heretofore announced, and reported 123 U. S. 335. United States v.
Morant, 647.
See APPEAL 2, 3, 4, 5;
JURISDICTION, A, 1; B, 1;
SUBMISSION OF A CAUSE.
1. There is no legal presumption in favor of jurisdiction in proceedings
not according to the common course of justice; but the policy of the
law requires the facts conferring it to be proved by direct evidence of
a formal character. Sabariego v. Maverick, 261.
2. The facts that Spanish public officers seized a tract of land in Mexico
as confiscated for the treason of its owner, and that after taking regular
and appropriate steps for its sale they proceeded to sell it and to make
conveyance of it by instruments reciting these facts and accompanied
by certificates of the officers who took part in the transaction that the
property had been so confiscated, raise no presumption, under the law
of any civilized State, that any judicial proceedings were taken against
the owner to find him guilty of treason or to confiscate his property
for that offence. Ib.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.
See JUDGMENT, 5;
NATIONAL BANK.
PRO FORMA JUDGMENT.
See COURT OF CLAIMS.
1. Under the provision of the act of July 31, 1876, c. 246, 19 Stat. 121, “that
before any land granted to any railroad company by the United States
shall be conveyed to such company, or any person entitled thereto
under any of the acts incorporating or relating to such company, unless
such company is exempted by law from the payment of such cost, there
shall first be paid into the Treasury of the United States, the cost of
surveying, selecting and conveying the same by the said company or
persons in interest," the New Orleans Pacific Railway Company, as the
owner, by conveyance from the New Orleans, Baton Rouge and Vicks-
burg Railroad Company, of its interest in the land grant made to the
latter company by § 22 of the act of March 3, 1871, c. 122, 16 Stat. 579,
was bound to pay the cost of surveying the land, before receiving a
patent for it, although such cost had been incurred and expended by
the United States before March 3, 1871, the construction of no part of
the road having been commenced before the expiration of the five
VOL. CXXIV-49
years limited for the completion of the whole of it. New Orleans Pacific
Railway Co. v. United States, 124.
2. A applied at a public land office for a S.E. section of land. By mis-
take the register in the application described it as the S.W., and A
signed the application so written, but the entry in the plat and tract
books showed that he had bought and paid for the S.E. . He imme-
diately went into possession of the S.E., and he and those under him
remained in undisputed possession of it for more than 35 years. About
22 years after his entry some person without authority of law changed
the entry on the plat and tract books, and made it to show that his
purchase was of the S. W. instead of the S.E. 4, thus showing two
entries of the S.W. . W., then, with full knowledge of all these facts,
located agricultural scrip on this S.E. . S., or those claiming under
him, did not discover the mistake until after W. had got his patent.
Held, that W. was a purchaser in bad faith, and that his legal title,
though good as against the United States, was subject to the superior
equities of S. and of those claiming under him. Widdicombe v.
Childers, 400.
3. In March, 1848, A S and E S, his wife, settled upon a tract of public
land in what was then the Territory of Oregon, and is now Washing-
ton Territory, and from thenceforward continued to reside upon it,
and cultivated it for four years as required by the act of September 27,
1850, 9 Stat. 496, c. 76. After completing the required term of culti-
vation, A S died intestate in January, 1853. In October, 1853, E S,
assuming to act under the amendatory act of February 14, 1853, filed
with the Surveyor General of the Territory, proof of the required resi-
dence and cultivation by her deceased husband. In 1855 or 1856 the
heirs and the widow agreed upon a partition, she taking the east half
and they the west half. In 1856 the Probate Court made partition
of the west half among the heirs, and, one of them being a minor,
appointed a guardian to represent him, and directed the guardian to
sell, by public auction, the tract allotted to his ward in the partition.
In accordance therewith the guardian made such sale, and executed
and delivered a deed of the property to N S, the purchaser, who entered
into possession of the tract, and made valuable improvements on it,
and from that time on paid the taxes upon it. In May, 1860, the map
of the public survey, showing this donation claim, was approved, and
in June, 1860, final proof of the settlement and cultivation by A S was
made. In June, 1862, E S died. In July, 1874, the donation certificate
was issued, assigning the west half to A S, and the east half to E S, and
in 1877, under the provisions of Rev. Stat. § 2448 a patent was issued
accordingly, notwithstanding the deaths of the parties. Some years
afterwards the heirs of A S and E S sold and conveyed to J B their
interest in the land so sold to N S. J B thereupon brought this action
against N S for possession of it. Held: (1) That before the act of
February 14, 1853, the settler not being required to give notice in
advance of the public survey, A S was not in fault for not having given
such notice during his lifetime; (2) That, as the law contemplated that
when a joint settlement had been made by two, the benefit of the dona-
tion, in case of the death of either, should be secured to the heirs, the
notice given by the widow in October, 1853, was sufficient to secure the
donation claim in its entirety; (3) That the heirs of A S and their
privies in estate were estopped, as against N S, to deny that A S resided
on the tract and cultivated it, and that his widow and children were at
the date of his death entitled, under the statute, to the donation land
claim; (4) That the widow and the heirs having agreed to a division
among themselves, other persons could not complain of the arrange-
ment if the Surveyor General afterwards conformed to their wishes in
this respect; (5) That the proceedings in the Probate Court were war-
ranted by the laws of Oregon in force at that time; (6) That the
minor having made no objection to those proceedings for eleven years
after coming of age, and not having indicated an intention to disa-
vow the sale until the property had greatly increased in value, his
course was equivalent to an express affirmance of the proceedings,
even if they were affected with such irregularities as, upon his prompt
application after coming of age, would have justified the court in set-
ting them aside. Brazee v. Schofield, 495.
See EJECTMENT;
MINERAL LAND;
SAN FRANCISCO.
1. In this case the court holds that the petition for the removal of the
cause to the Circuit Court of the United States was presented too
late. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co. v. Burns, 165.
2. The proceeding, authorized by the statutes of Colorado, for condemning
land to public use for school purposes, is a suit at law, within the
meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and the acts of
Congress conferring jurisdiction upon the courts of the United States,
which may be removed into a Circuit Court of the United States from
a state court. Searl v. School District No. 2, 197.
REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICERS.
See EQUITY, 7;
JURISDICTION, B, 3.
1. The title of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company to its lands in contro-
versy, derived by grant from the Hoboken Land and Improvement
Company, was confirmed and enlarged by the act of the legislature of
New Jersey of March 31, 1869, "to enable the United Companies to
improve lands under water at Kill von Kull and other places," and the
title of the other defendants to their lands in controversy, also derived
by grant from said Hoboken Company, was enlarged and confirmed by
grants from the State, under the riparian acts of the legislature of the
same 31st March; and thus all these titles are materially distinguished
from the title of the Hoboken Land and Improvement Company, (de-
rived only through § 4 of its charter,) which was the subject of the
decision of the highest court of the State of New Jersey in Hoboken
Land and Improvement Co. v. Hoboken, 7 Vroom, (36 N. J. Law,) 540.
Hoboken v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 656.
2. The act of the legislature of New Jersey of March 31, 1869, “to enable
the United Companies to improve lands under water at Kill von Kull
and other places " embraced but one object, and sufficiently indicated
that object in its title, viz.: that it was intended to apply to the lands
of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company in controversy in these actions;
and thus it complied with the requirements of the constitution of New
Jersey respecting titles to statutes. Ib.
3. By the laws of New Jersey lands below high-water mark on navigable
waters are the absolute property of the State, subject only to the power
conferred upon Congress to regulate foreign commerce and commerce
among the States, and they may be granted by the State, either to the
riparian proprietor, or to a stranger, as the State sees fit. Ib.
4. The grant by the State of New Jersey to the United Companies by the
act of March 31, 1869, under which the Pennsylvania Railroad Com-
pany claims, and the grants under the general riparian act of the same
date under which the other defendants claim, were intended to secure,
and do secure, to the respective grantees the whole beneficial interest
in their respective properties, for their exclusive use for the purposes
expressed in the grants. Ib.
5. Any easement which the public may have in New Jersey to pass over
lands redeemed by filling in below high-water mark in order to reach
navigable waters, is subordinate to the right of the State to grant the
lands discharged of the supposed easement. Ib.
6. A riparian proprietor in New Jersey has no power to create an easement
for the public over lands below high-water mark, as against the State
and those claiming under it; and if he attempts to do it, and then
conveys to another person all his right to reclaim the land under water
fronting his property, his grantee may acquire from the State the title
to such land discharged of the supposed easement. Ib.
7. The title of a grantee under the riparian acts of New Jersey differs in
every respect from that of a riparian owner to the alluvial accretions
made by the changes in a shifting stream which constitutes the bound-
ary of his possessions. Ib.
8. The defendants in error hold the exclusive possession of the premises in
controversy against the adverse claim of the plaintiff to any easement
by virtue of the original dedication of the streets to high-water mark
on the Loss map. Ib.
See PRACTICE, 1;
SUBMISSION OF A CAUSE.
1. Upon the statutes of the United States which are considered at length
in the opinion of the court, Held: That no obligation rests upon the
Postmaster General to readjust the salaries of postmasters oftener than
once in two years; that such readjustment, when it takes place, estab-
lishes the amount of the salary prospectively for two years; but that a
discretion rests with the Postmaster General to make a more frequent
readjustment, when cases of hardship seem to require it. McLean v.
Vilas, 86.
2. Claimant was a private in the Marine Corps, and one of the marines
who composed the organization known as the Marine Band. He per-
formed on the Capitol grounds and on the President's grounds under
proper order.
Held, that he was entitled to the additional pay pro-
vided for by Rev. Stat. § 1613. United States v. Bond, 301.
3. Seventy-five per cent of forty-five hundred dollars is the maximum pay
to which an officer of the Army of the United States placed on the
retired list as a colonel is entitled. Marshall v. United States, 391.
See PAYMASTER'S CLERK.
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1. The act of Congress of July 1, 1864, 13 Stat. 332, c. 194, taken in con-
nection with the ordinances of the city of San Francisco and the act
of the legislature of California which it refers to, operated to convey
to the city the land occupied by the squares known as "Alta Plaza"
and Hamilton Square" for the uses and purposes specified in the
ordinances, and to dedicate the tracts to public use as squares, and
made it unlawful for the city to convey the same to any private par-
ties; and the conveyance did not in any way inure to the benefit of
the plaintiff in error. Hoadley v. San Francisco, 639.
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