The motion was of course carried unanimously.

The sagacity of Lord Wellington in pressing the siege of Badajoz with such vigour, now became manifest. Soult was rapidly advancing to the relief of this important fortress; and Marmont, after vainly attempting to carry Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida by a coup de main, was marching into the interior of Portugal. The British commander instantly moved forward to check the progress of Soult, but that officer having, on his arrival at Villa Franca, been apprised of the fall of Badajoz, began his retreat. Marmont penetrated as far as Castella Branca, where he also learned the result of the siege, and commenced his retreat so hastily, that he abandoned this place the very same day on which he entered it. He derived no other advantage from his movements than the plunder of one or two provinces; so inglorious had the efforts of the enemy become under the commanding influence of Lord Wellington. Already did they feel the superiority of his genius, and were reduced to the necessity of regulating their movements by his exploits. If he was engaged in a daring enterprise which promised to occupy him for a few weeks, they resumed their activity and advanced; if he was successful, they retreated, and sunk once more into inaction. Such was the opening of a campaign which was to exhibit events yet more brilliant and astonishing.

The retreat of Soult was precipitate, but he was pursued with great alacrity by the British cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton. On the evening of the 11th April, this gallant of ficer came up with the enemy's rear guard, consisting of 2500 cavalry, at Villa Garcia, on the confines of Estremadura. Major General Le Marchant with his dragoons charged the French with such impetuosity, as to drive

them in the utmost confusion upon Llerena, where the main army had retired. On the same day Soult evacuated that place; and the province of Estremadura was thus entirely freed from the presence of the enemy.

While these great operations were going forward, the Guerillas in the north of Spain were not inactive. The French had dared to consider the patriots as traitors, and had committed many acts of wanton cruelty; but an ample retaliation was now to be taken for these excesses. Don Geronimo Merino (commonly called El Cura de Villoviado) a most able and enterprising Guerilla chief, succeeded in making 500 prisoners, including 1 lieutenantcolonel and 11 other officers, after a resistance which cost the enemy 73 killed and 97 wounded. The prisoners immediately suffered in the proportion of 20 for each of the three members of the Junta of Burgos, who had been put to death by the enemy, and in the proportion of 10 for each of Merino's soldiers, who lately shared the same fate This act was accompanied by a declaration that in the same ratio, retaliation would always be observed.— On the 28th, when retiring to Villa Franca with the remainder of his prisoners, Merino took post with a part of his forces at a cross road, where he expected a rescue would be attempted, Being apprised of the advance of the enemy in pursuit of the convoy, he dressed an ambuscade, into which the enemy fell, and there left dead 36 men, besides a considerable number of wounded.

The British commander prepared for prosecuting the ulterior objects of the campaign. Marmont was at Salamanca; Drouet at Aguazel; and Soult at Seville; and Lord Wellington in the first instance directed his efforts to break up entirely the communications betwixt the French armies of Portugal and of the south of Spain.

For this purpose he detached General Hill to destroy the bridge of Almarez across the Tagus, on the eastern frontier of Estremadura, which formed their only remaining line of communication. -General Hill, on his approach, found the bridge strongly protected; both sides of the river were defended with works, which the enemy had thrown up; while the castle and redoubts of Mirabete, situated at a short distance, added much to the difficulties of his enterprise. He determined, however, to carry his object at all hazards; in the expectation that he might arrive at the point of attack before day-light, and take the enemy by surprise, he ordered that the flank column of his army should be provided with ladders, and should attempt the forts by escalade. The extreme badness of the roads prevented him from arriving so soon as he expected; and he therefore resolved to penetrate by the mountain path, leading through the village of Romangordo, although he thus lost the benefit of his artillery. He could not form his columns before day-break; the French were of course fully apprised of his intentions, and opened a heavy fire on the advancing columns ; the British disregarded their utmost efforts, and advanced to the assault of the fort which protected the left bank of the river. The works were in a moment escaladed at three different points; the garrison still continued their fire; the British had recourse to the bayonet, and quickly settled the affair. The enemy fled in all directions, and attempted to escape by the bridge; but their comrades on the other side of the river had already destroyed it. Those who escaped destruction by the bayonet perished in the stream; the garrison which occupied Fort Ragusa on the opposite bank were panic-struck, and fled with precipitation towards Naval Moral; and the enterprise of General Hill was

crowned with complete success. The British lost in this brilliant affair about 30 killed, and 130 wounded; the loss of the enemy was much greater, exclusive even of the prisoners, who, to the number of 300, fell into the hands of the conquerors.-The capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, and the destruction of the bridge of Almarez, do immortal honour to the British arms. In these memorable contests the enemy had every advantage of position which nature and art could give him; yet was he subdued in a shorter space than other generals with other troops require to make preparations for the protracted labours of a siege. The French, by their ingenuity in fortifying places which were so soon to be reduced, established the most formidable barriers for the future defence of the peninsula against invasion.

The bridge of Almarez formed almost the only communication below Toledo, by which a large army could cross the Tagus; and the French generals were of course fully aware of its importance. When Marmont heard of the movements of General Hill, he broke up from Salamanca, and moved to the south-east as far as Fort Veras, where he heard of the British successes, and again retired upon Salamanca. Here he employed himself in throwing up additional fortifications; the late events appear to have so much intimidated him, that he thought no works strong enough for the protection of his army. In all the operations of the French generals, they grossly miscalculated the enterprise of their enemy; they made movements in defence of fortresses which had already fallen, and after a short advance, were uniformly compelled to retrace their steps. Thus did Marmont advance to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, when he was astonished by the intelligence, that the British had already reduced it; thus also did Soult move

forward to the relief of Badajoz, when the intelligence reached him at Villa Franca, that it was already in possession of the enemy; and thus did Marmont move tardily to protect the bridge of Almarez, when it was already taken, after which he was obliged to retire, and amuse himself in strengthening the

fortifications of Salamanca. These unprofitable movements, which seemed the effect of distraction rather than of system, proved the entire dependence of the French operations on those of their enemies, while they evinced the paramount genius of the British commander.

EVERY preparation having been made for the advance of the British into Spain, they crossed the Agueda on the 13th June, and on the 16th reached Salamanca. It was supposed that Marmont would have at tempted to defend this city; but on the advance of the British cavalry, the French troops which had been left before it, retired, and crossed the Tormes. The enemy had fortified some convents in Salamanca, and had left about 800 men for their defence, with whom Marmont's army still endeavoured to keep up a communication Major-General Clinton, with the sixth division of the British army, was ordered to reduce them, while the rest of the British troops were kept in readiness to oppose the army of Marmont, should it attempt the recapture of the town. This attempt was accordingly made; the French having collected their whole force, moved forward on the 20th, but found Lord Wellington so advantageously posted, that they hesitated about offering battle. They were soon attacked, however, by a division of the army under Sir Thomas Graham, and forced to retire. The enemy still kept up a com

munication, however, with the forts in Salamanca; but Lord Wellington, by a masterly manœuvre, at last compelled him to abandon them to their fate.-The forts had been finely constructed, and were well defended; they had been established in such a manner as to support each other, and the difficulties which opposed their reduction were very considerable. In one of them, however, a practicable breach was effected; but this fort could not be taken till another which protected it had been reduced; an attempt was therefore made to carry the latter by assault. This enterprise was unsuccessful, and Major-General Bowes, a very gallant officer, fell while leading on the storming party-The conduct of this officer was very gallant, and deserves to be remembered. So eager was he for the success of the enter prise for which he had been selected, that he advanced in person at the head of the storming party and was wounded; but no sooner was his wound dressed than he returned to the post of honour, and gloriously perished at the head of his brave soldiers.

The reduction of the forts had ki therto proved a work of greater diffi.

culty than was at first expected; but success was now to crown the efforts of the army. On the 27th of June, a practicable breach was made in one of the principal forts, and at the same time, the other which protected it was discovered to be on fire. The assault was immediately ordered; but before the troops had advanced, a proposal was received from the French governor, offering to capitulate after the lapse of some hours. Lord Wellington was not to be deceived by an offer SO insidious ; he knew that it had no other object but to gain time for extinguishing the flames; and he returned for answer, that the garrison must surrender immediately. The governor made another trial of artifice; Lord Wellington answered him, by ordering the troops to advance to the assault. So much were they accustomed to enterprises of this character, that they received this order with the utmost joy; advanced with a resistless impetuosity; drove the French before them, and made themselves masters of the fort with very little loss. The governor saw that all further resistance must be vain, and capitulated on the terms which were dictated to him by the British general. For three years had the French been employed in constructing these fortifications; and so strong did they consider them, that they had formed them into a depot for stores of all kinds, which now fell into the hands of the British. Lord Wellington himself, when he examined the forts, is said to have expressed surprise at the rapidity with which they had been carried; and the French marshal was, as usual, filled with astonishment. Some doubts have been insinuated as to the policy of Lord Wellington, in waiting for the reduction of these forts, by which he was prevented for a time from following up the advantages which he had gained over Marmont. The French marshal, it is

said, was at this time separated both from Bonnet, who occupied the Asturias, and from the army of the centre; and the opportunity ought to have been seized of bearing down upon him, before he could receive reinforcements. When supported by the other armies, he once more became superior in numbers to the British, and was enabled to turn upon his pursuers. The great victory which was afterwards gained must be ascribed chief. ly, we are told, to the errors committed by the French marshal, at a time when all the chances of war were in his favour; chances which had arisen during the time employed in reducing the forts at Salamanca. These forts could not, even in the most unfavourable circumstances, have offered any considerable obstacle to the British army, and it would have been more. prudent, therefore, it has been said, to have left a small force to blockade them, and to have hastened the pursuit of Marmont, while he was in no condition to have offered a serious resistance. In these speculations, however, it seems to be forgotten, that the forts were found to be much stronger than had been anticipated; that there would have been scarcely any delay in taking them, strong as they were, but for an accidental scarcity of ammunition, which suspended the operations for some days; that the French considered Salamanca, with its forts, as of sufficient importance to induce them to risk a battle in its defence, and that in the condition to which the French armies might have been redu ced, the considerable depot established at Salamanca was an object, of which it was important that Lord Wellington should deprive them-But it is time to return from these idle criticisms, to the narration of the events of the campaign.

So soon as the forts were reduced, Lord Wellington put the army in