complete execution and judgment upon the award; nor does the fact
that the employé was a material witness before the arbitrators in deter-
mining the sum awarded furnish such ground, when there is nothing
in the case to show that he stated what he did not believe to be true
and when the weight of the evidence shows that what he said was
true. Ib.

3. Under the circumstances of this case the court applies the rule stated in
Atlantic Delaine Co. v. James, 94 U. S. 207, that the power to cancel
an executed contract "ought not to be exercised except in a clear case,
and never for an alleged fraud unless the fraud be made clearly to
appear; never for alleged false representations, unless their falsity is
certainly proved, and unless the complainant has been deceived and
injured by them." Ib.

4. When a complainant in a bill in equity has been guilty of apparent
laches in commencing his suit his bill should set forth the impediments
to an earlier prosecution, the cause of his ignorance of his rights, and
when the knowledge of them came to him; and if it appears at the
hearing that the case is liable to the objection of laches on his part,
relief will be refused on that ground. Richards v. Mackall, 183.

5. In this case the court holds that the complainant was guilty of laches,
and refuses relief on that ground alone. Ib.

6. A court of equity has no jurisdiction of a bill to stay criminal proceed-
ings. In re Sawyer, 200.

7. A court of equity has no jurisdiction of a bill to restrain the removal
of a public officer. Ib.

8. Under the act of August 18, 1856, 11 Stat. 118, c. 163, the cestuis que
trust under a will devising real estate in the District of Columbia to
trustees, with limitation over, filed a bill in equity in the Supreme
Court of the District praying for a sale of a portion of the lands held
in trust, in order that the sums received from the sale might be applied
to the improvement of the remainder. Such proceedings were had
therein that a trustee was appointed by the court to make the sale as
prayed for, and a sale was made by him to J. M., husband of one of
the cestuis que trust, for the sum of $24,521.50. He gave his promissory
notes to the trustee so appointed for this sum, and the sale was ratified
and confirmed by the court. J. M. then sold the tract thus sold to him,
to the District of Columbia as a site for a market, and received in pay-
ment thereof market bonds of the District, of the nominal value of
$27,350, from which he realized $22,700. Instead of paying the sum
derived from the sale of these bonds to the trustee in part payment of
his note, and to be applied to the improvement of the remainder as
prayed for in the bill, J. M. applied it directly to such improvement.
The District of Columbia then filed its petition in the cause, setting
forth the facts, and praying that, as the proceeds of the bonds had in
fact been applied, although irregularly, to the improvement as con-
templated, an account might be taken of the amount so expended, and

J. M.'s notes be cancelled as paid, and the trustee ordered to convey
directly to the District. Held, that the District had an equity which
entitled it to have the $22,700 credited on J. M.'s notes in the hands
of the trustee, and a further equity on payment to the trustee of the
balance of the agreed price, to have those notes cancelled, and to have
a conveyance of title from the trustee, discharged of all lien on account
of unpaid purchase money, and that no resale would be ordered until
there should be a default by the District in making the additional pay-
ment within some reasonable time to be fixed by the court.
of Columbia v. McBlair, 320.

District

1. On the proof in this case the court holds that Coddington, from whom
appellant bought the bonds which form the subject matter of the suit,
took them with knowledge of such facts as would prevent him from
acquiring any title by purchase which he could enforce, as a bona fide
holder, against the Florida Central Railroad Company, one of the
appellees herein; and that appellant as purchaser of the bonds occu-
pies no better position than Coddington. Trask v. Jacksonville &c.
Railroad Co., 515.

2. An estoppel cannot apply in this case to the State or to its successor in
title. Hoboken v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 656.

See JUDGMENT, 1,

2;

LOCAL LAW, 6;

PUBLIC LAND, 3 (3), (6);
WASHINGTON AQUEDUCT.

EXCEPTION.

A general exception to a refusal to charge a series of propositions, as a
whole, is bad, if any one of the series is objectionable. Union Ins. Co.
v. Smith, 405.

EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.

On a consideration of all the proof in this case the court holds (1) That
Boyd was a party to the proceedings which resulted in his removal
from his office as executor; and (2) that there is no reason to reverse
the decree of the court below on the merits. Boyd v. Wyly, 98.

EVIDENCE.

1. Expert testimony as to whether, under the circumstances, it was the
exercise of good seamanship and prudence to attempt to have the vessel
towed to Cleveland, was competent. Union Ins. Co. v. Smith, 405.
2. The question of the competency of the particular witnesses to testify as
experts, considered. Ib.

3. The weight of the evidence of each witness was a question for the jury,

in view of the testimony of each as to his experience. Ib.

4. It was not improper to refuse to allow the defendant to ask a witness
what talk he had with the master of the tug, after she was taken in
tow, in regard to the leak, or what should be done, it not being stated
what it was proposed to prove, and it not appearing that the statement
of the master ought to be regarded as part of the res gestae. Ib.

See ASSUMPSIT;

PRESUMPTION.

FEME COVERT.

See LOCAL LAW, 8.

FLORIDA LAND GRANT.

See PRACTICE, 3.

FRAUD.

See CONTRACT, 2 (1);
EQUITY, 2, 3.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.

1. In a suit in equity by an assignee in bankruptcy to set aside transfers
of land by the bankrupt, alleged to have been made in fraud of his
creditors, this court held that the allegations of the bill were not estab-
lished. Norton v. Hood, 20.

2. In a suit in equity by an assignee in bankruptcy to set aside a fraudulent
transfer of the bankrupt's assets, this court agrees with the court below
that the evidence shows that the transferee had no valuable pecuniary
interest in the transferred property, and that the transfer was made to
prevent it from coming into the hands of the assignee in bankruptcy.
Vetterlein v. Barnes, 169.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

1. In order to take an alleged contract of sale out of the operation of the
statute of frauds there must be acts of such a character as to place the
property unequivocally within the power and under the exclusive do-
minion of the buyer, as absolute owner, discharged of all lien for the
price. Hinchman v. Lincoln, 38.

2. Where, by the terms of the contract, a sale is to be for cash, or any
other condition precedent to the buyer's acquiring title in the goods
be imposed, or the goods be at the time of the alleged receipt not fitted
for delivery according to the contract, or anything remain to be done
by the seller to perfect the delivery, such fact will be generally conclu-
sive that there was no receipt by the buyer. Ib.

3. The receipt and acceptance by the vendee under a verbal agreement,
otherwise void by the statute of frauds, may be complete, although
the terms of the contract are in dispute. Ib.

4. In this case, on the facts recited in the opinion of the court, the court
held, (1) that there was sufficient evidence of a verbal agreement be-
tween the parties for the sale of the securities at the price named;
(2) that the delivery of the property by the plaintiff was not such a
delivery of it to the defendant as to amount to a receipt and accept-
ance of it by him, satisfying the statute of frauds; and (3) that that
inchoate and complete delivery was not made perfect by the subse-
quent acts of the parties. Ib.

See COURT AND JURY, 2, 3, 4.

GARNISHMENT.

See ATTACHMENT.

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS.

See TREASURY SETTLEMENTS.

HABEAS CORPUS.

See CHINESE.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

See TREATY.

HOMESTEAD.

See LOCAL LAW, 8.

ILLINOIS.

See LOCAL LAW, 8.

INDICTMENT.

1. In an indictment for committing an offence against a statute, the offence
may be described in the general language of the act, but the descrip-
tion must be accompanied by a statement of all the particulars essen-
tial to constitute the offence or crime, and to acquaint the accused
with what he must meet on trial. United States v. Hess, 483.

2. A count in an indictment under Rev. Stat. § 5480, which charges that
the defendant, "having devised a scheme to defraud divers other per-
sons to the jurors unknown, which scheme he" "intended to effect by
inciting such other persons to open communication with him" " "by
means of the post-office establishment of the United States, and did
unlawfully, in attempting to execute said scheme, receive from the
post-office" "a certain letter" (setting it forth), "addressed and
directed" (setting it forth), "against the peace," &c., does not suffi-
ciently describe an offence within that section, because it does not
state the particulars of the alleged scheme to defraud; such particu-
lars being matters of substance, and not of form, and their omission
not being cured by a verdict of guilty. Ib.

INSOLVENCY.

See CONTRACT, 3.

INSURANCE.

1. A time policy of marine insurance on a steam tug to be employed on
the Lakes, insured her against the perils of the Lakes, excepting perils
"consequent upon and arising from or caused by" "incompetency of the
master" "or want of ordinary care and skill in navigating said ves-
sel, rottenness, inherent defects," "and all other unseaworthiness."
While towing vessels in Lake Huron, in July, her shaft was broken,
causing a leak at her stern. The leak was so far stopped that by
moderate pumping she was kept free from water. She was taken in
tow and carried by Port Huron and Detroit and into Lake Erie on a
destination to Cleveland, where she belonged and her owner lived.
She sprang a leak in Lake Erie, and sank, and was abandoned to
the insurer. On the trial of a suit on the policy, it was claimed by
the defendant that the accident made the vessel unseaworthy, and the
failure to repair her at Port Huron or Detroit avoided the policy. The
court charged the jury that if an ordinarily prudent master would have
deemed it necessary to repair her before proceeding, and if her loss
was occasioned by the omission to do so, the plaintiff was not entitled
to recover; but if, from the character of the injury and the leak, a
master of competent judgment might reasonably have supposed, in the
exercise of ordinary care, that she was seaworthy to be towed to Cleve-
land, and therefore omitted to repair her, such omission was no bar to
a recovery. Held, that there was no error in the charge. Union Ins.
Co. v. Smith, 405.

2. The defendant having set up, in its answer, that the loss was occasioned
by want of ordinary care in managing the tug at the time she sprang
a leak in Lake Erie, and having attempted to prove such defence,
it was not error to charge the jury that such want of ordinary care
must be shown by a fair preponderance of proof on the part of the
defendant. Ib.

See EVIDENCE, 1, 4.

INTERNAL REVENUE.

Under § 3220 of the Revised Statutes, the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue is authorized to pay to the plaintiff in a judgment recovered against
a collector of internal revenue, for damages for a seizure of property
for an alleged violation of the internal revenue laws, made by the col-
lector under the direction of a revenue agent connected with the office
of the supervisor of internal revenue, the amount of such judgment,
and is not restricted to the payment of such amount to the collector.
United States v. Frerichs, 315.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2.