« ForrigeFortsett »
sented by them respectively as contained in which will accord to the citizen the greater the certificate of nomination. It must be ob- liberty in castiog his ballot. People, Eaton, v. served that the certificate under which the con- | District Court, 18 Colo. 26. It has been held troversy arises as to the right to use the word that, where two factions of the same political "People's” is not arraigned by any persons or party have held separate conventions, and cerauthority representing the People's party. No titied nominations, using the same political one claiming any allegiance to that party is designation, the secretary of state is without here complaining of the act of Chairman Pat- authority to decide which of the two is entitled terson and his associates. The complaint to the party name, and is required in such case comes from the chairman of the state commit- to certify both sets of nominations, giving to tee of an entirely separate political party. each the political designation found in the cerWhile he probably has the right to prefer such tificate of nomination. People, Eaton, v. Disa complaint, and have the matter adjudicated, trict Court, supra; Phelps v. Piper, 48 Neb, nevertheless we are confronted with the fact 724, 33 L. R. A. 53; Shields v. Jacob, 88 Mich. that at the instance of one not affiliated with 164, 13 L. R. A. 760. In Kansas a nomipa. the People's party in any manner, so far as the tion by electors designating their single candi. record discloses, we are asked to judicially date as the nominee of the Miners' and Labor. deny the right of more than 100 electors, in- ing Men's party was recognized as a party cluding the one highest in authority in the nomination, and the court says: “We think party in this state, describing themselves as that each political party has a perfect rigbt io the representatives of that party, from giving select its candidates as it pleases, and have the party name to their candidates. If this their names printed under its party heading; certificaie bad come in conflict with other that there is nothing in the law nor in reason nominations made by the same party in regu- preventing two or more political parties, lar convention, a very different question might whether acting through conventions or by pearise. In the case at bar, however, we have titions, from selecting the same individuals before us the broad question wbetber, in any for one or more of the offices to be filled." case, the secretary of state is at liberty to re. Simpson v. Osborn, 52 Kap. 328. Io Minnespect the designation of a political party or sota the supreme court upheld as party nomiprinciple mentioned in a certificate of nomina- nees certain candidates named by a mass tion by electors, when the certificate is signed, convention, in opposition to rival candidates sworn to, and presented by the state chairman presented by a delegate convention of the same of such party, and in its body alleges that the party; one of the reasons assigned being the signers represent the party, in the absence of entire absence of any statutory provision reguany other existing nomination by such party lating the manner in which political parties for the same office; or whether he is bound to sbould proceed in organizing conventions or disregard such description, or add something making nominations. Manston v. Mchitosh, to it, not found in the certificate, indicating 58 Minn. 525, 28 L. R. A. 605. To hold that the manner in wbich the nominations were the provisions of the statute authorizing a made. There can hardly exist a doubt but convention to make nominations, and defining that our legislation on the subject of elections a convention as an organized assemblage of is more or less imperfect, which fact invites electors representing some political party or conflict, and possibility of confusion; but the principle, necessarily confines a political party courts cannot supply omissions in the law. to proceedings by and through a convention, Anticipating, or perhaps having experienced, especially in view of the other provisions af. controversy along this very line, many of the fecting vominations by electors' certificate, or states have explicitly regulated the manner in by petition, as it is sometimes popularly which party nominations may be made. There termed, would require the judiciary to interis nothing of that character in our law. We polate something which has been omitted, perhave searched the election law in vain to dis baps purposely, from the statute. In the case cover any limitations upon party nominations. I at bar do convention of the People's party has There is not a clause or line anywhere requir- acted as to two candidates for electors subse ing or tending in that direction that a political quent to the declination of two persons named party can only present nominations for public in convention as well as by petition. No comoffice through the medium of party conven-mittee was given authority io act. The chair. tions or primary meetings. The writer of this man of the state committee, with 100 associ. opinion believes that a wise regulation in that ates, present the certificate in question as regard, and legislation explicitly defining the alleged representatives of the party. If å status of nominations by certificate of elect- party may, under any circumstances, act otherors, would be desirable; but there is no such wise, than by convention or primary meeting, legislation at present, and the courts have no no lawful or reasonable objection can be urged authority to place restrictions upon those mat- to such action in the case and upon the facts ters when the legislature has left them open. before us. We conclude, therefore, that the A convention of delegates, or even a mass con respondent was not bound to disregard the povention, is, after all, but a representation of litical designation accompanying the names of some political party; neither constitutes the the candidates Jordan and Sims in the certifiparty itself; and until the appropriate depart-cate nominating them, that a fair and reasonment has limited or restricted the method by able construction of the statute does not rewhich a party may be represented, and through quire him to add to or qualify the party name what character of representation it may act, thus used. No such duiy being imposed upon we do not consider it within the province of that officer, it does not rest upon the court. the courts to do so. If there is any doubt The writ prayed for must be denied. about a matter of this character, then that Conaway, J., concurs. Groesbeck, Ch. construction of the statute should be adopted 'J., did not participate in the decision,
NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT.
Andrew DEBNEY, Plff. in Err.,
roneous instruction where it could not have 0.
prejudiced the complaining party. STATE of Nebraska.
3. Held, that the eighth instruction, defining the term "deliberation," was as
favorable to the accused as he was entitled to (45 Neb. 856.)
4. Instructions given to a jury should be *1. The crime of murder is regarded as construed together; and if, when so considered having been committed at the time when as a whole, they properly state the law, it is suffitbe fatal blow or wound is inflicted, although
cient. the death occurs on a subsequent date; and the 5. Held, that the twenty-fourth paraparty is to be tried by the laws in force at the graph of the charge to the jury, upon the time the injurious act is done.
subject of intoxication, is applicable to the evi2. It is not reversible error to give an er
dence adduced on the trial.
6. Evidence held to sustain a convic*Headnotes by NORVAL, Ch. J.
tion for murder in the first degree.
NOTE.-Time when homicide is deemed to be com- with the requisite contemporaneous intent and demitted.
sign which legally rendered it felonious,-the sub
sequent death of the injured party being the reAs to the locality of crime committed by shoot- sult or sequence, rather than a constituent eleing or striking across state boundary, see note to mental part of the crime, the giving of the blow State v. Hall (N. C.) 28 L. R. A. 59.
constituting the felony, the blow alone being the This note is limited entirely to the consideration act of the party, the death only a consequence of of the question of time, and does not include any such act. cases involving the jurisdiction of the court, or the
Again, in Stout v. State, 76 Md. 317, it was held question of place, although in many cases the time that by the inflicting of a mortal wound then and and place of the commission of the crime would there, the accused expended bis active agency in seem to be treated as analogous, the weight of au- producing the crime, no matter where the injured thority being in favor of the doctrine that the party might languish, or where he might die, if crime is committed where the blow is struck, the death ensued within the time and as a consequence shot fired, or the poison administered, and there- of the stroke or poison given, the grade and charfore it would seem that if the place where the blow acteristics of the crime being determined immeis given determines the place or jurisdiction of the diately that death ensued, and that the result recourt, the crime may equally be said to be com- lated back to the original felonious wounding or mitted at the time the blow is given, the shot is poisoning, the giving of the blow that caused the fired, or the poison is administered.
death constituting the offense. There is, however, very little direct authority And so in Siate v. Gessert, 21 Minn. 369, it was upon the question involved in this note, the courts beld that it was for his acts that the defendant was as a general rule seeming to assume that the place responsible, such acts constituting his offense, the where the crime is committed determines the time death which characterized those acts not being his of the committal of the offense. The dicta of the act but the consequence thereof. courts in many cases wherein the point raised was Again, in Com. v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1, 7, 100 Am. purely one of jurisdiction lead to this supposition. Dec. 89, the court in support of the theory that the
With respect to the question of time, it bas been deed is committed at the time when the fatal blow, held that murder is a complex term denoting sev- etc., is given, stated that the injury and death were eral facts of which the death of the party is one of as much the continuance, operation, and effect of the most essential. The mortal stroke or the ad- the unlawful act as if the deed had proved instantly ministration of poison does not constitute the fatal, the unlawful intent attending and qualifycrime, unless the sufferer dies thereof within a year ing the act until its final result. and a day. Com. v. Parker, 2 Pick. 550, 558. This And in Riley v. State. 9 Humph. 646, 658, it was principle may be said to be the settled rule of law, beld that the blow given was the act of the party, the duthorities as a whole supporting it.
and the death was only the consequence of the In United States v. Guiteau, 1 Mackey. 498, blow, 539, it was held that murder was committed within So, in State v. Carter, 2 N. J. L. 499, the time that the District of Columbia when the felonious blow the blow was given was looked upon as the time of was struck there, notwithstanding the consequent the committal of the offense. That case, however, death happened without the District and in one of was one dealing with the question of jurisdiction. the states.
And in People v. Adams, 3 Denio, 190, 45 Am. Dec. So, in People v. Gill, 6 Cal. 637, where the blow 468, which was also a case relating to jurisdiction, was given before, but the death ensued after, the the court held that a crime was committed in the passing of the California statute of April 16, state of New York at a time when a party, though 1856, which provided that upon trials for crimes out of the state, put in motion his act by an innocommitted previous to its passage the party should cent third party acting under him within the state. be tried by the laws in force at the time of the com- Again, in Burns v. People, 1 Park. Crim. Rep. 182, mission of such crime, the court holding that the 185, the court said that if a party assaulted, after a death must be made to relate back to the unlawful felonious attempt, died within a year and a day, act which occasioned it, and that as the party died the same act, which till his death was an assault in consequence of the wounds received on a par- and a misdemeanor only, though aggravated, was ticular day, the day on which the act was com- by that event shown to bave been a mortal wound, mitted, and not the one on which the result of the the event, strictly speaking, not changing the charact was determined, was the day on which the acter of the act, but relating back to the time of murder was properly charged.
the assault, and the same act wbich might be a felAnd again, in Green v, State, 66 Ala. 44, 41 Am. onious assault only, had the party not died, was Rep. 744, it was held that the crime of murder con-shown by that event to bave been a mortal wound sisted in the infliction of the fatal wound coupled and the crime a capital felony.
7. When the county attorney finished Messrs. Reid & Morgan,M. V. Moudy, his closing address to the jury, some of the and Albert & Reeder for plaintiff, in error. bystanders, without the knowledge or condi- Mr. A. S. Churchill, Aitorney General, vance of anyone connected with the prosecu- for the State. tion, applauded, which was quickly suppressed by the presiding judge, and wbo administered a Norval, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of rebuke to the persons making the applause. the court: Held, that the record failed to disclose that the
An information was filed by the county atdefendant was prejudiced by the demonstration. torney in the district court of Nance county,
charging the plaintiff in error, Andrew Deb(October 1, 1895.)
ney, with murder in the first degree. The
prisoner was found guilty as charged, and was RROR to the District Court for Nance by the court sentenced to be banged, which defendant of murder. Affirmed.
ing. It appears from the record before us that The facts are stated in the opinion.
the plaintiff in error and his wife, Catherine
And in state v. Hall, 114 N. C. 909, 919, 28 L. R. A. given date, and while the state laws had changed 59, it was stated that if a party standing in one the penalty prior to the finding of the indictment, state shoots at another in a neighboring state, un- the court held the indictment sufficient as charging til the act consummates a crime there is simply an that the deceased died on the day of the act comattempt, but when the party is wounded by such mitted, prior to the finding of the indictment, and shot the crime in its completeness exbibits itself. the passing of the law changing the death penalty.
So, in State v. Bowen, 16 Kan. 475, the court stated Again, in Com. v. Stafford, 12 Cush. 619, the court that although the crime was not complete until would also seem to lean to the opinion that the death, yet the death simply determined the charac-i crime is committed when the poison is administer of the crime committed in giving the blow, and ; tered at various times, death or murder being the referred back to and qualified that act.
result. In that case, bowever, the question was one And it has been held tbat the offense of shooting of practice relating to the allegation of the crime at another is committed in the state of Georgia in the indictment, as being caused by injuries inwhen one in tbe state of South Carolina, without flicted on different days. malice aforethought, but not in self-defense, or In a case wherein the defendant was convicted under other circumstances of justification aims of manslaughter under $ 5344 of the United States and fires a pistol at another, who at the time is in Revised Statutes, which makes it manslaughter the former state, even though the ball misses him for a captain, engineer, pilot, or other person emand strikes the water in that state near the boat ployed on a vessel, by his misconduct, negligence, which be occupies. Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 22 or inattention to his duties, to cause the death of L. R. A. 248.
any person, the court stated that the offender was In Archer v. State, 106 Ind. 426, 432, the court guilty, not when the misconduct or negligence ocpointed out the conflict in the authorities as to curred, but where that misconduct bore fruit by whether death was part of the crime of murder, causing the death of a human being. Re Doig, some authorities maintaining that death was the 4 Fed. Rep. 193, 196. mere consequence of the crime; others holding In Rex v. Hargrave, 5 Car. & P. 170, in a case of that it was part of the crime, for the reason that manslaughter against the prisoner as principal in there was no murder until death occurred, which the second degree, the court stated that tbe giving must be within a year and a day, but the court did of the blows which caused the death constituted not pass upon the question, as in that case, which the felony, and that the languishing of the dewas one of murder, the defendant's acts were sub- ceased was no part of the offense. stantive criminal wrongs, forming essential parts And again, the case of Reg. v. Lewis, 7 Cox, C. C. of the crime, and the point was wholly jurisdic- 277, Dears. & B. C. C. 182, 186, 26 L. J. M. C. N. S. 104, tional in its character.
3 Jur. N. S. 525, would also seem to support the And the same conclusions would seem to have theory that the offense was committed at the time been arrived at by the court in the case of State v. the blow is given, although that case was one enKelly, 76 Me. 331, 49 Am. Rep. 620, although that tirely relating to the question of jurisdiction. was a case of jurisdiction.
In Reg. v. Holland, 2 Moody & R. 351, the court So, it would seem that the court, in State v. stated that if the prisoner wilfully and without Blunt, 110 Mo. 32:2, 337, looked upon the offense as justifiable cause, inflicted the wound which ulticommitted at the time the blow was given, inas- mately caused the death, he was guilty of murder, much as it stated that the fact that death occurred and that it made no difference whether the wound a short time after the county boundary had been was in its nature instantly mortal, or whether it reached, was a mere incident and result of the became the cause of death by reason of not being crime previously committed in another county. properly cared for, the real question being whether But that case related solely to the question of ju- in the end the wound inflicted was the cause of risdiction.
death, the court considering the ultimate death as And the same principles form the basis of the the consequence of the blow. court's decision in passing upon the court's juris- In the case of Chapman v. People, 39 Mich. 357, diction in Ex parte McNeeley, 36 W. Va. 84, 15 L 359, 361,362, in answer to the argument that the mur. R. A. 226, a poisoning case, where the death oc- der was considered in law as occurring when the curred within the state, but in that case as juris- blow was given which resulted in death, the court diction was expressly conferred upon the state looked upon death as an essential ingredient in court by statute, the court upheld the prosecution homicide, and that until it occurred there was no in the state where the death occurred.
such crime, no murder being then committed, Although the case of State v. Ryan, 13 Minn. 371, there being no doctrine of relation which could was one wherein the sufficiency of the indictment alter the date or the time of the death, and no rule was attacked, the defendant being indicted and wbich could anticipate the death and complete the convicted of murder in the first degree, under the crime earlier,-especially where there was no statlaws in effect at the time charged in the indictment, utory provision to the contrary. which alleged the killing of the deceased on a
Debney, being unable to live happily together, death, but the place where the criminal act is a separation took place. Subsequently a recon- perpetrated, to which the jurisdiction to try ciliation was brought about, and after a time a and punish is given. It was the inflicting of second separation occurred. Afterwards, on the fatal wounds by the prisoner, coupled with the 4th day of July, 1893, the accused went to the requisite contemporaneous intent or design, the place where his wife was stopping, in which constituted the felony; the subsequent Nance county, and asked her if she would go death of Mrs. Debney being a result or sequence bome with him, and she replied she would not. rather than a constituent element of the offense. He then inquired if she never intended to go The doctrine is stated thus by Mr. Bishop, at with him, and, upon receiving a negative an- $ 51 of volume 1 of his work on Criminal Proswer, he drew bis revolver, and shot at his wife cedure: “The true view appears to be that five times, three of the balls penetrating her the blow is murder or not, according as it pro. body. After she fell to the ground, be jumped duces death within a year and a day or not; upon ber, and stamped her head and breast. and therefore, in all cases, an indictment lies From the wounds thus inflicted, Mrs. Debney in the county wbere the blow was given.” To died, in Platte county, on the 9th day of the the same effect, see 1 Whart. Crim. L. 292; same month. The verdict of the jury found Kerr, Homicide, $ 226; Rex v. Hargrare. 5 Car. the prisoner guilty of murder in the first de- & P. 170; Green v. State, 66 Ala. 44, 41 Am. gree, but did not fix the penalty.
Rep. 744; State v. McCoy, 8 Rob. (La.) 545, 41 The first question argued by counsel is Am. Dec. 301. whether the accused was entitled to the bene- In Riley v. State, 9 Humph. 646, it was held fit of the amendment to S 3 of the Criminal that the venue is proved in a murder case by Code adopted by the legislature of 1893, fixing establishing that the mortal blow was inflicted the punishment for murder in the first degree in the county in which the prosecution is at death or imprisonment in the penitentiary brought, without proving the county where for life, in the discretion of the jury. The act the deceased died. Green, J., in delivering of the legislature containing the aforesaid the opinion of the court, says: “For, although, amendment of the Criminal Code contained at common law, it was said the offense was not no emergency clause. Therefore, under the complete until death, yet it would be doing provisions of $ 24, art. 3 of the state Constitu- violence to language io say that the offense tion, it did not become operative until three was committed in the county where the death calendar months after the adjournment of the happened, although the strokes were given ir session of the legislature at which it was en another county.
East says the comacted. The twenty-third legislative assembly mon opinion was that he might be indicted finally adjourned on the 8th day of April, 1893, where the stroke was given. That alone is the and it is contended by counsel for plaintiff in act of the party. He commits this act, and the error that the act to which reference is made death is only a consequence." above went into effect at the expiration of United States v. Guiteau, 1 Mackey, 498, was three calendar months from such adjournment, a prosecution for the murder of President Garor on July 9, 1893, the day on which tbe death field. In that case the fatal shot was fired in of Mrs. Debney occurred. On the other hand, Washington, in the District of Columbia, from the attorney general argues that the amend- wbich the president died three months later, at ment did not go into effect until August 1, Elberon, in the state of New Jersey. Guiteau 1893; in other words, that the "three calen was indicted and tried for the crime in the Dis. dar months” begins to run at the expiration trict of Columbia. The point was made in the of the months within which the legislature case that the court had no jurisdiction on the adjourned sine die. In our view, it is un ground the crime was committed at the place necessary-indeed, it would be quite out of where the death occurred. The court, in an place-to decide at this time between these opinion by Justice James, held that the murconflicting positions of counsel, or to review der was committed within the District of Cotheir arguments or the anthorities cited in sup-lumbia, since the fatal wound was given there, port thereof, since the time when the amend. although the consequent death happened withment of 1893 to $ 3 of the Criminal Code went out the District, and in one of the states. into force does not on the record arise in this State v. Kelly, 76 Me. 331, 49 Am. Rep. 620, case, unless the crime with wbich the plaintiff was a prosecution for murder. The wound in error is called upon to answer was commit which produced the death was inflicted within ted on July 9, the day Mrs. Debney died, and the limits of Ft. Popham, a fort of the United not on the 4th day of the same month, when States, from the effects of which wound death the fatal wounds were inflicted. Undoubtedly, ensued at Phipsburg, outside the limits of the the concurrence of both the wounds and the fort. It was held the crime was committed consequent death were necessary for the con- where the mortal blow was given, and not summation of the crime of murder, for, until where the person died. The court, in the death ensues, the crime is not complete. The opinion, observes: “But, it is said that, alquestion has been frequently before the courts though a mortal wound may be inflicted within for adjudication, Where is the crime commit a fort, still, if the person wounded dies elseted when the wounds or blows, and the death where, the crime must not be regarded as bav. resulting therefrom, occur in different countiesing been committed in the fort, but at the place or states? And the great weight of the deci- where the person dies, and that in such a case sions bolds that, independent of any statutory the courts of the latter place have jurisdiction. provision upon the subject, the crime is com- It is undoubtedly true that the courts of the mitted and is punishable in the jurisdiction latter place do sometimes have jurisdiction; where the fatal wound or blow is given; in but we are satisfied that, when this is so, it is other words, that it is not the place of the not because the crime is to be regarded as having been committed there, but because some it may be true that the crime is not completed rule of law, statutory or otherwise, expressly until death, yet that the death simply deterconfers such jurisdiction. The modern and mines the character of the crime committed in more rational view is that the crime is commit- giving the blow, and refers back to and qualited where the unlawful act is done, and that ties that act.” the subsequent death, while it may be sufficient In State v. Gessert, 21 Minn. 369, it appeared to copfer jurisdiction, cannot change the local- that the defendant was indicted for murder in ity of the crime.”
Wasbington county, in that state, by feloni. State v. Carter, 27 N. J. L. 499, was an in- ously stabbing and wounding one Savazyo, in dictment for murder. The blows were struck said county, from which he died in the couoty in Hudson county, New York, from which of Pierce, in the state of Wisconsin. The inthe injured party died in New Jersey, where dictment was demurred to, on the ground that the prosecution was brought. Vredenburgh, it did not charge the commission of an offense J., in speaking for the court upon the ques in Washington county. The court sustained tion of jurisdiction, uses this language: “The the indictment. Berry, J., in passing upon only fact connected with the offense alleged to the question of jurisdiction, said: “It is for have taken place within our jurisdiction is bis acts that defendant is responsible. They that, after the injury, the deceased came into constitute his offense. The place where they and died in this state. This is not the case are committed must be the place where his where a man stands on the New York side of offense is committed, an tberefore the place the line, and, shooting across the border, kills where he should be indicted and tried. In this one in New Jersey. When that is so, the blow instance the acts with which defendant is is in fact struck in New Jersey. It is the de- charged, to wit, the stabbing and wounding, fendant's act in this state. The passage of the were committed in Washington county. The ball after it crosses the boundary, and its ac. death which ensued in Pierce county, though tual striking, is the continuous act of the de- it went to characterize the acts committed in fepdant. In all cases the criminal act is the Washington county, was not an act of defendimpinging of the weapon, whatever it may be, ant committed in Wisconsin, but the conseon the person of the party injured, and tbat quence of bis acts committed in Washington must necessarily be wbere the impingement county." happens. And whether the sword, the ball, If the crime is deemed committed in the or any other missile passes over a boundary in county where the fatal wounds were given, as the act of striking, is a matter of no conse- the authorities hold, it follows that the offense quence. The act is where it strikes, as much was committed when such wounds were inwbere the party who strikes stands out of the flicted. True, the death occurred at a subse. state as where he stands in it. Here no act is quent date, but it relates back to the time the done in this state by the defendant. He sent mortal injury was received. The accused comno missile or letter or message that operated as mitted all the acts constituting the offense on an act witbin this state. The coming of the July 4: the death which ensued in Platte party injured into this state afterwards was his county, on July 9, merely characterized bis own voluntary act, and in no way the act of acts. The crime of murder consists in intenthe defendant. If the defendant is liable here tionally and unlawfully causing the death, at all, it must be solely because the deceased and, while it is true that the crime is not comcame and died bere after be was injured. Can plete until death occurs, yet it is incorrect to that, in the nature of things, make the defend say that the death is an element in the crime. ant guilty of murder or manslaughter here? It is merely a necessary condition to it. The If it can, then, for a year after an injury is in- elements of the crime are the acts of the perpeflicted, murder, as to its jurisdiction, is ambu- trator, such as the malice, intent, and the latory at the option of the party injured, and wound or blow. The crime was committed becomes punishable, as such, wherever be may when the mortal wounds were jpflicted, and see fit to die. It may be manslaughter, in iis be is to be tried by the laws theu in force. various degrees, in one place; murder, in its A case precisely in point is People v. Gill, 6 various degrees, in another. Its punisbment Cal. 637. The defendant was indicted for the may be fine in one country, imprisonment, crime of murder. After the blow, but prior whipping, beheading, strangling, quartering to the death of the victim, a change in the hanging, or torture, in another, and all for no statute was made by the legislature. A conact done by the defendant in any of these juris- viction was had under the amended law, and dictions, but only because tbe party injured upon a review of the case the supreme court found it convenient to travel
beld the crime to be of the date of the blow, In the case of State v. Bowen, 16 Kan. 475, and governed by the law then in force. The Brewer, J., after reviewing the authorities chief justice, in the course of bis opinion, obbearing upon the question, says: “It seems served: The blow was given before, but the to us, without pursuing the authorities further, death ensued after, the passage of the last statreasonable to hold that, as the only act which ute. The death must be made to relate back the defendant does toward causing the death to the unlawful act which occasioned it, and is in giving the fatal blow, the place where he as the party died in consequence of wounds redoes that is the place wbere he commits the ceived on a particular day, the day on which crime, and that ibe subsequent wanderings of the act was committed, and not the one on the injured party, uninfluenced by the defend which the result of the act was determined, is ant, do not give an ambulatory character to the day on which the murder is properly to be the crime; at least, that those movements do cbarged." not, unless under express warrant of the stat- Complaint is made of the giving of the ute, change the place of offense; and that, while twelfth instruction, which reads as follows: