dealings with goods by his master, even though such third parties know of the charter (f).

Case 1.-A. chartered a ship to C. to sail to X. and load from C.'s agent there, cargo to be stowed at merchant's risk and expense. The captain to sign bills of lading, if required at any rate of freight, without prejudice to the charter. At X. goods were shipped by shippers who knew nothing of the charter, under a bill of lading signed by the master. Held, that the shippers could sue A., the master having signed as his agent (y).

Case 2.-A. had purchased a ship for the purpose of selling it to C. under an agreement which provided for payment of part of the purchasemoney down and part at the expiration of a charter of the same date. Under this charter A. agreed to let, and C. to hire the steamer, for four months; charterer to provide and pay for provisions, and wages of captain, officers, engineers, and crew, owner to pay insurance and maintain steamer in an efficient condition during service, charterers to provide and pay for coal, port charges, etc. Payment for use and hire of vessel at £750 per month. Owner has option of appointing chief engineer to be paid by charterers, owner to have lien on cargoes for freights due under charter. C. appointed and paid captain, officers, and crew, A. appointed chief engineer, A. was registered as owner and managing owner. F. shipped goods on board, in ignorance of the charter, and received bills of lading, signed by the captain and a broker employed by charterers. In an action against A. by F., on bills of lading-Held, that A. having parted with the possession and control of the vessel, the captain was not his servant so as to bind him by his signature to the bill of lading (e).

Case 3.-A's steamer was chartered for C.; F. shipped goods on it in ignorance of such charter, and received a bill of lading signed by "C., agents." There is a custom with steamships that the brokers and not the masters should sign bills of lading. It was found as a fact that C. signed the ill of lading as agent for and with the authority of A. Held, that A. was liable to F., and would have been even if no such authority had existed (h).

Case 4.-On June 24, C., brokers, wrote to F., "We now beg to offer you room in ship R." On June 26, F. accepted this, and an agreement was drawn up between F. and "C. acting for A., owners of the R." On June 25th, C. and D. jointly had chartered the R. from A., paying a lump freight, their liability to cease on loading. The master signed bills of lading, and on the voyage sold the goods. Held, that F.'s remedy was against A. and not against C. (i).

Case 4.-C. chartered a ship from A. and put it up as a general ship. F. put goods on board in ignorance of the charter. The captain refused to sign bills of lading except in terms of the charter, which gave the shipowner liens for demurrage and freight under the charter, and refused to deliver up the goods. Held, that shippers who had shipped in ignorance of the charter were entitled to demand their goods back rather than be bound by the provisions of the charter, and that the owners were bound to redeliver them free of any claim for lien or charges (k).

(e) Baumvoll v. Gilchrest; (1893), A. C. 9.

(f) Schuster v. McKellar (1857), 7 E. & B. 704.

(g) Sandeman v. Scurr (1866), L. R. 2 Q. B. 86. See also The Figlia Maggiore (1848), L. R. 2 A. & E. 106.

(h) Hayn v. Culliford (1878), 3 C. P.D. 410.

() Wagstaff v. Ande son (1880), 5 C. l'. D. 171 (C. A.)

(Peck v. Larsen (1871), L. R. 12 Eq. 378. The question would seem to be

Case 5.-A ship was chartered by C. from A.; F. shipped goods under a bill of lading not referring to the charter. Held, that the owner was liable for bad stowage, unless he proved that the shipper had notice of the charter, in which case he was freed (1).

Case 6.-C. chartered a ship from A. and put it up as a general ship. F. shipped goods in it, in which O. had a right of property, and F. was enabled to ship those goods through the negligence of E., the master, in signing bills of lading tor them. At the end of the voyage E., with A.'s approval, delivered the goods to G., consignees under the bill of lading, in spite of O.'s demand for the goods. Held, that though E. in signing bills was probably acting as charterer's agent, yet, in delivering the goods at the port of discharge with A.'s approval, he was acting as A.'s agent, and A. was therefore liable to an action by O. (m).

(c.) Indorsee from Shipper.

If a bill of lading given by a shipowner or his agent (n) to the shipper, whether charterer or not, and differing in its terms from the charter, comes into the hands of G., a bond fide holder for value of such bill of lading (0).

I. If G. is ignorant of the charter, the shipowner will be bound by the bill of lading (p), even though his agent had no authority to sign it, provided that such bill is on its face within the ordinary authority of a master or broker (q), and that the difference in terms has not been obtained by fraud of any previous holder (r).

II. If G. is aware of the charter, the shipowner will not

whether the shippers were, or should in reason have been, aware of the charter. See Watkins v. Rymill (1883), 10 Q. B. D. 178.

(1) The St. Cloud (1863), B. & L. 4. But if the owner had not possession and control of the ship, he would not be liable: Baumvol v. Gilchrest (1892), 1 Q. B. 253; (1893), A. C. 9.

(m) Schuster v. McKellar (1857), 7 E. & B. 704. F. could only have sued E. or C. under the bill of lading; and, if A. had demised the ship to C., O. could only have sued C.; but as there was no demise, and O. did not sue in contract under the bill of lading, but in tort, A. was liable to O.

(n) Cf. Baumroll v. Gilchrest (1892), 1 Q. B. 253; (1893), A. C. 9. (o)But where G. had before indorsement the property in the goods represented by the bill of lading, which was taken by the charterer as B.'s agent, the bill of lading was held only a receipt, and G. was bound by the charter: De Laurier v. Wyllie (1889), 17 Sc. Sess. C. 167, et ante, p. 42.

(p) The Patria (1871), 3 L. R. Adm. 436; Gilkison v. Middleton (1857), 2 C. B., N.S. 134, but see note on p. 40, ante, on difficulties where the shipper is charterer.

(q) Grant v. Norway (1851), 10 C. B. 665, at pp. 687, 688; Cox v. Bruce (1886), 18 Q. B. D. 147; Reynolds v. Jex (1865), 7 B. & S. 86.

Article 20, post, and note thereto, p. 53.

(r) Mitchell v. Scaife (1815), 4 Camp. 298.

And see

be liable to G. for a bill signed by his agent beyond any authority conferred by such charter (8).

III. In any case the terms of the charter will not be incorporated in the bill of lading without a plain expression in the bill of lading of the intention to do so (t), neither will the indorsee be bound by verbal negotiations with the shipper not embodied in the bill of lading (u).

Case 1.-A ship was chartered with certain excepted perils, including "restraint of princes." F. shipped goods in ignorance of the charter, and the master signed a bill of lading only containing an exception of "perils of the sea." In an action in rem by G., the consignees, who also were ignorant of the charter, against ship, owner, and master, for failing to deliver through "restraint of princes," held, that the owner was liable, and that the contract in the bil of lading was not affected by the contract in the charter of which F. and G. were inorant (v).

Case 2. A ship was chartered by C. for a certain voyage, at a certain freight with a lien on the cargo for all freight, the master to sign bills of lading without prejudice to the charter. C. shipped goods for which the master signed a bill of lading, making the goods deliverable to G., "paying freight as per margin," i.e., £196. C. indorsed the bill for value to G. Held, that the owners having by their master signed bills making the goods deliverable on payment of a certain freight, could only claim that freight, and not the whole freight for which they had a lien under the charter, as against consignees who had advanced money on faith of the statements in the bill of lading (w).

Case 3.-A. chartered a ship to C. at a certain freight, “ A. or his agent to sign bills of lading at any rate of freight without prejudice to this charter." D., C.'s agent abroad, advanced money to the ship, and in consideration of such advance the master loaded goods from D., giving a bill of lading, "shipped by D., to be delivered to order, or assigns, paying freight

(s) Article 20, post.

(t) Chappel v. Comfort (1861), 10 C. B., N.S. 802; Fry v. Mercantile Bank of India (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 689; Smith v. Sieveking (1855), 4 E. & B. 945. "Where a charter is entered into, the special provisions of that charter are binding only as between the charterer and shipowner, and if a bill of lading is signed by the master, and that bill of lading comes to the hands of an assignee for value, the latter is entitled to have the goods delivered to him on the terms mentioned in the bill of lading, and, properly speaking, is not bound to refer to the charter at all" (Willes, J., in Chappel v. Comfort, at p. 810). This is subject to reference to the charter for any of its terms expressly incorporated in the bill of lading. And see post, Article 19.

(u) Leduc v. Ward (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 475.

(v) The Patria (1871), 3 L. R. Adm. 436. Otherwise if F. had shipped through C., the charterer as agent. De Laurier v. Wyllie ((1889), 17 Sc. Sess. C. 167. (w) Gilkison v. Middleton (1857), 2 C. B., N.S. 134. See also Mitchell v. Scaife (1815), 4 Camp. 298. This case is distinguishable from cases like Kern v. Deslandes (1861), 10 C. B., N.S. 205, by the fact that the holder is an indorsee for value, and not a mere agent or factor. Here too the owners seem to have authorised the signing of the bills of lading (see per Cockburn, J.), and so varied their lien. I have omitted the part of the case which was overruled in Kirchner v. Venus (1859), 12 Moore, P. C. 361, as to whether there was a lien for freight at all.

to D.'s agent, G., as per margin." Held, that the master had no authority to make such a contract, and that A. was not bound by it to G., consignees of cargo (x).

Case 4.-C. chart red a ship from A. to pay a certain freight, sixteen laydays and demurrage at £2 per diem. C. shipped a cargo consigned to G. in London under a bill of lading, "paying freight as per charter," with a memorandum in the margin, "There are eight working days for unloading in London." The vessel was detained four days beyond her lay-days. G. was sued by A. for demurrage. Held, that as the bill of lading did not clearly show that the conditions as to demurrage in the charter were incorporated in the bill of lading, G. was not liable (y).

Case 5.-F. shipped goods on A.'s vessel, and took a bill of lading, setting out that the vessel was lying at X. and bound for Z., with liberty to call at any ports in any order. F. knew that the ship was going to Z. by way of Y., which was altogether out of the course of a voyage from X. to Z. F. indorsed the bill of lading to I. The ship proceeded to Y., and was lost on the way. Held, that I. was not prevented from recovery for the deviation, by F.'s knowledge of the course of the voyage, such knowledge not being embodied in the bill of lading (z).

Article 19.-Incorporation of Charter in Bill of Lading.

Where the holder of a bill of lading for goods shipped on a chartered vessel is either a shipper other than the charterer, whether aware of the charter or not (a), or an assignee of such bill for value, even from the charterer (b), the stipulations of the charter on any particular point will not be incorporated into the bill of lading without a plain expression in the bill of lading of the intention to do so (c).

Where such an intention plainly appears it will be adopted; thus the clause "freight and all other conditions as per charter," will incorporate into the bill of lading all conditions in the charter to be performed by the consignee

(x) Reynolds v. Jex (1865), 7 B. & S. 86. Such a contract as to freight was beyond the usual authority of a master, and should have put G. on inquiry. See also Arrospe v. Barr (1881), 8 Sc. Sess. C., 4th Ser., p. 602.

(4) Chappel v. Comfort (1861), 10 C. B., N.S. 802.

(z) Leduc v. Ward (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 475.

(a) The Patria (1871), 3 L. R. Adm. 436. But where the charterer took a bill of lading in his own name, but as agent for F. the real owner of the goods, to whom he endorsed the bill of lading, F. was held bound by the charter, though the bill of lading did not refer to it. De Laurier v. Wyllie (1889), 17 Sc. Sess.

C. 167, and see p. 42 ante.

(b) Fry v. Mercantile Bank of India (1866), L R. 1 C. P. 689.

(c) Chappel v. Comfort (1861), 10 C. B., N. S. 802; Smith v. Sieveking (1855), 4 E. & B. 945; Wegener v. Smith (1854), 15 C. B. 285.

of the goods (d) applicable to and consistent with the character of the bill of lading (e), but not inapplicable or insensible conditions (ƒ), or clauses of the charter which would alter express stipulations in the bill of lading (g), or which are not conditions to be performed by the consignee (d).

Under such a clause holders of the bill of lading have been held liable for charterparty demurrage at the port of loading (h) or at the port of discharge (e), but the cesser clause (ƒ), or arbitration clause (i), or the exceptions in the charter, will not be incorporated in the bill of lading (d).

66

Case 1.-C. chartered a ship from A. "the ship to have a lien on cargo for freight 70s. per ton ... to be paid on unloading of the cargo. C. shipped part of the cargo under a bill of lading containing a clause: freight for the said goods payable in Z. as per charter," and indorsed the bill for value to I. Held, that against I. the shipowner had a lien only for the freight due for the goods included in the bill of lading, and not a lien for the whole chartered freight (k).

Case 2.-C. chartered a ship from A. with a clause that fourteen working days were allowed for loading and unloading, and ten days on demurrage at £35 a day. F. shipped corn under a bill of lading: "paying freight for the same goods, and all other conditions as per charter." F. indorsed the bill to I. for value. At the port of discharge, owing to delay of other shippers, I. was delayed in removing his goods, and three days' demurrage was incurred. Held, that I. was liable to pay demurrage as per charter. Semble, that A. could recover the demurrage for the three days from each of the shippers ().

(d) Serraino v. Campbell (1891), 1 Q. B 283; following dicta in Taylor v. Perrin (1883), (unreported decision of the House of Lords); De Laurier v. Wyllie (1889), 17 Sc. Sess. C. 167.

(e) Porteus v. Watney (1878), L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 534, at p. 542 (C.A.); Gardner v. Trechmann (1884), 15 Q. B. D. 154 (C.A.) Howitt v. Paul (1878), 5 Sc. Sess. C., 4th Ser., p. 321. In Howitt v. Paul, v s., "paying freight as per charter,' was held to incorporate a stipulation for the payment to the captain of a gratuity for "good delivery.".

(f) Gullischen v. Stewart (1884 (C.A.)), L. R. 13 Q. B. D. 317; Bryden v. Niebuhr (1884), 1 C. & E. 241; but see Barwick v. Burnyeat (1877), 36 L. T. 250, and note ante, p. 40.

(g) Gardner v. Trechmann, vide supra.

(h) Gray v. Carr (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 522.

(i) Hamilton v. Mackie (1889), 5 Times L. R. 677.

(k) Fry v. Mercantile B nk of India (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 689. See also Mitchell v. Scaife (1815), 4 Camp. 298. The Court based their decision on the grounds: (1) That a clear intention to give the extended lien was not shown: Chappell v. Comfort, ride supra. (2) That the charter fixed the rate of freight and not a lump freight, and this only was incorporated in the bill of lading. Such a division of liability will not be applied to demurrage: Porteus v. Watney, vide supra.

(Porteus v. Watney (1878), L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 534 (C.A.); disapproving Rogers v. Hunter (1827), M. & M. 63; Dobson v. Droop (1830), M. & M. 441; quare, whether the charter would not be satisfied by the charterers receiving £10