« ForrigeFortsett »
ing statements. We believe each attempted to corporated in Pennsylvania under said act can perform his duty as he saw it, thougb they do collect more than the amount actually loaned, not seem to believe that of each other. Nev. with 6 per cent interest. ertheless, the main fact stands out prominently Jarrett v. Cope, 68 Pa. 67; Philanthropic and unquestionably that the court below disre- Bldg. A880. v. McKnight, 35 Pa. 470; Kupfert garded, in spirit at least, a rule of this court, v. Guttenberg Bldg. Asso. 30 Pa. 465. and thereby this defendant, in the absence of The comity between the states, in force in its counsel, who was in attendance upon his Pennsylvania, does not hold that because the duties in this court, was cast in a verdict for statute law of New York provides that the ex$6,000. Lawfully defendant had a right to ercise of certain powers conferred upon the counsel. Through po fault of its own or of its corporation in question shall not be deemed a counsel, but because of the erroneous ruling of violation of the New York statutes against the court below, it had none.
usury, that therefore this corporation shall be The trial was not, therefore, lawful, and the permitted to exercise all these powers, or any juögment must be reversed. It is reversed ac- of them, in the state of Pennsylvania, without cordingly, and a v. f. d. n. awarded.
regard to the usury laws of this state.
1 Spelling, Priv. Corp. $ 80, p. 99; Runyan v. Coster, 39 U. S. 14 Pet. 122, 10 L, ed. 382;
Thompson v. Waters, 25 Mich. 221, 12 Am. Rep. Joseph C. BENNETT, Appt.,
243; Falls v. United States Sav. Loan & Bkg.
Co. 97 Ala. 422, 24 L. R. A. 174; Hitchcock v. EASTERN BUILDING & LOAN ASSO- Enc. Law, p. 334, note 1, tit. Usury; Bard y
United States Bank, 7 Ala. 386; 8 Am. & Eng. CIATION of Syracuse, New York.
Poole, 12 N. Y. 504; New York Mut. Suv. & L.
A880. v. Slaughter, 4 Pa. Dist. R. 660; Southern (177 Pa. 233.)
Bldg. & L. A880. v. Riggle, Id. 617; National A contract to pay money to a loan asso- Bldg. & L. As8o. v. Riley, Id. 663; Farrior v. ciation situated in another state at its New England Mortg. Secur. Co. 88 Ala. 275; place of business, made by a resident of one state, American Freehold Land Mortg. Co. v. Sewell. who applied to become a member of the associa- 92 Ala. 163, 13 L. R. A. 299; Evans v. Kittrell, tion as resident in the foreign state, is to be gov- 33 Ala. 449; Rowland v. Old Dominion Bldg. erned by the laws of its residence, although it & L. A880. 115 N. C. 825; Meroney v. Atlanta had an agency at the place where the borrower Nat. Bldg. & L. A880. supra. resided through wbich the contract was made. A contract made at one place, to be per.
formed at another, is governed by the law of (October 5, 1896.)
the place of performance, provided that the
place of performance was not fixed different the Court of Common Pleas for Lycoming evading the usury laws of the place where the County in favor of defendant in an action
contract was made. brought to recover back money paid by plaintiff to defendant which was alleged to have Hoskins, 100 Pa. 551; Depay v. Humpreys, 8
Fitzsimons v. Baum, 44 Pa. 32; Earnest v. been usurious interest upon a loan. Affirmed. Mart. N. S. 1; Hartranft v. Uhlinger, 115 Pa.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
270; Chapman v. Robertson, 6 Paige, 627, 31 Spencer, for appellant: The place of contract is where it is delivered Smith, 17 III. 328, 65 Am. Dec. 656; Story;
7 Wait, Act. & Def. 623, pl. 15; McAllister v. and first takes effect as a binding obligation. 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 547.
Confl. L. p. 422, $ 304a; Martin v. Johnson, 84
Ga. 481, 8 L. R. A. 170; Kilcrease v. Johnson, The obligations were delivered at Williams
85 Ga. 600. port, and the
money was paid at Williamsport, thus fixing Williamsport as the place where all of the circumstances of the case, whether
It is a question to be left to the jury, under the contract was consummated and the obli. or not these obligations were not made payable gations delivered and first became binding as at Syracuse, New York, for the purpose of such.
evading the usury laws of Pennsylvania. Hitchcock v. United States Bank, 7 Ala. 386; Rowland v. Old Dominion Bldg. & L. A880. 115. 14 Ind. 607; Andreus v. Hoxie, 5 Tex. 171;
Kilcrease v. Johnson, supra; Vail v. Heustis, N. C. 825, 116 N. C. 877; Meroney v. Atlanta Fitzsimons v. Baum, 44 Pa. 41; Masterman v. Nat. Bldg. & L. A880, 116 N. C. 882.
Courie, 3 Campb. 488; Hammet v. Yea, 1 Bos. Although the appellee has complied with the & P. 151; Lee v. Cass, 1 Taunt. 511; Ketchum act of April 22, 1874 (Pub. Laws, 108), by filing v. Barber. 4 Hill, 228; Andrews v. Pond, 38 the required certificate in the office of the sec. U. S. 13 Pet. 65, '10 L. ed. 61. retary of the commonwealth, this does not con.
Mr. W. C. Gilmore, for appellee: fer upon it authority to exercise within this state the powers conferred upon it by its York contract and is to be determined by the
The contract in question was clearly a New charter.
laws of New York, It is only by virtue of the provisions con. tained in the 37th section of the act of April Genesee Mut. Ins. Co. 12 N. Y. 258; Watson
Hyde v. Goodnouo, 3 N. Y. 266: Western v. 29, 1874 (cl. 1, Pub. Laws, 96, and cl. 6, v. Brewster, 1 Pa. 381; Benners v. Clemens, 58 Pub. Laws, 98), that building associations in- Pa. 24; Bell v. Packard, 69 Me. 105, 31 Am.
NOTE.- For usury upon loans by building asso- Rep. 251; Sands v. Smith, 1 Neb. 108, 93 Am. ciations, see note to Reeve v. Ladies' Bldg. Asso. Dec. 331; Mills v. Wilson, 88 Pa. 118. (Ark.) 18 L. R. A. 129.
The contract in question was payable by its
express terms in the state of New York and for a loan of $200, which was granted in Deshould therefore be construed according to the cember of the same year. As security for the laws of New York
loan he gave a bond and mortgage on some land 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 546, and cases in Lycoming county, Pennsylvania, for the sum there cited; Addison, Cont. $ 239; Broun v. of $207.89, wbich included the premium paid for Camden & A. R. Co. 83 Pa. 316; Mills v. Wil the loan. The actual money paid to the plainson, supra; Irvine v. Barrett, 2 Grant, Cas. tiff was $180. A the same time he gave to the 73; Archer v. Dunn, 2 Watts & S. 327; defendant sixty-seven promissory notes, for Waverly Nat. Bank v. Hall, 150 Pa. 466; $3,17 each, except three for $1.67 each, the agBuilding & Loan Asso. v. Logan, 66 Fed. Rep. gregate amount of which was secured by the 827; National Mut. Bldg. & L. A880. v. Ash- mortgage, and represented the monthly pay. worth, 91 Va. 706; United States Bldg. & L. ments to be made by the plaintiff as a member Asso. v. Farrell (Tenn.) (See National Bldg. & of the association. On August 31, 1893, the Loan Herald, Feb. 15, 1896).
plaintiff paid the mortgage debt in full, In the absence of positive enactments to the the amount being $181.07, after deducting the contrary, or unless against public policy, cor-withdrawal value of his stock and a rebate preporations of one state may exercise within an- mium. He now claims that the premium reother state the general powers conferred by its tained by the defendant and the fines charged charter.
against him in the settlement were usury, and Grant v. Henry Clay Coal Co. 80 Pa. 208; seeks to recover in this action $50.95, alleging Merrimac Min. Co. v. Levy, 54 Pa. 227, 93 that this amount was the excess over legal inAm. Dec. 697; Bank of Kentucky v. Schuylkill terest on the amount of money actually loaded Bank, 1 Pars. Sel. Eq. Cas. 180; Bank of Au- to him by the defendant. He contends that gusta v. Earle, 38 U. S. 13 Pet. 519, 10 L. ed. his contract with the defendant was a Pennsyl. 274; Life Asso. of America v. Rundle (“Relfe vavia contract, and to be governed by the law v. Rundle"), 103 U. S. 225, 226, 26 L. ed. 339; of that state. The defendant bad an agency Lancaster v. Amsterdam Improv. Co. 140 N. Y. at Williamsport, in Pennsylvania, and the 576, 24 L. R. A. 322; People v. Fire A880. of transaction was conducted between the plaintiff Philadelphia, 92 N. Y. 311, 44 Am. Rep. 380; | and the defendant's agent at that place. That Hollis v. Drew Theological Seminary, 95 N. Y. circumstance, however, is of no account if the 166; People v. Blake, 54 Mich. 239; United contract was to be performed in the state of States Mortg. Co. v. Gross, 93 III. 483; Ameri. New York. The appellant does not at all discan & F. Christian Union v. Yount, 101 U. pute the proposition that contracts are to be S. 352, 25 L. ed. 888: Tombigbee R. Co. v. governed by the law of the place where they Kneeland, 45 U. S. 4 How. 16, 11 L. ed. 855; are to be performed, nor does he contend that Cowell v. Colorado Springs Co. 100 U. S. 55, he would have any right of recovery under the 25 L. ed. 547; Williams v. Creswell, 51 Miss. law of New York, which permits building and 817; Silver Lake Bank v. North, 4 Johns. Ch. loan associations to charge usurious rates of 370; Bard v. Poole, 12 N. Y. 495; Merrick v. interest on loans. The learned court below Van Santcoord, 34 N. Y. 208; British Ameri. decided that the place of performance was the can Land Co. v. Ames, 6 Met. 391; Martin v. state of New York, and the contract was thereMobile & 0. R. Co. 7 Bush, 116; Guaga Iron fore to be governed by the law of that state. Co. v. Dawson, 4 Blackf. 202; Leasure v. In this opinion we concur. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. 91 Pa. 491; Dodge v. A point was also made tbat, if the contract Council Bluffs, 57 Iowa, 560; Frazier v. Will- was made for the purpose and with the intent cox, 4 Rob. (La.) 517; Life Asso. of America v. of evading the usury laws of Pennsylvania, it Levy, 33 La. Ann. 1203; Kennebec Co. v. Au- must be governed by the law of Pennsylvania, gusta Ins. & B. Co. 6 Gray, 204; Flash and not of New York. As to this the court v. Conn, 16 Fla. 428, 26 Am. Dec. 721; below held that there was not a scintilla of Newburg Petroleum Co. v. Weare, 27 Ohio St. evidence of any such intent, and therefore the 343; Western Teleg, Co. v. Mayer, 28 Ohio doctrine could not apply to this case; and in St. 521; Bunk of Washtenau v. Montgomery, 3 that ruling also we fully concur. Ill. 422; Santa Clara Female Academy v. Sulli- It is only necessary to examine briefly the van, 116 III. 375, 56 Am. Rep. 776; Baltimore contract of the parties in order to determine at & 0. R. Co. v. Glenn, 28 Md. 287, 92 Am. what place it was to be performed. The deDec. 688; Wood Hydraulic Hose Co. v. L'ing, fendant's place of business was at Syracuse, in 45 Ga. 34; Home Ins. Co. v. Davis, 29 Mich. the state of New York. The plaintiff's appli238; Kerchner v. Gettys, 18 S. C. 525; People, cation for membership was in the following Peabody, v. Chicago Gas Trust Co. 130 Ill. 208, words: “I, Joseph Bennett, of Williamsport, 8 L. R. A. 497; Ellerman v. Chicago Junction county of Lycoming, state of Pennsylvania, R. & U. S. Y, Co. 49 N. J. Eq. 217.
hereby apply for membership in the Eastern
Building & Loan Association of Syracuse, OnGreen, J., delivered the opinion of the opdaga county, New York, and subscribe for court;
two shares of instalment stock. I hereby agree The defendant is an incorporated building to abide by all the terms, conditions, and by. and loan association, duly incorporated by the laws contained or referred to in the certificate laws of New York, and located and transact- of shares and will also comply with all the rules ing its business at Syracuse, in that state. and regulations of said association.” The The plaintiff, in October, 1891, made applica- plaintiff's application was accepted, and he tion to become a member of the association, by thereupon became a member, consciously and purchasing two shares of its stock, and, in intentionally, of an association of the state of November following, received a certificate for New York, and contracted that he would abide the shares. In May, 1892, he made application by their by-laws, and comply with all their
rules and regulations. His subsequent appli- | made. And, when those terms are clear, excation for a loan was entitled “Application for plicit, involved in no doubt whatever, they Loan from the Eastern Building & Loan Asso- must prevail; and it is the duty of the courts ciation of Syracuse, N. Y.” He afterwards to enforce them according to their literal meansigned an application for an advance, addressed ing. Nor is there the slightest ground for an as follows: "To the Board of Directors of the allegation that the contract was made for the Eastern Building & Loan Association of Syr- purpose of evading the usury laws of Pennsy!. acuse, N. Y.;" requesting the advance to be vania. Who had such a purpose, and what is made, and again agreeing to comply with the the evidence of it? Did the plaintiff have it, charter and by-laws of the association, and all and, if so, did he communicate it to the derequirements defined by the committee of the fendant? If so, where is the evidence of it? board of directors. Thereupon sixty-seven There is none whatever. The defendant's potes were prepared, sent to him for signature, business was transacted at its proper place of and signed by him, in the following words: business in the state of New York." This busi
On or before the last Saturday of March, 1893, ness was a part of its regular business, dove in I promise to pay three and 17 dollars to the its usual way; and, as a matter of course, the order of the Eastern Building & Loan Associa. mere fact that this loan was made to a citizen tion of Syracuse, N. Y., at its office in Syra- that it was done with an intent to evade the
of Pennsylvania cannot justify an inference cuse, N. Y. Value received. Williamsport, Jan. 2, 1893.
laws of Pennsylvania. This business was done Joseph C. Bennett.
just as all its other business was done. The
defendant had a lawful right to loan money When he gave his bond for the money wherever it pleased, and it would be most loaned be obligated himself as follows: "I, absurd to say that, because it lent money to a Joseph C. Bennett, am held and firmly bound Pennsylvanian, it therefore intended to evade unto the Eastern Building & Loan Association | the laws of Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvanian of Syracuse, N. Y., in the sum of $400, had a right to borrow money in the state of lawfúl money of the United States of America, New York if he chose to do so, and, if he to be paid to said Eastern Building & Loan contracted to pay it in the state of New York, Association of Syracuse, N. Y.,' In be must be conclusively presumed to know that the condition of the bond it is provided his contract would be governed by the law of that if he pays to the association, repeat that state. In all this there is not a shadow of ing its name and place, $207.89 in sixty- an unlawful intent to evade the law of Pennseven equal payments, of $3.17 each, except sylvania. There was therefore nothing to subthree of $1.67 each, "payable monthly to said mit to the jury on that question. association, at its office in Syracuse, N. Y., on Judgment affirmed. or before the last Saturday of this and each and every month," etc. The mortgage also executed by the plaintiff repeats the name and designation of the defendant, and its place; reciies the bond, with its condition for making HARRISBURG NATIONAL BANK, Appt., all the payments at the office of the company, at Syracuse, New York; and then grants to the defendant, repeating its name and place, cer
Elizabeth Reily BRADSHAW. tain described land of the plaintiff, situate in Lycoming county, Pennsylvania, with the
(178 Pa. 180.) usual proviso that, if the payments are all made to the defendant, the bond and mortgage 1. A statute excepting accommodation should become void. Thus, it will be seen that in every possible
indorsement from the contracts which may
be made by a married woman does not render way in which the English language could ex
invalid a renewal after marriage of such an inpress it the plaintiff entered into a written
dorsement made before marriage. contract with the defendant to pay it, in sixty- 2. A married woman may confirm the seven different payments, every one of which
act of her attorney in renewing, in excess was to be made at the office of the defendant
of his authority, her indorsement on a note given in Syracuse, New York, a designated aggregate before marriage, if she could have conferred the sum of money. What is the use of discussing
power on him in the first instance. the question whether this was a contract to pay 3. The facts that renewal notes are not money in the state of New York? What is
made until after the old ones are overthere to discuss? Nothing. No other place due, and tbat the old ones are not protested for of payment is mentioned or can possibly be nonpayment, will not make the renewals new implied. This one place is positively expressed contracts beyond the power of a married woman over and over again, and many times over, in to make if the original note was indorsed before solemn instruments, signed and sealed by the plaintiff himself, and in sixty-seven different NOTE.—The power of a married woman to exenotes, also signed by the plaintiff. It is a cute a renewal of an obligation created before her waste of time to discuss so plain a matter. The marriage is a matter on which there are few prefact that the plaintiff lived in Pennsylvania,
As to the wife's capacity to contract generally, and negotiated there with an agent of the see Prentiss v. Paisley (Fla.) 7 L. R. A. 640, and note. defendant either for the membership or for the
For the somewhat kindred matter of the validity loan, is not of the slightest significance. Tbe of a renewal by an incompetent person of an oblicontract must be adjudged by its express terms, gation created while competent, see Memphis Nat. no matter where the parties were wben it was Bank v. Sneed (Tenn.) ante, 274, and note.
her marriage and the renewals are in pursuance | Inst. § 1266; Ritter v. Singmaster, 73 Pa. 400; of a general understanding that they shall be Brown v. Scott, 51 Pa. 357. made, and there was no intention that they should
If, then, the renewals in question were not be new contracts.
payments, but operated simply as a suspension
of the right of action, the obligation evidenced (October 5, 1896.)
by the contract remained, and necessarily re
lated back to the origin of the debt. AP be all be plaintiff fromena judgmenth of Overholt v. First Nat. Bank, 82 Pa. 490;
the Court of Common Pleas for Dauphin Stephens v. Monongahela Nat. Bank, 88 Pa. County in favor of defendant in an action 157, 32 Am. Rep. 438. brought to enforce defendant's alleged liability The true test of liability in the present case as indorser on a promissory note. Reversed. must depend upon the question whether or
The facts found by the trial court were as not an antenuptial contract of indorsement follows:
falls within the probibition of the acts of 1887 **(1) In July, 1889, Miss Elizabeth Reily in- and 1893. Their plain import is to enlarge the dorsed a note for $10,000 for the accommoda- powers of married women, and to coofer upon tion of her brother, John W. Reily, which them all the powers of a feme sole except in was discounted for bim by the Harrisburg Na- certain specified particulars. tional Bank, wlih knowledge that she was an Real Estate Invest. Co. v. Roop, 132 Pa. 496, accommodation indorser, and when this note 7 L. R. A. 211; Koechling v. Benkel, 144 Pa. matured on November 4, 1889, she in like 215. manner indorsed a like note in repewal of the
Antenuptial contracts are substantially in first. Before the second note matured, she be the same position as before, except that they came the wife of Walter J. Bradshaw, and may recognize such contracts, and bind themexecuted, jointly with him, a power of attor- selves in relation thereto, more effectually than ney to G. M. McCauley.
(2) After they could under previous laws. her marriage and the execution and delivery of Glyde v. Keister, 32 Pa. 87; Finley's Ap this power of attorney, she removed to Helena, peal, 67 Pa. 453. Montana, where she resided when the second Since the acts of 1887 and 1893 she can con. note matured on March 7, 1890. On that day fess a judgment, or do any other act in recog. the attention of her attorney was called to this nition of ber liability in such cases, to the same note by the president of the bank, who asked extent as if she were a feme sole. him to indorse a vote ip renewal. Mr. McCau- Adams v. Grey, 154 Pa. 258; McCormick v. ley expressed doubt whether he bad authority Bottorf, 155 Pa. 331; Milchell v. Richmond, 164 so to do, and the president said, if he would Pa. 566. indorse it, it would be satisfactory, which he The potes given before marriage are not tben did. He had no knowledge of the exe separable from the renewals made after marcution of the note until this time, and Mrs. riage, but the liability of the defendant is to Bradshaw had not mentioned it to him, nor be drawn from the transaction as a whole, and given him any authority to act for her, except not from any single part of it. the power of attorney above referred to. No Mahon v. Gormley, 24 Pa. 80. protest or notice of nonpayment was made or Demand and notice are not parts of the congiven as to the note which then matured. At tract, but merely steps in the remedy, which this time the balance to the credit of John W. may be waived by the indorser. Reily on the books of the bank was $2,558.06. Barclay v. Weaver, 19 Pa. 396, 57 Am. Dec. (3) Thereafter, at intervals of four months, 661. until August 17, 1894, notes, each in renewal A subsequent promise to pay the note by an of the preceding one, were given to the bank indorser who has full knowledge of all the with the accommodation indorsement of Eliza- facts, amounts to a complete waiver of the beth R. Bradshaw, the defendant. None of want of due notice. these renewal notes were protested, and there Sherer v. Easton Bank, 33 Pa. 134. were intervals of, in some cases, two or three Mr. S. J. M. McCarrell for appellee. days, and in others as many weeks, between the maturity of a given note and the indorse- Fell, J., delivered the opinion of the court: ment and delivery of the renewal. Most of The question Ipresented by this case relates the notes, when matured and renewed, were to the power of a married woman 10 bind her. delivered to the attorney of John W. Reily self by the renewal of an accommodation inand Mrs. Bradshaw, and the renewal interest dorsement made before her marriage. The dewas paid by him on account of John W. fendant, when single, indorsed a promissory Reily. (4) When the last note matured, on note at four months for $10,000 for the accom December 20, 1894, it amounted, with interest, modation of the maker, her brother. Once to $10,817, and it was duly protested, and no before marriage she renewed her indorsement, tice of nonpayment was sent to the defendant." and after her marriage she renewed it as the
Messrs. Robert Snodgrass and Wolfe notes became due, at intervals of four months, & Bailey, for appellant:
for the period of nearly five years. The last All of the potes, subsequent to the original, of the series of notes was protested, and this were renewals and were so marked, They suit brought upon it. The statement was were not payments in any sense, nor were they drawn and the case presented by the plaintiff shown to have been tendered or accepted as upon the theory that the notes given before such. They could not have been considered marriage and the renewals after marriage were as payments unless it was clearly shown that parts of a continuing transaction, and that the they were so intended.
defendant's liability was to be drawn from the Randolph, Com. Paper, $ 1511; Dan. Neg. whole of it. The marriage of the defendant
did not affect her relation to obligations into of the act, although the obligation may belong which she had previously entered so as to re- to the probibited class. The bank could have lease ber from an antenuptial contract, and it bound the defendant to the payment of the is conceded that the protest of the first pote pote absolutely by protest. She could have wbich became due after her marriage would bound herself by a waiver of protest. The rebave fixed her liability as to it; but it is claimed newal of her indorsement at the maturity of the that she was without power, after marriage, note was but the recognition and continuance of to renew her indorsement, as she is not per- an obligation which she had before assumed, mitted by the act of June 8, 1893, to become and which was binding upon her. Whether the an accommodation indorser. The learned | power of attorney given by the defendant to judge, before whom the case was tried without G. M. McCauley authorized the indorsement a jury, held as conclusions of law that the de- made by him of the note of March 7, 1890, is fendant was discharged from liability upon the pot material. If she bad power to renew note indorsed by her before marriage and the indorsement after marriage, she could do which matured thereafter by the failure of the it by her attorney, and if the power under bank to protest it for nonpayment; that the which he acted was not broad enough, it was failure to protest was not waived by the incompetent for her to ratify and confirm his dorsement of new notes from time to time; act. This she did. The indorsement of notes and that she was not bound by the indorse in renewal by the defendant after she had been ments made after marriage, for the reason that released from liability on preceding notes beshe was incompetent to incur liability as an ac- cause of the failure of the bank to protest commodation ipdorser. The primary question them for nonpayment was not, under the ciris whether a married woman is bound by the cumstances, the assumption of a new liability renewal of an existing valid contract, entered as accommodation indorser. After her marinto before marriage, when the contract is one riage she resided in Montana. The notes were wbich the law does not authorize her to make sent to her by her attorney for indorsement. after marriage. The act of 1893 gives a mar. Most of them were returned to the bank beried woman ihe same right to acquire, control, fore the maturity of the notes which they and dispose of property and to make contracts were intended to renew. The bank relied in relation thereto that she possessed before upon her carrying out in good faith the undermarriage. The limitation placed upon the standing wbich existed between them as to repower conferred is tbat she may not become newals. Sbe did carry it out. It was not at accommodation indorser, maker, guarantor, or any time the intention of either party that she surety for another." The purpose of the limi- was assuming a new obligation for her brother, tation is to protect her from contracts pot con- but it was the intention of both that the renected with the management of ber estate, and newals should be as of the dates of the notes from which she could derive no advantage. renewed; that there should be no gap; and that As to contracts relating to her own estate or she was continuing her own obligation, entered affairs, the existing restraint was removed. It l into before marriage, by which she was bound. remains as to a class of contracts into which | While the defendant was not authorized, after she might be induced or constrained to enter marriage, to enter into a new contract as acfor the benefit of others. The defendant was commodation indorser, it was competent for liable on the indorsement of the note which her to continue her valid antenuptial contract. became due two months after her marriage. In dealing with this the act of 1893 imposed True, her liability was conditional only, but it no limitation upon her power. She could would have been fixed and made absolute by have taken advantage, as could any indorser, protest and notice. By the renewal of her in- of the failure of demand and notice by the dorsement she did not enter into a new obliga- holder of the note, or she could overlook the tion for the benefit of another, but she contin omission and recognize and reassert her liabil. ued and extended for her own benefit an existity by a new indorsement. By so doing she ing obligation by which she was bound. By was not entering into a new contract not auso doing she did not “become an accommoda- thorized by the act. Substantially the same tion indorser,” and enter into a new forbidden principle was asserted in Brunner's Appeal, 47 contract. The contract already existed and Pa. 67. Under the act of 1848 a married its continuance was for the relief and benefit woman was liable on her antenuptial contract, of her estate. A construction of the act but was without power to confess judgment which denies a woman, after marriage, the for a debt due by her. It was held in the case power to continue an antecedent obligation, cited that she could agree to the revival of a would in many cases impose a hardship upon judgment entered after marriage by virtue of her. If she cannot continue, the alternative is a power of attorney signed by her before marto pay, however great may be the loss to her riage, for the reason that it was not the creaestate. Such a construction is not required by tion of a new liability by the renewal of one the letter of the act, and would not be in bar- already existing. We are of opinion that unmony with its spirit. The proviso of the act der the findings of fact judgment should have of 1887, which is incorporated into the act of been entered for the plaintiff. 1893, is for the protection of women after mar- The judgment is reversed, and set aside, and riage from a class of contracts in which they now, October 5, 1896, judgment is entered for have no direct interest, and from which their the plaintiff for the amount of the note of estates can derive no advantage. The renewal | August 17, 1894, with interest and costs of proof an obligation contracted before marriage, test, $12,202.06. we think, oes not come within the meaning