II.

France knew nothing of the paper which I have called CHA P. the 'unsigned remonstrance,'* and as it might well be judged highly improbable-though it afterwards turned out to be the fact that the French Emperor, in a letter of condolence to a gentlewoman, should have meant to assail his own officers in the form of innuendo, there seemed to be little room for doubting that the English must have been the delinquents to whom he ascribed timid counsels.

Our Government took fire at the supposed charge, and an indignant remonstrance was addressed to the Government of the Emperor. This time, however, the cure for the mischief was easily found. The Emperor consented to insert in the Moniteur' a distinct assurance, declaring that the allusion had no reference to the English. This accordingly was done, and in very plain terms: The following words of 'the letter of the Emperor to the Marechale de St 'Arnaud, viz., "resisting timid counsels," have been made the subject of false interpretations. The only object of the words was to make specially conspicuous the energy of Marshal de St Arnaud in opposing the very natural differences of opinion which, on the eve of so grave a resolution, were manifested in the counsels of the French army and 'fleet.' This declaration, of course, put an immediate end to the misunderstanding between the two Governments which the Emperor's words had occasioned. It was apparently surmised at the time that the

6

* Ante, vol. ii. p. (in 4th edition) 155.

+ 'Moniteur' announcement, dated Paris, le 30 Octobre.

Declara

tion in the

Moni

teur.'

II.

Question

ing of the

allusion.

CHAP. Emperor's disclaimer of all intention to allude to the English was a sacrifice of truth to policy; but a full as to the knowledge of what had occurred on the 8th of Sepreal mean- tember strongly tends to dispel that idea. It seems Emperor's plain that the French officers who submitted for consideration the unsigned remonstrance of the 8th of September were the men to whom the Emperor alluded. The remonstrants were officers of great weight and authority, who put forward what may be called orthodox military considerations considerations of such a kind as would have been probably approved by the French War Office, though opposed to the personal wishes of the Emperor. For that reason alone the Emperor might naturally have been willing to level a blow at them; but another and yet more cogent motive was apparently conducing to his somewhat infelicitous taunt. After the victory of the Alma, and the successful establishment of the Allied armies in the invaded country, he might well seek to make it appear that he had sanctioned, and promoted the enterprise.

The Emperor at this all that passed on the days which followed.

time had not, perhaps, learnt 8th of September and the If he had known the entire truth, and had been willing to disclose it, he would have said that Marshal St Arnaud was so grievously ill at the time as to be physically incapable of himself reconsidering the question of the invasion at the instance of the remonstrants-that in these circumstances he placed the decision in the hands of the English Commander-and that Lord Raglan, then

II.

eluding discussion, and gliding, as it were, into action, CHA P. found means to overrule the remonstrance without even attempting to refute it, and drew forward the whole Armada, whether French or English or Turkish, to the rendezvous off Cape Tarkan.*

III.

Prince Mentschikoff wrote no despatch recounting the disaster he had undergone on the Alma,† but he sent an aide-de-camp to St Petersburg.

No depatie

spatch recounting the battle of the Alma from

Mentschi

koff.

state of

For several days towards the close of the month of Prince September, the Czar had been growing more and more impatient for tidings. His impatience, it seems, was The Czar's rather the longing for the good news he expected than expectthe result of evil foreboding. It is said that he looked ancy. upon what he deemed to be the unwarlike rashness of the invasion with a feeling akin to pity; and assuring himself that the Allies would soon be his prisoners, he ordered, they say, that in that event the captive armies of the West, but more especially the English, should be treated with kindness.

At length the moment came when it was announced to the Czar that an aide-de-camp fresh come from the Crimea was in the ante- room. brought into the Czar's presence.

* See chap. ix. vol. II.

He was instantly
By brief word or

+ An official narrative of the battle was afterwards prepared at the Russian Headquarters; but was in the form of a journal. The aide-decamp despatched to St Petersburg carried, it is believed, no word of writing from the Prince.

This aide-de-camp, I have heard, was Major Gregg.

His receptidings of

tion of the

the Alma.

II.

CHAP. eager gesture he was ordered to speak. He spoke'Sire, your army has covered itself with glory, but Then instantly the Czar knew that the tale to be told was one of disaster. With violent imprecations he drove the aide-de-camp from his presence. The aide-de-camp, however, understood that he was liable to be again called in; and after a time-a quarter of an hour I think I have heard-he was once more in the Czar's presence. The Czar was changed in look. He seemed to be more composed than he had been, but was pale. When the aide-de-camp approached, the Czar thrust forward his hand as though to snatch at something, and imperatively cried, 'The despatch!' The aide-de-camp answered, Sire, I bring no despatch.' 'No despatch?' the Czar asked, his fury beginning to rekindle as he spoke. Sire, Prince Mentschikoff was much hurried, and'Hurried!' interrupted the Czar; 'What! what do you mean? Do you mean to say he was running?'* Again his fury became uncontrollable; and it seems that it was some time before he was able to hear the cruel sound of the truth. When at length the Czar came to know what had befallen his army, he gave way to sheer despair; for he deemed Sebastopol lost, and had no longer any belief that the Chersonese was still a field on which he might use his energies.

I have said that this man, gathering into his own person all the power, all the will, all the cares of the empire, was verily and indeed that which he had dared to call himself when he said that he was 'the

* Est ce qu'il courrait ?'

II.

'State.' I have said, too, that because the religion CHA P. and the national passions of his obedient millions were his religion and his passions, therefore, in his superb and stately form vast Russia was truly incarnate. But never was this incarnation more manifest than in the time of the nation's trouble. Because a disaster had come upon Russia, her Czar was first raging, then prostrate. He obeyed the instinct which brings a man in his grief to sink down and lie parallel with the earth, and to seek to be hidden from all eyes. He took to his bed. Knowing the danger of approaching him, everybody was scared from the door of the chamber.

By the side of the low pallet-bed that he lay on there was a pitcher of barley-water, or some such liquid, and of that, it is supposed, from time to time he drank; but, except the nourishment thus obtained, it is believed that for many days he took no food.

This period of blank despair was indeed so prolonged that, when other and better tidings were beginning to come in from the Crimea, the Czar, it is said, still lay in the same condition.

People feared to approach him so long as there was nothing to set against the thought of the defeat on the Alma; but when the more hopeful accounts came in, some thought they might approach him once more. Going to his bedside, they told him of these new tidings, and spoke of it as possible, if not even likely, that Sebastopol might still be saved. But the Czar would put no faith now in any words of hope. Nay, he raged, as they say, against those who sought to