cate that a difference is there observed between them; and from this difference it will follow that he who struck the Lord on the face (John xviii. 32) could not be, as some have supposed, the same whose ear the Lord had but just healed (Luke xxii. 51), seeing that this last was a doûλos, that profane and petulant striker an vπηρéτηs, of the High Priest. The meanings of διάκονος and vπηρéτηs are much more nearly allied; they do in fact continually run into one another, and there are a multitude of occasions on which they might be promiscuously used; the more official character and functions of the vπηρéτηs is the point in which the distinction between them resides.

§ x.-- δειλία, φόβος, εὐλάβεια.

Or these three words, the first is used always in a bad sense; the second is a middle term, capable of a good interpretation, capable of an evil, and lying pretty evenly between the two; the third is quite predominantly used in a good sense, though it too has not altogether escaped being employed in an evil.

Δειλία, the Latin timor, having θρασύτης οι 'foolhardiness' for a contrary extreme (Plato, Tim. 87 a), is our cowardice.' It occurs only once in the N. T., 2 Tim. i. 7; but deiλiáw, John xiv. 27; and dexos, Matt. viii. 26; Mark iv. 40; Rev. xxi. 8. In this last passage the Sexo beyond doubt are those who in time of persecution have, out of fear

of what they should suffer, denied the faith. It is joined to avavôpeía (Plato, Phædr. 254 c; Legg. ii. 659 a); to ʊxpóτns (Plutarch, Fab. Max. 17); to ekλvois (2 Macc. iii. 24); is ascribed by Josephus to the spies who brought an ill report of the Promised Land (Antt. iii. 15. 1); being constantly set over against ἀνδρεία, as δειλός over against ἀνδρεῖος: for example, in the long discussion on valour and cowardice in Plato's Protagoras, 360 d;) and see the lively description of the deλós in the Characters (29) of Theophrastus. Aeλía does not of course. itself allow that it is timorous, but would shelter its timidity under the more honorable title of evλáßera (Philo, De Fort. 739); pleads for itself that it is indeed dopáλeia (Plutarch, An. an Cor. App. Pej. 3; Philo, Quod Det. Pot. Insid. 11).

Þóẞos, answering to the Latin 'metus,' is a middle term, and as such it is used in the N. T. sometimes in a bad sense, but oftener in a good. Thus in a bad sense, Rom. viii. 15; 1 John iv. 18; cf. Wisd. xvii. 11; but in a good, Acts ix. 31; Rom. iii. 18; Eph. vi. 5; 1 Pet. i. 17. Φόβος being thus a péσov, Plato, in the passage from the Protagoras referred to above, adds aioxpós to it, as often as he would indicate the timidity which misbecomes a man.

Evλáßeia, which only occurs twice in the N. T. (Heb. v. 7; xii. 28), and on each occasion signifies piety contemplated on the side in which it is a fear of God, is of course from εὐ λαμβάνεσθαι, the image underlying the word being that of the careful taking hold, the cautious handling, of some

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precious yet delicate vessel, which with ruder or less anxious handling might easily be broken. But such a carefulness and cautious prudence in the conducting of affairs (the word is joined by Plutarch (Marc. 9) to πрóvοia), springing as no doubt in part it does from a fear of miscarriage, easily lies open to the charge of timidity. Thus Demosthenes, who opposes εὐλάβεια το θράσος (517), claims for himself that he was only εὐλαβής, where his enemies charged him with being deλós and aтоλμоs. It is not wonderful then that fear. should have come to be regarded as an essential element of evλáßeia, though for the most part no dishonorable fear, but such as a wise and good man might not be ashamed to entertain. Cicero (Tusc. iv. 6): Declinatio [a malis] si cum ratione fiet, cautio appelletur, eaque intelligatur in solo esse sapiente; quæ autem sine ratione et cum exanimatione humili atque fractâ, nominetur metus.' He has probably the definition of the Stoics in his eyes. These, while they disallowed póßos as a πάθος, admitted εὐλάβεια into the circle of virtues; thus Diogenes Laertius (vii. 1. 116): Tv dè εὐλάβειαν [ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι] τῷ φόβῳ, οὖσαν εὔλογον ἔκκλισιν· φοβηθήσεσθαι μὲν γὰρ τὸν σοφὸν οὐδαμῶς, εὐλαβηθήσεσθαι δέ. Yet after all, in these distinctions whereby they sought to escape the embarrassments of their ethical position, they did in fact say nothing; being only ὀνοματομάχοι, as Peripatetic adversary lays to their charge. See on this matter the full discussion in Clement of Alexandria, Strom. ii. 7-9.

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§ xi.—κακία, πονηρία, κακοήθεια.

WE are probably at first inclined to regard Kakia in the N. T. as expressing the whole complex of moral evil, as vice in general; and in this latitude no doubt it is often used. Thus, apetaì Kaì κakĺαι are 'virtues and vices' (Aristotle, Rhet. ii. 12; Plutarch, Conj. Præc. 25, and continually); while Cicero (Tusc. iv. 15) refuses to translate kaкíα by malitia,' choosing rather to coin vitiositas for his need, and giving this as his reason: Nam malitia certi cujusdam vitii nomen est, vitiositas omnium;' showing plainly hereby that in his eye Kakia was the name not of one vice, but of all. Yet a little consideration of the passages in which it occurs in the N. T. must make evident that it is not there so used; for then we should not find it as one in a long catalogue of sins (Rom. i. 29; Col. iii. 8); seeing that in it alone the others would all have been contained. We must therefore seek for it a more special meaning, and bringing it into comparison with Tovnpía, we shall not err in saying that kakía is more the evil habit of mind, Tovηpía rather the outcoming of the same. Thus Calvin says of κakia (Eph. iv. 32): 'Significat hoc verbo [Apostolus] animi pravitatem quæ humanitati et æquitati est opposita, et malignitas vulgo nuncupatur.' Our English translators, rendering κaxía so often by ' malice' (Eph. iv. 32; 1 Cor. v. 8; xiv. 20; 1 Pet. ii. 1), show that they regarded it in the same light.

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But the Tovnpós is, as Hesychius calls him, ὁ δραστικὸς τοῦ κακοῦ, the active worker out of evil; the German Bösewicht,' or as Beza (Annott. in Matt. v. 37) has drawn the distinction: 'Signifcat πονηρός aliquid amplius quam κακός, nempe eum qui sit in omni scelere exercitatus, et ad injuriam cuivis inferendam totus comparatus.' He is, according to the derivation of the word, ỏ πapéxwv Tóvous, or one that, as we say, "puts others to trouble;" and Tovnpía is the cupiditas nocendi;' or as Jeremy Taylor explains it: "aptness to do shrewd turns, to delight in mischiefs and tragedies; a loving to trouble our neighbour and to do him ill offices; crossness, perverseness, and peevishness of action in our intercourse" (Doctrine and Practice of Repentance, iv. 1). If the kakós κακός is contrary to the ἀγαθός, and the φαῦλος to the καλοκαγαθός, the πονηρός would find his exact contrast in the χρηστός.

While kakia and πovηρía occur several times in the N. T., καкоn@eia occurs there but once, namely, in St. Paul's long and fearful enumeration of the wickednesses with which the Gentile world was filled (Rom. i. 29), and never in the Septuagint. We have translated it 'malignity.' When, however, we take it in this wider meaning, which none would deny that it very often has (Plato, Pol. i. 348 d; Xenophon, De Ven. xiii. 16), it is very difficult to assign to it any district which has not been already preoccupied either by κακία οι πονηpía. Even supposing the exact limits which separate those two words have not been perfectly