PHOTOGRAPHS. See LEVY AND SEIZURE, 2.

EXAMINATION.

PHYSICAL EVIDENCE, 20.

PLEADING.

1. An objection that an allegation is not sufficiently full, clear, and specific cannot be reached by demurrer, but requires a motion to make it more specific. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Lynch (Ind.) 293 2. A demurrer to a complaint against a grantee of one who erected a dam for injuring land by maintenance of the nuisance cannot be sustained for failure to state injury after notice to defendant of the nuisance, where the notice was given fifteen days before suit was brought, and the complaint alleged injury up to the time it was filed. Leitzsey v. Columbia Water Power Co. (S. C.) 215 3. A complaint alleging an agreement and promise to convey real estate is not demurrable because it does not expressly allege that the contract was in writing. Van Epps v. Redfield (Conn.)

360

PRESUMPTIONS.

NOTES AND BRIEFS. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY. See BONDS, 3. PROXIMATE CAUSE. See also STREET RAILWAYS, 3.

2. A city is authorized to grant to a railroad company such rights in public grounds as the legislature itself might have granted, and such only, by Minn. Gen. Stat. 1894, 2680, authorizing the corporate authorities of any city to grant, sell, convey, or lease any public grounds within the corporate limits to any railroad corporation.

Id.

3. Although a grant of special privileges on land dedicated to a particular public use is always subject to the implied condition that it may be revoked whenever the needs of the public require it, and the state or municipality has a large discretion in determining when such a condition arises, such a grant, when rightfully made and acted upon, cannot be revoked at the mere arbitrary pleasure of the Id. state or the municipality.

PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS. See also CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 18.

1. Power to assess railroad real estate for local improvements is conferred by a statute for the equalization of the public burden, which provides that railroad property, with certain exceptions, shall be subject to "taxation by ordinances for city purposes.' Philadel phia v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. (Pa.) 564

2. A strip of land 1,500 feet wide along a river bank and used by a railroad company as a coal and ore terminal is not all exempt from taxation as roadbed although a large part of it is covered with tracks.

Id.

781

NOTES AND BRIEFS. Proximate cause of injury to passenger. 782

PUBLIC GROUNDS. See also LEVEES, 3-5; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 8; STATUTES, 6.

NOTES AND BRIEFS.

Public moneys; liability of officer for; deposit in bank. 679 Public purposes for which it may be used. 818

RAILROADS. See also CARRIERS, 3;

COMMERCE, 2, 3; CORPORATIONS, 5, 6;
EMINENT DOMAIN, 3; EVIDENCE, 28; Ex-
PLOSIONS; LEVEES, 3, 5, 6; LIENS, 4, 5;
NEGLIGENCE, 4; PUBLIC GROUNDS, 2;
PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS, 1-3; RECEIVERS;
TRIAL, 8-10.

1. A lease by a railroad company without clear and specific statutory authority is utterly void. Van Steuben v. Central R. Co. (Pa.) 577 2. Authority to a street-railway company to cross any railroad operated by steam or otherwise does not give power to cross else where than at points where the railroad is crossed by a street or highway when other sections of the street-railway charter confine the adoption of its route to established streets and public highways. Northern C. R. Co. v. Har risburg & M. Electric R. Co. (Pa.) 572 3. A railroad right of way is property which the company may protect from unlawful invasion by a street-railroad company which seeks to establish a crossing over it. Id. 4. Constructing a street railway on a viaduct 100 feet long and 22 feet high over a railroad company's right of way, and operating cars thercon, are such an invasion of the rights of the railroad company as will entitle it to maintain a suit to restrain it.

NOTES AND BRIEFS.

Id.

RELEASE.

1. A majority of the members of an absolutely independent congregation cannot exercise the authority to remove officers whose term is indefinite, except by acting in compli ance with the rules and discipline of the church. Long v. Harvey (Pa.) 169

2. A meeting held by a majority of the members of an independent congregation of the "Disciples of Christ," which is presided over by a clergyman of another congregation and held under a call directed by a tribunal of the elders of sister congregations to whom the majority appealed, and which was held in front of the church because the elders belonging to the minority had closed and locked its doors, when the laws or rules of the church do not provide for such proceeding, is wholly without authority to depose the old officers or elect new ones, but their remedy is by assertion of their rights as members of the congre

gation.

NOTES AND BRIEFS.

Id.

Religious societies; laws of; power of ma170 jority.

REPLEVIN.

1. For the enhancement by a trespasser of

MENTS.

Railroad; duty as to sounding whistles. Right of street railway to cross. Liability for injury caused by lessee.

572 577

RATIFICATION. See ESTOPPEL, 2. RECEIVERS. See also BANKS, 2; CONFLICT OF LAWS, 6; CORPORATIONS, 10; EVIDENCE, 5.

Preference to railroad mortgagees is not gained by payment of a judgment against the railroad company for damages, when it is paid after its affirmance on appeal by the surety on a supersedeas bond who signed it when the mortgage was in existence and no default had been made upon it and when the railroad company was apparently solvent, although the bond may have benefited the mortgagees by preventing a levy on the railroad which might have worked detriment to them directly and indirectly as substantial owners of the property. Whitely v. Central Trust Co. (Ċ. Ċ. App. 6th C.)

303

ERS AND ELECTIONS, 3, 4.

NOTES AND BRIEFS.

Records; right of citizen to inspect. 144

1. Notice by a registered letter, provided for by Iowa Laws 1880, chap. 210, 2, in case of notice precedent to forfeiture of insurance policies, is completed by due registration of the letter at the office from which it is to be sent. Ross v. Hawkeye Ins. Co. (Iowa) 466

2. A letter is not registered so as to complete service of notice by registered letter where such service is authorized, until it is numbered as required by the postal laws and regulations, although the postmaster has received it properly addressed and given a receipt therefor. Id.

SEWERS. See DRAINS AND SEWERS,
NOTES AND BRIEFS; OIL; TRIAL, 7.
SHIPPING. See CARRIERS, 1, 2.
SITUS. See TAXES, NOTES AND BRIEFS.
SOLDIERS. See CIVIL SERVICE.

the legislature from power to designate where departments of the university shall be located. Sterling v. Regents of the University of Mich igan (Mich.)

NOTES AND BRIEFS.

150

1. Constitutional requirements as to the style of acts or the manner of their passage are mandatory, and not directory. Union Bank V. Oxford (N. C.)

487

2. Failure to enter the yeas and nays on legislative journals as required by N. C. Const. art. 2, § 14, on the second and third readings of an act authorizing the creation of indebted ness by a town, renders the act void. Id.

3. Certificates of speakers that an act was ratified, although conclusive of the fact that it was read three several times in each house and ratified, do not show that the act was read three several days in each house and that the yeas and nays were entered on the journal as required by N. C. Const. art. 2, 14, when by a town. the act authorizes the creation of indebtedness

Id.

legislature to which the executive approval is 4. A mere concurrent resolution of the not affixed as in case of a statute, although it is passed upon the governor's recommendation to ratify his appointment of an agent for the state, and expressly directs him to allow a certain compensation, is not an "express authority of law" which can authorize a contract which will be the basis for a claim against the state, under Cal. Const. art. 4, § 32, requiring "express authority of law" therefor, and of the same article, providing that "no law shall be passed except by bill." Mullan v. State (Cal.) 262

15

5. Tenn. Acts 1895, chap. 67, providing

A contract to convey land to be paid for in three annual instalments will not be specifically enforced nearly forty years after its execution, where there has been no valid payment of the purchase money and the land has greatly increased in value and the purchasers have become insolvent, although the vendor ten years after the execution of the contract procured a judgment for the purchase money, on which an invalid payment in full was made to the clerk of the court. Hendry v. Benlisa (Fla.)

STATE. See ESTOPPEL, 5.

283

of hotel, inn, and boarding house keepers, shall be misdemeanors, and declaring what shall constitute prima facie evidence of fraudulent intent in a prosecution for such acts, and authorizing the sale of baggage left by defaulting patrons,-is not unconstitutional on the ground that it embraces more than one subject. State v. Yardley (Tenn.) Partly invalid.

656

STATE INSTITUTIONS.
TIES, 4; PUBLIC MONEY.
STATE UNIVERSITY. See also MAN-
DAMUS, 2.

Clauses in a Constitution providing for a board of regents to be elected by the people, and to have general supervision of the state university and the control of all expenditures 34 L. R. A.

184

1896, chap. 427, the main was to secure a bi-partisan the whole act must fall. (N. Y.) Title.

8. Tenn. Acts 1895, chap. 67, entitled "An Act to Protect Hotel, Inn, and BoardingHouse Keepers," is not unconstitutional on the ground that the title embraces more than one subject. State v. Yardley (Tenn.) 656

9. The subject of Tenn. Laws 1895, chap. 67, providing for the protection of hotel, inn, and boarding-house keepers, is sufficiently embraced in the title "An Act to Protect Hotel, Inn, and Boarding-House Keepers," although the means or instrumentalities for such protection are not recited therein. Id. 10. A provision in a statute authorizing "townships" to refund their indebtedness is within the title "An Act to Enable . . Municipal Corporations to Refund Their Indebtedness." Rathbone v. Hopper (Kan.) 674

13. The requirement of Nev. Const. art. 4, 25, that the system of county governments shall be uniform throughout the state, means that all county governments must in all essential particulars be alike, and is violated by Nev. act March 15, 1895, attempting to confer upon Storey county the full powers of a municipal corporation. Id.

14. A statute giving a certain county power to issue bridge bonds and levy taxes to pay them does not violate Tenn. Const. art. 11, 8, prohibiting the suspension of general laws for the benefit of a particular individual and the granting to any individual of special rights, privileges, immunities, or exemptions. Bur nett v. Maloney (Tenn.) 541 15. A local-option law granting charter power to all the cities of a certain class, to take effect in ench city only upon the adoption of the same by such city, is in contravention of Minn. Const. art. 4, §§ 33, 34, prohibiting special legislation as to cities, and requiring all laws as to the same to be uniform in their operation throughout the state, although a local-option law granting power to adopt a mere by law or ordinance may be valid. State, Childs, v. Copeland (Minn.)

777

16. The right to repeal any existing special law, but not to amend, extend, or modify it, which is given by Minn. Const. art. 4, § 33 (amendment of 1891), does not include the

Id.

17. A statute authorizing the granting of a warrant of attachment against one who makes a false statement in writing to obtain credit will be strictly construed in favor of those against whom it may be employed, as it is in derogation of the common law. Penoyar v. Kelsey (N. Y.) 248

18. A provision exempting debts already contracted from the prohibition against transfers of property to prefer creditors is not embraced within the title of Tenn. Acts 1895, chap. 128, which indicates merely the prohi bition of such preferences without anything Nat. Bank v. Divine Grocery Co. (Tenn.) 445 to show that it permits any preferences. Third

19. A prohibition of judgments by default is not within the scope of Tenn. Acts 1895, chap. 128, indicating a prohibition of preferences by "confession of judgment." Repeal.

Id.

counties by the general revenue law of Tennes20. The limitation on the taxing power of see, passed at the extra session of 1895, does not repeal the provision of the special act of 1895, p. 122, chap. 80, relating to the power Burnett v. Maloney (Tenn.) to tax to pay bridge bonds of Knox county. 541

21. A statute which does not expressly repeal, revive, or amend any former law, but states that "all laws and parts of laws in conflict" therewith are repealed, does not violate Tenn. Const. art. 2, § 17, requiring all acts which repeal, revive, or amend former laws to recite the title or substance of the law repealed, revived, or amended. State v. Yardley (Tenn.)

NOTES AND BRIEFS.

656

the conclusion that the negligence in managing the car was later in time and therefore the proximate cause of the injury. Everett v. Los Angeles Consol. E. R. Co. (Cal.)

350 4. The fright of a mule caused by the usual noise incident to running a street car by electricity, without any unnecessary noise made for the purpose of scaring the animal, does not make the street railway company liable for re sulting damages. Doster v. Charlotte Street R. Co. (N. C.) 481 NOTES AND Briefs.

Street railways; use of streets by; crossing railroad. 572

Negligence in striking person by street car; contributory negligence.

350 Frightening of horse by street car;-(1) Generally; (2) by bells, gongs, and whistles; (3) by steam; (4) contributory negligence. 481 SUBCONTRACTORS. See CONTRACTS, 4; INTEREST, 2; LIENS, 6.

SUBWAYS. See ELECTRICAL USES AND
APPLIANCES, 6, 7, NOTES AND BRIEFS.
SUNDAY. See COMMERCE, 3; CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, 11, NOIES AND BRIEFS.
SUPERVISOR. See OFFICERS, 5.
SURVIVAL. See DEATH, 2.
TAXES. See also CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
10; COUNTIES, 8; LEVEES, 2; MANDA
MUS, 3; MORTGAGE, 2; MUNICIPAL COR
PORATIONS, 9; PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS, 4;
STATUTES, 14, 20.

1. The constitutional rule of uniformity in taxation is not violated by a statute author izing a county to make a donation to secure the location of a state institution within the county, although that county as well as others will be taxed for its maintenance. Lund v. Chippewa County (Wis.)

131

2. A tax on any property in specie or by the acre is contrary to Tenn. Const. art. 2, 28, requiring all property to be taxed accord ing to its value. Reelfoot Lake Levee Dist. V

Dawson (Tenn.)

725

3. A tax on land alone in acertain levee district, but excepting land under water, violates Tenn. Const. art. 2, § 28, requiring all property, real, personal, or mixed, to be taxed. Id.

4. The assessment and taxation of judg. ments rendered by the courts of a state in favor of and owned by citizens of other states is not authorized by Kan. Gen. Stat. 1889, chap. 107, 1. providing generally for the taxation of all property in the state and mentioning judgments among other classes of taxable personal property. Kingman County v. Leonard (Kan.) 810

5. Nontaxable property cannot be sold for the payment of a poll tax, under Miss. Const. 243, which makes said tax "a lien only upon taxable property," as this section is a part of the article on franchise and is intended to be a clog upon the franchise more than a means of revenue. Ratliff v. Beale (Miss.) 472

7. The intent of dealers in cattle to export part of them, and the fact that they do export about two thirds of all which they handle, do not prevent the taxation of such cattle to the average amount that they have on hand. Id.

8. Notice of a new assessment or of an increase of taxation required by Md. Code, art. 81, 145, is necessary in order to sustain such new or increased tax. Id. Transfer tax.

9. Bonds issued by the United States were not intended to be made subject to tax by the New York transfer tax act of 1892 as property over which the state "has any jurisdiction for the purposes of taxation." Re Whiting's Estate (N. Y.)

232

10. Bonds of a foreign corporation, as well as bonds and certificates of stock of domestic corporations, when deposited in a safe deposit nonresident, are "property within the state." vault within the state, although owned by a within the meaning of the New York transfer Id. tax act of 1892.

11. Bonds of a domestic corporation, which are in another state in possession of a nonresident owner, are "not property within the state,” within the meaning of the New York transfer tax act of 1892, imposing a tax on the transfer from a nonresident decedent of property within the state. Re Bronson's Estate (N. Y.)

238