Opinion of the Court.

confirmation is in trust for the benefit of the lot-holders under grants from the pueblo, town, or city of San Francisco, or other competent authority; and as to any residue, in trust for the use and benefit of the inhabitants of the city."

Upon these facts Hoadley claimed title to the parts of the "Alta Plaza" and "Hamilton Square," which were taken from the lands originally occupied by him under his entry in 1850. The Supreme Court of the State decided that the title was in the city, and enjoined him from "meddling or interfering with the same." 70 California, 320. To reverse that judgment this writ of error was brought.

Mr. S. W. Holladay for plaintiffs in error. Mr. John Cur rey and Mr. W. C. Belcher were with him on the brief.

Mr. George Flournoy, Sr., Mr. George Flournoy, Jr., and Mr. John B. Mhoon for defendant in error.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

This case was before us at October term, 1876, upon an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of the United States remanding it to the state court from which it had been removed under the act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470, c. 137. We then said that "the questions involved did not arise under the laws of the United States, but under the ordinances of the city as ratified by the act of the legislature. The act of Congress operated as a release to the city of all the interests of the United States in the land. The title of the United States was vested in the city. Whether the city took the beneficial interest in the property as well as the legal title depended upon the effect to be given to the act of the legislature and the ordinances, and not upon the act of Congress." For this reason we affirmed the order remanding the case which had been removed upon a petition "alleging that it was one arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States." Hoadley v. San Francisco, 94 U. S. 4.

The record in that case presented all the questions which

Opinion of the Court.

arise in this except one which is thus stated in the specification of error found in the brief of counsel for Hoadley :

"It was error for the court to decide that that part of the act of March 11, 1858, was valid which ratified the order of the board of supervisors of October 16, 1856, adopting the plan or map of the city in respect to the reservation of squares for public purposes,' and thereby deciding that plaintiff has no title, thus impairing the obligation of the contract of grant, in ordinance 822, in violation of Article 1, § 10, of the Constitution of the United States.

"It was error, because, under said decision, that part of the act of 1858 took plaintiff's property without due process of law, and without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States."

This makes it necessary to inquire whether ordinance 822 contains any contract with Hoadley, the obligation of which was impaired by the act of March 11, 1858, or whether it vested in him any property which would be taken away without due process of law if the statute is adjudged to be valid. In the consideration of federal questions of the character presented by this specification of error our first duty is to determine whether there is such a contract, or such right of property as is alleged. The existence of the contract or of the right is part of the federal question itself. The Bridge Proprietors v. The Hoboken Company, 1 Wall. 116, 145.

As to this branch of the case the record shows that the Supreme Court of California said in its opinion:

"Whatever rights the plaintiff acquired under the Van Ness ordinance he took subject to the act of 1858, which approved the survey and map above mentioned. This is true under any proper application of the doctrine of relation invoked on behalf of plaintiff. The act of approval ratified the ordinance 822 allowing title to be made under it by a possession designated in it, and ratified also ordinance 845 and the order of the justices approving the survey and map above mentioned; and when the act of 1858 was passed, the doctrine of relation could vest in the plaintiff no greater rights than he took under the act of 1858. Any rights which plaintiff derived under

Opinion of the Court.

the act of 1858 would be subject to all its provisions. At the same time that ordinance 822 was ratified the order approving the map and survey above mentioned was also ratified, and whatever rights plaintiff took under the act were subject to the provisions of the ordinance and order so ratified. We find in the case no trace of a contract between the plaintiff and any one which ever vested in plaintiff any rights different from those accorded to him herein." 70 California, 325.

To this we agree. When the ordinance was passed the title of the city to the property covered by the claim then pending before the District Court on appeal was imperfect. It never did acquire title by entry as contemplated in the first section, and that further action was required both by the legislature of California and by Congress before occupants could secure title under the grants contemplated in § 2, is clearly shown by § 10, which specially provides for application to the legislature to confirm and ratify the ordinance, and to Congress to relinquish the title of the United States. The ordinance granted only such title as the city was permitted by Congress and the State to convey. In its legal effect the act of Congress conveyed the lands to the city for the uses and purposes specified in the ordinances and the order of the city ratified by the act of the legislature. In this way the two squares, as designated in the report of the commissioners, approved by the order of October, 1856, were dedicated to public use as squares. Lands so dedicated could not lawfully be conveyed by the city to private parties, and therefore the conveyance by Congress did not inure in this particular to the benefit of Hoadley. In short, the State refused to confirm the ordinance, so far as it had reference to the grant by the city of any part of these squares, and Congress in its conveyance followed in this particular what had been done by the State.

The judgment is

Affirmed.

The court, on motion, amends the judgment and decree in this case heretofore announced, and reported 123 U. S. 335.

THIS case is reported 123 U. S. 335. After judgment was announced, Mr. Robert B. Lines, of counsel for appellees, on their behalf, presented to the court the following motion, entitled in the cause:

Come now the appellees, by Robert B. Lines, of counsel, and move the court that the decree heretofore rendered in the above entitled cause be set aside, and the said cause remanded to the District Court for the Northern District of Florida, with instructions to enter its decree confirming the title of appellees to the lands in controversy, describing the same according to United States surveys, and specifying the amounts of land and scrip certificates respectively, to which said appellees may be entitled, under the acts of Congress of June 22d, 1860, and March 2d, 1867.

And for ground of their said motion, the said appellees respectfully show:

That they are informed, that parts of said lands have been sold or granted by the United States; that in such case, it is provided by §§ 11 and 6 of said act of 1860, 12 Stat. 85, that the confirmees shall have the right to enter upon any of the public lands of the United States, a quantity of land equal in extent to that sold by the Government; that it has been the practice heretofore in such cases, for the decree of the lower court, to state whether any and what lands have been so sold within the limits of private land claims, (see Mandates and Records in United States v. Cushing, October term, 1873; United States v. Marquis of Casa Yrujo, October term, 1878, &c.); and that, unless the decree of the court below in this

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cause be reformed to include such a statement, the appellees will meet with difficulty at the Land Office, in securing either scrip for the lands sold or patents for the portion, if any, remaining unsold.

ROBERT B. LINES, of Counsel for Appellees.

MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.

It is ordered that the judgment in this case be amended by adding thereto instructions to the District Court from whose decree the appeal was taken to amend its decree by describing, according to United States surveys, the lands applied for by the appellees and confirmed to them by the decree, and by declaring that if any parts of said lands have been sold or granted by the United States, the appellees shall have the right to enter upon any of the public lands of the United States, a quantity of land equal in extent to that so sold or granted; and by directing a reference to be made to a master to ascertain whether any such sales, and if so what, and to what extent, have been made; and by declaring the appellees entitled to scrip certificates to the extent and amount of such sales and grants.

And the said District Court is further instructed to take such further proceedings as may be necessary to carry out the instructions of this decree.

So ordered.

CRAWFORD v. HALSEY.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.

Submitted February 2, 1888. - Decided February 20, 1888.

A member of a bankrupt partnership, purchasing of the assignee in bankruptcy a debt due the firm, takes only such rights as the assignee has, under the bankrupt laws, to contest the validity of a transfer of the debt as in violation of those laws.