came in contact was not insulated or protected | death-dealing force. In the case of Clements at the point where he caught it, and that he re- v. Louisiana Electric Light Co. 44 La. Ann. ceived the injuries of which he complained be- 695 et seq., 16 L. R. A. 43, the court said: cause thereof, then the law is for the plaintiff, "The deceased, Clements, was lawfully on the and they shall so find, unless they shall further gallery roof. He was engaged in a service believe from the evidence that he contributed that necessarily required him to run the risk of to cause his injury by his own negligence, and coming in contact with defendant's wires, that he would not have been injured but for either by stepping over them or going under his contributory negligence, if any there was. them. It is probable that the latter mode was No. 2. But unless they shall believe from the the most convenient, and there is no evidence evidence that the defendant's wire at that point that, in so doing, he incurred any greater risk. mentioned in instruction No. 1 was not so in- The wires were visible, and to all appearances sulated or protected as to make it reasonably were safe. The great force that was being free from danger, and that the plaintiff was carried over the wire gave no evidence of its injured thereby, the law is for the defendant, existence. There was no means for a man of and they should find. No. 3. Or if they ordinary education to distinguish whether the shall believe from the evidence that the wire was dead or alive. It had all the appearplaintiff was negligent, and thereby con- ance of having beea properly insulated. From tributed to cause the injury of which he com- this fact there was an invitation or inducement plained, and that he would not have been in- held out to Clements to risk the consequences jured but for his contributory negligence, if of contact. He had a right to believe they any there was, then the law is for the defend- were safe, and that the company had complied ant, and they should so find. No. 4. If the with its duties specified by law. He was rejury find for the plaintiff, they should award quired to look for patent, and not latent, dehim such a sum in damages as they may be- fects. Had he known of the defective insulalieve from the evidence would fairly compen- tion, and put himself in contact with the wire, sate him for the mental and physical sufferings he would have assumed the risk. The defect endured by him by reason of his injuries, and was hidden, and the insulation wrapping was for loss of time and capacity to earn money at deceptive. It is certain, had it been properly his trade and occupation. If they shall find wrapped, Clements would not have been from the evidence that the injuries of S. T. killed. His death is conclusive proof of the McLaughlin were caused by the negligence of defect of the insulation and the negligence of defendant, and shall further believe from the defendant. He exercised reasonable care in evidence that the negligence, if any there was, going under the wire in the performance of his was gross, then they may, in their discretion, duty, as he had a right to believe, from exteraward him such a further or additional sum as nal appearances, that the wire was safe. His punitive damages as they may deem right and action was such as not to tend to expose himproper, under the evidence and these instruc- self directly to the danger which resulted in tions, not exceeding in all the sum claimed in the the injury. In fact there was no apparent danpetition. Gross negligence means the absence ger. of slight care. No. 5. Ordinary care means that degree of care which ordinarily careful and prudent persons usually observe under the same or similar circumstances. Negligence means the failure to observe ordinary care. No. 6. Contributory negligence means the failure to observe that degree of care which ordinarily careful and prudent persons usually observe under the same or similar circumstances to protect themselves from harm, and, by reason of such failure, helped or caused to bring about the injury complained of." To the giving of instructions Nos. 1 and 2, the plaintiff excepted. It cannot be said that, when Clements went on the roof to repair it, he went into the presence of known danger, and assumed the hazards of the employment. The employment was not dangerous. The wires, if properly insulated, as above stated, would have been harmless. It was only a remote danger, which he had to risk, and this depending upon the fact whether or not the defendant company had done its duty as specified by law. The external appearances, the only indication of performed duty to which Clements' attention could be fixed, were guaranties that the defendant company had done its duty. These appearances assured him that in the performThe demurrer to the petition was properly ance of his work in sweeping the roof, it was overruled, as was also the motion for instruc- not dangerous for him. to risk going over or tion to the jury to find for the defendant. It under the wire. Bomar v. Louisiana North & also seems to us that William Pryott had a dis- South R. Co. 42 La. Ann. 983. Even in the qualifying interest in the action, and should presence of a known danger, to constitute conhave been excused for cause. But by far the tributory negligence it must be shown that most important question involved is the law the plaintiff voluntarily and unnecessarily exapplicable to the case. Electricity is a power-posed himself to it, unless it is of that characful and subtle force, and its nature and man- ter that the plaintiff must assume the risk from ner of use not well understood by the public, the very nature of the danger to which he is nor is its presence easily ascertained or deter- exposed. From the appearances of the wire. mined. Its use for private gain is very exten- its wrappings with insulated tape, and the sive, and becoming more and more so. The known duty of the defendant to protect the indaily avocation of many thousands, of neces- sulation at this particular splice or joint, Clemsity, brings them near to the subtle force, and ents had no reason to anticipate danger except it seems clear that the electric companies from the fault of the defendant company. should be held to the use of the utmost care This fault was the cause of his death, and his to avoid injuring those whose business or act in passing under or over the wires was too pleasure requires them to come near such a remote to give it the character of contributory negligence." The case of Haynes v. Raleigh Gas Co. 114 N. C. 211, 26 L. R. A. 810, was an action to recover for death caused by a boy taking hold of a live broken wire that was in the street. We quote from the decision of the court as follows: "It is due to the citizen that electric companies that are permitted to use for their own purposes the streets of a city or town shall be required to exercise the utmost degree of care in the construction, inspection, and repair of their wires and poles, to the end that travelers along the highway may not be in jured by their appliances. The danger is great, and care and watchfulness must be commensurate to it. Passengers on railroad trains have a right to expect and require the exercise by the carrier of the utmost care, so far as human skill and foresight can go, for the reason that a neglect of duty in such case is likely to result in great bodily harm, and sometimes death to those who are compelled to use that means of conveyance, as the result of the least negligence may be of so fatal a nature the duty of vigilance on the part of the carrier requires the exercise of that amount of care and skill in order to prevent accidents.' Ray, Negligence of Imposed Duties, p. 53. All the reasons that support the rigid enforcement of this rigid rule against the carrier of passengers by steam apply with double force to those who are allowed to place above the streets of a city wires charged with a deadly current of elec tricity, or liable to become so charged. The requirement does not carry with it too heavy a burden. Human skill can easily place wires and poles so that they will not fall or break, unless subjected to some strain that could not be anticipated; and it can as readily prevent the possibility under ordinary circumstances of the contact of wires that should not be alJowed to touch one another." The evidence in this case conduces to show 1 that appellant was at work at his regular trade, and was where he had a right to be, and the joint of the wire, being apparently insulated, was to some extent, at least, a guaranty that there was no danger; but, independent of that fact, the situation of appellant, his work in hand, and the proximity of the wire, were such that he might without negligence have thoughtlessly taken hold of the wire, because he seemed to need support; and, besides, it was hardly to be expected that the current was on the wire at about noon, the wire being used wholly to supply incandescent lights or lamps. It seems clear to us that appellee should have been required to have had perfect protection on its wires at the point and place where appellant was injured. The fact that it was very expensive or inconvenient is no excuse for such failure. Very great care might be sufficient as to the wires at points remote from public passways, buildings, or places where persons need not go for work or business; but the rule should be different as to points where people have the right to go for work, business, or pleasure. At the latter points or places the insulation or protection should be made perfect, and the utmost care used to keep it so. Instructions Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, and 8, asked by appellant, should have been given. The others refused were not important, and tended to draw attention to particular facts or evidence. Such instructions are not favored in law. It results from the foregoing views that the court erred in giving instructions Nos. 1 and 2, marked as given. The other instructions given by the court were not excepted to; hence need not be discussed. For the errors indicated, the judgment below is reversed, and cause remanded, with directions to set aside the verdict and judgment, and for a new trial upon principles consistent with this opinion. WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT. Thomas LANCEY et al., Appts., V. KING COUNTY et al., Respts. (15 Wash. 9.) 1. Provisions concerning the condemnation and disposal of land by counties in relation to public improvements undertaken by the state or the United States are sufficiently covered by a title "An Act to Grant to and Prescribe Powers of Counties Relative to Public Works Undertaken or Proposed by the State or the United States." 2. A prohibition of county aid to any individual, association, company, or corporation does not apply to such aid to the state or United States. 3. A prohibition against county indebtedness for any other than strictly county pur NOTE. As to what will constitute a public purpose for which public money may be used, see note 'to Daggett v. Colgan (Cal.) 14 L. R. A. 474. poses will not prevent indebtedness for a public canal through the county to connect two large public waterways with the ocean. 4. That title to a public improvement when it is completed is to be conveyed to the United States will not prevent the state from exercising its power of eminent domain to acquire the necessary land upon which to construct it. (June 18, 1896.) APPEAL by plaintiffs from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County in favor of defendants in a proceeding to enjoin defendants from making a certain public improvement under an act of the legislature. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. As to the right of a foreign corporation to take property by eminent domain, see note to Lancaster v. Amsterdam Improv. Co. (N. Y.) 24 L. R. A. 327. WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT. Mr. C. W. Turner, for appellants: Const. art. 1, § 19. This is mandatory. Woolf v. Taylor, 98 Ala. 254; State, Standish, v. Nomland, 3 N. D. 427; Quinn v. Cumberland County, 162 Pa. 55; State, Ives, v. Kansas City, 50 Kan. 508; Grand Rapids v. Burlingame, 93 Mich. 469; Davies v. Saginaw County Supers. 89 Mich. 295; Montgomery v. State, 88 Ala. 141; People, Longenecker, v. Nelson, 133 Ill. 565; State v. Brown, 79 Ga. 324; Astor v. Arcade R. Co. 113 N. Y. 93, 2 L. R. A. 789; People, Seeley, v. Hall, 8 Colo. 485; Henderson v. London & L. Ins. Co. 135 Ind. 23, 20 L. R. A. 827; Thomas v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. 40 Fed. Rep. 126, 7 L. R. A. 145; Davis v. State, 61 Am. Dec. 331, and note and cases cited therein at pp. 342-346; People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 624; Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269; Cooley, Const. Lim. 4th ed. pp. 147-151. The statute under consideration provides that the expenses to be incurred in acquiring the property, etc., mentioned therein for the United States, shall be defrayed through the taxing power of the state, and that therefore such power shall be exercised by one sovereign for the benefit of another, at the sole cost of the taxpayers of one county. This is not the "public purpose" for which the state can lay taxes. Cooley, Taxn. 2d ed. pp. 4, 55, 108-110, 113, 140-142,and note, 143-145, 688, et seq.; 1 Desty, Taxn. pp. 14, 17, 25, 26 (embracing §§ 8, 9); Taxation and Eminent Domain Distinguished, Id. § 2; Restriction on Legislative Power, Id. p. 272; Purpose must be Local, Id. pp. 274, 283-287. The statute objected to authorizes the exercise of the state's eminent domain for the use and benefit of the United States, which is beyond the power of any state to do. People, Twombley, v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471, 9 Am. Rep. 94; Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 23 L. ed. 449; New Orleans v. United States, 35 U. S. 10 Pet. 723, 9 L. ed. 597; Dickey v. Maysville, W. P. & L. Turnp. Road Co. 7 Dana, 113; M'Culloch v. 4 Wheat. 429, 4 L. ed. 607; Darlington v. Maryland, 17 U. S. United States, 82 Pa. 382, 22 Am. Rep. 766. Messrs. A. W. Hastie, R. S. Greene, and Thomas Burke, for respondents: The judiciary will not interfere to avoid legislative action except in cases where the violation of constitutional inhibitions is most clear. Sutherland, Stat. Constr. § 92; Montclair Trop. v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 155, 27 L. ed. 433; State, McCarty, v. Montgomery County Comrs. 26 Ind. 522; People, Rochester, v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553. The Constitution does not prescribe the terms in which the subject of a bill shall be set out in its title. It will be sufficient if the subject of the act is so expressed in the title as to indicate to all what that subject is, or to call attention thereto. Allegheny County Home's Case, 77 Pa. 77; Johnson v. People, 83 Ill. 436; Sun Mut. Ins. 34 L. R. A. JUNE, Humes, 3 Wash. 276; Illinois v. Illinois C. R. different sections, are not incongruous, but, on 280; Clinton Twp. v. Draper, 14 Ind. 295; State, Weir, v. Davis County Judge, 2 Iowa, Wishmier v. State, Dickey, 97 Ind. 160; Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; Woodson v. Murdock, 89 U. S. 22 Wall. 351, 22 L. ed. 716; San Antonio v. Mehaffy, 96 U. S. 315, 24 L. ed. 817; Montclair Twp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 27 L. ed. 431; Otoe County v. Baldwin, 111 C. S. 1, 28 L. ed. 331; Mahomet v. Quackenbush, 117 U. S. 508, 29 L. ed. 982; Carter County v. Sinton, 120 U. S. 517, 30 L. ed. 701; People, Badger, v. Loewenthal, 93 Ill. 191; Blake v. People, 109 Ill. 504; Mix v. Illinois C. R. Co. 116 III. 502; Phillips v. Covington & C. Bridge Co. 2 Met. (Ky.) 219; State v. Bank of Missouri, 45 Mo. 528: Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; Whiting v. Mount Pleasant, 11 Iowa, 482; Reed v. State, Sedgw. Stat. & Const. L. 2d ed. p. 520, note; 12 Ind. 641; Sutherland, Stat. Constr. § 82: Yesler v. Seattle, 1 Wash. 308; Gasch v. Davies, 1 Wash. 290; State v. Spokane Falls, 2 Wash. 40; Marston v. Humes, 3 Wash. 267; Maling v. Crummey, 5 Wash. 222; Seymour v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 138; McMaster v. Advance Thresher Co. 10 Wash. 147. provement; and, being such, is a public purThe proposed improvement is a public imlevied either by the state or one of its municpose for which debt can be incurred or taxes ipal subdivisions. Corp. 4th ed. §§ 153, 158, 508; Sedgw. Stat. pose. Newberne Comrs. 2 Jones, Eq. 141, 64 Am. Dec, brouck v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 42, 80 Am. Dec. 718; Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 26 L. ed. 238; Atlantic Trust Co. v. Darling ton, 63 Fed. Rep. 76; State, Atty. Gen., v. Toledo, 48 Ohio St. 112, 11 L. R. A. 729; Folsom v. Township Ninety-Six ("Folsom v. NinetySix ") 159 U. S. 611, 40 L. ed. 278; Chicago, D. & V. R. Co. v. Smith, 62 Ill. 268, 14 Am. Rep. 99; Burr v. Carbondale, 76 Ill. 455; Marks v. Purdue University. 37 Ind. 155; Gordon v. Cornes, 47 N. Y. 608; Merrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen, 500. The question of what is a public purpose is for the legislature to determine in the first in stance. Cooley, Const. Lim. 5th ed. p. 604; Brodhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 658, 88 Am. Dec. 711; Speer v. Blairsville School Directors, 50 Pa. 150; Schenley v. Allegheny, 25 Pa. 128. Admitting, for the present, the assumption that the intent of this act is to provide that the state should vicariously exercise its right of eminent domain in behalf of the United States, the weight of authority and the better reasoning are in support of that right. Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 258; Lewis, Em. Dom. § 1; Burt v. Merchants' Ins. Co. 106 Mass. 363, 8 Am. Rep. 339. It cannot be successfully claimed that a ship canal within the borders of the state is not a public use to the people of that state. | v. Merchants' Ins. Co. 106 Mass. 356, 8 Am. Rep. 339; Orr v. Quimby, 54 N. H. 590; United States v. Reed, 56 Mo. 565; Re United States, 96 N. Y. 227. It is not the intention of the act to exercise the right of the state for the use and benefit of the United States. Vast works of the character indicated may be beyond the present ability of the county to prosecute, but that should be no good reason for refusing to permit it to receive aid from, and so far as it can to extend help to, the Federal government, when that government moves in a matter in which the county is so vitally interested. Re United States, supra; Cooley, Const. Lim. 5th ed. 525; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229: Burt v. Merchants' Ins. Co. 106 Mass. 356, 8 Am. Rep. 339; People, Twombley, v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 481, 9 Am. Rep. 94; Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 23 L. ed. 449; Darlington v. United States, 82 Pa. 382, 22 Am. Rep. 766. Scott, J., delivered the opinion of the court: This action was brought to enjoin the respondents, as county officers, from proceeding under an act of the legislature approved February 12, 1895 (Laws 1895, p. 3), entitled "An Act to Grant to and Prescribe Powers of Counties Relative to Public Works Undertaken or Proposed by the State of Washington, or the United States, and Declaring an Emergency" to condemn land for a right of way for a ship canal to connect lakes Union and Washington, in King county, with the waters of Puget sound, an undertaking projected by the genAssuming, then, that the object to be accom-eral government. The constitutionality of the plished is a public use, the question of the ne-act is attacked upon several grounds, the first cessity of exercising the power arises. The of which is that it is in violation of $19, decision of this question is legislative and judicial. Lewis, Em. Dom. § 170; Mills, Em. Dom. 14; Cooley, Const. Lim. 5th ed. 659; Sedgw. Stat. & Const. L. 2d ed. 446, note; Chesa peake & O. Canal Co. v. Key, 3 Cranch, C. C. 599; Willyard v. Hamilton, 7 Ohio St. pt. 2, p. 111, 30 Am. Dec. 195. not Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 406, 25 L. ed. 207; Story, Const. Lim. 5th ed. 653; Lewis, Em. Dom. 238; Mills, Em. Dom. § 11. The use being public and its necessity declared, the agency by or through which the state proceeds to the fulfilment of the use and the accomplishment of that end lies in the judgment of the legislature. Cooley, Const. Lim. 5th ed. 666; Morris Canal & Bkg. Co. v. Townsend, 24 Barb. 658; New York & E. R. Co. v. Young, 33 Pa. 175; Abbott v. New York & N. E. R. Co. 145 Mass. 450; Re Townsend, 39 N. Y. 171; Harris v. Elliott, 35 U. S. 10 Pet. 25, 9 L. ed. 333, and cases cited below. art. 2, of the Constitution, which provides that "no bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." Similar provisions are contained in the Constitutions of many of the states, and there are so many cases bearing upon the proposition as to prevent a consideration of them in detail. It is well settled, however, by the weight of authority, that an act of the legislature will not be declared void except in cases where the violation of this constitutional inhibition is most clear, and sound policy and legislative convenience require that this provision should be liberally construed. The subject of this act is the condemnation and disposal of land by counties for a public use in relation to public improvements undertaken by the state or the United States; and, in our opinion, the subjectThe state has a general right to condemn matter of the act is fairly included within the land to public use; she may select her own scope of its title, and there is nothing misleadagent to accomplish this public end, she has ing in the title. The powers granted are not selected the United States as such agent; the itemized therein, but this is unnecessary. The government is capable of undertaking the trust title gives notice that certain powers are granted and receiving title; this public use is a use to for the purposes mentioned, and that those the state; neither the Constitution of the state powers are prescribed in the act. There is one nor that of the United States forbids the Fed-general subject embraced in the act, and only eral government from taking or the state from granting this right; and the rights and interests of the citizens are as fully protected as if the state took the land for her own peculiar purposes. Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 258; United States v. Dumplin Island, 1 Barb. 24; Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md. 444, 74 Am. Dec. 550; Burt one, and that is expressed in the title sufficiently to prevent any person from being misled thereby. The purpose of the title is only to call attention to the subject-matter of the act and the act itself must be looked to for a full description of the powers conferred. Marston v. Humes, 3 Wash. 267; Montclair Twp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 27 L. ed. 431; State, McCarty, v. Montgomery County Comrs. | this is done. The essential character of the 26 Ind. 522; People, Rochester, v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553; Allegheny County Home's Case, 77 Pa. 77; Johnson v. People, 83 Ill. 431. Another objection is that the act is in conflict with 7, art. 8, of the Constitution, which provides that "no county . . . shall hereafter give any money or property, or loan its money or credit, to or in aid of any individual, association, company, or corporation except for the necessary support of the poor and infirm, or become directly or indirectly the owner of any stock in or bonds of any association, company, or corporation." It is clear that neither the state nor the United States is an "individual, as sociation, company, or corporation," within the meaning of this section, and cannot legitimately be brought therein by any judicial construction thereof. Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14, 8 Am. Rep. 24. It is next insisted that the act is obnoxious to the provisions of § 6, art. 8, of the Constitution, which prohibits a county from incurring debt for any other than strictly county purposes, it being contended that the tax to be levied in the prosecution of said undertaking is not for a county purpose, but that it is for a state or Federal purpose. But it is beyond question that the proposed undertaking is a public improvement. It is entirely within the limits of King county, and is for the purpose of connecting two large public waterways with the Pacific ocean; and it seems to us that such a canal can more properly be considered a public improvement than a railway for the construction of which it is well settled that aid may be granted by a municipality when authorized to do so by the legislature, there being no constitutional prohibition. The word "strictly" lends little or no additional meaning to the provision. It could not have been intended thereby to limit counties to ordinary | running expenses, and a canal may be as strictly a county purpose as a highway or a bridge, etc. It is apparent that the benefits resulting from this particular improvement will be largely local, notwithstanding the fact that it may also be of great general benefit; and it results that the purpose of the tax is local as well as public. 1 Desty, Taxn. SS 8, 59; Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh, 120; Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 26 L. ed. 238; Folsom v. Township Ninety-Six ("Folsom v. Ninety Six'), 159 U. S. 611, 40 L. ed. 278; Atlantic Trust Co. v. Darlington, 63 Fed. Rep. 76; Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 42, 80 Am. Dec. 718; Burr v. Carbondale, 76 Ill. 455. The remaining objection to the act, and the one most strongly insisted upon by the appellants, is that the act authorizes the exercise of the state's eminent domain for the use and benefit of the United States. But this is hardly a fair statement of the proposition. While it is proposed to convey the right of way, when obtained, to the United States, the improvement is for the use and benefit of the general public, and in a much greater degree for the citizens of that locality. It is not to be occupied and controlled by government agents, like a fort, but is for everybody's use as a great public highway, and the control by the general government is only to regulate that use for the general good, and it matters little by whom work as a local public improvement directly connected with the commercial business of the citizens of the county cannot be taken away from it, even though it has a considerable value to the general government for naval purposes and otherwise. It is apparent that the character of the work cannot be essentially altered by its ownership or control, and it is immaterial whether the United States or the county prosecutes the enterprise, or whether they do so jointly. Nor can it make any dif ference whether the power of the state or that of the general government is invoked to condemn the right of way. It is conceded that either the United States or the county could singly prosecute the enterprise, and, if either could do it, it would require some good reason for holding that they could not proceed jointly. The appellants contend that in all cases where the eminent domain of the state is exercised in the prosecution of a public improvement, the improvement when constructed, must remain in the control of the local authorities. If this assertion were true, it would afford a sufficient reason for holding that the contemplated undertaking was unauthorized in the form in which it is being prosecuted. But we are clearly of the opinion that this contention is not well founded, as, if the improvement be for a public use and benefit, the state can authorize the exercise of its eminent domain by individuals or by corporations other than municipal, and, if there is no constitutional prohibition, it may be a foreign corporation (New York & E. R. Co. v. Young, 33 Pa. 175; Abbott v. New York & N. E. R. Co. 145 Mass. 450); and in such cases the control or management of the improvement is not retained by the state. For a more marked instance, see the case of Re Townsend, 39 N. Y. 171, where a canal was constructed without the limits of the state, but which resulted in some damage to lands within the state. Appellants concede that there are several cases holding that the exercise of the state's eminent domain can be for the benefit of the United States, but they contend that in such instances the question of the public use was a legislative, and not a judicial, question; but it is apparent that this can go only to the manner of deciding it, and if it is for a public use the condition is satisfied, however decided. A case very like the one at bar was that of Re United States, 96 N. Y. 227, where many of the cases are taken up and considered. There, by an act of the legislature, the United States was granted the right to acquire the right of way necessary for the improvement of the Harlem river and Spuyten Duyvil creek, and for the construction of another channel from the North river to the East river through the Harlem Kills, and ceding jurisdiction. The undertaking was prosecuted jointly by the state and national governments, and the court said that, if either party might proceed in the matter, "it would be very singular if that which either party might do could not with equal propriety be accomplished by both." If such were not the case, it might prevent the consummation of a great public undertak ing, such as is contemplated here, on account of the vast expense, if it was to be exclusively |