Opinion of the Court. should nominally buy in all the property of Hood, and should hold the same until after Hood should have obtained his discharge in bankruptcy, and then a reconveyance should be made to Hood; that Hood should remain in possession and control of the properties, and they should be his, he being liable for all taxes, costs, and expenses, and entitled to all the rents and revenues and the proceeds of sales; that the agreement on the part of Frellsen was that he was simply to receive the amount of his judgment, principal, interest, and costs, in full, and was to be considered only as the nominal owner of the property; that the sheriff took no possession of the property under the fi. fa. of July, 1868; that, during the whole time Hood was in bankruptcy, from December 29, 1868, to January 27, 1871, he remained in possession of all the properties except the Black Bayou Place, and regularly paid the taxes, and was treated as the owner by Frellsen, who accounted to him for some of the rents and for the proceeds of the sale of the Black Bayou Plantation, by crediting them on the judgment, during the time when Hood was an undischarged bankrupt; that such fraudulent conspiracy between Hood and Frellsen was not known to the plaintiff until within a few weeks past; that the existence of the fraud was brought to light during the trial of the above named suit, brought by Hood against Frellsen, when the agreement of October 26, 1868, was first produced, in December, 1878; and that, in consequence of the dissolution of the injunction in that suit, Frellsen was proceeding to sell the Home Place and the Hood and Wilson Place under the executory process so issued by him. The bill prayed for a decree adjudging the plaintiff to be the owner, as assignee in bankruptcy, of all the properties above mentioned, from the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, and entitled to recover the rents thereof; that the mortgage of May 1, 1871, made by Hood, might be cancelled; and that the sale under the executory process of Frellsen might be enjoined. On the filing of the bill, a restraining order was issued in accordance with its prayer. Frellsen answered the bill, asserting the validity of the judg ment confessed by Hood and of the executions issued thereon, Opinion of the Court. and of the purchases made by Frellsen at the auction sales. He denied the allegations that there was any pretended sale or simulated title, or any fraud or collusion at the sales or in the purchases. He averred that the consideration for the agreement of October 26, 1868, and the motives for it, were set forth therein; that the motives were a disposition to oblige and assist Hood by affording him an opportunity to reinstate himself, if he should find it practicable; that the consideration was that Hood should pay with exact punctuality the debt owing by him, in the manner set forth in the agreement; that not one of the payments provided for by the agreement was made; that the agreement ceased to be operative before any order was made on Hood's petition in bankruptcy; that neither the plaintiff nor Hood had ever offered to pay the instalments of money mentioned in the agreement; that, in 1868, 1869, 1870, and afterwards, the property was under the exclusive control of Frellsen and subject to his title and possession, as purchaser; that Frellsen made no concealment of the agreement of October 26, 1868; that that agreement became inoperative and valueless by the discharge of Hood in bankruptcy; that the conveyance and mortgage of May 1, 1871, were made after such discharge in bankruptcy; and that the property specified in that mortgage was never within the possession, control, or authority of the District Court of the United States, or of the plaintiff. A replication was filed to this answer and proofs were taken on both sides, and, on the 13th of June, 1881, the District Court entered a decree, that the judgment in favor of Frellsen against Hood in 1866, and the executions thereunder in 1868, with the sales and conveyances by the sheriff, were valid and operative; that no fraud, collusion, or malpractice was established against Frellsen; that those proceedings entitled him to the property conveyed to him, discharged from any claim of the plaintiff; that any surplus arising from the sale under the executory process in favor of Frellsen should not be paid to Hood, but should be paid to the complainant as assignee in bankruptcy; that the injunction should be dissolved; and that the sheriff should dispose, under the direction of the court, of Opinion of the Court. the surplus that might remain after paying the debt due to Frellsen, and the costs of suit. The plaintiff appealed to the Circuit Court, which, on the 2d of February, 1884, affirmed the decree in favor of Frellsen, and dismissed the bill as against him, and remanded the cause to the District Court to enter such decree, and for such further proceedings against Hood, in favor of the plaintiff, as might be consistent with the equity of the bill, and proceedings against him personally. From that decree the plaintiff has appealed to this court. We find no difficulty in holding that the decree of the Circuit Court was correct. The case made by the bill is not established. On the contrary, the answer of Frellsen is supported by the proofs. His acts and doings throughout appear to have been fair and honest. The debt due to him, as secured by the confessed judgment, was an honest debt. By means of his purchases at the auction sales on the executions, he became the absolute owner of the properties he bought. The agreement of October 26, 1868, does not contain or suggest anything fraudulent. It assigns fair and natural motives for the favor he was doing to Hood. Although the agreement was executed by Hood as well as Frellsen, it contains no covenants or stipulations on the part of Hood, and no agreement by Hood to pay the amounts mentioned in it, making up the balance due on the judgment. The only stipulations in it are those made by Frellsen. He does not, by the agreement, sell and transfer the property to Hood, but only stipulates that he will sell and transfer it on condition that Hood shall punctually make the payments specified in it; and it contains an express stipulation that the failure of Hood or his assigns to punctually pay any of the amounts stated, at the times fixed, is to operate as a discharge of Frellsen from all his obligations therein contained. Hood wholly failed to take the benefit of this agreement, but, instead thereof, immediately after the first day of payment mentioned in it, he filed a petition in bankruptcy. By the terms of the agreement, all rights existing under it in favor of Hood had ceased prior to the filing of the petition in Statement of the Case. bankruptcy, and there was no right growing out of the agree ment which passed, or could pass, to the assignee in bankruptcy, as representing Hood, because, in that respect, the rights of the plaintiff attached only to rights which existed in favor of Hood at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. The only other right which the plaintiff could have, in his capacity as assignee in bankruptcy, was the right to reach property transferred by Hood in fraud of his creditors. As to that, the proof is that no property was transferred by Hood in fraud of his creditors, or taken by Frellsen in fraud of such creditors. We see nothing to impeach the validity of the rights of Frellsen sought to be enforced by the executory process, and affirm the decree of the Circuit Court. Affirmed. DRYFOOS v. WIESE. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. Argued December 14, 1887. - Decided January 9, 1888. Claim 2 of reissued letters-patent No. 9097, granted to Louis Dryfoos, assignee of August Beck, February 24, 1880, for an "improvement in quilting machines," namely, "2. The combination, with a series of vertically reciprocating needles mounted in a laterally reciprocating sewingframe, of conical feed-rolls, and mechanism for causing them to act intermittingly during the intervals between the formation of stitches, substantially as hercin shown and described," is not infringed by a machine which has no conical rollers, but has short cylindrical feedrollers at each edge of the goods, which they feed in a circular direction by moving at different rates of speed constantly, the needles having a forward movement corresponding to that of the cloth while the needles are in it, nor by a machine which has the well-known sewing-machine four-motion feed, which is capable of feeding in a circular direction by lengthening the feed at the longest edge of the goods. BILL IN EQUITY to restrain alleged infringements of letterspatent. Decree dismissing the bill, from which complainant appealed. The case is stated in the opinion of the court. Opinion of the Court. Mr. Edmund Wetmore for appellant. No appearance for appellee. MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court. This is a suit in equity brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, by Louis Dryfoos against William Wiese, for the infringement of reissued letters-patent No. 9097, granted to said Dryfoos, assignee of August Beck, February 24, 1880, for an "improvement in quilting machines," on an application for a reissue filed January 24, 1880, the original patent, No. 190,184, having been granted to Louis Dryfoos and Joseph Dryfoos, as assignees of Beck, May 1, 1877, on an application filed February 27, 1877. Joseph Dryfoos assigned all his interest to Louis Dryfoos, and the patent was reissued to Louis Dryfoos January 29, 1878, as No. 8063, on an application filed January 2, 1878. There are six claims in the second reissue, but the bill alleges infringement only of claim 1, and prays for an injunction only as to claim 1. The plaintiff's proofs, however, were directed to showing an infringement of claims 1 and 2. The Circuit Court, 22 Blatchford, 19, considered the case in respect to both claim 1 and claim 2. It held the second reissue to be invalid in respect to claim 1, and to be valid as to claim 2; but it held that the defendant had not infringed claim 2, and dismissed the bill. From that decree the plaintiff has appealed. In the opinion of the Circuit Court, delivered by Judge Wheeler, the questions involved are so well stated that we adopt his language, as follows: "The invention was and is stated, in the original and reissues, to be of improvements on the quilting machine shown in letters-patent No. 159,884, dated February 16, 1875, granted to the same inventor,” (that is, to Louis Dryfoos, as assignee of Beck, as inventor). "That machine was for quilting by gangs of needles in zigzag parallel lines, and was fed by cylindrical rolls having an intermittent VOL. CXXIV-3 |