across V. Fresh dis position of our cavalry now effected by Lord Lu accordance with an arrangement to that effect which CHAP. had been preconcerted with Sir Colin Campbell, withdrew his division to a part of the South Valley which was between the Number Four and the Number Five Redoubts. The position he then took up was the valley, his squadrons facing eastward. so placed as to be able to take in flank any enemy's currence force which might bend away from the valley and Colin endeavour to pass to the south, with intent to assail Balaclava. He was can with the con of Sir Campbell. tions upon period of the battle. Such, then, was the first period of the battle of ObservaBalaclava; and it must be acknowledged that the the first engagement, if it had closed at this time, would have furnished a distressing page for the military history of England. War often demands bitter sacrifices, and may sometimes force men to repress-not only their generous impulses, but-even those appeals of the conscience which a too fiery soldier might treat as the absolute dictates of honour. It may therefore well be that Lord Lucan performed a stern duty, when (with the sanction of Sir Colin Campbell) he determined that our cavalry must be patient of the attack directed against Canrobert's Hill, must endure to see English guns captured, must suffer our allies to be slaughtered without striking a blow to defend them; and the soundness of his conclusion can hardly be determined by the casuists, but rather by those who CHAP. know something of the conditions in which the power V. of the cavalry arm (when cavalry chances to be the only available force) can be wisely, and therefore rightly, exerted.* If our people in general had known the truth, they would have been guilty of unspeakable meanness when they cast off all blame from themselves, and laid it upon the Turkish soldiery-upon men who had been not only entrusted to the honour and friendship of our army, but were actually engaged at a post of danger in defending the first approaches to the English port of supply.t The truth is, however, that the great bulk of our army (including Lord Raglan himself) had regarded the work on Canrobert's Hill as a fastness susceptible of a protracted defence; and-strange as the statement may seem-were, for a long time, unacquainted with the nature of the conflict there sustained by the brave Turkish soldiery. Several causes contributed to obscure the truth. In the first place, the defence of the work, though carried to extremity, was still of necessity brief; for when once the men, numbered by thousands, had swarmed in over a feeble parapet *The opinion of our cavalry, so far as I have been able to observe it, tends to sanction Lord Lucan's decision. + Lord Lucan was never one of those who thus spoke. He could see the nature of the conflict on Canrobert's Hill, and I believe he has always spoken generously of the firmness with which the Turks awaited the onslaught of overpowering numbers. Sir Colin Campbell was also a spectator; and he says in his despatch,- The Turkish troops in 'No. 1 persisted as long as they could, and then retired.' V. on the top of an isolated hillock which was held by CHAP. only some 500 or 600 men, the end, of course, could not be distant; and although there were numbers of our cavalry-men who had been so posted as to be able to see that the Turks stood their ground with desperation, and were in close bodily strife with the enemy before they gave way under his overwhelming numbers, yet to the great bulk of the spectators, whether English or French, who gazed from the steeps of the Chersonese, no such spectacle was presented. They looked from the west; and, the attack being made upon the north-eastern acclivity of Canrobert's Hill, they saw nothing of the actual clash that occurred between the brave few and the resolute many. They descried the enemy on the heights of Kamara and on the line of the Woronzoff road, but lost sight of him when from that last position he had descended into the hollow to make his final assault; and soon afterwards, without having been able to make out what had passed in the interval, they saw the Turkish soldiery beginning to stream down from the gorge of the work. Then almost immediately they saw the red fezzes pouring out from the other redoubts, so that what they observed on the whole was a general flight of the Turks. They saw nothing of the fierce though short strife which ended in the slaughter of 170 out of the 500 or 600 men on Canrobert's Hill; and I believe it may be said that the loss sustained by the devoted garrison of this little field-work long remained unknown to the English. Considering that the Turkish VOL. IV. H CHAP. soldiery died fighting in defence of the English lines, V. this Cer I find in the correspondence between the French and English Headquarters some trace of an attempt on the part of one of the hapless Turkish commanders to have justice done to his people; but probably the remonstrant did not know how to state a fact in such way as to obtain for it any real access to the European mind, for it does not appear that he succeeded in conveying any clear idea to the mind of General Canrobert. This is shown very clearly by the tenor of his correspondence. Any one who ever had means of judging of Lord Raglan's nature must be able to imagine the eagerness with which, upon learning the truth, he would have hastened to redress the wrong done. All this while, the French and the English Commanders on the Chersonese had been too distant from the scene of the attack against the Turkish redoubts to be able to sway the result; but they, each of them, proceeded to make arrangements for ulterior operations. The spot on which lan placed upon being of the The His dis positions succour of Upon being apprised of the impending attack, Lord Raglan had at once ridden up to that part of the ridge which best overlooked the scene of himself the then commencing engagement; and as soon as apprised his sure, rapid glance had enabled him to apprehend attack. the probable scope and purport of his assailant's design, he determined to move down two out of his five infantry divisions for the defence of Balaclava. 1st Division, under the Duke of Cambridge, and for the the 4th Division, under General Cathcart, were ac- Balaclava, cordingly despatched upon this service. Lord Raglan, securing however, was not without suspicion that the opera- on the tions in the plain of Balaclava might be a feint, and Chersonese that the real attack might be made from Sebastopol surprise. upon the besieging forces. He took care to make provision for such a contingency; and his oral directions for the purpose were conveyed by Captain Calthorpe, one of his aides-de-camp, to Sir Richard England, the Commander of the 3d Division. and for the forces against a General Canrobert, also, upon hearing of the attack General galloped up to the ridge overlooking the Balaclava * Lord Raglan was on the ground before the capture of Canrobert's Hill. Canrobert also on the ridge. |