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No. VI.

GENERAL SCARLETT'S STAFF.

Report from General Scarlett to Lord Lucan, October 27, 1854.-Extract.

My best thanks are due to Brigade-Major Conolly, and to my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Elliot, 5th Dragoon Guards, who 'afforded me every assistance, and to Colonel Beatson of the 'Honourable E.I.C. service, who, as a volunteer, is attached to my Staff.'

General Scarlett to Lord Lucan, December 17, 1854. Remonstrance against the omission of the names of Colonel Beatson and Lieutenant Elliot.

General Scarlett to the Military Secretary.-Extract. 'Lieutenant Elliot, till severely wounded in the head, was at my side in the charge, and previously displayed the greatest coolness and gallantry. Colonel Beatson also gave me ' all the assistance which his experience and well-known gallantry enabled him to do throughout the day.'

Lord Lucan to General Scarlett, December 18, 1854.-Extract.

'I did not consider it fitting specially to name him [Lieu'tenant Elliot] in my report. . . . I do not consider that it 'would have been justice towards regimental officers specially 'to name all Staff officers, and I think that the obvious con'sequences of such general and indiscriminate recommenda'tions would be that but little value would be attached to

*

Certainly Lord Lucan discriminated, and discriminated, as I believe, without acting from 'favour and affection,' but still so infelicitously that he named and commended in his despatch his own first aide-de-camp, who had not happened to be in any of the cavalry charges, and (suppressing Scarlett's report) steadfastly refused to allow the name of Elliot to appear, Elliot being a man who had charged at the side of Scarlett, and come out with some fourteen wounds!

'general officers' requests, and that the claims of all would 'suffer.'

General Scarlett recommended Elliot for the Victoria Cross, and the application was refused on the plea that to charge and fight hand to hand was nothing more than the duty of a cavalry officer.

No. VII.

The Strength of the body of Russian Cavalry under General Ryjoff which engaged General Scarlett's Brigade.

It is admitted by General de Todleben that the Russian cavalry included in Liprandi's and Jabrokritsky's detachment numbered 22 squadrons of regular cavalry, with a strength of 2200, and 12 sotnias' of Cossacks, with a strength of 1200, making altogether 3400. Upon the question whether Colonel Jeropkine's six squadrons of 'combined Lancers' formed part of General Ryjoff's force, and also upon the question whether the squadron which advanced against the 93d Highlanders rejoined the main body before Scarlett's charge, the wording of Liprandi's official despatch is indecisive. On the other hand, General de Todleben's statement is explicit enough in giving a negative to both these questions; and the General even seeks to cut down the force which engaged Scarlett's dragoons to a strength of 1400: but, as he discloses the cause of the mistake which led him to that conclusionnamely, the mistake of overrating the number of squadrons opposed to Campbell-his error does not mislead. In support of the opinion that puts Ryjoff's force at about 3500, I may state that the body certainly included Lancers (other than Cossacks), and that is a fact which could be well accounted for if the six squadrons of Jeropkine's Lancers were present. As tending to show that the estimate of 3500 might not be excessive, I may mention that an accomplished artillery officer

(Colonel Hamley), who would be necessarily well skilled in estimating distances and (by consequence) in inferring the numerical strength of a column, was of opinion that Ryjoff's force must have numbered no less than 6000. I consider that a computation of from about 2000 (or, speaking more exactly 1900) to 3000 is the highest that could well be made by any one who does not altogether discard the official Russian accounts.

No. VIII.

PAPERS RELATING TO THE RECALL OF LORD LUCAN.

BALACLAVA, Oct. 26, 1854.

DEAR GENERAL AIREY,-I enclose a copy of the order handed me by Captain Nolan yesterday, as desired by Lord Raglan. When his lordship is enabled to give it his attention, I anxiously hope that he will not still think I lost the Light Brigade' in that unfortunate affair of yesterday.—Believe me, &c.

The Quartermaster-General.

(Signed)

LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen..

Lord Raglan to the Secretary of State, October 28, 1854.—

Extract.

As the enemy withdrew from the ground which they had momentarily occupied, I directed the cavalry, supported by the Fourth Division under Lieutenant-General Sir George Cathcart, to move forward and take advantage of any opportunity to regain the heights; and not having been able to accomplish this immediately, and it appearing that an attempt was making to remove the captured guns, the Earl of Lucan was desired to advance rapidly, follow the enemy in their retreat, and try to prevent them from effecting their objects.

In the meanwhile, the Russians had time to re-form on their own ground, with artillery in front and upon their flanks.

From some misconception of the instruction to advance, the Lieutenant-General considered that he was bound to attack at all hazards, and he accordingly ordered Major-General the Earl of Cardigan to move forward with the Light Brigade.

This order was obeyed in the most spirited and gallant manner. Lord Cardigan charged with the utmost vigour, attacked a battery which was firing upon the advancing squadrons, and having passed beyond it engaged the Russian cavalry in its rear; but there, his troops were assailed by artillery and infantry as well as cavalry, and necessarily retired after having committed much havoc upon the enemy.

BALACLAVA, Nov. 30, 1854.

MY LORD,-In your lordship's report of the cavalry action of Balaclava of the 25th ultimo, given in the papers which have just arrived from England, you observe that, from some misconception of the instruction to advance, the LieutenantGeneral considered that he was bound to attack at all hazards, and he accordingly ordered Lord Cardigan to move forward with the Light Brigade. Surely, my lord, this is a grave charge and imputation reflecting seriously on my professional character.

I cannot remain silent; it is, I feel, incumbent on me to state those facts which I cannot doubt must clear me from what I respectfully submit is altogether unmerited.

The cavalry was formed to support an intended movement of the infantry, when Captain Nolan, the aide-de-camp of the Quartermaster-General, came up to me at speed, and placed in my hands this written instruction:

Copy.

'Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, follow the enemy, and try to prevent the enemy carry

'ing away the guns. Troop of horse-artillery may accompany.

French cavalry is on your left.

'Immediate.

(Signed) 'R. AIREY,'

After carefully reading this order I hesitated, and urged the uselessness of such an attack, and the dangers attending it; the aide-de-camp, in a most authoritative tone, stated that they were Lord Raglan's orders that the cavalry should attack immediately. I asked him where? and what to do? as neither enemy nor guns were within sight. He replied in a most disrespectful but significant manner, pointing to the further end of the valley, 'There, my lord, is your enemy; there are your ' guns.'

So distinct in my opinion was your written instruction, and so positive and urgent were the orders delivered by the aidede-camp, that I felt it was imperative on me to obey, and I informed Lord Cardigan that he was to advance; and to the objections he made, and in which I entirely agreed, I replied that the order was from your lordship. Having decided against my conviction to make the movement, I did all in my power to render it as little perilous as possible. I formed the brigade in two lines, and led to its support two regiments of heavy cavalry, the Scots Greys and Royals, and only halted them when they had reached the spot from which they could protect the retreat of the light cavalry, in the event of their being pursued by the enemy; and when, having already lost many officers and men by the fire from the batteries and forts, any further advance would have exposed them to destruction. My lord, I considered at the time-I am still of the same opinion that I followed the only course open to me. As a lieutenant-general, doubtless I have discretionary power; but to take upon myself to disobey an order written by my Commander-in-Chief within a few minutes of its delivery, and given from an elevated position, commanding an entire view of all the batteries and the position of the enemy, would have been nothing less than direct disobedience of orders, without any other reason than that I preferred my own opinion to that VOL. IV. 2 D