V.

to spare for the immediate defence of the place made CHAP. it a thing of great moment that the promptest possible despatch of reinforcements should not be left dependent upon the result of persuasions addressed to an independent commander, more especially where the commander whose assent thus had to be gained was a man of a hesitating and anxious temperament.

weakness

Independently of the inherent fault that there was in Inherent this outer line of defence, the collateral arrangements of the were far from being calculated to avert a disaster.

outer line.

Collateral

ments

which

tended to

bility of a

disaster.

One important omission was this: In all the works arrange. constituting this outer line, the Turkish soldiery were left without that strengthening help which might have increase the probabeen afforded them by the presence in each redoubt of one or two Englishmen accustomed to rule Orientals; and the want was in no way supplied by sending, instead, a non-commissioned officer of artillery.* Then, again, since the cavalry was much looked to as an arm to ward off for some time any Russian attack, it would have been well to avoid a severance of authority by placing under one commander the whole of the forces, whether horse, or foot, or artillery, which were charged with the defence of Balaclava; for excellent as was

In the mere mechanical business of working a gun the Turkish Topdji is likely to be quite as well skilled as an English artilleryman. What is wanted for converting a herd of Turks into a formidable body of warriors is the presence of a resolute man or boy of a higher station in life, who will undertake to lead them. The singular power that can be exerted over a Turkish force by a fearless English gentleman is spoken of, ante, vol. II. chap. ii. Notwithstanding all that had been achieved in the defence of Silistria and on the field of Giurgevo, there was an entire neglect of the means which there produced such brilliant results.

V.

CHAP. the understanding between Lord Lucan and Sir Colin Campbell, their concord was no equivalent for the advantage which belongs to absolute unity of command. Above all, if the plan of defence were to rest at all on our cavalry, there was cogent need of an effort to neutralise in some measure the vice of Lord Hardinge's peace-service appointments, and to make arrangements for giving more or less of initiative power in the field to men such as Morris and Elliot, who were practised in war, and knew by their own experience what it was to lead squadrons in battle. No such effort was made.

Mentschi

koff's purpose of assailing the de

fences of

collected

enterprise.

It was against these defences of Balaclava that Prince Mentschikoff now resolved to direct an attack. So early as the night of the 13th of the month, ColoBalaclava, nel Rakovitch, with three battalions, four guns, and a The forces couple of hundred Cossacks had ventured down from for this the Mackenzie Heights; and having been suffered at break of day on the following morning to take possession of the village of Tchorgoun, he there established the nucleus of a force complete in all arms, which thenceforth began to gather in the valley of the Tchernaya. On the 23d, this force had been definitively constituted as the 'Detachment of Tchor'goun,' and placed under the command of General Liprandi. The force comprised 17 battalions of foot, 30 squadrons of horse,* and 64 guns. But besides the

* 20 squadrons of regular cavalry, and 10 'sotnias' (or, as I call them, 'squadrons') of Cossacks. A 'sotnia' imported about the same number of horsemen as a 'squadron.' General de Todleben is careful to make all possible 'deductions from strength,' but he acknowledges that each

V.

troops under the orders of Liprandi, there was a dis- CHAP. tinct force, commanded by General Jabrokritsky, and comprising some 8 battalions,* 4 squadrons of horse, and 14 guns, which had orders to co-operate with the Detachment of Tchorgoun. Altogether, therefore, the force set apart for the attack upon the defences of Balaclava comprised 25 battalions, 34 squadrons of horse, and 78 guns. The numerical strength of the force is not to be learned with strict accuracy; † but it seems to have amounted to about 25,000 men. † For a sound appreciation of the battle of Balaclava, The object it would be well to know what was the object con- templated templated by the assailant. His primary design was. to seize the outer line of defence and the camp of the 93d Highlanders, as well as the camp of the Turks established near Kadiköi.§ It is plain, however, that the enterprise of an assailant who might attain to so much as that would be strangely collapsing if he were squadron and each sotnia had a strength in effectives of 100 horsemen, p. 387.

* Literally, 7 and ths.

+ Because, at the period in question, the morning states' of the infantry had been left uncorrected since the beginning of the month, and the 'states' of the cavalry were wanting altogether.-Todleben, p. 388.

On the 25th of October 1854 the most recent 'states' of the infantry strength were those which had been furnished at the beginning of the month; and these, together with the estimated reckoning of the cavalry (of which no 'states' had been prepared), give a total of 23,425, without counting the artillerymen, who (at 30 men for each gun) would number 2340, making, altogether, 25,725; but it is right to say that General de Todleben (by making a guess at the deductions from strength which may have occurred since the beginning of the month, and by reducing the estimate of the cavalry strength) cuts down the total effective to 20,500 (p. 388-90). In that estimate, however, he does not, I believe, include the 2340 artillerymen.

Todleben, p. 384, 387, 388.

of the con

attack.

V.

CHAP. to stay his victorious advance without doing all he could to bring ruin upon the English in the small crowded port from which they drew their supplies; and the possession of a spot from which it would have been practicable to shell Balaclava must needs have been coveted. The destruction of the root which the English had taken in Balaclava may therefore, perhaps, be regarded as the real, though ulterior object of the intended attack.

Distribution of the Russian force into

tinct bodies,

and the duties

to each.

The force destined for the attack upon the Turkish redoubts was divided into three columns. The left three dis- column was commanded by General Gribbé, the centre .column by General Semiakine, the right column by Colonel Scudery; and, with that last force, General assigned Jabrokritsky's detachment was in close co-operation. Gribbé was to issue from the direction of the Baidar valley, seize the heights of Kamara, and thence take part in the attack directed against Canrobert's Hill. General Semiakine, at the same time, was to advance against Canrobert's Hill, and the Redoubt Number Two, by the road which leads from Tchorgoun to Kadiköi.

Colonel Scudery's column was to issue from the Tractir road, cross the North Valley, and advance upon the Arabtabia or Redoubt Number Three.'

The main body of the cavalry with its attendant batteries was to enter the North Valley, and there form in columns of attack to await Liprandi's next orders.

A battalion of the Ukraine regiment, with a company of riflemen and a battery of field-artillery, was to constitute the reserve.

V.

Finally, General Jabrokritsky, though not under CHA P. the orders of Liprandi, was to cover the intended attack, by descending from the region of Mackenzie's Farm and taking post on the Fedioukine Hills.

Informa

enemy's

The man march

obtained

by the Turks the day before the battle.

Notwithstanding the trust they repose in the direct intervention of Heaven, the Turks know how to eke out their faith by means sufficiently human; and being too warlike a people to be careless of the value of foreknowledge in regard to the designs of the enemy, they see the use of a scout. The officer who had the merit of obtaining, at this time, good, decisive intelligence, was Rustem Pasha, the Turkish Brigadier-General. On the 24th of October, a spy em- 24th Oct. ployed by him brought back an account which dis- tion of the closed Liprandi's designs for the morrow. announced that troops to the number of 25,000, and of all arms, were to march upon the plain of Balaclava, and he even prepared his hearers to expect an advance from the direction of Baidar. He was carefully examined by Lord Lucan, as well as by Sir Colin the infor Campbell; and, both Generals coming to the conclusion that this report was well worthy of attention, Lord Bingham (his father's aide-de-camp), was sent by Lord Lucan to Headquarters with a letter from Sir Colin Campbell conveying the intelligence. Lord Bingham delivered the letter and the tidings it conveyed to the Quartermaster-General, but did not succeed in obtaining an interview with Lord Raglan, who was then engaged with Canrobert. General Aircy, it is true, interrupted the conference of the two Commanders, and showed Lord Raglan the letter;

The way

in which

mation

was dealt

with.