whence it is a maxim founded no lefs upon utility than upon juftice, That men in fociety ought to be extremely circumfpect, as to every action that may poffibly do harm. On the other hand, it is also a maxim, That as the profperity and happiness of man depend on action, activity ought to be encouraged, instead of being difcouraged by dread of confequences. These maxims, feemingly in oppofition, have natural limits that prevent their encroaching upon each other. There is a certain degree of attention and circumfpection that men generally bestow upon affairs, proportioned to their importance: if that degree were not fufficient to defend against a claim of reparation, individuals would be too much cramped in action; which would be a great discouragement to activity: if a lefs degree were fufficient, there would be too great scope for rafh or remifs conduct; which would prove the bane of society. These limits, which evidently tend to the good of fociety, are adjusted by the moral fenfe; which dictates, as laid down in the section of Reparation, that the man who acts with forefight of the probability of mischief, or acts rafhly and uncautiously without fuch forefight, ought to be liable for confequences; but that the man who acts cautiously, without foreseeing or fufpecting any mischief, ought not to be liable for confequences.

In the fame fection it is laid down, that the moral fenfe requires from every man, not his own degree of vigilance and attention, which may be very small, but that which belongs to the common nature of the fpecies. The final cause of that regulation will appear upon confidering, that were reparation to depend upon perfonal circumstances, there would be a neceflity of enquiring into the characters of men, their education, their manner of living, and the extent of their understanding; which would render judges arbitrary, and fuch law-fuits inextricable. But by affuming

the

the common nature of the species as a standard, by which every man in confcience judges of his own actions, law-fuits about reparation are rendered easy and expeditious.

LIBERTY and NECESSITY confidered with refpect to Morality.

HAving, in the foregoing fections, afcertained the reality of a moral sense, with its fentiments of approbation and difapprobation, praise and blame; the purpose of the present section is, to fhew, that these fentiments are confiftent with the laws that govern the actions of man as a rational being. In order to which, it is first necessary to explain these laws; for there has been much controversy about them, especially among divines of the Arminian and Calvinift fects.

:

Human actions, as laid down in the first section, are of three kinds one, where we act by instinct, without any view to confequences; one, where we act by will in order to produce fome effect; and one, where we act against will. With respect to the first, the agent acts blindly, without deliberation or choice; and the external act follows neceffarily from the instinctive impulfe *. Ac

tions

* A ftonechatter makes its neft on the ground or near it; and the young, as foon as they can fhift for themfelves, leave the neft inftinctively. An egg of that

tions done with a view to an end, are in a very different condition in thefe, deliberation, choice, will, enter: the intention to accomplish the end goes firft; the will to act in order to accomplish the end is next; and the external act follows of course. It is the will then that governs every action done as means to an end; and it is defire to accomplish the end that puts the will in motion; defire in this view being commonly termed the motive to act. Thus, hearing that my friend is in the hands of robbers, I burn with defire to free him: defire influences my will to arm my fervants, and to fly to his relief. Actions done against will come in afterward.

But what is it that raifes defire? The answer is at hand: it is the profpect of attaining some agreeable end, or of avoiding one that is difagreeable. And if it be again enquired, What makes an object agreeable or disagreeable, the answer is equally ready, that our nature makes it fo; and more we cannot fay. Certain visible objects are agreeable, certain founds, and certain fmells: other objects of these fenfes are disagreeable. But there we must ftop; for we are far from being fo intimately acquainted with our own nature as to affign the causes. These hints are fufficient for my prefent purpose: if one be curious to know more, the

bird was laid in a swallow's neft, fixed to the roof of a church. The fwallow fed all the young equally without diftinction. The young ftonechatter left the neft at the ufual time before it could fly; and falling to the g ound, it was taken up dead. Here is instinct in purity, exerting itself blindly without regard to variation of circumstances. The fame is obfervable in our dunghill-fowl. They feed on worms, corn, and other feeds dropt on the ground. In order to difcover their food, nature has provided them with an instinct to scrape with me foot; and the instinct is fo regularly exercised, that they fcrape even when they are fet upon a heap of

corn.

theory

theory of defire, and of agreeableness and disagreeableness, will be found in Elements of Criticism (a).

With respect to inftinctive actions, no perfon, I prefume, thinks that there is any freedom, more than in acts done against will: an infant applies to the nipple, and a bird builds its neft, no less neceffarily than a stone falls to the ground. With refpect to voluntary actions, fuch as are done with a view to an end, the neceffity is the fame, tho' less apparent at first view. The external action is determined by the will: the will is determined by defire and defire by what is agreeable or difagreeable. Here is a chain of causes and effects, not one link of which is arbitrary, or under command of the agent: he cannot will but according to his defire: he cannot defire but according to what is agreeable or disagreeable in the objects perceived: nor do these qualities depend on his inclination or fancy; he has no power to make a beautiful woman ugly, nor to make a rotten carcase sweet.

Many good men apprehending danger to morality from holding our actions to be neceffary, endeavour to break the chain of caufes and effects above mentioned, maintaining, "That whatever "influence defire or motives may have, it is the agent himself "who is the cause of every action; that defire may advise, but

cannot command; and therefore that a man is ftill free to act "in contradiction to defire and to the strongest motives." That a being may exist, which in every cafe acts blindly and arbitrarily, without having any end in view, I can make a fhift to conceive: but it is difficult for me even to imagine a thinking and rational being, that has affections and paffions, that has a desireable end in view, that can easily accomplish this end; and yet, after all, can fly off, or remain at reft, without any cause, reason, or motive, to fway it. If fuch a whimsical being can poffibly ex

(a) Chap. 2.

́ ́ist, I am certain that man is not fuch a being. There is perhaps not a perfon above the condition of a changeling, but can fay why he did fo and fo, what moved him, what he intended. Nor is a single fact stated to make us believe, that ever a man acted against his own will or defire, who was not compelled by external violence. On the contrary, conftant and univerfal experience proves, that human actions are governed by certain inflexible laws; and that a man cannot exert his felf-motive power, but in pursuance of fome defire or motive.

Had a motive always the fame influence, actions proceeding from it would appear no less neceffary than the actions of matter. The various degrees of influence that motives have on different men at the fame time, and on the fame man at different times, occafion a doubt by fuggefting a notion of chance. Some motives however have fuch influence, as to leave no doubt: a timid female has a physical power to throw herself into the mouth of a lion, roaring for food; but she is with-held by terror no lefs effectually than by cords: if she should rush upon the lion, would not every one conclude that he was frantic? A man, tho' in a deep fleep, retains a physical power to act, but he cannot exert it. A man, tho' desperately in love, retains a physical power to refuse the hand of his mistress; but he cannot exert that power in contradiction to his own ardent defire, more than if he were fast afleep. Now if a ftrong motive have a neceffary influence, there is no reason for doubting, but that a weak motive must also have its influence, the fame in kind, tho' not in degree. Some actions indeed are strangely irregular; but let the wildest action be scrutiniz'd, there will always be discovered fome motive or defire, which, however whimsical or capricious, was what influenced the perfon to act. Of two contending motives is it not natural to expect, that the stronger will prevail, however little its excess may be? If there be any doubt, it must be from a supposition that a

weak