a commercial sense to the commercial speculation entered upon by the shipowner and charterer. Held, that the charterer was justified under the circumstances in throwing up the charter, though as the delay arose from excepted perils he had no action against the shipowner (k).

Case 2.-A ship is chartered to fetch ice from Norway in March, to be delivered in June; owing to delay from perils of the sea she cannot arrive in Norway till August, or at her final destination till November. Submitted; the charterer may throw up the charter (1).

Case 3.-A ship was chartered to proceed to Z. with all convenient speed, with an exception of "restraint of princes." Before anything had been done under the charter, the French Government declared Z. blockaded. Held, that the shipowner was only bound to wait a reasonable time for the removal of such an obstacle, and as it was likely to continue so long as to defeat the object of such a commercial adventure, the shipowner was justified in throwing up the charter, and in refusing to load at all, though the loading was not prevented by the blockade of Z. (m).

Case 4.-A ship was chartered as "bound to Nantes," to load at Nantes and proceed to Z. Before proceeding to Nantes, the ship went to Newcastle. The charterer alleged unreasonable delay, and refused to load. Held, that such an allegation was only a ground for an action for damages, and would not support a repudiation of the charter, unless it was also alleged that the delay frustrated the object of the voyage (n).

Case 5.-A ship was chartered" with all convenient speed, having liberty to take an outward cargo for owner's benefit, direct on the way, to proceed to X. and there load a full cargo." The ship deviated to Y. which was not "direct on the way to X., and arrived at X. a few days late. The charterer refused to load. It was admitted that the object of the voyage was not frustrated, and the whole Court held, that the charterer was not entitled to repudiate the charter, but had his remedy in damages (o).

Case 6.-Owing to the delay of the master of a ship, who omitted to take on board provisions and stores while the cargo was loading, the ship was detained after her loading was completed, so that the harbour froze and she was ice-bound for the winter. Held, that the shipowners were liable for the damages resulting from such delay (p).

Case 7.-A ship was chartered on October 20, to go in ballast to X., and bring back a cargo of fruit direct to Z.; if the vessel did not arrive at X, by January 31, the charterer was to be at liberty to cancel the charter. The ship did arrive before January 31, but made an intermediate voyage before so doing. Held, that the charterer was entitled to throw up the charter, the implied undertaking to proceed with reasonable speed having been broken (7).

(k) Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co. (1874), L. R. 10 C. P. 125. See also Tully v. Howling (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 182.

(On authority of Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co. vide supra, see per Bramwell, B., pp. 141, 143, 146. Touteng v. Hubbard (1802), 3 B. & P. 291, must be taken as overruled so far as it contradicts Case 2.

(m) Geipel v. Smith (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 404.

(n) Clipsham v. Vertue (1843), 5 Q. B. 265. See also Tarrabochia v. Hickie (1856), 1 H. & N. 183.

(0) McAndrew v. Chapple (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 643. See also Bornmann v. Tooke (1808), 1 Camp. 377. But see Freeman v. Taylor (1831), 8 Bing. 124, where six weeks' delay and deviation on the outward voyage, found by the jury to frustrate the object of the charter, was held to put an end to the charter. (p) The Wilhelm (1866), 14 L. T. 636.

(1) Me Andrew v. Adɩms (1834), 1 Bing. N. C. 29; (a good example of the double undertaking, express and implied).

Note 1.-The case of Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance (r) has never been formally approved by the House of Lords, though Lord Blackburn in Dahl v. Nelson said (8): "There was a dissenting minority" [i.e. Cleasby, B], "in that case, and some previous authorities are perhaps not quite consistent with it. It is no doubt competent to your Lordships to reconsider that case, and decide contrary to it; I think it was rightly decided." In the same case Lord Watson said (t): "I adopt the view of Brett, L.J. (u), that the shipowner must bring his ship to the primary destination named in the charter, unless he is prevented from getting his ship to that destination by some obstruction or disability of such a character that it cannot be overcome by the shipowner by any reasonable means, except within such a time as, having regard to the adventure of both the shipowner and the charterers, is as a matter of business wholly unreasonable." It was also cited without disapproval by Lord Selborne and Lord Watson in Inman v. Bischoff (x), and may therefore be accepted as established law.

Whether there is a day named in the charter by which performance must be commenced or completed, or a general stipulation expressed in the charter, such as "with all possible despatch, certain perils excepted," there will also be held to be an implied undertaking to proceed "in time reasonable for the commercial adventure.' Failure in the express stipulation, but compliance with the implied one, will in the case of a named day justify the charterer in repudiating the contract, in the case of a general stipulation will give him only an action for damages (y). Compliance with the express stipulation, but failure in the implied one, would entitle the charterer to repudiate (z).

The three cases relied on by Cleasby, B., in his dissenting judgment (a) in Jackson's Case, cannot be relied on as law so far as they conflict with this.

In Hadley v. Clarke, F. shipped goods by A.'s ship "to be carried from Liverpool to Leghorn;" when the cargo was loaded and the voyage had begun, an embargo was laid on the ship at Falmouth, which detained her for two years, and it was held that such an embargo only suspended and did not dissolve the contract between the parties. There was here no finding by

(r) L. R. 10 C. P. 125 (1874).

(s) (1881) L. R. 6 App. C. 38, 53.

(t) L. R. 6 App. C. 38, 59, 60.

(u) 12 Ch. D. at p. 593. Cf. per Collins, J., in Assicurazioni v. The Bessie Morris (1892), 1 Q. B. at p. 577; C. A. (1892), 2 Q. B. 652.

(x) L. R. 7 App. C. 670, 676, 689 (1882). See also Rankin v. Potter (1872), L. R. 6 H. L. 83, 104, 113, 117, 133.

(y) Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co. (1874), L. R. 10 C. P. 125; Clipsham v. Vertue (1843), 5 Q. B. 265.

(*) McAndrew v. Adams (1834), 1 Bing N. C. 29.

(a) Hadley v. Clarke (1799), 8 T. R. 259; Touteng v. Hubbard (1802), 3 B. & P. 291; Hurst v. Ushorne (1856), 18 C. B. 144.

the jury that the object of the adventure was frustrated. It is difficult to imagine a modern jury finding that two years' delay did not put an end to the commercial adventure; and in Geipel v. Smith (1872) (b), the shipowner was allowed to repudiate under circumstances much less strong.

In Touteng v. Hubbard (c) a ship was chartered for a voyage to St. Michael's for fruit; and she was delayed by an embargo till the fruit season was over. The case really turned on the nationality of the vessel, but the judges, following Hadley v. Clarke, said obiter that the merchant would have been under the necessity of furnishing the ship with a cargo if she had arrived at St. Michael as soon as she conveniently could after the raising of the embargo, though the fruit season was over.

In Hurst v. Usborne (c), a ship was chartered to proceed to X. for grain or other lawful merchandise; she did not arrive at X. till the export trade in grain was over; evidence as to the state of the corn trade was held inadmissible (d).

In Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co. (e), Bramwell, B., delivering the judgment of the majority of the Court, expressed disapproval of the two latter cases. As to Touteng v. Hubbard, he pointed out that the dicta cited were obiter, and said, "I cannot think that it would have been so held, had it been necessary to act upon it," proceeding to put cases shewing the unfortunate results of such a decision; while, as to Hurst v. Usborne, ho was more decided, and said: "I think it is unsatisfactory, and, if a decision on the question now before us, wrong."

None of these cases therefore can be taken as authorities in any way contradicting the implied undertaking of the shipowner to carry out the voyage in a time which is reasonable, having regard to the commercial adventure concerned. Though thero are few cases as to the effects of unreasonable delay in the carrying voyage, it seems clear that the principle covers this as well as delay before loading; such cases would naturally be less frequent, as, if the shipowner wishes to repudiate, he, or his captain, must still act for the time as the agent for the cargo-owners and for the benefit of the goods, while the cargoowner is also under the necessity of taking the cargo, if he repudiates.

Note 2.-The question has, it is believed, never arisen as to bills of lading, but it is submitted that a shipper who had shipped his goods would be entitled to demand them back if the ship did not sail within a reasonable time as defined above, or

(b) L. R. 7 Q. B. 404.

(c) Hadley v. Clarke (1799), 8 T. R. 259; Touteng v. Hubbard (1802), 3 B. & P. 291; Hurst v. Usborne (1856), 18 C. B. 144.

(d) There is also The Newport (1858), Swabey, 335, a decision of Mr. Registrar Rothery, following Hadley v. Clarke, vide supra, and holding that a detention of three years by capture only temporarily suspended the contract.

(c) L. R. 10 C. P. 125, at pp 146, 147.

if, being unseaworthy, she could not be made seaworthy within a reasonable time; or if on the voyage, the ship was detained, as by a blockade, an unreasonable time.

Implied contract to proceed without deviation or delay.
(See Articles 99, 100.)

Article 31.-Implied undertaking by Shipper not to ship dangerous Goods without Notice.

By the common law of England (ƒ) the shipper of goods impliedly undertakes to ship no goods of such a dangerous character or so dangerously packed, that the shipowner or his agent could not by reasonable knowledge and diligence be aware of their dangerous character, without notice to the shipowner or his agent of such dangerous character; and he is therefore liable to any person who is injured by the shipment of such dangerous goods without notice (g).

But when the shipowner or his agent has full opportunities of observing the dangerous character of such goods, he is treated as having such notice, and the shipper is not therefore liable (h).

Quare, whether the shipper's undertaking is an absolute one to ship no dangerous goods without notice (i), or merely an undertaking to use due diligence to avoid such shipment (k).

(f) Certain special goods are also dealt with by statutory penalties: see 36 & 37 Vict. c. 85, ss. 23-27; 38 & 39 Vict. c. 17, ss. 33, 34, 36, 39, 43 (Explosives); see Appendix III. All bills of lading contain special provisions as to risky or hazardous goods, c.g., glass, specie, &c.

(g) Brass v. Maitland (1856), 6 E. & B. 470; Hutchinson v. Guion (1858), 5 C. B., N.S. 149; Williams v. East India Company (1802), 3 East, 192, at pp. 200, 201; Farrant v. Barnes (1862), 11 C. B., N.S. 553: in which see dictum, per Willes, J., at p. 563.

(h) Acatos v. Burns (1878), 3 Ex. D. 282, which seems thus reconcilable with Brass v. Maitland and other cases, though some of its dicta are more sweeping.

(i) As laid down by Campbell, C.J., and Wightman, J., in Brass v. Maitland. (k) As laid down by Crompton, J., in Brass v. Maitland, and apparently by Brett, L.J., in Acatos v. Burns, where he says, "There is no warranty that the goods shipped have no concealed defects at the time of shipment." This alternative, in view of the findings of the jury in Acatos v. Burns, and the judgment of the Court therein, is possibly the correct view.

Case 1.-F. shipped on board A.'s ship sixty casks described as "bleaching powder," apparently sufficiently packed; in fact, the powder contained chloride of lime, which corroded the casks, and damaged the rest of the cargo. Held, that, in the absence of notice to A. of the dangerous character of the goods, F. was liable for the resultant damage, unless the powder was such a well known article that masters of ships ought to know of its dangerous character. F. pleaded that he shipped the goods, packed as he received them from third persons, without negligence. Held, by Lord Campbell and Wightman, J., no defence; by Crompton, J., a good defence (1).

Case 2.-A., shipowners, received for shipment from F. a quantity of salt cake with permission to stow it in bulk. In ignorance of its nature, they stowed it next casks, which it corroded, letting out the brine they contained, which damaged the salt cake. F. sued A. for negligent stowage. Held, that proof that F. concealed the dangerous nature of salt cake from A., and that it would not be known to masters in the ordinary course of business, was a good defence. Held, also, that the mere fact that F. authorized stowage in bulk was no defence, as he did not authorize negligent stowage in bulk (m).

Case 3.-F. shipped maize in A.'s ship, apparently in good order and condition; on the voyage it sprouted and was evidently in bad condition and dangerous. The jury found that it was dangerous when shipped; but that its state could not have been ascertained by the use of reasonable means, and that the shipowner had full opportunities of examining it. Held, that F. was not liable for any damage or delay occasioned by such shipment (n).

(1) Brass v. Maitland (1856), 6 E. & B. 470.

(m) Hutchinson v. Guion (1858), 5 C. B., N.S. 149.

(n) Acatos v. Burns (1878), 3 Ex. D. 282. On these findings, the decision of the Court appears to overrule part of the decision in Brass v. Maitland in favour of the view of Crompton, J.