Dissenting Opinion: Harlan, J.

of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to procecdings in bankruptcy." Rev. Stat. § 720.

The act of March 3, 1887, declares that the Circuit Courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, arising under the Constitution of the United States.

Parsons' suit is, confessedly, of a civil nature; and it proceeds upon the ground that what the defendants propose to do will violate rights secured to him by the Constitution of the United States. It is, therefore, a suit arising under the Constitution of the United States. Whether the Circuit Court, sitting in equity, could properly grant to the plaintiff the relief asked is not a question of jurisdiction within the rule that orders, judgments, or decrees are void, where the court, which passed them, was without jurisdiction. It is rather a question as to the exercise of jurisdiction. As this suit is one arising under the Constitution of the United States, and is of a civil nature, the inquiry in the mind of the Circuit Judge, when he read the bill, was whether, according to the principles of equity, a decree could be properly rendered against the defendants? Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 858.

The statute provides that "suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States in any case where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law." But if one of those courts should render a final decree, in behalf of the plaintiff, notwithstanding he had a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law, would the decree be a nullity? Could it be assailed, collaterally, as void, upon the ground that no case was made justifying relief in equity? When a party has disregarded a preliminary injunction issued by a Circuit Court of the United States, has been fined for contempt, and is in custody for failing to pay the fine, must he be discharged upon habeas corpus in every case where it appears, upon the face of the bill, that the plaintiff has a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law? Those questions, it

Statement of the Case.

seems to me, should receive a negative answer. I do not understand the court to decide that the Circuit Court could not, under any circumstances, or by any mode of proceeding, enforce the rights which the plaintiffs contend are about to be violated by the defendants; but only, that the court below, sitting in equity, had no authority to interfere with the proposed action of the defendants. It seems to me that this question would properly arise upon appeal from any final decree rendered in the cause, and is not determinable upon writ of habeas corpus.

Upon the delivery of the opinions in this case, Mr. Attorney General stated to the court, in open court, that he would take notice of the order awarding the writ, and that he would order the discharge of the prisoners, without requiring the issue of the writ.

BISSELL v. SPRING VALLEY TOWNSHIP.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS.

Submitted December 6, 1887. - Decided January 9, 1888.

The entry of final judgment on demurrer concludes the parties to it, by way of estoppel, in a subsequent action between the same parties on a different claim, so far as the new controversy relates to the matters litigated and determined in the prior action.

A final judgment for defendant in an action against a municipal corporation to recover on coupons attached to bonds purporting to have been issued by the corporation, entered on demurrer to an answer setting up facts showing that the bonds were never executed by the municipality, concludes the plaintiff in a subsequent action against the municipality to recover on other coupons cut from the same bonds.

Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, distinguished.

THE following was the case, as stated by the court.

In October, 1880, the plaintiff below, who is also plaintiff in error here, commenced an action in the Circuit Court of the

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Statement of the Case.

United States for the District of Kansas, to recover the amount due on several interest coupons of seventy-three bonds of one thousand dollars each, purporting to have been issued by Spring Valley Township, a municipal corporation of Kansas, to aid the Atlantic and Pacific Railway Company in the construction of a railroad through the limits of the township. The petition alleged that pursuant to the act of the Legislature of the State, entitled "An act to enable municipal townships to subscribe for stock in any railroad, and to provide for the payment of the same," approved February 25, 1879, and in pursuance of an order of the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Cherokee, in the State of Kansas, and a vote of more than three-fifths of the qualified voters of the township, voting at an election held for that purpose, the township issued, among others, seventy-three negotiable bonds, bearing date December 15, 1871, by each of which it promised to pay, fifteen years after date, to the railroad company or bearer, one thousand dollars, with interest at the rate of seven per cent per annum, with coupons for the interest attached; that afterwards each of the bonds, with the coupons, was put upon the market, and sold and delivered to bona fide purchasers for full value; that in April, 1872, each of the said bonds, with the coupons attached, was registered in the office of the Auditor of the State, and on each a certificate of such registration was indorsed; that after the issue and delivery of the bonds, and before their maturity, or the maturity of either of them, or of the coupons sued upon, they were sold and delivered to the plaintiff for the price of ninety cents on the dollar thereof; and that when said coupons became due, they were presented for payment at the place where they were made payable, and payment was refused. The plaintiff therefore asked judgment for the amount due upon them. Attached to the petition was a copy of one of the coupons and of one of the bonds, the several coupons and bonds being, except in their numbers, similar to the copies annexed. The bonds were signed “William H. Clark, Chairman Board of County Commissioners," and "J. G. Dunlavy, County Clerk." The coupons were signed in the same way, except that preceding the name of Dunlavy

Statement of the Case.

was the word "attest." The act of Kansas, under which the bonds purported to be issued, required that they should "be signed by the chairman of the Board of County Commissioners, and attested by the clerk, under the seal of the county."

To that petition the defendant answered, setting up various matters of defence, and among others that J. G. Dunlavy, whose name appeared on the bonds as county clerk, never signed or authorized his name to be signed to the bonds or to the coupons, nor did he affix to them, or authorize to be affixed, the seal of the county. A demurrer was interposed to several of the defences, and among others to the one containing this allegation respecting the alleged signature of Dunlavy. The Circuit Court overruled the demurrer so far as it related to this defence, holding that the municipality could not be bound upon an instrument of that character unless it was executed by the officers named in the statute; that a purchaser must inquire whether the bonds and coupons were so executed; that if the instruments were not signed by the proper officers, but by persons having no authority, or color of authority, they were void; and that the allegation charged this in substance.

The defendant then filed an amended answer, setting up among other things the same matter-that Dunlavy, whose name appeared on the bonds as county clerk, never signed or authorized his name to be signed to said bonds or coupons, nor did he affix or authorize to be affixed the seal of the county to them. To this answer the plaintiff replied, admitting that the bonds to which the interest coupons sued upon belonged, were not attested by J. G. Dunlavy, county clerk of the county of Cherokee, in the State of Kansas, in person, but alleged the fact to be that, at the time of issuing the bonds, Dunlavy was sick and unable to discharge the duties of his office, and by reason thereof authorized his brother, John Dunlavy, to attest the bonds for him, by signing his name as county clerk and affixing the seal of the county to them. Subsequently it was agreed between the parties, and the agreement was signed by their attorneys and filed as part of the record in the case, that this reply and the answer of the defendant should be with

Statement of the Case.

drawn, and that the defendant should file an answer, setting out the question of defence as to the signature of Dunlavy and the affixing of the county seal, and also a plea of the statute of limitations as to coupons barred, such answer to be verified; that the plaintiff should forthwith file his demurrer to this answer; and that the whole question should be submitted to the court, and judgment rendered in accordance with the pleadings, upon its sustaining or overruling the demurrer. This stipulation was carried out. An amended answer, duly verified, setting up those matters, was filed, to which the plaintiff demurred. The court overruled the demurrer, but the plaintiff refused further to plead and stood upon it. Final judgment was thereupon entered for the defendant. On appeal to this court this judgment was affirmed. See Bissell v. Spring Valley Township, 110 U. S. 162.

In April, 1885, the plaintiff brought the present action in the Circuit Court against the township on certain other of the coupons attached to the same seventy-three bonds, alleging an execution of the bonds and coupons and a complete registration in the office of the Auditor of the State. To this petition the defendant answered as follows:

"1st. As a first defence, said defendant says that it ought not to be charged with the said supposed debt by virtue of said supposed bonds and coupons, because it, by its attorneys, says that J. G. Dunlavy, whose name appears on said bonds and coupons as county clerk, never signed his name thereto or thereon, nor ever authorized any party or parties to sign his name thereto or thereon, and that said signature is not his signature, nor did he affix or authorize to be affixed the seal of said county of Cherokee to said bonds or coupons.

"2d. Said defendant, further answering and pleading in bar of this action, says that said plaintiff ought not to maintain his said action herein, because on the 13th day of October, 1880, the said plaintiff, Charles R. Bissell, filed his certain petition against this defendant in this court in debt, wherein and whereby he sought to charge this defendant with liability upon certain of the pretended bonds and coupons attached thereto, claimed by said plaintiff to have been issued by this defendant,