by holding up his sword for a rally he could draw any stragglers to his side, and he had no aide-decamp, no orderly with him. What was he to do?* Well indeed might it be said that the emergency was an unforeseen one, for what manual had ever explained how a cavalry leader should act if all the troops he could see were out of his reach, and he had no one at his side by whom he could send an order? Even when in the midst of the narrative, I found time to speak-although shortly-of what Lord Cardigan believes to be the true rule of cavalry practice. His theory is, that a cavalry officer in command of two or more lines when about to undertake a charge should of a body first give sufficient directions to the officers in command of his supports, and thenceforth address himself Lord Cardigan's theory as to the duty of a of a cavalry officer who charges at the head of cavalry comprising more than one line. specially (in the absence of exceptional circumstances) him is shown, I think, by the terms of the private memorandum which he imparted to Lord Raglan on the second day after the battle, and long before controversy began; for he there described himself as having been ordered to attack-not with the Light Brigade, but-with the 13th Light Dragoons, and the 17th Lancers, i.e. with the regiments constituting his first line. See note, ante, p. 247. * As was said by the Lord Chief Justice, it would be well for men forming opinions upon Lord Cardigan's conduct' to ask themselves how " they would have acted in a similar state of things?' over the squadrons advancing in support first by giving them anticipatory directions, and afterwards by showing them through the means of their eyesight and without any further words the way in which he leads his first line.* If, in short, he gives proper instruction to his supports before the commencement of the charge, and then proceeding to lead his first line, takes care to lead it efficiently, he has done all that in ordinary circumstances could be required of him. There is a defect in the argument by which Lord Cardigan applies this theory to his own case; for as soon as he had determined that (without first riding off a great way to the rear) there was nothing for him to do towards rallying or otherwise governing the fragments of his first line, the exigency under which a General may be forced to leave his supports to take care of themselves would seem to have lost its force. After the conclusion he had come to in regard to the hopelessness of attempting to rally his first line, or taking any farther part in its combats, Lord Cardigan was so circumstanced that he had leisure to look after his supports; and, indeed, there was no other public duty of a momentous kind that he well could attempt to discharge. to the ef Lord Cardigan, however, has reinforced this theory Lord Cardigan's by an important assertion. He solemnly declares that assertion when he retreated, he nowhere could see his supports; fect that and after intimating a belief that he could not have see the supports. * Supposing the application of the theory to be confined within proper bounds, it seems to be based upon the necessity of the case, and to be, for that reason, sound; but I observe that infantry officers are at first much startled when they hear it propounded as a justification for leaving the supports to themselves. he did not His written ex of the course he took in retiring. reached them without pushing his search through bodies of Russian cavalry, he finally submits that any endeavour on his part to get to his supports under such circumstances would have been absolutely hopeless and therefore wrong. In explanation of the course that he took in replanations tiring, Lord Cardigan has made written statements, of which the following are a portion :-After stating that he gradually retreated' until he reached the battery into which he had led the first line, he goes on to say-On arriving there I found no part of 'the first line remaining there; those which sur'vived the charge had passed off to the left short of the Russian limber-carriages or retreated up the hill. I can upon my most solemn oath swear 'that in that position, and looking round, I could 'see none of the first line or of the supports. The supports ought to have followed me in the 'attack, instead of which they diverged to the right ' and left. My aides-de-camp were pre' vented by different causes from being with me. I 'was consequently nearly or quite alone. I have already positively stated that when I got back to 'the battery which we had attacked and silenced, I 'could see none of the first line, and no troops formed either on the right or the left. I therefore found myself alone; and I ask, was it not my duty to retreat gradually and slowly in rear of the broken parties of 'the first line up the hill, rather than turn and ride through the Russian cavalry in search of my supports, without knowing at the time which way they 'had gone, they not having followed the first line in the advance as they ought to have done? My humble opinion is, that it is quite sufficient for a General of Brigade to return with as well as lead the attack of the front line, unless he should by chance come in 'contact with his supports, in which case he would remain with them; but it may be observed that no general officer could have rendered any service or 'assistance in an affair like that of Balaclava, in which all the loss of men and horses was sustained in twenty minutes, and there were no troops left with ' which to attack an overwhelming force like that of 'the Russians in position on that day.' * "What was the duty of the Brigadier under such circumstances? In such a desperate mêlée to remain to be taken prisoner, or was it his duty to retire ?' + When Lord Cardigan declares that at the time of The sworn testimony this asser his retiring he nowhere saw the supports, he places by which himself in antagonism to a great body of sworn testi- tion is enmony.+ Is it, can it be true that Lord Cardigan in his retreat met a part of his supports then moving down towards the battery, and that in the face of their continued advance he pursued his way towards the rear, past the left of the 4th Light Dragoons? § I acknowledge the apparent weight and the general * Paper furnished to me by Lord Cardigan. + Another paper furnished to me by Lord Cardigan. The affidavits here referred to in Cardigan v. Calthorpe were not regarded as being strictly relevant to the exact question then at issue, and Lord Cardigan, I believe, had no opportunity of adducing evidence in contradiction of them. The effect of the litigation was to raise the question stated in the text, but not to solve it. § This was the main question raised by the testimony adduced on behalf of Colonel Calthorpe. countered. The defi nite ques tion thus raised. consistency of the evidence which has been adduced in support of an affirmative answer to this question, and I believe in the good faith of the witnesses. I also acknowledge that, supposing the supports to have reached the guns before Lord Cardigan retreated, it is hard to understand how he could have ridden back through the battery without becoming cognisant of the obstinate and boisterous combat which was there maintained for some time by the 4th Light Dragoons. But, on the other hand, there stands the solemn assertion of Lord Cardigan; there is the mass of counterevidence which he has adduced; there is a question of mistaken identity;t there is difficulty in seeing how Lord Cardigan, after his encounter with the Cossacks, could possibly have come back in time to be meeting the 4th Light Dragoons on the English side of the battery; and it will not be forgotten that the officer whose conduct at the time of his retreating has thus been brought into question, was the one who, a minute before, had been leading his brigade down the valley, and charging at its head through the guns with a firmness that was never surpassed. The question is not ripe for conclusive decision.‡ * Not sworn and filed in a court of law, but verified by the witnesses as their solemn 'declarations,' and laid before me by Lord Cardigan. + Notwithstanding the great difference in the ages of the two men, an officer who was himself with the 4th Light Dragoons, and who could judge of the extent to which smoke and rapid movement might baffle the sight-I mean Captain E. W. Hunt-believed that Lieutenant Houghton of the 11th Hussars, who rode back mortally wounded, was mistaken for Lord Cardigan. From another source I have ascertained that Lieutenant Houghton (who wore the same conspicuous uniform as the leader of the brigade) rode a chestnut horse very like Lord Cardigan's. Some of those who, as is supposed, might throw much light on the |