in a city is on a large scale, and involves very great expenditures, compared with those of a rural county. Finally, the population of a city is less homogeneous in character than that of a rural county; the proportion of poverty is much greater; the number of people who live from hand to mouth is larger; the average of comfort is lower; the dependent part of the population is more numerous. At the same time, little or nothing is left for the people to determine in the smaller divisions-the wards and school-districts; and they are thus made politically ignorant.

418. Under such circumstances, it is of great importance that the central power, to which so much is assigned, shall be clearly visible to the people, in order that they may always and easily hold it responsible. The entire executive power and responsibility ought to be given to a single man—the Mayor-because then every citizen who had cause of complaint would know whom to blame. The Mayor ought to have the appointment of all his subordinates, because thus only can he hold them to their duty. The executive powers-that is to say, the enforcement of the laws-ought not in any detail to be assumed by the Council; for this is a most fertile source of corruption. The Council, which is the city's legislature, ought to be a numerous body, so that each councilman or alderman should be personally known to his small constituency, who could then oblige him to care for their interests, and punish him for neglect or corruption. Finally, the courts in a city ought to possess a very high character, and neither judges nor justices of the peace ought to be elected, but should be appointed-probably by the Governor of the state-and for life or good behavior, and they should have large salaries. With such a system, the city government would be amenable at all times to the will of the inhabitants, who could punish extravagance, inefficiency, or any kind of maladministration, at the elections, if they chose; and could at any rate make as good a government as they wished. Moreover, I want you to remember that where great power is given to an executive, able men like the place, and will seek it; for able men like to

exercise power. But if you make of a governor or mayor only a figure-head, and give the real power to others, the office falls into contempt.

419. Now almost all our city governments in this country are framed on principles directly contrary to those I have stated above. The executive powers, which ought to be concentrated in a Mayor, are divided among different boards and commissions, and are thus frittered away. The Council is usually a small body; the judges and justices of peace are elected, together with a large number of executive officers; the different parts of the executive hold office for different periods, and the people can never, at a single election, remove all the officers who have been concerned in maladministration; and finding themselves thus disabled, and compelled, moreover, to vote for a great number of officers of whose character and fitness they can not inform themselves, they presently lose all interest in public affairs, and resign the political power to knaves and their tools. The Mayor of a city like New York, did he have the powers which belong to the office, would have authority and patronage almost equal to that of the President of the United States; and the office would be one for which the ablest citizens would strive. But if he has no power, or but little, really able men will refuse the place.

420. City governments are made needlessly cumbrous and corrupt, also, by performing some duties which might well be left to private effort. For instance, the fire-insurance companies could manage a fire department much more cheaply and effectively than a political government. Again, the question of licensing drinking-shops might well be left to the people in the wards. Street-cleaning could, perhaps, be left to the wards also, though, as it has to do with the general health, this might not be possible unless the city government assumed not only the inspection of streets, but the punishment by fine of those ward authorities who neglected this duty. Finally, the city ought not to own market spaces, docks, piers, or other property used by private individuals. The city government should exercise, of course, the right of police and inspection,

but it can not own and manage such property either profitably or efficiently.

421. If you remember what you read about Decentralization and about the Responsibility of the Executive, you will see the way in which city governments may be reformed: first by relieving them of work which they can not do well; and next by fixing power and responsibility upon the Mayor. What is wanted is to enable the people readily, and at a single effort, to change the whole administration; then they can really punish maladministration—and they undoubtedly will, whenever it begins to oppress or offend them. For the mass of the people are vitally interested in moderately good government, and will inevitably get it, if the machinery of government is so arranged that they can, by willing it at the polls, punish the inefficient or corrupt rulers.

XLII.

OF SOME FAULTS IN OUR STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

422. It is a grave fault of most of our state constitutions that they allow, and in some cases make necessary, special legislation. By this is meant acts specially granting privileges to particular persons. You will see, if you consider for a moment, that where such grants are made, the Legislature becomes subject to the attack of cunning and unscrupulous men, who will seek privileges injurious to the people; that rival corporations will oppose each other before the Legislature, and resort to bribery to gain their ends or defeat their opponents; and that for perfectly proper objects men will be put to a needless expense and trouble to obtain a special charter.

423. Whatever any citizens or association can rightfully do, they may do under general laws, equally applicable to all other citizens. Thus every state should have a clearly drawn general railroad law, and other general laws under which all kinds of corporate enterprises could be prosecuted without the ne

cessity for special charters; and the Legislature should be forbidden in the Constitution to grant or to entertain any application for a special charter of any kind whatever.

424. It is another grave fault of most of our state constitutions that they interfere with the power of the Governor to appoint his subordinates in the executive department, and thus weaken responsibility, and cause confusion in the government. Every where, also, the sheriff is elected in the counties; whereas he ought to be appointed by the Governor. He is the Governor's lieutenant in the county; the peace officer, who in case of riot or public disturbance has a right to call out the body of citizens, and with whom in all such emergencies the Governor communicates. His office, which is of right a very high and responsible one, is now degraded, and, having large fees annexed to it, has long been one of the important political "spoils."

425. It is another grave fault in almost all our state constitutions that they oblige the people to elect the judges, and thus debauch the courts, and lower their tone and authority.

426. It is another grave fault of the state constitutions that they restrict the power of the people, in the counties and townships, to refuse to license drinking-shops, to adopt compulsory education regulations, and to do other things for which they ought to be competent. Thus the Constitution errs in making too rigid the general rules under which the people are to live.

XLIII.

OF TERRITORIES, PUBLIC LANDS, COLONIES, AND MANIFEST DESTINY.

427. One of our greatest and most important politica. safeguards lies undoubtedly in the possession of vast quantities of public lands, and in the wise and liberal policy under which these lands have been thrown open to settlement.

428. The Federal Government is the original owner of waste or unsettled lands-both those in the territories and those which lie within constituted states. It has made a free gift to every state of a large quantity of these public lands, to be used for the support of public schools and of agricultural colleges; it usually gives to a state all the swamp and overflowed lands within its bounds which were public or Congress lands at the time of its admission into the Union; and it gives to every actual settler one hundred and sixty acres from the surveyed lands, free of cost, except the trifling charges for proofs of actual settlement and continued cultivation. It has also, within a few years, given a great quantity of land to railroad companies, on condition that they should construct and work railroads through these lands, and thus open them to settlement.

429. The political advantage of our possession of so vast a quantity of wild lands lies in this, that it leaves open for many years a broad field for the exertions of the more adventurous, enterprising, and restless part of our community. A hired laborer to whom the condition of dependence has become hateful has no refuge in a thickly settled European state except emigration to a distant country, and abandonment of his own nationality. This ought not to deter a European from emigrating; but the American workman is happy that he need not leave his country, but may, under the protection of its flag and laws, settle himself on the public lands, and there, with very little capital, achieve independence at least, and perhaps more. He has not to fear unequal or strange laws; for the farthest Western territory is ruled by Congress upon welldefined principles, and becomes a state as soon as it has acquired a sufficient population. The flag which floats over him commands peace and order, and the whole power of the Federal Government is ready to make his life and property

secure.

430. A territory is organized politically by permission of Congress; its Governor and other executive officers and judges are appointed by the President; it has a Legislature which