their tempers quite as violent. They, as well as the French politicians, wished to make their country great by commerce; and as the established ascendency of England appeared to them to stand in the way, they scrupled not about the means which might be employed to remove it. Their minds were not susceptible of a generous emulation; envy was the only feeling which a near view of the naval and commercial greatness of England could excite in their breasts. They had no dread of France, who had in the course of the war lost her commerce, her colonies, and her ships; whose power never came into contact with their own; whose resources of all kinds were devoted to the prosecution of a war, in the issue of which they vainly thought that America had no interest. But they hated England, her commerce and her power, as cordially even as the members of the French government did and had America been as little dependent on commerce as France, had her citizens been as indifferent to its real interests, or had her rulers possessed the same despotic sway over their fortunes which the French government had assumed over those of its own subjects, it is probable that Mr Maddison and his friends would at once have followed the example of Buonaparte, by prohibiting all commercial intercourse with the British empire. But the Americans had not yet been wholly overawed by their rulers; and it became necessary therefore to pursue a more indirect and insidious course with them, than that which had been followed by Buonaparte in his dealings with a people whom he had entirely

subdued.

The measures pursued by France in the execution of her anti-commercial system, suspended for a while the international law of Europe, and afforded to the rulers of America the pretext which they had so long desired,

for gratifying their animosity against England. The commercial hostility of France during the peace, although never considered by Great Britain as a ground for war, was not however forgotten when hostilities were renewed: and the English ministers therefore determined to employ the naval power which was at their command, to the annihilation of the foreign commerce of their enemy. Their measures were such as the interests of England demanded, and which a state of hostility fully justified; and they completely succeeded in accomplishing the object which they had in view. The foreign commerce, of France was annihilated-her industry checked-her resources wasted; and her ruler discovered, when it was too late, how gross were the errors which he had committed. It was impossible, however, to retract; and he resolved on carrying his commercial war to the utmost pitch of fury. In this temper did Buonaparte issue his famous Berlin decree, which renewed all the old prohibitory regulations, and ludicrously declared the British islands to be in a state of blockade, at the very moment when the fleets of Great Bri tain actually blockaded all the ports of France and her dependencies. Neutral vessels bound to or returning from a British port were made liable to capture by this singular decree.-Matters remained for some time in this state, the French ruler being unable to execute his decree, and the British government being averse to advance further in so barbarous a warfare. But having again proved successful in his northern campaign, Buonaparte resumed with fresh vigour his prohibitory system; he confirmed all the provisions of the Berlin decree; excluded the merchandise of Great Britain and her colonies from the ports of France and her dependencies, and accompanied these prohibitions with the severest pe nalties. Every article of British produce

was searched for, seized, and committed to the flames; while the most cruel punishments were inflicted on the subjects of France who dared to violate these arbitrary laws.-This violent system had now reached its height, and it seemed to be the determination of the French ruler to have it executed with the greatest rigour; the British government, therefore, could no longer, either in prudence or honour, delay the retaliation which its power enabled it to inflict. The famous Orders in Council were therefore issued; all trade to France or her dependencies was strictly prohibited; all vessels, of whatever nation, which ventured to engage in this trade, were declared liable to seizure, and France with her dependencies was thus reduced to that state of blockade with which she had vainly threatened the British islands. The orders in council admitted but of one single exception to this general blockade of the French empire: the French decrees had declared all vessels liable to seizure which had touched at a British port; the orders in council, to counteract this provision, declared on the other hand, that only such ships as were in that situation should be permitted to sail for France. Thus did the utter extinction of the foreign trade of France result as a consequence of the very measures of her own government; measures which no despotism, how ignorant soever, would have ventured to adopt, had it not trusted to a power which effectually silences all popular opinion.

Two questions have been put on the subject of these orders in council, Were they founded in justice, and were they supported by reasons of expediency? On the first point, with which alone foreign powers had any concern, the advocates of these measures had a very easy task to perform; for nothing surely can be more obvious to those who know any thing of the law of na

tions, than the right of Great Britain to retaliate upon her enemies their own violence and injustice.-What has been called the rule of the war 1756, forms. the first link in that chain of commercial restrictions, which in the sequel became so complicated; and the perfect equity of this rule has always appeared manifest to the most enlightened minds. France, like the other European powers who possessed distant colonies, endeavoured to secure for herself the monopoly of their markets and during peace strictly prohibited all strangers from carrying on trade with them. When she goes to war with England, however, the superiority of her enemy's naval power compels her to relax the rigour of her colonial policy; and she is willing that neutral vessels should bring home the produce of her American settlements. By the interference of these neutrals, however, the English are manifestly deprived of the advantages which their naval power would otherwise secure to them; of the chance of captures, and the certainty of reducing the enemy's colonies without striking a blow. But no neutral can, upon any pretext, claim greater advantages after, than she enjoyed before the war; she has a right to insist that her relative condition to the belligerents shall not be rendered worse by the hostilities in which they may engage, but she can have no right to demand that it should be improved. By admission, however, to the colonial trade of France during war, a trade from which neutrals are excluded by France herself during peace, the condition of the neutral is manifestly improved; it is improved at the expence of England, who is deprived of the chance of captures and conquests which her power would otherwise give her; and it is improved to the great gain of France, whom the interference of neutrals protects against the overwhelming power of her enemies. There

can be no doubt then as to the equity of the rule of the war 1756, that rule of which France and America have so loudly complained. The order in council of January, 1807, which was not issued after the Berlin decree had been published by Buonaparte, was also justifiable on the very same principle; it went merely to exclude neutrals during war from a branch of the enemy's trade to which they had no access in time of peace. So far then the measures adopted by the British government rested on the clearest principles of international law.

And what were the measures adopt ed by the French? had they any foundation in the acknowledged principles and usages of public law? The decree of Berlin prohibited all commerce in British commodities; France indeed had a right to do this, how fatal soever the measure might be to her own interest and that of her dependencies and had the Berlin decree gone no far. ther, although it might have had the effect of embittering the hostile spirit of the two countries, it neither could have justified, nor would it have been met by any specific act of retaliation on the part of England. But the French ruler, in a moment of despair, ventured to declare the British islands in a state of blockade, and to interdict all neutrals from trading with a British port. This was a violent infringement of the law of nations; a daring insult on neutral rights; an act of mad injustice, which loudly called upon all parties to avenge themselves on its authors. The honour of England preeminently demanded that she should repel this outrage with becoming spirit; and although she at first seemed willing to treat so impotent a measure with contempt alone, and to wait till she might learn its result on the conduct of America, yet the right still remained to her of exercising retaliation when the proper season should arrive.

The date of the publication of the Milan decree appeared to her to be that season; time enough had been allowed to the different neutral powers to remonstrate against the conduct of the enemy; they had failed to improve the opportunity afforded them, and England could no longer remain silent when a new decree was issued, more unjust and insulting than its predecessor; more absurd and barbarous than any thing which had ever occurred among civilized nations. She, therefore, issued her orders in council, which in effect reduced the French empire to a state of blockade, and cut off the whole commerce which neutrals had hitherto carried on with the enemy. Of these measures France of course had no right to complain; and a very little reflection will be sufficient to shew that if America had any just grounds of remonstrance, she should have offered them to France alone, and not to England, against whom she was so prompt to bring forward accusations.

France was the first of the bellige rents to violate the law of nations. She issued the Berlin decree, and followed it up by the other, dated at Milan, by both of which the Americans and all other neutrals were prevented from maintaining their usual intercourse with England. These measures were in their principle a direct invasion of neutral rights, and it was therefore the duty of neutral powers to have remonstrated against them with firmness. But America did not thus resist; and she in this manner committed herself with the enemy. It was a principle maintained by Buonaparte on all occasions, that those who did not resist an injury offered them by either of the belligerents, were no longer to be considered as neutrals; that by their acquiescence, they made themselves parties to the cause of the enemy, and that of course they were

to be treated in the same way as if they had actually declared war against the nation to whose interests they stood opposed. It was on some principle of this kind, that he declared the ships of all neutrals which submitted to what he called the tyranny of the English, denationalized-an uncouth and barbarous word, invented to serve the occasions of these unhappy times, when Europe was no longer under the guidance of wise and sound principles. To submit to any thing which France pretended to call a departure from the international law of Europe, was therefore held sufficient to denationalize the ships of neutral powers, and although the application of this principle may frequently have been erroneous, there can be no doubt that the principle itself was just. If France violated the law of nations, as she unquestionably did by her Berlin decree; and if America calmly acquiesced in this insult on her rights, there can be no sort of doubt that she thus made herself a party in the quarrel which France had with England; that she in effect combined with the common enemy, and that her ships were, to use the jargon of the French government, clearly "denationalized." Had England therefore meditated hostility towards America; had she been anxious to avail herself of a pretext for making a quarrel; had she been desirous of exacting from a secret enemy the full penalties of her accession to the cause of the other belligerent; she might very well have proceeded, on the simple fact of American acquiescence in French violence, at once to have treated the Americans as her enemies.

A candidexposition, therefore, of the rights and duties of belligerents and neutrals, must exculpate England from all blame in issuing her orders in council. It is the doctrine of all jurists, that the rights of neutrals during war are pre

cisely the same as during peace; that neutral powers are entitled to demand of either belligerent, that in their intercourse with the other they shall not be subjected to greater restraints than they experienced during a season of tranquillity; but no neutral is entitled to require more than this, or can expect that a belligerent should sacrifice to the convenience of the neutral, any of the just rights which she may acquire by a state of war. The principle of this doctrine is obvious; no nation can expect that a foreign power is to sacrifice its own immediate interest to her convenience or advantage. When we come to consider these general principles with reference to the case of America, their force seems to be irresistible. Suppose that America had been entirely out of the question; that her name were unknown in Europe, and that she had still remained in her ancient state of dependence on the British empire; suppose for a moment, that the question had arisen entirely betwixt Great Britain and France; that France had violated the law of nations, by presuming to declare the British islands in a state of blockade, and then let any impartial person say, what is the policy which Great Britain would have been entitled and called upon to pursue? She would clearly have had a right to do the same thing to France which France had attempted to do to her; that is, she would have been entitled to declare the French empire in a state of blockade, and to have followed up the blockade with all possible vigour. Such then was her undoubted right; and will it be pretended that America-that a foreign nation was entitled to interfere with her in the exercise of her rights? It is of no importance to enquire, whether the blockade of France was, or was not, on the whole beneficial to England; that was a

matter for England alone to consider; it was a question with which America had no sort of concern; and it is of the rights of America alone that we now speak. America, then, had no right to complain of the exercise of the powers which England possessed, as one of the great European bellige rents, which she derived immediately from that state of hostilities, in which she, and not America, was involved, and which of course she had a right to improve to her own advantage, and to the annoyance of her enemies.

There is still another light in which this momentous question may be considered, with reference to the established law of nations. It is in the power of England to exclude America or any other nation from trading with herself, and it is in the power of France to do the same. Suppose that both nations had mutually agreed to treat America in this manner, could she have ventured to complain? But it is the same thing whether these powers do so directly, and in conjunction, or indirectly by means not less efficacious; whether they exclude the Americans by the operation of a peaceful league betwixt themselves, or by a series of measures adopted during war. If France, by attempting to exclude all neutrals from English ports, communicated to her enemies a right to retaliate, can the Americans interfere, or are they in a worse condition than if the belligerents had separately, and in a time of profound peace, determined to renounce all commercial intercourse with them? Surely they could not with justice complain; they could not demand that their condition should be improved by a state of European warfare; they could not claim the forbearance of England towards her enemies, for the sole purpose of conferring a favour upon neutrals; they could not, in short,

upon any sound principle, object to the orders in council.

Different opinions were entertained on the question as to their expediency; and although these famous measures are said to have been in the first instance strongly pressed upon ministers by the mercantile interest, there can be no doubt, that the government was in some measure deserted by this powerful body, before the orders in council were finally repealed. The discussions which at intervals ensued on this subject, were signalized by the uncommon zeal and acuteness of the advocates on both sides; and an account of them in the order in which they occurred, will form not the least interesting branch of the history of public affairs for the present year.

Although the question arising out of the orders in council formed at first the chief subject of dispute betwixt Great Britain and America, yet in the course of the discussion, many other points were introduced scarcely less difficult of arrangement.-At the meeting of the American congress in the end of the preceding year, the speech delivered by the president gave evident indications of a very hostile spirit towards Great Britain; and as this speech was followed by a report of the committee of congress for foreign affairs, which was no less warlike, the hopes which had been entertained of an amicable arrangement seemed to vanish. The committee, with an affectation of impartiality, began by a general complaint as to the wrongs which America had sustained both from France and England, in the seizure of the property of the citizens of the United States, when peaceably pursuing their lawful commerce on the high seas; and reprobated the defence which had been offered by each party-that its acts of violence were merely retaliatory, on similar acts com.