γεμόνι δικαίως ἀνατίθεται: with the three sections preceding.

Still, it may be asked, if rouaiver be thus the higher word, and if wolμaive was therefore superadded upon Booke, because it was so, and because it implied so many further ministries of care and tendance, why does it not appear in the last, which must be also the most solemn, commission given by the Lord to Peter? how are we to account, if this be true, for his returning to Bóσke again? I cannot doubt that in Stanley's Sermons and Essays on the Apostolical Age, p. 138, the right answer is given. The lesson, in fact, which we learn from this his coming back to the Bóoke with which He had begun, is a most important one, and one which the Church, and all that bear rule in the Church, have need diligently to lay to heart; this namely, that whatever else of discipline and rule may be superadded thereto, still, the feeding of the flock, the finding for them of spiritual nourishment, is the first and last; nothing else will supply the room of this, nor may be allowed to put this out of its foremost and most important place. How often, in a false ecclesiastical system, the preaching of the word loses its preeminence; the Bookev falls into the background, is swallowed up in the Touaíveiv, which presently becomes no true ποιμαίνειν, because it is not a βόσκειν as well, but such a 'shepherding' rather as God's Word, by the prophet Ezekiel, has denounced (xxxiv. 2, 3, 8, 10; cf. Zech. xiii. 15—17; Matt. xxiii.).

§ xxvi.—ζῆλος, φθόνος.

THESE words are often joined together; they are so by St. Paul, Gal. v. 20, 21; by Clemens Romanus, 1 Ep. ad Cor. 3, 4, 5; and by classical writers as well; as, for instance, by Plato, Phil. 47 e; Legg. iii, 679 c; Menex. 242 a. Still, there are differences between them; and this first, that ζῆλος is a μέσον, being used sometimes in a good (as John ii. 17; Rom. x. 2; 2 Cor. ix. 2), sometimes, and in Scripture oftener, in an evil sense (as Acts v. 17; Rom. xiii. 13; Gal. v. 20; Jam. iii. 14); while 60óvos is not capable of a good, but is used always and only in an evil, signification. When λos is taken in good part, it signifies the honorable emulation, with the consequent imitation, of that which presents itself to the mind as excellent (Lucian, Adv. Indoct. 17, îλos TŵV ἀρίστων: Herodian, ii. 4, ζῆλος καὶ μίμησις: vi. 8, ENλWTYS Kai μIμnτns). It is the Latin ' æmulatio,' in which nothing of envy is of necessity included, however it is possible that such in it, as in our ' emulation,' may find place; the German 'Nacheiferung,' as distinguished from Eifersucht.' The verb æmulor,' as is well known, finely expresses the difference between worthy and unworthy emulation, governing an accusative in cases where the first, a dative where the second, is intended.

6

By Aristotle λos is employed exclusively in this nobler sense (Rhet. ii. 11), to signify the active emulation which grieves, not that another has the

good, but that itself has it not; and which, not pausing here, seeks to make the wanting its own, and in this respect is contrasted by him with envy: ἔστι ζῆλος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθῶν ἐντίμων, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ ̓ ὅτι

οὐχὶ καὶ αὑτῷ ἐστι· διὸ καὶ ἐπιεικές ἐστιν ὁ ζῆλος, καὶ ἐπιεικῶν· τὸ δὲ φθονεῖν, φαῦλον, καὶ φαύλων. Cf. Jerome (Exp. in Gal. v. 20):λos et in bonam partem accipi potest, quum quis nititur ea quæ bona sunt æmulari. Invidia vero alienâ felicitate torquetur.' And again (In Gal. iv. 17): 'Emulantur bene, qui cum videant in aliquibus esse gratias, dona, virtutes, ipsi tales esse desiderant.' Ecumenius: ἔστι ζῆλος κίνησις ψυχῆς ἐνθουσιώδης ἐπί τι, μετά τινος ἀφομοιώσεως τοῦ πρὸς ὃ ἡ σπουδή ἐστι.

But it is only too easy for this zeal and honorable rivalry to degenerate into a meaner passion, a fact strikingly attested in the Latin word 'simultas,' connected, as Döderlein (Lat. Synon. vol. iii. p. 72) shows, not with simulare,' but with simul;' those who together aim at the same object, who are thus competitors, being in danger of being enemies as well; just as aμiλλa (which however has kept its more honorable use, see Plutarch, Anim. an Corp. App. pej. 3) is connected with aμa. These degeneracies which wait so near upon emulation, may assume two shapes; either that of a desire to make war upon the good which it beholds in another, and thus to trouble that good, and, if possible, make it less; therefore we find λos and epis continually joined together (Rom. xiii. 13;

2 Cor. xii. 20; Gal. v. 20; Clemens Romanus, 1 Ep. 3, 6); or, where there is not vigour and energy enough to attempt the making of it less, there may be at least the wishing of it less. And here in this last fact is the point of contact which

λos has with p0óvos (thus Plato, Menex. 242 a: πρῶτον μὲν ζῆλος, ἀπὸ ζήλου δὲ φθόνος); the latter being essentially passive, as the former is active and energic. We do not find þ¤óvos in the comprehensive catalogue of sins at Mark vii. 21, 22; its place being there supplied by a circumlocution, plaλμμòs πovnρós, but one putting itself in connexion with the Latin 'invidia,' which is derived, as Cicero observes, a nimis intuendo fortunam alterius;' cf. Matt. xx. 15; and 1 Sam. xviii. 9: "Saul eyed," i. e. envied, "David." 0óvos is the meaner sin, being merely displeasure at another's goods λύπη ἐπ ̓ ἀλλοτρίοις ayabois, as the Stoics defined it, Diogenes Laertius, vii. 63. 111), with the desire that these may be less: and this, quite apart from any hope that thereby its own will be more (Aristotle, Rhet. ii. 10). He that feels it, does not feel with it any impulse or longing to raise himself to the level of him whom he envies, but only to depress the envied to his own.2

1

1 Augustine's definition of póvos (Exp. in. Gal. v. 21) is not quite satisfactory: Invidia vero dolor animi est, cum indignus videtur aliquis assequi etiam quod non appetebas.' This would rather be véμeois and veμeoâv in the ethical terminology of Aristotle (Ethic. Nic. ii. 7. 15; Rhet. ii. 9),

2 On the likenesses and differences between μioos and póvos, see Plutarch's graceful little essay, full of subtle analysis of the human heart, De Invidia et Odio.

When the victories of Miltiades would not suffer the youthful Themistocles to sleep (Plutarch, Them. 3), here was λos, that is, in its nobler form, an emulation which prompted him to worthy actions, and would not let him rest, till he had set a Salamis of his own against the Marathon of his great predecessor. But it was 60óvos which made that Athenian citizen to be weary of hearing Aristides evermore styled "The Just " (Plutarch, Arist. 7); and this his envy contained no impulses moving him to strive for himself after the justice which he envied in another. See on this subject further the beautiful remarks of Plutarch, De Prof. Virt. 14.

6

§ xxvii.—ζωή, βίος.

THE Latin language and the English are alike poorer than the Greek, in having but one word, the Latin vita,' the English life,' to express these two Greek. There would, indeed, be no comparative poverty here, if wń and Bios were merely duplicates; but, covering as they do very different spaces of meaning, it is certain that we, having but one word for them both, must use this one in very diverse senses; it is possible that by this equivocation we may, without being aware of it, conceal very real and important differences from ourselves; for, indeed, there is nothing so potent to do this as the equivocal use of a word.

The true antithesis of ζωή is θάνατος (Rom. viii. 38; 2 Cor. v. 4; cf. Jer. viii. 3; Ecclus. xxx. 17;