Van Rensselaer agt. Owen. tion contended for, I should be prepared to overrule or disregard it; but it is far from being so. That was an action of ejectment brought by an heir-at-law of a testator against a party in possession-the testator having devised his real estate (the premises in question, with others), to executors in trust, until the youngest son became of age-and also vested them with a power to sell, and directed a distribution of the proceeds of the sale among his children. The executors had leased for a term exceeding the duration of their trust estate, and disregarding such lease, one of the sons (apparently the youngest) had brought ejectment. The court held the suit well brought, but after its commencement the surviving executor exercised the power to sell, and sold the property to a third person. The court held, that under section 31 of the Revised Statutes, before quoted, the title of the plaintiff had expired, and that the provisions of that section took effect; doubtless, upon the theory that the lawful exercise, by the executor, of the power of sale conferred by the testator, terminated the interest of the plaintiff in the real estate as such, and was the exercise of a paramount power derived not from the plaintiff, but from a higher source; that the plaintiff could not, after the exercise of such a power by the executor, have effectually alienated the estate himself, and must content himself with participating in the proceeds of the sale. Under the doctrine of equitable conversion, his real estate was turned into personal property. (See Lang agt. Kopke, 5 S. S. C. R. 363, for a fuller statement of the provisions of the Lang will.) It was in view of such a case, that the superior court employed the language, liable (if the facts were not borne in mind) to some misconstruction. "It (§ 31) applies to all cases where the title upon which a plaintiff seeks to recover the possession of real property, has from any cause ceased to exist, before the trial. It would be a narrow construction to confine it to cases in which the title expires by its own limitation." I am for affirming the judgment of the court below. MILLER, J., concurred. INGALLS, J., expressed no opinion. Green agt. Van Buskirk. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. HANNIBAL GREEN, plaintiff in error agt. MORRIS S. VAN BUS- A valid judgment, rendered in a court of one of the states of the Union, is valid If the plaintiff in such judgment is sued in another state for acts done under and by virtue of such judgment, in the state where it was rendered, by pleading such judgment in justification of his acts, he will sufficiently set it up, to enable him to claim the benefit of section 1, article 4, of the constitution of the United States, which provides that "full faith and credit shall be given in each state, to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state," and of the act of congress of May 26, 1790. December Term, 1866. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York. MOTION to dismiss the writ of error, on the ground that it does not appear from the record that the supreme court of the United States had jurisdiction. DAVID L. SEYMOUR, AMASA J. PARKER, and J. M. CARLISLE, for defendants in error. Mr. Justice MILLER, delivered the opinion of the court. This is is a writ of error to the supreme court of the state of New York, and a motion is made to dismiss it, because the record does not present a question within the twentyfifth section of the judiciary act. The case upon which such question is supposed to arise is this: John W. Bates was the owner of forty-one iron safes in the city of Chicago, and on the 3d day of November, 1857, executed and delivered, in the state of New York, to Van Buskirk and others, a chattel mortgage of said safes. On the 5th day of the same month, Hannibal Green caused to be levied on the same safes a writ of attachment, sued by him out of the proper court in Illinois, against the property of Bates. The attachment suit proceeded to judgment, and Green agt. Van Buskirk. the safes were sold in satisfation of Green's debt. Van Bus kirk, Green and Bates, were all citizens of New York. Green's attachment was levied on the safes as the property of Bates, before the possession was delivered to Van Buskirk, and before the mortgage from Bates to him was recorded, and before notice of the existence of said mortgage. Van Buskirk afterwards sued Green in the New York courts, for the value of the safes thus sold under his attachment, and Green pleaded the proceeding in the court of Illinois, in bar of the action. Van Buskirk recovered a judgment, which was affirmed in the highest court of the state of New York. It is claimed by the plaintiff in error, that the faith and credit which these proceedings have by law and usage, in the state of Illinois, were denied to them by the decision of the courts of New York, and that in doing so they decided against a right claimed by him under section 1, article 4, of the constitution, and the act of congress of May 26, 1790, on that subject. The section of the constitution referred to, declares that "full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state. And that congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof." The act of 1790 (1 U. S. Statutes, 122), was intended to be an exercise of the power conferred upon congress by this section. In the leading case of Mills agt. Duryee (7 Cranch, 481), this court held that the act in question did declare the effect of such judicial records, and that it should be same in other states, as that in which the proccedings were had. In the case of Christmas agt. Russell, decided at the present term of the court, we have reaffirmed this doctrine, and have further declared that no state can impair the effect thus to be given to judicial proceedings in her sister state, by a statute of limitation intended to operate on demands which may have Green agt. Van Buskirk. passed into judgment by such proceedings, as though no such judgment had been rendered. The record before us contains the pleadings in the case, the facts found by the court, and the conclusions of law arising thereon. Among the latter, the court decides, “that by the law of the state of New York, the title to the property passed on the execution and delivery of the instrument under the facts found in the case, and overreached the subsequent attachment in the state of Illinois, and actual prior possession under it, at the suit of defendant, although he was a creditor, having a valid and fair debt against Bates, and had no notice of the previous assignment and sale. And that the law of the state of New York is to govern the transaction, and not the law of the state of Illinois, where the property was situated." Notwithstanding the inverted manner in which the court has here stated its legal conclusions, it seems clear that it did not pass upon the effect of the judicial proceedings in Illinois upon the title of the property in contest. The case is not varied by declaring that the mortgage made and delivered in New York, overreached the subsequent attachment in Illinois. According to the view taken by that court, Van Buskirk, the plaintiff, had title to the property under the laws of New York, by virtue of his mortgage, and the question to be decided was, whether the proceedings in Illinois were paramount in their effect upon the title to the New York mortgage. It is said that Van Buskirk being no party to the proceedings in Illinois, was not bound by them, but was at liberty to assert his claim to the property in any form that might be open to him; and strictly speaking this is true. He was not bound by way of estoppel, as he would have been if he had appeared and submitted his claim, and contested the proceedings in attachment. He has a right to set up any title to the property which is superior to that conferred by the attachment proceedings, and he has the further right to show that the property was not liable to the attachment—a right from which he would have been barred, if he had been a Green agt. Van Buskirk. party to that suit. And this question of the liability of the property in controversy to that attachment, is the question which was raised by the suit in New York, and which was there decided. That court said that this question must be decided by the laws of the state of New York, because that was the domicil of the owner at the time the conflicting claims to the property originated. We are of opinion that the question is to be decided by the effect given by the laws of Illinois, where the property was situated, to the proceedings in the courts of that state, under which it was sold. There is no little conflict of authority on the general question as to how far the transfer of personal property by assignment or sale, made in the country of the domicil of the owner, will be held to be valid in the courts of the country where the property is situated, when these are in different sovereignties. The learned author of the Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, has discussed the subject with his usual exhaustive research. And it may be conceded that as a question of comity, the weight of his authority is in favor of the proposition that such transfers will generally be respected by the courts of the country where the property is located, although the mode of transfer may be different from that prescribed by the local law. The courts of Vermont and Louisiana, which have given this question the fullest consideration, have, however, either decided adversely to this doctrine, or essentially modified it. Such, also, seems to have been the view of the supreme court of Massachusetts. (Lanfear agt. Sumner, 17 Mass. 110; Taylor agt. Boardman, 28 Vermont, 589; Ward agt. Morrison, Id. 593; Emmerson agt. Partridye, 27 Id. 8; Oliver agt. Townes, 14 Martin's La. 93; Norris agt. Mumford, 4 Id. 20.) But after all, this is a mere principle of comity between the courts, which must give way when the statutes of the country where property is situated, or the established policy of its laws prescribe to its courts a different rule. The learned commentator, already referred to, in speaking of the law in Louisiana, which gives paramount title to an attach |