Heisk. 349, 24 Am. Rep. 308, and State v. Butler, 11 Lea, 419,-before mentioned. The former cases ruled that the municipal ordinances therein considered were in the nature of regulations for the removal and prevention of nuisances along the sidewalks, and were therefore within the police power of the state; and the latter cases ruled that the special assessments there involved were for municipal purposes, in the general sense, and therefore within the taxing power. Reelfoot lake levee district is in no sense either | rather within that of McBean v. Chandler, 9 a county or an incorporated town. All taxes that are leviable at all, except those authorized to be levied by counties and incorporated towns, respectively, must undoubtedly be levied by the legislature; and all taxes levied by the legislature must as certainly be levied with reference to the restrictions of g 28. It follows, therefore, that, if a levy of taxes for the benefit of the Reelfoot lake levee district be permissible at all, it must be made by the legislature, and subject to those restrictions. Whether taxes for such an object be allowable in any case will be considered hereafter. Complainants contend in the next place that, if the act be not sustainable under the taxing power, it can be and should be sustained under the police power of the state. This latter power, like the former one, is an attribute of Sovereignty; and it may rightfully have expression in the form of legislation, whenever needful for the promotion of public health, or the preservation of public safety, order, or wellbeing. Rules and regulations established in the proper exercise of this power often require the payment of money for certain specified objects, and thereby in some measure partake of the nature of tax laws, though in primary purpose entirely distinct from them. "The distinction between a demand of money under the police power, and one made under the power to tax, is not so much one of form as of substance. The proceedings may be the same in the two cases, though the purpose is essentially different. The one is made for regulation and the other for revenue. If, therefore, the purpose is evident in any particular instance, there can be no difficulty in classifying the case, and referring it to the proper power. Only those cases, where regulation is the primary purpose, can be specially referred to the police power.' Cooley, Taxn. pp. 586, 587. Obviously, the burden intended to be laid on the property of the citizen by the act under consideration is not primarily for regulation; but, on the contrary, revenue is the primary and greatly preponderating purpose, if not, indeed, the exclusive purpose, in the legislative mind. The paramount and controlling idea disclosed in every part of the act is to raise a fund with which to reclaim from frequent inundation a large body (some 300,000 acres) of land in the Mississippi valley, and thereby enhance its value and the wealth of its owners. Strictly speaking, it is without an element or feature of regulation. The health of the people in the locality might be somewhat improved, and even life itself might be saved accordingly, by the construction of the contemplated levee, and the consequent prevention of periodical overflows; but those are the most remote of the benefits to be anticipated from such a work, and were, likely not thought of by the members of the general assembly. Without further enlarging upon the subject, we hold unhesitatingly, that this legislation is in no sense referable to the police power of the state, and that it cannot be justified thereunder. It does not fall within the reason of Franklin v. Maberry, 6 Humph. 369, 44 Am. Dec. 315; Washington v. Nashville, 1 Swan, 180; Whyte v. Nash ville, 2 Swan, 369; and Nashville v. Berry, 2 Tenn. Legal Rep. 26,-before mentioned, but The act is unconstitutional for the further reason that the legislature attempts thereby and therein to delegate a portion of the taxing power to the Reelfoot lake levee district, without express authorization so to do. It has already been seen that the power of taxation is essentially legislative, and, that being so, it fell to the legislative branch of the government, in the organic division of governmental power. Such being the case, that branch, and that branch alone, is authorized to levy taxes in the first instance, and it can delegate its power to do so only to the extent expressly stated in the 29th section of art. 2 of the fundamental law; that is, to the extent of authorizing counties and incorporated towns to levy taxes for county and corporation purposes, respectively. No department of the government can resign or abdicate any of its distinctive and essential powers to another department, and much less to a mere subdivision or inferior agency, unless expressly authorized by the or ganic law itself. State v. Armstrong, 3 Sneed, 654. "It is a general rule of constitutional law that a sovereign power conferred by the people upon any one branch or department of the government is not to be delegated by that branch or department to any other. This is a principle which pervades our whole political system and, when properly understood, admits of no exception. And it is applicable with peculiar force to the case of taxation." Cooley, Taxn. p. 61; Waterhouse v. Cleveland Public Schools, 8 Heisk. 859. The mere apportionment of sovereign powers among the three co-ordinate branches of the state government, without more, imposed upon each of those branches the affirmative duty of exercising its own peculiar powers for itself, and prohibited the delegation of any of those powers, except in cases expressly permitted. Such was the interpretation of the Constitution of. 1796, under which an act authorizing county courts to levy taxes for county purposes, and also another act authorizing a navigation tax in a collection of designated river counties, were adjudged to be unconstitutional and void because that instrument did not in terms empower the legislature to confer such authority upon county courts. Marr v. Enloe, 1 Yerg. 452. That case was decided at the close of the year 1830, and must have been well known to the delegates composing the convention that framed the Constitution of 1834. That convention had the power to abrogate the rule of construction announced and applied in that case totally, or to subject it to partial modifications. It chose the latter, and authorized the legislature to delegate the power of taxation to the counties and incorporated towns. This was done by the 29th section of the second article of the Constitution the state, and enlarge her wealth and population. The owners, who would have to bear the burden of reclamation and continued protection, would naturally and justly receive the greatest and most direct benefit. Nevertheless, the state would be benefited in the important respects just mentioned. Her general reve nues would be increased, not by reason of her receipt of any part of the taxes to be raised under the special act, but because the taxable value of the lands reclaimed and protected would be increased, and the general taxes thereon correspondingly enlarged. The exaction made of the citizens of the district for such an object would be of a public nature, and therefore within the taxing power. It would be for a public purpose in a twofold sense: First, because beneficial to a large com then framed and subsequently adopted. The convention did not mean to go further. The implication is irresistible that the expression of the authority to delegate the power to the counties and towns is an absolute exclusion of authority to delegate the power to any other agency. It is impossible to doubt that the convention designated the counties and incorporated towns, and authorized the power to be conferred on them, for the reason that without such designation the power of taxation would be restricted to the legislature only. Keesee v. Civil Dist. Bd. of Edu. 6 Coldw. 131. That provision of the Constitution of 1834 was copied literally into the Constitution of 1870, without any further modification; and it must be presumed to have been so copied with the understanding and intent that the whole of the taxing power should remain in the legislature, ex-munity of people within the district; and, seccept that part expressly authorized to be delegated. Waterhouse v. Cleveland Public Schools, 8 Heisk. 859; McBean v. Chandler, 9 Heisk. 372, 24 Am. Rep. 308. The particular feature of the act that is most objectionable as a delegation of the taxing power is that in which the levee district is authorized to decide for itself what rate of taxation, if any, shall be laid annually, only the maximum rate being prescribed. The legislature, before passing the law, should have determined at least three - things: (1) that the purpose in view was a proper purpose for taxation; (2) the annual rate required for the present; and (3) the rule under which it should be levied. These matters are within the legislative function, and cannot be delegated, in the absence of express authority of the fundamental law. Such questions may be left to counties and incorporated towns, in respect of their own taxes, and within proper limitations; but that is so because the general assembly is expressly empowered to grant them that authority. No other agency or instrumentality of the government can be given such power. Had the legislature adequate power to create by special law such an agency or instrumentality as that set forth in the act before us? We have been able to discover no good and valid reason why it had not. The intended creature was clearly not a private corporation, and consequently could not have been within the prohibition (Const. art. 11, § 8) that "no corporation shall be created by special law.' State v. Wilson, 12 Lea, 246; Ballentine v. Pulaski, 15 Lea, 633; Williams v. Nashville, 89 Tenn. 490. Nor, indeed, was it to be a corporation at all. It could have been but an inferior agency or instrumentality of the state, in the nature of a taxing district, designed to reclaim and perpetually protect about 300,000 acres of land in the northwestern corner of the state,-rich and of great value, but for the periodical overflows to which it is subjected by the high waters of the Mississippi river. The accomplishment of such an object would greatly benefit the numerous owners of the soil, and thereby enhance the resources of 34 L. R. A. ondly, because beneficial to the state in the particulars already indicated. The taxes to be raised by and for such an agency or instru mentality, however, would be subject to the same requirements as are taxes levied for state, county, and municipal purposes, under $ 28 and 29 of art. 2 of the Constitution. The creation of levee districts has been adjudged to be within the legislative power in Arkansas (Carson v. St. Francis Levee Dist. 59 Ark. 513), in Louisiana (New Orleans Draining Co. Case, 11 La. Ann. 338), in Mississippi (Daily v. Scope, 47 Miss. 367), in Missouri (Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495, 72 Am. Dec. 276), in Wisconsin (Donnelly v. Decker, 58 Wis. 461, 46 Am. Rep. 637), and in other states; and the creation of irrigation districts has been held to be within that power in California (Hogar v. Yolo County Supers. 47 Cal. 222, and Turlock Irrig. Dist. v. Williams, 76 Cal. 360), and perhaps in other states. It is said by Judge Cooley that "taxing districts may be as numerous as the purposes for which taxes are levied." Cooley, Taxn. 151. It is not every act with unconstitutional provisions that must fail in toto. If, notwithstanding and withstanding such provisions, there be left enough for a complete law, capable of enforcement, and fairly answering the object of its passage, the courts will reject only the void parts, and enforce the residue. Čooley, Const. Lim. 215, 216: Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U. S. 80, 26 L. ed. 318; Florida C. R. Co. v. Schutte, 103 U. S. 118, 26 L. ed. 327; Tillman v. Cocke, 9 Baxt. 429. We regret that the act before us is not susceptible of such division and enforcement. Taking out the taxing feature, and the act is completely emasculated. A levee district without a levee, or the means of constructing one, is a creature without force or power to exist. Since the bill of complainants must inevita bly fail for reasons already stated, it is entirely unnecessary to determine, or even consider. the question of jurisdiction. Affirm the decree and dismiss the bill. WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT. An equitable estoppel will preclude the public from claiming as a public park land so designated on a recorded plat, where it makes no claim to the land except by failing to assess it for taxes for many years, and then the owner files a new plat on which the land is described as his own property, after which he continues in possession as he always has done, takes down the old fence and makes a new one, expends money in other improvements upon it, pays taxes for a series of years upon it, and builds a sidewalk along one side by order of the city authorities, and there was an express adoption of his new plat about seven years after it was filed by an act incorporating the city. (November 4, 1896.) APPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of till he sold the property in 1890, as hereinafter the Circuit Court for Outagamie County in favor of defendant in an action brought to recover damages for breach of covenant of title in a deed of certain real estate. Affirmed. Statement by Marshall, J.: On the 31st day of October, 1851, George W. Lawe was the owner in fee of certain lands situated in the city of Kaukauna, Outagamie county, Wisconsin, including the premises in question. On that day he caused to be made a plat of said lands, subdividing the same into lots and blocks, and on the 31st day of October, thereafter, caused such plat to be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of such county, for the purpose of establishing a legal town plat of the premises, pursuant to the proOn such visions of chap. 41, Rev. Stat. 1849. plat the premises in dispute, except lots 5 and 14. are designated as "Public Square." Immediately after the plat was recorded, Lawe commenced selling lots, describing the same according to such plat, and it was, for all purposes, recognized by him and all persons claiming under him, and by the public as well, as a valid town plat, up to the time of the comOn the 29th day mencement of this action. of May, 1878, the title to the premises in dispute being in Lawe, except as affected by such plat, he joined with Meade and Black in making and placing on record a new plat covering the same and other lands adjoining. Such new plat was named "Lawe, Black, & Meade's Addition to Kaukauna." The making and recording of such new plat purported to be for the purpose of subdividing into lots and blocks the premises therein described, and making a legal plat thereof under the laws of the state of NOTE. AS somewhat akin to the subject of the above case, see note to Meyer v. Graham (Neb.) 18 L. R. A. 146, as to the rights acquired against the public by adverse possession of a highway or city street. For a denial of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent the public from asserting its rights Wisconsin respecting the subject. On such against an obstruction in a street, see Webb v. Demopolis (Ala.) 21 L. R. A. 62. For the loss by the public of its right to a highway by mere nonuser or otherwise than by official action, see note to Maire v. Kruse (Wis.) 26 L. R. A. 449. Derby v. Alling, 40 Conn. 435; Police Jury v. Foulhouze, 30 La. Ann. 64; Jersey City v. Morris Canal & Bkg. Co. 12 N. J. Eq. 562; Elliott, Roads & Streets, 117; Requa v. Rochester, 45 N. Y. 129, 6 Am. Rep. 52; Rhodes v. Bright wood (Ind.) 43 N. E. 942; Meier v. Portland C. R. Co. 16 Or. 500, 1 L. R. A. 856; Carter v. Portland, 4 Or. 339; Angell & D. Highways, 3d ed. § 149. When a person maps off his land into town lots and streets, and offers his lots for sale by reference to the map, there is no mistaking his intention. under such claim, and so continued up to the commencement of this action. This action was brought for breach of the covenants of title upon the ground that the claim of the city to the premises as a public park was valid, and that Lawe was not the owner thereof at the time he conveyed the same to the plaintiff. The trial court found that, at the time of the making of such deed, Lawe was the owner and seised in fee of the premises in dispute, and that plaintiff was such'owner and was so seised under the aforesaid deed at the time of the commencement of this action, free from any claim of the city of Kaukauna, and ordered Grogan v. Hayward, 4 Fed. Rep. 161; Hickjudgment accordingly, dismissing the comlin v. McClear, 18 Or. 126; Gregory v. Linplaint. Exceptions were taken to raise the coln (Neb.) 14 N. W. 423; Giffen v. Õlathe, 44 questions discussed and referred to in the Kan. 343; 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. §§ 628, 638, noteopinion. Judgment was rendered in accord- 3; Godfrey v. Alton, 12 Ill. 30, 52 Am. Dec. ance with the aforesaid order, and plaintiff 476; Alvord v. Ashley, 17 Ill. 363; Belleville v. appealed. Stookey, 23 Ill. 441; Waugh v. Leech, 28 Ill. 488; Field v. Carr, 59 Ill. 198; Fulton v. Mehrenfeld, 8 Ohio St. 440; Baker v. Johnston, 21 Mich. 319; Banks v. Ogden, 69 U. S. 2 Wall. 57, 17 L. ed. 818; Donohoo v. Murray, 62 Wis. 100; Wiggins v. McCleary, 49 N. Y. 346; Heitz v. St. Louis, 110 Mo. 618; Maywood v. Maywood, 118 Ill. 61; Rives v. Dudley, 3 Jones, Eq. 126, 67 Am. Dec. 231; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, title Dedication, p. 405, note 3, and cases cited, p. 407, note 2, and cases cited; Elliott, Roads & Streets, 90; Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415, 26 L. ed. 187; United States v. Hodson, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 395, 19 L. ed. 937; Jarstadt v. Morgan, 48 Wis. 245; Rowan v. Portland, 8 B. Mon. 232; Irwin v. Dixion, 50 C. S. 9 How. 31, 13 L ed. 34. Mr. Humphrey Pierce, for appellant: The town of Kaukauna plat of 1851 is a valid statutory dedication, and vested the title to the land marked "Public Square" thereon in the public for the public use; it substantially complies with the provisions of the statute in respect to plats. Rev. Stat. 1849, chap. 41, § 5; Ely v. Bates, 5 Wis. 467; Sanborn v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 16 Wis. 20; Williams v. Smith, 22 Wis. 598; Gebhardt v. Reeves, 75 Ill. 301; Williams v. Milwaukee Industrial Exposition Asso. 79 Wis. 524; Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. § 628, note 2. Where a plat is in doubt it is to be resolved against the donor and in favor of the public. Elliott, Roads & Streets, 111. The rule of construction in plats is the same as in grants to effectuate intent of donor. San Leandro v. Le Breton, 72 Cal. 170. A mere mistake in the plat cannot affect the validity of the statutory conveyance. Burbach v. Schweinler, 56 Wis. 390; Ely v. Bates, 5 Wis. 467. Formalities in a plat of statutory dedication to public use are regarded the same as in an ordinary deed of conveyance. State v. Schwin, 65 Wis. 214; Emmons v. Milwaukee, 32 Wis. 434; Gardiner v. Tisdale, 2 Wis. 155, 60 Am. Dec. 407. A deed is sufficient if it is possible to identify the land from the description; and the deed will be sustained if possible, and arbitrary rules will be disregarded. Devlin, Deeds, § 1012, citing Scheiber v. Kaehler, 49 Wis. 291; Elliott, Roads & Streets, 89; Gebhardt v. Reeves, 75 Ill. 301; Methodist Episcopal Church v. Hoboken, 33 N. J. L. 22, 97 Am. Dec. 696; Jarstadt v. Morgan, 48 Wis. .249. It was not necessary that the plat be accepted. Rev. Stat. 1849, chap. 41, § 5; Anno. Rev. Stat. § 2263; Pettibone v. Hamilton, 40 Wis. 414: Williams v. Smith, 22 Wis. 594; Methodist Episcopal Church v. Hoboken, 33 N. J. L. 1, 97 Am. Dec 696; San Leandro v. Le Breton, 72 Cal. 175; Elliott, Roads & Streets, 87; Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. § 628. Acceptance of a portion of a plat is constructive acceptance of the whole, and acceptance of streets on a plat or map is acceptance also of the public square. If there be public squares or places represented on the map, the same rule applies to them, and dedication thereof may be estab lished in the same manner. San Leandro v. Le Breton, 72 Cal. 175; Watertown v. Cowen, 4 Paige, 510; Cincinnati v. White, 31 U. S. 6 Pet. 431, 8 L. ed. 452; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, title. Dedication, p. 416, note 3, and cases cited; Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. SS 644, 645; Lennig v. Ocean City A880. 41 N. J. Eq. 606, 56 Am. Rep. 16; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 406. Where the dedication is express, evidenced by a recorded plat, the intent as expressed in such plat cannot be contradicted by parol. Rhodes v. Brightwood (Ind.) 43 N. E. 942; Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, 101 Ind. 200, 51 Am. Rep. 749. In case private rights accrue by reason of the dedication there can be no revocation. Dill. Mun. Corp. § 632; Rhodes v. Brightwood, supra. Mere nonuser of a public square until required by the public, however long continued, cannot operate as an abandonment, and all in possession will be presumed to hold in subordination to paramount rights of the public. Reilly v. Racine, 51 Wis. 526; State v. Leaver, 62 Wis. 393; Elliott, Roads & Streets, 89; Shea v. Ottumwa, 67 Iowa, 39; Methodist Episcopat Church v. Hoboken, 33 N. J. L. 1, 97 Am. Dec. 696; Derby v. Alling, 40 Conn. 410; Meier v. Portland C. R. Co. 16 Or. 500, 1 L. R. A. 856; Henshaw v. Hunting, 1 Gray, 210. No title could be acquired by Lawe under such claim of adverse possession. Livermore v. Maquoketa, 35 Iowa, 358; Bur hans v. Van Zant, 7 Barb. 91; San Leandro v. Le Breton, 72 Cal. 170; Hoadley v. San Francisco, 50 Cal. 265; People v. Pope, 53 Cal. 437; Grogan v. Hayward, 4 Fed. Rep. 161; Re Olean, 135 N. Y. 341, 17 L. R. A. 640. The continued occupation of land by one who has conveyed to another is presumed to be in subordination to the title of the grantor. But he is not concluded as to the public unless the dedication is accepted by the public. People v. Jones, 6 Mich. 176; Tillman v. People, 12 Mich. 401; Lee v. Lake, 14 Mich. 12, 90 Am. Dec. 220; Detroit v. Detroit & M. R. Co. 23 Mich. 173. And such acceptance must be within a reasonable time. Wayne County v. Miller, 31 Mich. 447; Field v. Manchester, 32 Mich. 281; Cass County Supers. v. Banks, 44 Mich. 468; People v. Beaubien, 2 Dougl. (Mich.) 271. When the legislature has provided the manner in which such transfer should be accomplished, a compliance with the requirements prescribed is just as essential in order that the original proprietor may be devested of title as the execution of a deed of conveyance would. be in the transfer of real estate from one person to another on a purchase. Schwallback v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 69 Wis. 292; Schwalbach v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 73 Wis. 139; State v. Castle, 44 Wis. 678; Childs v. Nelson, 69 Wis. 125; Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. § 667-675; Elliott, Roads & Streets, 665-669; Simplot v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 16 Fed. Rep. 350; Brooks v. Farwell, 4 Fed. Rep. 161; Kopf v. Utter, 101 Pa. 27; Com. v. Alburger, 1 Whart. 488; Rung v. Shoneberger, 2 Watts, 23, 26 Am. Dec. 95; Burbank v. Fay, 65 N. Y. 71; Driggs v. Phillips, 103 N. Y. 77: St. Vincent Female Orphan Asylum v. Troy, 76 N. Y. 114, 32 Am. Rep. 286; Walker Gardiner v. Tisdale, 2 Wis. 185, 60 Am. Dec. V. Caywood, 31 N. Y. 51; San Francisco Bd. 407; People v. Beaubien, 2 Dougl. (Mich.) 256;of Edu. v. Martin, 92 Cal. 209; Cross v. Mor- Grand Rapids v. Hastings, 36 Mich. 122; Peoristown, 18 N. J. Eq. 305; Jersey City v. Mor-ple v. Jones, 6 Mich. 184; Emmons v. Milris Canal & Bkg. Co. 12 N. J. Eq. 561; Archer waukee, 32 Wis. 435. v. Salinas, 93 Cal. 51, 16 L. R. A. 145; Logan County Supers. v. Lincoln, 81 Ill. 156; Indianapolis, P. & C. R. Co. v. Ross, 47 Ind. 25; Thibodeaux v. Maggioli, 4 La. Ann. 73; Ingram v. Police Jury, 20 La. Ann. 226; Louisiana Ice Mfg. Co. v. New Orleans, 43 La. Ann. 217: Coleman v. Thurmond, 56 Tex. 519; Vicksburg v. Marshall, 59 Miss. 563; Philadelphia v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 58 Pa. 253; Rochdale Canal Co. v. Radcliffe, 18 Q. B. 287; Memphis v. Lenore, 6 Coldw. 412: Rhodes v. Brightwood (Ind.) 43 N. E. 942. Defendant's acts in his alleged adverse possession being a public nuisance no such possession could ripen into title. Elliott, Roads & Streets, 668; Meiners v. Frederick Miller Brewing Co. 78 Wis. 366, 10 L. R. A. 586. The fact that the property was assessed and taxes thereon paid by Lawe does not affect the rights of the public therein; and especially is this true under all the circumstances appearing in the case. Lemon v. Hayden, 13 Wis. 159; Rhodes v. Brightwood, supra; San Leandro v. Le Breton, 72 Cal. 170; Re Commissioners of Public Parks, 6 N. Y. Supp. 779; Ellsworth v. Grand Rapids, 27 Mich. 250; Getchell v. Benedict, 57 Iowa, 121: Gilman v. Milwaukee, 55 Wis. 328; Angell & D. Highways, 321; St. Louis v. Gorman, 29 Mo. 593, 77 Am. Dec. 586; Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 511, 31 Am. Dec. 157; Prather v. Lexington, 13 B. Mon. 559, 56 Am. Dec. 585; Lorillard v. Monroe, 11 N. Y. 392, 62 Am. Dec. 120. Mr. David S. Ordway, for respondent: Making a plat of land by the proprietor showing lots, blocks, and streets evidently for the use of those who shall come to occupy the property, and their subsequent sale in such subdivisions according to the plat, is one of the clearest ways of declaring an intention to dedicate, and bas been held to conclude the owner so far as the rights of subsequent purchasers are concerned. Winnetka v. Prouty, 107 Ill. 225; Grandville v. Jenison, 84 Mich. 55; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, title, Dedication, p. 405. Whether this plat was valid or not in order to a complete dedication it must have been accepted by the public before actual dedication. Williams v. Milwaukee Industrial Exposition Asso. 79 Wis. 528; Winnetka v. Prouty, 107 Ill. 218; Littler v. Lincoln, 106 Ill. 353. Until acceptance by the municipality, although the owner is estopped to deny the dedication, whenever private rights intervene the act of the owner in platting, etc., is in the nature of a mere offer to the municipality. Chicago v. Gosselin, 4 Ill. App. 573; Wayne County v. Miller, 31 Mich. 447; Field v. Manchester, 32 Mich. 279; Buskirk v. Strickland, 47 Mich. 389; Oswego v. Oswego Canal Co. 6 N. Y. 264; Underwood v. Stuyvesant, 19 Johns. 186, 10 Am. Dec. 215; State v. Carver, 5 Strobh. L. 217; Bissell v. New York C. R. Co. 26 Barb. 630; Hamilton v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 124 Ill. 235; Reilly v. Racine, 51 Wis. 529. The city as representing the public is concluded from now opening the park for public use after what has transpired. Paine Lumber Co. v. Oshkosh, 89 Wis. 449; Reilly v. Racine, 51 Wis. 530; Cochran v. Toher, 14 Minn. 385; Derosia v. Winona & St. P. R. Co. 18 Minn. 133; Johnson v. Burlington (Iowa) 63 N. W. 694. Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the court: Assuming, as appellants contend, that the recording of the plat of 1851 and the subsequent ratification of it by Lawe and the public, under Rev. Stat. 1849, chap. 41, § 5, operated to make a valid town plat and to vest the title to the premises in dispute in the public, notwithstanding noncompliance with statutory requirements, and without regard to any act of acceptance on the part of the public, yet we hold that the doctrine of equitable estoppel in pais applies to the case, and effectually bars the public from setting up any claim thereto. That rules this case, and the other questions raised need not be considered. It is well settled that, though land be dedicated to the public use by a private owner, so as to vest the title in the donee for such use, |