for the same place, the primary meetings are the scene of the strife between them; and it is there that good citizens may defeat a corrupt or incapable candidate in their own party.

406. The preparatory work which I have described to you above is done in what is called a caucus-which is simply a private meeting of influential politicians. Whether the caucus shall be a good or an evil thing depends on the character of the men who compose it. It is a method of political action used alike by the best and the vilest politicians; the wisest and most necessary measures of the last twelve years, for instance, as well as the basest and most injurious, have been discussed and prepared in caucus before they were presented to the public; and both the ablest and the worst of our political leaders have been introduced into political life, and advanced in it, in thesé silent, secret, but not therefore necessarily evil councils, by their friends. In a country where intelligence is so widely diffused, and where there is so high an average of ability, it is very seldom that a man, except after long and brilliant service, becomes so conspicuously the one man for the place that his party retains him as a matter of course.

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407. A fault in our political arrangements makes the caucus very often, in the hands of bad men, an instrument for elevating corrupt men to power. This is the practice, in the states and cities, of electing a great many of the executive officers. Where this is done, the caucus enables corruptionists to prepare a ticket composed of a few good men and a large tail of the lowest class of politicians, and such a "slate" is then forced upon the party as the best thing that can be got." The viler kind of politicians do not trouble themselves much about a Congressional caucus; but wherever a dozen or twenty candidates are to be nominated, there is their opportunity. If the executive head, be he President, Governor, or Mayor, has the selection, appointment, and removal of all his subordinates, a "slate " becomes impossible, and the caucus is no longer so powerful a tool in the hands of bad men. In some of our states, at one time, members of Congress were

chosen on a general ticket; that is to say, the whole Congressional delegation of the state was voted for by all the people of the state. But experience showed that the caucus put a few good men and a multitude of bad ones on the same ticket; and as both parties did this, the result was for evil only. It is sometimes urged that if the President, Governor, or Mayor has unrestrained power to appoint or remove his subordinates, he will appoint bad men. But even the decisive check of the Senate does not always suffice to prevent the appointment of conspicuously bad or incompetent men; and it does serve to conceal the faults of a ruler, and lessen his responsibility to the people, in a mischievous manner. It is better that a President or Governor or Mayor shall show his character plainly by bad appointments; for then he will become hateful to the people, and lose his chance of re-election, while the caucus will be shorn of its power for evil.

408. Do not be ashamed or afraid to meet in caucus, if you should by and by take part in politics; but remember that bad men and measures may be defeated there as well as at the primary meetings. And as a sound rule for party action, remember that if, in spite of your efforts, your party nominates a bad man for office, you should openly vote against him. For it is better, for your party's interest, that it should be defeated if it nominates bad men than that it should succeed. When a political party becomes the tool of corrupt or ignorant men, it is in danger, not of a temporary, but of a lasting defeat. If both parties nominate bad men for an office, it is better that your own party should be defeated; for it is not in that case responsible for the misgovernment, and your party leaders may learn wisdom from defeat. Hence, the more ardently you desire the success of your political party, the more vigorously you may scratch the bad names off your ticket when you go to the polls.

XL.

OF THE IMPORTANCE AND DUTY OF THE

MINORITY.

409. The first duty of a minority is to become a majority. 410. A minority is just as likely to be right as a majority; and if it is, and if it persists in asserting its principles, and if its leaders are able enough to frame a practical and constitutional policy, and to meet their opponents in argument before the people, it will by and by find itself in the majority. For "the people, rightly instructed, always favor the right.” The long course of the antislavery discussion showed this. The first antislavery men were not practical politicians, but moralists; they demanded immediate and unconditional emancipation, because slavery was unjust, and injustice ought at any price to be removed. These excellent men had but little direct influence on practical politics-for the answer to their appeal was that the Constitution forbade interference with slavery where it existed. What they did was to advertise to the people, with wonderful courage and pertinacity, the monstrous wickedness of slavery. The political leaders of the minority, however, seized their opportunity, and at the auspicious time framed a policy upon the slavery question which was both practical and constitutional. They said, "We will not touch slavery in the states where it exists-that would be unconstitutional; but we demand that it shall not be extended to the territories, which are controlled by the Federal Government." With that policy they appealed to the people; and as it was both right and practical, and constitutional, and as the minority possessed very able leaders, who freely met their opponents in public debate, in time they achieved a perfectly legitimate political victory.

411. A minority is contemptible, and must fail, when it

has neither principles nor policy to oppose to the majority, but relies upon abuse of its opponents, or mere criticism of the majority's blunders. For in such a case, unless the majority is extraordinarily corrupt or inefficient, the people, seeing no principles at issue, will condone its offenses, and maintain it in power, out of a conservative spirit which is one of the most valuable qualities in a free people. Nor are they wrong in this; for if the minority have no satisfactory policy or principles to offer, their struggle is merely one for place or office, with which the people have but little sympathy.

412. In general, inefficiency is more quickly resented by the people in their rulers than corruption, unless that assumes the dimensions of mere vulgar robbery. Inefficiency and corruption usually go together. But the strongest appeal of a minority to the American people is against injustice; and a party in power may lose an election, and find itself suddenly deserted by its strongest friends among the people, on such an issue as that called the Poland Gag Law, which was believed to attack the liberty of the press.

413. A strong and able minority is a very important part of a legislative body. Its office there is to examine and criticise the propositions and acts of the party in power; to scrutinize its expenditures; to expose its inefficiency, its usurpations of power; to ridicule its blunders; and to oppose all attempts at bad legislation. Where a minority is strong in votes, and has able leaders, the first effect of its vigilance is to make the party in power more careful in administration and legislation, and thus to benefit the country; and its second effect is to rally to its side the most independent and ablest members of the majority, and thus-if the majority is inefficient or corrupt-to prepare the people's minds for a change at the elections.

414. But, on the other hand, where a legislative minority lacks ability and statesmanship, and offers a merely factious or trivial opposition, it is very apt to fall into contempt with the people, and to injure its own prospects of political suc

cess.

XLI.

OF CITY GOVERNMENTS.

415. A city is a political corporation, created by the states. and governed according to a charter framed by the state Legislature, and which may be altered or repealed by that body at will. This charter prescribes the duties and defines the powers of the rulers, just as any other political constitution does.

416. In our political system cities have become the strongholds of misrule. This arises from two causes: first, the city government concerns itself more intimately with the lives of the inhabitants than any other, wherefore there is a proportionately greater possibility of corruption and maladministration; second, city charters, almost without exception, subdivide power and responsibility among boards or commissions, and thus disable the people from discovering the authors of corruption and misrule, and from punishing them even if they are known.

417. The inhabitants of a city depend upon their central political authorities to make, repair, and clean the streets, to regulate the police, to abate nuisances, to protect them against fires, to adopt and enforce health regulations, to grant licenses to sell liquor, to provide public markets, to regulate street cars and gas-pipes, to care for the water supply, to manage the parks and other public places, to take charge of paupers, to control hospitals, to manage the free schools, to control wharves and piers if it is a sea-port, and to do a number of other things, of which some, outside of cities, are done by each citizen for himself, or by the private enterprise of citizens united for that purpose, and others are divided among county, township, and school-district authorities, each independently and directly responsible to the people. Morcover, all public work