1. The entry of final judgment on demurrer concludes the parties to it, by
way of estoppel, in a subsequent action between the same parties on a
different claim, so far as the new controversy relates to the matters
litigated and determined in the prior action. Bissell v. Spring Valley
Township, 225.
2. A final judgment for defendant in an action against a municipal corpo-
ration to recover on coupons attached to bonds purporting to have been
issued by the corporation, entered on demurrer to an answer setting
up facts showing that the bonds were never executed by the munici-
pality, concludes the plaintiff in a subsequent action against the muni-
cipality to recover on other coupons cut from the same bonds. lb.
3. The omission of the word "dollars," in a verdict for the plaintiff in an
action of assumpsit, does not affect the validity of a judgment thereon.
Hopkins v. Orr, 510.
4. Under a statute authorizing an appellate court "to examine the record,
and, on the facts therein contained alone, award a new trial, reverse or
affirm the judgment, or give such other judgment as to it shall seem
agreeable to law," a judgment on a general verdict may be affirmed, if
the evidence in the record supports any count in the declaration. Ib.
5. Under a statute requiring an appellant to give bond, with sureties, to
prosecute his appeal to a decision in the appellate court, and to per-
form the judgment appealed from, if affirmed; and enacting that if
the judgment of the appellate court be against the appellant, it shall
be rendered against him and his sureties; a judgment of the appellate
court, affirming a judgment below for a sum of money and interest,
upon the appellee's remitting part of the interest, may be rendered
against the sureties, as well as against the appellant. Ib.
See COURT OF CLAIMS;
LOCAL LAW, 1.
JURISDICTION.
See PRESUMPTION, 1.
A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
1. In an action at law in a Circuit Court of the United States in New
York an order was made, referring the action to a referee "to deter-
mine the issues therein." He filed his report finding facts and conclu-
sions of law, and directing that there be a money judgment for the
plaintiff. The defendant applied to the court for a new trial on a
case and exceptions," in which he excepted to three of the conclu-
sions of law. The court denied the application and directed that
judgment be entered "pursuant to the report of the referee," which
was done. On a writ of error from this court: Held, that the only
questions open to review here were, whether there was any error of
law in the judgment, on the facts found by the referee; and that, as
the case had not been tried by the Circuit Court on a filing of a
waiver in writing of a trial by jury, this court could not review any
exceptions to the admission or exclusion of evidence, or any excep-
tions to findings of fact by the referee, or to his refusal to find facts as
requested. Roberts v. Benjamin, 64.
2. Rulings of a Circuit Court at the trial of an action at law without a
jury where there had been no waiver of a jury by stipulation in writ-
ing signed by the parties or their attorneys, and filed with the clerk, as
required by § 649 Rev. Stat., are not reviewable here. Dundee Mort-
gage Co. v. Hughes, 157.
3. If a Circuit Court of the United States, in granting a motion to remand
a cause to the state court, has not before it, by mistake, the complaint
in the action, it is within the discretion of that court, upon a showing
to that effect, to grant a rehearing; but this court has no power to re-
quire that court by mandamus to do so. In re Sherman, 364.
4. An injunction restraining the prosecution of an action of replevin in a
court established under the authority of the United States involves of
itself no question of the validity of an authority exercised under the
United States. In re Craft, 370.
5. When the highest appellate court of a State disposes of a question sup-
posed to arise under the Constitution of the United States without a
direct decision, and in a way that is decisive of it, and which is not
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and upon a ground
which was not evasive, but real, then the decision of the alleged fed-
eral question was not necessary to the judgment rendered, and conse-
quently this court has no jurisdiction over the judgment. Brooks v.
Missouri, 394.
6. The case is dismissed for want of jurisdiction as the record fails to
show, expressly or by implication, that any right, title, privilege, or
immunity under the Constitution or laws of the United States was
specially set up or claimed in either of the courts below. French v.
Hopkins, 523.
7. The jurisdiction of this court under Rev. Stat. § 709, for the review of
the decision of the highest court of a State is not dependent upon the
citizenship of the parties. Ib.
8. An adjudication by the highest court of a State that certain proceedings
before a Mexican tribunal prior to the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
were insufficient to effect a partition of a tract of land before that time
granted by the Mexican Government to three persons who were part-
ners, which grant was confirmed by commissioners appointed under
the provisions of the act of March 3, 1851, 9 Stat. 631, "to ascertain
and settle the private land claims in the State of California," presents
no federal question which is subject to review here. Phillips v. Mound
City Association, 605.
9. When a cause is brought here by writ of error to a state court, on the
ground that the obligation of a contract has been impaired and prop-
erty taken for public use without due compensation, in violation of the
provisions of the Constitution of the United States, the first duty of
this court is to inquire whether the alleged contract or taking of prop-
erty exists; and the facts in this record disclose no trace of the
alleged contract or the alleged taking of property. Hoadley v. San
Francisco, 639.
See APPEAL, 2, 3, 4, 5;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1;
COURT OF CLAIMS.
B. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. A court of the United States, sitting as a court of law, has an equitable
power over its own process to prevent abuse, oppression, and injustice;
which power may be invoked by a stranger to the litigation as incident
to the jurisdiction already vested, and without regard to his own
citizenship. Gumbel v. Pitkin, 131.
2. The exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon Circuit Courts of the
United States by Rev. Stat. § 915 to administer the attachment laws of
the State in which the court is held, necessarily draws to itself every-
thing properly incidental, even though it may bring into the court, for
the adjudication of their rights, parties not otherwise subject to its
jurisdiction; and is ample to sanction the practice of permitting the
constructive levy, by attaching creditors under state process, upon
property in possession of a United States marshal by virtue of an
attachment made under a process from a Circuit Court of the United
States for the same district, and their intervention in proceedings in
the latter court where, as between state courts of concurrent jurisdic-
tion, a similar method of acquiring and adjusting conflicting rights is
prescribed. Ib.
3. The Circuit Court of the United States has no jurisdiction or authority
to entertain a bill in equity to restrain the mayor and committee of a
city in Nebraska from removing a city officer upon charges filed
against him for malfeasance in office; and an injunction issued upon
such a bill, as well as an order committing the defendants for con-
tempt in disregarding the injunction, is absolutely void, and they are
entitled to be discharged on habeas corpus. In re Sawyer, 200.
4. A suit to enforce the performance of a contract is a suit to recover the
contents of a chose in action, within the meaning of § 629 of the
Revised Statutes. Shoecraft v. Bloxham, 730.
5. A deed of trust, in the nature of a mortgage, set out in full a contract
between the mortgagor and certain parties for the conveyance of sev-
eral parcels of land to him, and then conveyed to the mortgagee all
the right, title, and interest which he, the mortgagor, had, or might
thereafter acquire, "in and to" the lands embraced by the contract:
Held, that the conveyance was in legal effect an assignment of the
contract; and that the assignee could not maintain a suit for the
enforcement of this contract in the Circuit Court of the United States,
under § 629 of the Revised Statutes, if the assignor could not have
maintained the suit in such Circuit Court if no assignment had been
made. lb.
C. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
See COURT OF CLAIMS.
LACHES.
See EQUITY, 4, 5.
LIMITATION, STATUTES OF
See LOCAL LAW, 6, 7;
TREASURY SETTLEMENTS.
1. Section 429 of the Code of Nebraska, which provides that when a
judgment or decree shall be rendered in any court of that State for
a conveyance of real estate, and the party against whom it is rendered
does not comply therewith within the time therein named, the judg
ment or decree "shall have the same operation and effect, and be as
available, as if the conveyance" "had been executed conformably to
such judgment or decree" is a valid act; and such a decree or judg-
ment, rendered in the Circuit Court of the United States respecting
real estate in Nebraska operates to transfer title to the real estate
which is the subject of the judgment or decree, upon the failure of the
party ordered to convey to comply with the order. Langdon v. Sher-
wood, 74.
2. An appeal lies to the general term of the Supreme Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia from a denial by that court in special term of a
motion for a new trial, made on the ground that the verdict was
against the weight of evidence. Inland and Seaboard Coasting Co. v.
Hall, 121.
3. A mortgagee, in Louisiana, under an act containing the pact de non
alienando, can proceed against the mortgagor after the latter's expro-
priation through confiscation proceedings, as though he had never
been divested of his title. Shields v. Schiff, 351.
4. The holder of a mortgage upon real estate in Louisiana ordered to be
sold under a decree of confiscation may acquire the life interest of the
mortgagor at the sale, and may possess and enjoy that title during
the lifetime of the mortgagor without extinguishing either the debt
or the security, by reason of confusion as provided by the code of that
State. Ib.
5. The heirs of a person, whose property in Louisiana was sold under a
decree of confiscation, succeed after his death by inheritance from
him, and, being in privity with him, are bound equally with him by
proceedings against him on a mortgage containing the pact de non
alienando. Ib.
6. If a mortgage debtor in Louisiana, in a suit to foreclose a mortgage
containing the pact de non alienando, waives the benefit of prescription,
those who take from him are estopped from pressing it as effectually
as he is estopped. Ib.
7. In Nebraska the cause of action upon a county warrant issued by a
board of county commissioners does not accrue when the warrant is
presented for payment and indorsed "not paid for want of funds,"
but at a later date when the money for its payment is collected or
when sufficient time has elapsed for the collection of the money; and
as matter of law it cannot be said that about two years is such a
"sufficient time," so as to cause the statute of limitations to begin to
run. King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 459.
8. An ante-nuptial settlement was executed prior to 1867, by which J. M.
conveyed to his brother T. M., land in Illinois, in trust for his in-
tended wife, for her life, and in case of her death leaving a child or
children, to such child or children, and in case of her death without a
child, then to S. M. and O. L. for life, with remainder to J. M. and
his heirs. In May, 1867, J. M., S. M., and O. L. joined in conveying
the premises to the wife for the purpose of determining the trust and
vesting their respective rights under the settlement in her absolutely.
In 1872 J. M. and the wife joined in a trust deed of the premises, in
the nature of a mortgage, to secure the payment of a debt of the hus-
band. The trust deed purported to be acknowledged by the husband
and wife; but after foreclosure and sale, the husband and wife, being
in possession of the premises, set up as against the purchaser, that the
wife had never acknowledged it, and that by reason thereof she had
never parted with the homestead right in the premises secured to her
by the law of Illinois. The purchaser filed this bill in equity, to have
the wife's homestead right set off to her on a division, or, if the prop-
erty was incapable of division, to have it discharged of it on the pay-
ment into court of $1000. Held: (1) That, without deciding the
effect of the birth of a child, after the deed of May, 1867, as a
restraint upon
the alienation of the fee, the trust deed of 1872, under
the Illinois statute of March 27, 1869, respecting deeds of femes covert,
operated to convey the life estate of the wife to the grantee, and that
no acknowledgment was necessary to its validity; (2) That, the mas-
ter having reported that the property could not be divided, the com-
plainant was entitled to the possession of the whole premises, under
the laws of Illinois, upon payment into court of $1000. Knight v.
Paxton, 552.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2;
RIPARIAN RIGHTS.
|