Opinion of the Court. that he complained to Richards of the injustice done by the sale, and endeavored to procure a compromise with him; that the latter repeatedly promised to do what was right, and to release his claim on the property when he was reimbursed by rents and profits for the money he had expended; that Richards promised to render an account of his claim, but no account was ever rendered, except one so extravagant that it could not be considered; and that he has never been able to effect any arrangement with him. The evidence does not sustain these allegations. Appellee testifies that in August, 1873, his father tendered to Richards the amount of his judgment, together with all the expenses and costs of all kinds. But he admits that the appellant declined to accept the money. While appellant was, perhaps, willing to surrender his purchase, shortly after it was made, if he had been reimbursed his expenditures in connection with the property, there is no satisfactory proof that he ever recognized the legal or equitable right of the appellee or of any one else to deprive him of the full benefit of that purchase. We find nothing whatever in the record to excuse the failure of the appellee to institute legal proceedings, in due time, to have the sale set aside. He knew that the appellant relied upon the sale, and upon the faith of it expended large sums. He knew that the premises here in dispute were in fact levied on for his debts, and were intended to be sold in satisfaction of those debts. But after the property has largely increased in value, and after sleeping upon his rights for nearly twelve years, with information, during the whole of that period, of every fact now relied upon by him, appellee asks the aid of a court of equity to set aside the sale and conveyance, and adjudge him to be the owner of the property; and chiefly, because of a mistake of the officer in not so describing the premises in the advertisement of sale and in the conveyance, as to properly identify them. In our judgment, he is not in a position to claim the interference of a court of equity. For that reason alone, the judgment must be Reversed and the cause remanded, with direction to dismiss the bill. Opinion of the Court. WHITNEY v. ROBERTSON. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. Argued December 13, 14, 1887. -- Decided January 9, 1888. The treaty of February 8, 1867, with the Dominican Republic (art. 9) provides that "no higher or other duty shall be imposed on the importation into the United States of any article the growth, produce, or manufacture of the Dominican Republic, or of her fisheries, than are or shall be payable on the like articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of any other foreign country or of its fisheries." The convention of January 30, 1875, with the king of the Hawaiian Islands provides for the importation into the United States, free of duty, of various articles, the produce and manufacture of those islands, (among which were sugars,) in consideration of certain concessions made by the king of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. Held, that this provision in the treaty with the Dominican Republic did not authorize the admission into the United States, duty free, of similar sugars, the growth, produce, or manufacture of that republic, as a consequence of the agreement made with the king of the Hawaiian Islands, and that there was no distinction in principle between this case and Bartram v. Robertson, 122 U. S. 116. By the Constitution of the United States a treaty and a statute are placed on the same footing, and if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control, provided the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is selfexecuting. THIS was an action to recover back duties alleged to have been illegally exacted. Verdict for the defendant and judgment on the verdict. The plaintiffs sued out this writ of error. 4 Mr. A. J. Willard and Mr. H. E. Tremain for plaintiffs in Mr. M. W. Tyler was with them on their brief. error. Mr. Solicitor General for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the court. The plaintiffs are merchants, doing business in the city of New York, and in August, 1882, they imported a large quan Opinion of the Court. tity of "centrifugal and molasses sugars," the produce and manufacture of the island of San Domingo. These goods were similar in kind to sugars produced in the Hawaiian Islands, which are admitted free of duty under the treaty with the king of those islands, and the act of Congress, passed to carry the treaty into effect. They were duly entered at the custom house at the port of New York, the plaintiffs claiming that by the treaty with the Republic of San Domingo the goods should be admitted on the same terms, that is, free of duty, as similar articles, the produce and manufacture of the Hawaiian Islands. The defendant, who was at the time collector of the port, refused to allow this claim, treated the goods as dutiable articles under the acts of Congress, and exacted duties on them to the amount of $21,936. The plaintiffs appealed from the collector's decision to the Secretary of the Treasury, by whom the appeal was denied. They then paid under protest the duties exacted, and brought the present action to recover the amount. The complaint set forth the facts as to the importation of the goods, the claim of the plaintiffs that they should be admitted free of duty because like articles from the Hawaiian Islands were thus admitted, the refusal of the collector to allow the claim, the appeal from his decision to the Secretary of the Treasury and its denial by him, and the payment under protest of the duties exacted, and concluded with a prayer for judgment for the amount. The defendant demurred to the complaint, the demurrer was sustained, and final judgment was entered in his favor, to review which the case is brought here. The treaty with the king of the Hawaiian Islands provides for the importation into the United States, free of duty, of various articles, the produce and manufacture of those islands, in consideration, among other things, of like exemption from duty, on the importation into that country, of sundry specified articles which are the produce and manufacture of the United States. 19 Stat. 625. The language of the first two articles of the treaty, which recite the reciprocal engagements of the two countries, declares that they are made in consideration Opinion of the Court. "of the rights and privileges" and "as an equivalent therefor," which one concedes to the other. The plaintiffs rely for a like exemption of the sugars imported by them from San Domingo upon the 9th article of the treaty with the Dominican Republic, which is as follows: "No higher or other duty shall be imposed on the importation into the United States of any article the growth, produce, or manufacture of the Dominican Republic, or of her fisheries; and no higher or other duty shall be imposed on the importation into the Dominican Republic of any article the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States, or their fisheries, than are or shall be payable on the like articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of any other foreign country, or its fisheries." 15 Stat. 473, 478. In Bartram v. Robertson, decided at the last term, (122 U. S. 116,) we held that brown and unrefined sugars, the produce and manufacture of the island of St. Croix, which is part of the dominions of the king of Denmark, were not exempt from duty by force of the treaty with that country, because similar goods from the Hawaiian Islands were thus exempt. The first article of the treaty with Denmark provided that the contracting parties should not grant "any particular favor" to other nations in respect to commerce and navigation, which should not immediately become common to the other party, who should "enjoy the same freely if the concession were freely made, and upon allowing the same compensation if the concession were conditional." 11 Stat. 719. The fourth article provided that no "higher or other duties" should be imposed by either party on the importation of any article which is its produce or manufacture, into the country of the other party, than is payable on like articles, being the produce or manufacture of any other foreign country. And we held in the case mentioned that "those stipulations, even if conceded to be self-executing by the way of a proviso or exception to the general law imposing the duties, do not cover concessions like those made to the Hawaiian Islands for a valuable consideration. They were pledges of the two contracting parties, the United States and the king of Opinion of the Court. Denmark, to each other, that in the imposition of duties on goods imported into one of the countries which were the produce or manufacture of the other, there should be no discrimination against them in favor of goods of like character imported from any other country. They imposed an obligation upon both countries to avoid hostile legislation in that respect. But they were not intended to interfere with special arrangements with other countries founded upon a concession. of special privileges." The counsel for the plaintiffs meet this position by pointing to the omission in the treaty with the Republic of San Domingo of the provision as to free concessions, and concessions upon compensation, contending that the omission precludes any concession in respect of commerce and navigation by our government to another country, without that concession being at once extended to San Domingo. We do not think that the absence of this provision changes the obligations of the United States. The 9th article of the treaty with that republic, in the clause quoted, is substantially like the 4th article in the treaty with the king of Denmark. And as we said of the latter, we may say of the former, that it is a pledge of the contracting parties that there shall be no discriminating legislation against the importation of articles which are the growth, produce, or manufacture of their respective countries, in favor of articles of like character, imported from any other country. It has no greater extent. It was never designed to prevent special concessions, upon sufficient considerations, touching the importation of specific articles into the country of the other. It would require the clearest language to justify a conclusion that our government intended to preclude itself from such engagements with other countries, which might in the future be of the highest importance to its interests. But, independently of considerations of this nature, there is another and complete answer to the pretensions of the plaintiffs. The act of Congress under which the duties were collected authorized their exaction. It is of general application, making no exception in favor of goods of any country. It was passed VOL. CXXIV-13 |