet in height for 37 grantees in separate lots, they could not insist feet in length, and then 17 feet high for about on a restriction personal to the original grantor; 19 feet, rebuts the inference that it was ever and the court says: “Where it is apparent intended as a party wall in the legal significathat the condition was annexed to a grant for tion of that term, to be used by both lot ownthe purpose of improving or rendering more ers for building purposes. The most that can beneficial and advantageous the occupation of be said for it on the evidence is that it was a the estate granted when it should become di partition or division wall, the same as a partivided into separate parcels and be owned by tion fence dividing the two lots. It may have different individuals, or when the manifest ob- been a trespass on 1,208 to the extent it rests on ject of a restriction on the use of an estate was that lot. If so, the owner or owners submitted to benefit another tract adjoining to or in the to it; but by their submission they acquired no vicinity of the land on which the restriction is right inconsistent with the restriction imposed imposed,” equitable relief will be afforded. upon the middle lot by the covenant in the Not one of these cases is in conflict with our deed. The right to a party wall is statutory. decision here; on the contrary, they support it. It is not a right to at any time, and in any While cases are cited which support the con. manner, use the land of another. One of two tention of appeHees, the weight of authority is adjoining owners, for building purposes, may, the other way, and we see nothing to induce subject to limitations consistent with the right us to depart from the settled rulings on this of each, encroach upon his neighbor with a question as announced in our own cases al party wall. But, manifestly, this, was no such ready cited.

structure, and conferred on defendants no right The decree of the court below refusing an in- to assume that it absolutely terminated the rejunction is reversed, and injunction is awarded striction in favor of the Landell lot; for, even as prayed for in plaintiffs' bill. It is further if a party wall, at most it gave the middle lot ordered that appellees pay the costs.

owner the right to use it as a party wall to

the height of 10 feet, the limit of the restricA petition for rebearing having been filed, tion. But the wall was solid to the height and Dean, J., on July 15, 1896, handed down the length it was built. The purpose of the refollowing response:

striction was to afford lighi and air to 1,206, At the first hearing in this case, both in oral and the extent of the enjoyment was measured argument and on the paper books, the case by the extent of the restriction on 1,208. That turned on but a single question, riz., whether restriction was, po building or part of a buildthe restriction as to building placed by the ing should be added to the house upon the lot original grantor on lot No. 1,208, in favor of to the rear, higher than 10 feet from the surlots 1,206 and 1,210, was perpetual, or whether face of the lot. But Landell or his grantors it ended with the existence of the house then themselves erect a solid wall along the line of upon the middle lot. After a careful copsid 1,206 and 1,208, 56 feet in length from the rear eration, we decided the restriction was continu- of the old building on the middle lot, through ing, and directed that an injunction issue in which neither light nor air could penetrate. conformity to the prayer of the petitioner. By their own act, plaintiffs have said, "For 19 The effect of this was to restrain defendants feet we do not ask for light and air, except at from putting any building on 1,208 to the rear the height of 17 feet, and for 37 feet further of the house upon it in 1832, higher than 10 we do not ask for either except at the height of feet from the surface of the lot. The defend- 12 feet.” Clearly, equity will not compel deants then petitioned the court for a modifica- fendants to award plaintiffs that which, by tion of the decree, for the reason that, even if their own distinct and unequivocal act, they the judgment of the court that the restriction have declared is valueless to them. was a continuing one were well founded, the It is alleged now the ownership of plaintiff plaintiffs, by their own acts, bad relinquished to 1,206 does not extend to Sansom street, but the right to assert it to the full extent set out in only 149 feet from Chestnut, leaving about 86 Hause's deed of 1832. The case is fully report- feet to which the injunction should not apply. ed. Landell v. Hamilton,175 Pa. 327, ante. 227. To this it is replied the bill alleges and the The court ordered a reargument only on the answer admits, plaintiffs, Landell et al., own back to Sansom street; and there is no proof | cannot say, because the one waived the restricto the contrary. So far as we can discover tion for 18 feet to the height of 17 feet, therefrom the pleadings and proofs, the title of Lan- fore the other did so too; or because one dell et al., or any part of it, is nowhere dis- waived it for 37 feet to the height of 13 feet 9 puted; therefore we can make no modification inches, therefore the other is bound, when by of the decree in this particular. The restric- his own act he only waived to a height of 12 tion here by the covenants in the original deeds, feet for that distance. As we have said, renders it impossible to make such modifica neither could, by his independent act or deed, tion of the original decree as will preserve the affect the right of the other. But it seems to apparent right of defendant as against each of us the correct conclusion is that to the full exthese parties. The middle lot is servient to tent they have equally gone in dispensing with both the eastern and western; but the owner the restriction both can in equity be made subof neither the eastern nor western can, by his ject to our decree. Therefore we modify the independent act or deed, relinquish that sub- original decree so that it shall not operate to serviency so as to affect the other. Here the restrain defendants from building to a height owner of 1,206 has declared that for 19 feet of 13 feet 9 inches for a distance of 19 feet light and air from 1,208 are valueless to him from the rear of the old main building of the below a height of 17 feet, and for 37 feet fur- middle lot. Further, from the end of the 19 ther they are valueless below 12 feet; thus, for feet thus specified it shall not operate to rea distance of 56 feet, waiving the strict terms strain defendants from building to a height of of the restriction. The owner of 1,210 bas | 12 feet from the ground for a further distance also waived the restriction by building his wall of 37 feet. The costs of this case to be taxed 56 feet to a height of 13 feet 9 inches. Welas part of the original decree.


Re Appraisal of ESTATE OF Augustus | N. Y. 224; People, Westbrook, V. Trustees of WHITING, Deceased.

Ogdensburgh, 48 N. Y. 390; People v. Willis, 133

N. Y. 383; People, Jefferson, v. Smith, 88 X. (150 N. Y. 27.)

Y. 576; Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U, S. 491,

25 L. ed. 558; 1 Desty. Taxn. 64, 326; Johnson 1. Bonds of a foreign corporation, as

v. Oregon City, 3 Or. 13; Ankeny v. Multnomah well as bonds and certificates of stock County, 4 Or. 277; Orcutt's Appeal, 97 Pa. 179: of domestic corporations, when deposited State v. Dalrymple, 70 Md. 294, 3 L. R. A. 372; in a safe-deposit vault within the state, although Re Enston's Will, 113 N. Y. 174, 3 L. R. A. owned by a nonresident, are “property within the 464; ke Romaine's Estate, 127 N. Y. 80,12 L. state," within the meaning of the transfer tax R. $. 401; Smalls Estate, 151 Pa. 1; Coleman's act of 1892.

Estate, 159 Pa. 231; Re Phipps's Estate, 77 Hun, 2. Bonds 'issued by the United States 325: Re James, Id. 211.

were not intended to be made subject to tax by the transfer tax act of 1892, as property over dents in respect to property outside the juris

Any attempt to impose taxes on nonresiwhich the state “bas any jurisdiction for the diction is void, because the tax laws of a state purposes of taxation."

have no extraterritorial operation. (Gray and Haight, JJ., dissent.)

Northern C. R. Co. v. Jackson, 74 U. S. 7

Wall. 262, 19 L. ed. 88; Cleveland, P. & A.R. (October 6, 1896.)

Co.v. Pennsylvania ("State Tax on Foreign-held

Bonds) 82 U. S. 15 Wall. 300, 21 L. ed. 179: Whiting, deceased, from an order of the Coleman, 119 N. Y. 137, 7 L. R. A. 407. Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First Bonds of the United States are bonds of a Department, affirming an order of the Surrogate foreign corporation. for New York County assessing for succession Re Merriam's Estate, 141 N. Y. 479; Orcutt's tax the estate of decedent. Modified and of Appeal, supra. firmed.

The state has no power to impose a legacy The facts are stated in the opinions.

or succession tax in respect of bonds of the Mr. George L. Rives, for appellants: United States owned by a nonresident.

A debt cannot be regarded as property in a Strode v. Com. 52 Pa. 181; Re Swift's Estate , state in which neither the debtor nor the cred 137 N. Y. 77, 18 L. R. A. 709; Re Verriam's itor resides.

Estate, supra; Re Hoffman's Estate, 143 N. Y. People, Iloyt, v. Commissioners of Taxes, 23' 327; Home Ing. Co. v. New York, 134 C. S. 594,

. , V.

NOTE.--As to the situs of property for purposes mortgages for the purpose of taxation, see Boyd y. of taxation, see numerous cases in a note to Com. Selma (Ala.) 16 L. R. A. 729, and note; also Holland v. Delaware Division Canal Co. (Pa.) 2 L. R. A. v. Commissioners of Silver Bow County (Mont.) 2: 798; also Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Board of L. R. A. 797. Assessors (La.) 16 L. R. A. 56.

See also the following case, Re Houdayer's Estate As to the situs of debts evidenced by notes and I (N. Y.) post, 235.

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