Section 68 provides that, if when goods are landed, the shipowner gives notice for that purpose, the lien for freight is to continue; and, by section 73, if the lien is not discharged in ninety days after the goods have been so landed and warehoused, the warehouseowner may sell the goods by public auction, observing certain rules laid down in sections 74 and 75. Chapter 68 is entitled "An Act for Amending the "law relating to copyright in works of the Fine "Arts, and for repressing the Commission of Fraud "in the production and sale of such works." This Act extends the benefit of copyright to every original painting, drawing, and photograph made in the British dominions, or elsewhere, by a British subject, and not sold, and secures the exclusive right of copying, engraving, re-producing, and multiplying such painting, etc., by any means, or in any size, for the term of the author's natural life, and seven years after his death. The penalties are forfeiture of the copies, and a penalty not exceeding £10. Parties fraudulently disposing of copies of paintings, photographs, with false signatures, or making addition to genuine works, and selling them as genuine, is made liable to a penalty of £10, or double the full price of the picture sold or offered for sale. The importation of pirated works is prohibited by sec. 10; and by sec. 11 the author of pirated works may sue an action of damages, notwithstanding the infliction of penalties. The only country in Europe, we believe, with which we have no extradition convention for the Burrender of criminals, is Denmark; and instances have within these few years occurred where advantage has been taken of this exception, and the criminals have thereby escaped. In April last, however, a convention was agreed to and signed at London, between this country and Denmark, whereby it was agreed to mutually surrender criminals; and this convention has now been given effect to by chapter 70 of the statutes. Chapter 85 we give in full: An Act to Facilitate the Transmission of Moveable Property in Scotland. [7th August, 1862.] 'Whereas, it is expedient to facilitate the Transmission of Moveable Estate in Scotland:' Be it enacted, by the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords, Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows: 1. From and after the passing of this Act, it shall be competent to any party, in right of a personal bond or of a conveyance of moveable estate, to assign such bond or conveyance by assignation in or as nearly as may be in the form set forth in Schedule A hereto annexed; and it shall be competent to write the assignation or assignations on the bond or conveyance itself in or as nearly as may be in the form set forth in Schedule B hereto annexed; which assignation shall be registrable in the books of any Court, in terms of any clause of registration contained in the bond or conveyance so assigned; and such assignation, upon being duly stamped and duly intimated, shall have the same force and effect as a duly stamped and duly intimated assignation according to the forms at present in use. 2. An assignation shall be validly intimated (1) by a Rotary public delivering a copy thereof, certified as cor rect, to the person or persons to whom intimation may in any case be requisite; or (2) by the holder of such assignation, or any person authorised by him, transsuch person; and (in the first case) a certificate by such mitting a copy thereof, certified as correct, by post to notary public in or as nearly as may be in the form set forth in Schedule C hereto annexed, and (in the second case) a written acknowledgment by the person to whom such copy may have been transmitted by post as aforesaid of the receipt of the copy, shall be sufficient evidence of such intimation having been duly made: Provided always, that if the deed or instrument containing such assignation shall likewise contain other conveyances or declarations of trust purposes, it shall not be necessary to deliver or transmit a full copy thereof, but only a copy of such part thereof as respects the subject-matter of such assignation. 3. Nothing in this Act contained shall prevent the transmission of any personal bond or conveyance of moveable estate, or the intimation of any assignation according to the forms at present in use. 4. The following words in this Act, and in the Schedules assigned to this Act, shall have the several meanings hereby assigned to them, unless there be some thing in the subject or context repugnant to such construction; that is to say, the word "Bond" and the word "Conveyance" shall extend to and include personal bonds for payment or performance, bonds of cauassignations in security of every kind, decreets of any tion, bonds of guarantee, bonds of relief, bonds and Court, policies of assurance of any assurance company or association in Scotland, whether held by parties resident in Scotland or elsewhere, protests of bills or of promissory notes, dispositions, assignations, or other conveyances of moveable or personal property or effects, assignations, translations, and retrocessions, and also any competent Court; the word "Assignation" shall probative extracts of all such deeds from the books of also include translations and retrocessions, and probative extracts thereof; the words "Moveable Estate" shall extend to and include all personal debts and obligations, and moveable or personal property or effects of every kind. Transmission of Moveable Property (Scotland) Act, 5. This Act may be cited for all purposes as the 1862." Schedules referred to in the foregoing Act. SCHEDULE A. I, A B, in consideration of, etc. (or otherwise, as the case may be), do hereby assign to C D, and his heirs or assignees (or otherwise, as the case may be), the bond (or other deed, describing it) granted by E F, dated, etc., by which (here specify the nature of the deed, and specify also any connecting title, and any circumstances requiring to be stated in regard to the nature and extent of the right required). In witness whereof, etc. (Insert Testing Clause in usual form). SCHEDULE B. I, A B, in consideration of, etc. (or otherwise, as the case may be), do hereby assign to CD, and his heirs or assignees (or otherwise, as the case may be), the foregoing (or within-written) bond (or other writ or deed, describing it) granted in my favour (or otherwise, as the case may be, specifying any connecting title and any circumstances requiring to be stated in regard to the nature and extent of the right assigned). In witness whereof, etc. (Insert Testing Clause in usual form). SCHEDULE C. I, (A) of the city of notary public, do hereby attest and declare, That upon the day of and between the hours of and I duly intimated to B (here describe the party) the within-written assignation (or otherwise, as the case may be), or an assignation granted by (here describe it), and that by delivering to the said A personally (or otherwise) by leaving for the said A, within his dwelling house at E, in the hands of (here describe the party), a full copy thereof (or, if a partial copy, here quote the portion of the deed which has been delivered), to be given to him; all of which was done in presence of C and D (here name and describe the two witnesses), who subscribe this attestation along with me. In witness whereof, etc. (Insert Testing Clause in usual form, to be subscribed by the party and the two witnesses.) Reviews. STUDIES IN ROMAN LAW, WITH COMPARATIVE VIEWS of Session in Scotland. continue, and we hope to see some measures taken by the heads of the Supreme Court, to enforce a uniform course of study and examination preparatory to admission to practice before our Inferior Courts. One reason why Roman law has not been studied in this country as it ought, was, that there were no books readily accessible to introduce the student. The Corpus Juris is by no means very attractive, especially to one just beginning the study of law. The only readily accessible introductions to the Civil Law in English that we know of is a translation of M. Claude de Ferriere's History of the Roman or Civil Law-a work of no great value; Dr Taylor's Elements of the Civil Law-a useful summary of which was afterwards published; and Gibbon's Remarkable Forty-fourth Chapter. But the discovery of Gaius' Institutes, the eritical works of Neihbur on Roman History, and his followers, have so re-constituted Roman History and Law as to render the older writers on that law of little value to the student. Embodying modern discoveries in Roman law and history, so far as bearing on law, Lord Mackenzie's "Studies" present an excellent summary of the civil law, and exhibits in an attractive manner all that is necessary to be known by way of introduction. He gives a history of the law down to the time of Justinian-its consolidation under that Emperor, and the fate of the law after his time, to its revival-with other branches of learning. He has a WE think it can hardly be said with truth that law has preliminary chapter on Jurisprudence, and the principal been studied as a science in Scotland for many years divisions of law, to which he gives a present living past. All that seems to have been aimed at was such a interest by briefly discussing the rights of belligerentsknowledge of the art as to pass examination, and to the Declaration of Paris, of April, 1856-the Law of make such an appearance at the bar as not quite to Blockade-of Contraband, and the Affair of the Trent. discredit the traditional learning and eloquence of the The author then proceeds to an exposition of the Roman gown. The days have long since become historical when law, with brief comparisons of the French, English, and our law students resorted to the French and German Scottish law. His lordship does not pretend to originality Universities, where they acquired more than the Pro- in the preparation of such a work; it is simply an exfessors taught, or could be learned even from books; position of the Roman Civil Law as elucidated by recent and this additional knowledge was brought to bear upon discoveries, but the arrangement is such as to convey a the municipal law of their fatherland, until our lawyers perfect idea of the field to be gone over by the student. attained an amount of learning and a cosmopolitan cast It will not only be a most excellent text-book for of mind which raised them far beyond your mere cantor students, but will be useful to others who may wish to formularum. It must, however, be said in excuse, if obtain some knowledge of Roman law as a branch of not in justification, of this marked difference between the present and the past generation of lawyers, and those of a hundred years ago, that, from whatever cause, foreign study seemed to have gone out of fashion (for learning has its fashions like less frivolous things) and we had no means at home of supplying the want which these offered. Our chairs of law and subsidiary studies were deficient, not only in number, but were sometimes not filled by men with such unquestioned learning and ability as to influence and attract students. These wants, we need not say, are now being gradually supplied in our Universities by the founding of new chairs, or the restoration of others long in abeyance, so that our lawyers may attain at home such a legal education as may enable them to vie with the most learned of our ancient lawyers. It is, besides, not to be denied, that beyond the profession, the standard of general attainments has of late years been gradually rising, and has enabled most intelligent business men to form a pretty shrewd guess of the kind of men to whom they can most safely entrust their legal business; and, as a necessary consequence, lawyers themselves have felt that if law was to retain and maintain its title to be a learned and liberal profession, their diligence must be increased, and their studies augmented. To attain a thorough knowledge of Scottish law, we must lay a solid foundation in Roman law. To some extent this has been attended to in qualifying for admission to the bar; but, strange to say, it has been hitherto considered quite unnecessary for most of the members of the other branches of the profession. Why this has been so is probably enough explainable; but we see no reason why it should historical study, but who have hitherto been deterred by the mere sight of the volumes in which that law has hitherto been hidden. LAW OF HIGHWAYS IN SCOTLAND, WITH STATUTES AND THIS is one of Dr Barclay's most useful volumes. To Having heard parties' procurators, and resumed consideration of the proof, productions, and whole process, Finds that this action is directed against the defender as executrix of the deceased James Bow, who carried on business under the firm of A. & T. Bow, of which firm he was the sole partner: Finds that the summons concludes for £500 in name of solatium and damages for the patrimonial loss sustained by the pursuers, through the death of their son, Thomas, who was an apprentice to the said A. & T. Bow, or James Bow, and who was killed on Tuesday, the 28th June, 1859, by falling from a chimney-stalk at North Leith, for the erection of the brickwork of which A. & T. Bow were contractors-the accident happened, as is alleged, in consequence of the defective character of the machinery used in the erection: Finds that another party of the name of Speden, a mason in Edinburgh, was contractor for the mason-work of said stalk: Finds that the said Thomas M'Ketterick, Jun., was sent along with other workmen by the said deceased James Bow to put up the said brickwork: Finds that they did so accordingly, and the whole brickwork of the stalk was completed by Monday, the 27th June, 1859, although the boilers, which had to be built in with brick near the foot of the stalk, still remained to be placed: Finds that on or about Friday, the 24th June, David Bow, the foreman who had been sent by James Bow to superintend the doing of the brickwork, entered into a contract or agreement with George Knowles, (Speden's foreman), to put the belt and copestones on the chimney-stalk; and David Bow posted a letter on said Friday to James Bow, to tell him of the contract, and to get his sanction to it: But finds that James Bow never received the said letter, nor was made acquainted with the contract, seeing that he died suddenly at eight o'clock A.M. of Saturday, the 25th June, and his death was known to David Bow and his workmen, at North Leith, on the evening of that day: Finds that, notwithstanding, David Bow proceeded in the afternoon of Monday, the 27th, and morning of Tuesday, the 28th June, to the execution of his contract for laying the copestones, and employed the said Thomas M'Ketterick, Jun., and the witness, Archibald Hood, to assist him: Finds that David Bow and M'Ketterick were both on the top of the stalk on said Tuesday morning, when they were precipitated to the ground, and were killed, in consequence of the legs of a triangle placed on the top of the stalk having slipped or spread out when a copestone was in the act of being brought up, whereby the triangle was upset, and the men thrown down: Finds that the said James Bow had not sanctioned the employment of Thomas M'Ketterick, Jun., for anything connected with the building of said stalk except the brickwork, and had not himself entered into any contract for laying the copestones, or instructed or allowed his men to be employed in the execution of such contract; and he had himself died three days before the accident happened: Finds that in these circumstances, even though damages were due, they could not be charged against the executry of the deceased, as the debt was not contracted by him, or during his life-time, and yet this action is laid against the defender solely in her character of executrix, and not as personally responsible in respect of having adopted the contract entered into at his own hand by the foreman, and which contract the defender in point of fact did not adopt, although she has carried on the business of A. & T. Bow since James Bow's death; but the books show no payment of wages for laying the copestones: Finds farther, and separatim, that the triangle and tackling supplied by the deceased James Bow were in all respects sufficient for building the brickwork of the stalk, which was accordingly finished without the occurrence of any accident: Finds, that although it is usual for the brickbuilder to accommodate the mason, who is to put on the stone work with the use of his tackling, the brick-builder does not thereby become responsible that it shall be in all respects suitable for the work to be performed by the mason, who is bound to look after that himself: Finds, as regards the more immediate cause of the accident, that a piece of sheet-iron attached to one of the legs of the triangle, and by which the leg was fastened to the platform, having become loose, the deceased Thomas M'Ketterick and his fellow-workman, Archibald Hood, while engaged in fitting on the copestones, observed what had happened, and took it upon themselves to remedy the defect by nailing the sheet-iron of new, and this they did without communication with the foreman or their employer: Finds that, as far as can be ascertained, the means they resorted to were insufficient to prevent the leg from slipping, and the triangle was upset in consequence, and the men killed: Finds that M'Ketterick and Hood were thus themselves the cause of the accident, having taken the repair into their own hands, and made it imperfectly, the triangle itself being proved to have been sufficiently sound and strong when put upon the stalk: Therefore sustains both the preliminary defences and those upon the merits, and assoilies the defender: Finds the pursuers liable in expenses: Allows an account thereof to be given in, and remits the same to the auditor to tax and report, and decerns. This Interlocutor was appealed, but Sir Archibald Alison adhered in the following judgment: Having heard parties' procurators under the pursuers' appeal upon the Interlocutor appealed against, and having made avizandum with the debate, and considered the proof adduced and whole process, Adheres to the said Interlocutor, for the reasons therein stated, and also those contained in the following Note, and dismisses the appeal. NOTE. The present action, which concludes for reparation on account of the death of the pursuer's son, Thomas M'Ketterick, is directed against the widow and executrix of the deceased James Bow, bricklayer in Glasgow, who carried on business under the firm of A. & T. Bow, of which he was sole partner. It is grounded on the allegation that the death of the pursuer's son was owing to the fault or negligence of the defender's deceased husband, or of his foreman or manager, David Bow, or of some party for whom he was responsible, and in consequence of the defective nature of the scaffolding and machinery used in the erection of a chimney-stalk in Leith, for the brickwork of which he was the contractor. Speden, a mason, entered into a sub-contract with David Bow, the foreman of James Bow, for the stone-work of the chimney, which included the putting up of a strong belt or copestone at the top of the chimney. Speden's contract with David Bow was verbal only. James Bow, the contractor, died on Satur day morning, the 25th June, 1859, at seven A.M., and the catastrophe which killed the pursuer's son occurred on the morning of Tuesday, the 28th, following. A letter from David Bow, announcing the sub-contract entered into by him with Speden, was posted from Leith on the evening of Friday, the 24th of June, but it could not have reached the deceased before his death, which took place suddenly the following morning. The sub-contract was concluded between Speden and David Bow by the intervention of Knowles, Speden's foreman. The chimney-stalk, so far as the brickwork was concerned, was finished on the Friday night, the 24th of June, before Bow, the contractor's death; but the stonework, con. tracted for by Speden, still remained in great part to be done. The catastrophe which occasioned the death of the pursuer's son was caused by the carelessness of the deceased himself and Hood, who had both been taken on by Speden after the brickwork of the chimney was finished, and were in his employment in raising the stones for the stone work at the top, which were to form the cope. The fault they had committed was this: the stones were raised by a rope turned over by a pulley in the interior of the stalk at the top, which pulley was supported on a triangle, the feet of which were inserted in apertures made in the brickwork. This triangle so placed was strong enough to support the loads of brick which had previously been hoisted up under Bow's contract, but it was not strong enough to support a load of stones of double the weight it had ever before carried, and the nails fastening the feet of the triangle were old and rusty, and from these causes the triangle slipped after a heavy stone had been hoisted 10 or 12 feet, and the pursuer's son, who was at the top of the stalk, was precipitated, along with David Bow, the foreman, to the bottom, and both were killed on the spot. In these circumstances three defences arise, and have been stated against the action, any one of which appears sufficient to exclude it. In the first place, the defender is sued as executrix only of her deceased husband, whose contract for the brickwork of the chimney had been finished before his death, and three days before the catastrophe occurred. 2dly, The catastrophe happened in the execution of the sub-contract that Speden had taken for the stone work, and was brought on by the acts of persons then in Speden's employment; and the deceased contractor, James Bow, had not heard of the sub-contract with Speden before his death, and he had never sustained or authorised it. 3dly, When it did occur, the catastrophe was F* owing not to any erroneous or faulty instructions given, or arrangements made either by David Bow, the foreman of the contractor, or of Knowles, Speden's foreman, but was entirely owing to the imprudent act of Hood, and M'Ketterick, the deceased himself, unknown to their master, in loading the triangle at the top of the stalk with a load of stones greater than it could bear, and greater than under Bow's direct management it had ever been loaded with before. In these circumstances the two principles come at once into play, that the master is not responsible for the consequence of the imprudence of one of his workmen, who, himself, suffers by that imprudence, or from the imprudence of a fellow-workman, engaged with him in the same work, and acting of their own accord, and not in obedience to orders given by the employers or those in authority under him. DAVID COOK, of Carphin, v. JAMES RUSSELL and Superior and Vassal-Feu Duty-16th and 17th Vict., c. 80-Prorogation of Jurisdiction.-A feu contract, the feu duty in which was above £25, prorogated the Sheriff's jurisdiction in the event of the irritancy, ob non solutem canonem, being incurred and enforced. The irritancy was incurred, and declarator of tinsel of the feu was brought before the Sheriff. Held, that the action was incompetent before the Sheriff, the feu duty being above £25, notwithstanding the clause prorogating the Sheriff's jurisdiction. THE pursuer is mid-superior of certain lands of Gorbals, held by him from the Trades' House, part of which he feued to the defenders. They were called in the summons as vassals under the pursuer in the said subjects conform to feu contract entered into between the pursuer and defenders-an extract of which was produced in process. The summons concluded that the vassals having run in arrear of their feu duty, and proportion of duplication of feu duty for the period of upwards of three years, or, at least, for two years at and preceding the term of Martinmas, 1861, amounting, the said arrears of feu duty, to the sum of £335 13s 10d sterling, under deduction of £63 18s 10d recovered to account thereof on 24th January, 1862, leaving a balance of £271 15g sterling of said arrears of feu duty due to the said David Cook, exclusive of interest from 24th January, 1862, the irritancy incurred by the feu contract had been incurred in terms of said feu contract, and the application to the Sheriff thereby nominated a competent judge in the premises, was competent to have the property in question evicted from the defenders foresaid, and in terms of the Act 16th and 17th Vict., c. 80, sec. 32, the Sheriffs were empowered to sit in judgment in actions of irritancy applying to subjects not exceeding in yearly value the sum of £25, and which jurisdiction had been prorogated by the defenders in said feu contract, to the effect of allowing the Sheriff to declare the eviction of the premises, and in terms of the said Act, and clause of prorogation of jurisdiction, the defenders, their families, servants, sub-tenants, cottars, and depen dants, goods and gear, ought to be decerned and ordained to remove furth and from their possession of all and whole two plots of ground particularly described, etc.; and to leave the same void and redd, that the pursuer, and others authorised by him, might enter thereto and possess and dispose thereof at pleasure, and warrant to that effect should be granted to be executed at the first term of Whitsunday or Martinmas, which should first occur four months after the same was issued, The defences were Preliminary-(1) action incompetent in this Court under the feu contract founded on; (2) action incompetent under 16th and 17th Vict., c. 80; (3) action having been libelled partly on the feu contract, and partly on the Act 16th and 17th Vict., c. 80, the same was incompetently libelled. Merits-(2) a denial that the defender owed the pursuer the sum sued for, or any part thereof, or any arrears of feu duty under the feu contract founded on. The pursuer had lately taken proceedings against the defenders irregularly and incompetently, under which about £500, which he had not accounted for, and under he had carried through a sale of properties estimated at which any claims he otherwise might have had, had been paid, and the pursuer was called on to produce the proceedings, including a report of the sale. The record was then closed, parties heard, and thereafter the Sheriff-Substitute pronounced the following Interlocutor:- Finds that, by the 32d section of the statute 16th and 17th Having heard parties' procurators on the closed record, Vict., c. 80, libelled, jurisdiction is conferred on Sheriff's to where the subjects shall not exceed the yearly value of £25: judge in declarators of tinsel of feus ob non solutem canonem Finds that jurisdiction in actions of that nature being compe tent to this Court, it is within the power of parties to prorogate its jurisdiction in the like actions where the value of the subjects shall exceed the statutory yearly value, Ersk. i. ii. 30: Finds it instructed by the extract registered feu contract between the pursuer and defender produced, that the feu duties of the two steadings of ground in question, and therein descricontract, the parties provided and agreed that, in case two bed, are of the yearly value of £87 10s: Finds that, by said feu years of said feu duties should lie over unpaid, that the feu right thereby created should cease, and that the said steadings, with the buildings thereon, should revert back to the pursuer as superior, and that he should be entitled to apply to the Sheriff of the County of Lanark for having the property evicted, and who, the parties declared and agreed, should be a competent judge to decide in such action: Finds that the pursuer and defender having thus prorogated jurisdiction, the present action has been and is validly and competently instituted in this Court: Therefore repels the whole preliminary defences, and reserves the question of expenses; and, on the merits, appoints the process to be enrolled first Court day that parties may be heard on the points whether the arrears of feu libelled have been liquidated by the realised proceeds of sale referred to, and as is alleged in the defence, and in the view of farther proceedings in the process being taken. legal proposition, was well founded, that no consent of parties could prorogate the jurisdiction of a judge, to hear and determine any case of a class to which his original jurisdiction that class of cases, although it should be limited, that juriswas incompetent. But where there does exist jurisdiction in diction may, by agreement of parties, be extended, "as the transition is easier from a smaller to a greater, than from a cause of one kind to one of quite a different kind," Ersk, supra, NOTE. The defenders' argument at the bar, as an abstract The defender appealed, and after a hearing Sir Archibald Alison pronounced the following judgment:-Having heard parties' procurators under the defenders' libelled as having been furnished to his wife, he denies that, at the dates of those furnishings, his wife was living with him, or was præposita negotius for him, or that she traded with the pursuers with his knowledge and authority, or in any way whatever upon his responsibility. The defender and his wife have been separated for the last seven years, and during that period any business transacted, or debts incurred by her, have been so upon her own separate and exclusive account and responsi bility, and on this ground the defender ought to be assoilzied. The preliminary plea was repelled, and a proof allowed to both parties. The proof having been led, and parties' procurators heard, the Sheriff-Substitute pronounced the following Interlocutor: appeal upon the Interlocutor appealed against, and whole process, Finds that the present action has been brought under the Sheriff Court Act of 16th and 17th Vict., c. 80, sec. 32, which renders it competent to pursue in Sheriff Courts actions of declarator ob non solutem canonem where the yearly value of the subjects shall not exceed £25: Finds it objected to, and pleaded in defence, that the action is incompetent in this Court, and privative to the Court of Session, inasmuch as the feu duty of the subjects in question is £87 10s a year: Finds that the feu duty stipulated to be paid by the feu contract libelled on is £87 10s, and that by a clause in the contract the parties agreed to prorogate the jurisdiction of this Court: Finds that it is stated by Erskine, B. 1, T. 2, sect. 38 and 31, that jurisdiction may be prorogated to causes above a statutory amount in themselves competent to the Court, but not the jurisdiction of Sheriff's to causes involving questions of heritable rights or actions of reduction, or to summonses in a different class of actions: Finds, in point of law, that, at common law, actions of declarator of irritancy, ob non solutem canonem, are privative to the Court of Session, and, by the Sheriff Court Act, sect. 32, such actions are declared competent in Sheriff Courts, but that only where the yearly value. Having heard parties' procurators, and resumed consideraof the subjects does not exceed £25, and that, as ex concessio, tion of the proof, productions, and whole process, Finds that the yearly value of the subjects here is much above that the pursuers' averment is, that the defender's wife was carryamount the yearly feu duty payable for the property under ing on business at the time the goods in question were furthe feu contract being £87 10s, the action is not within the nished to her, as a shawl fringer in Montrose Street, and that exception introduced by the statute, such actions being only the defender is liable for the price of said goods, either in vircompetent in the Sheriff Court where the yearly value of the tue of the propositura possessed by his wife, or because sho subjects does not exceed the statutory amount: Finds, there- traded with the pursuers upon the defender's responsibility, fore, that the action is incompetent in this Court, and that and with his knowledge and authority: Finds that the ordithe Court has no jurisdiction in such an action as the present, nary and implied propositura of a wife exists only in rebus notwithstanding the clauses in the feu contract agreeing to domesticis, and extends only to them within the range of prorogate the jurisdiction of the Sheriff, seeing that such an domestic use and proper for a family, and this species of action is privative to the Supreme Court, except in the case præpositura has no applicability to a case like the present: where the yearly value of the subjects does not exceed £25, Finds that a special institorial power may also be conferred the sum fixed by the statute, which is not the case here: on a wife when she is either employed or authorised to Therefore alters the Interlocutor complained of, sustains the manage a shop or business for her husband, or when she first two preliminary defences that the action is incompetent keeps a shop or carries on a business with his permission, in in this Court: Dismisses the same, and finds the defender, which cases the husband is liable for her contracts actione Core, entitled to expenses, of which appoints an account to be institoria: But finds that when a wife, living apart from her given in and taxed by the auditor, and decerns. husband, or even where living with him, carries on a business of her own without her husband's knowledge and consent, he Act. A. W. STEWART. is not liable for debts contracted in that business: Finds that since the year 1854 the defender and his wife have lived separate, with the exception of some months in the year 1858 or 1859-the precise period being left somewhat uncertain by the evidence: Finds that the goods sued for were furnished in March and April, 1859, with the exception of one item in June of that year: Finds that the pursuer, Robert Whyte, admits, in his deposition as a witness in causa, that the goods were ordered by the defender's wife-that the defender himself never transacted any business with the pursuers-and and invoiced the goods to her: Finds that the warehouse in that they entered Mrs Wilson as their debtor in their books, which the shawl fringing business was carried on was in the same tenement as that in which the defender carried on the business of a calenderer, and was on the second flat above the calender: Finds that the defender's wife admits, in her depo sition as a witness for the pursuers, that the defender did not participate in the stock or profits of the business, and had no concern with, and did not interfere in it, but she states that he knew she was getting the goods in question from the pursuers: Finds that the defender has deponed on the contrary, not only that he did not know that his wife was carrying on believed that his daughter, Mary, who was then 26 or 27 the business of a shawl fringer in 1859, but that he knew and years of age, carried on said business on her own account: Finds that the name on the door of the shawl fringing premises was "M. Wilson," which might apply either to the defender's said daughter, or his wife, as the Christian name of both is Mary: Finds that it was admitted at the debate for the pursuers, and it is also established by the proof, that the shawl fringing business was carried on, at all events for the said daughter, and there is no evidence to show when it passed first two or three years after its establishment, by the defender's into the hands of the defender's wife, if it ever did so: Finds that the pursuers have failed to instruct any transaction con nected with said business entered into in name of the defender's the other hand, the defender has proved transactions between wife, except the purchasing of the goods in question, whilst, on third parties and his said daughter as a shawl fringer: Find Alt. DAVID LOCKHART. 14TH MAY, 1862. SHERIFF COURT, GLASGOW. ROBERT WHYTE & Co. v. ALEXANDER WILSON. Husband and Wife.-Circumstances in which a husband held liable for debts contracted by his wife in a trade carried on separately by the wife in which the husband had no interest. THE pursuers sued the defender for £83 12s 10d, for goods sold and delivered by the pursuers to Mrs Mary Sunith or Wilson, some time shawl fringer, Montrose Street, Glasgow, the wife of the defender, then residing with him as proposita negotius for the defender, or separatim as trading with the pursuers with the knowledge and authority of the defender, and upon his respousibility, under deduction of certain sums paid to account. The defence was 1. Preliminary-That in this action for the price of goods it is not for goods alleged to have been sold and delivered to the defender that he is sued, but for goods alleged to have been sold and delivered to his wife without her being called as a defender, and the summons as laid is therefore quite irrelevant, and ought to be dismissed. 2. On Merits-That whilst the defender is ignorant of, and does not admit the furnishing of the goods |