The following is Goeler's statement (p. 82) of the whole force of Pompeius in the battle : 1. Legionary soldiers in the battle 45,000 2. Legionary soldiers in the camp and forts 3,000 6. Auxiliary troops, number not known. Appian (B. C. ii. 70) in stating the number on both sides says that writers did not agree about them, and that he followed the best Roman authorities; but he does not mention Caesar. Appian says that his authorities make no mention of the number of the auxiliary troops on each side, as they reckoned them of no use. According to the most trustworthy authorities, he adds, on both sides 70,000 Italians were in the battle; or less than 60,000, as some say. Others exaggerated the whole number to 400,000; which is absurd, for how could these two skilful commanders encumber themselves with so many useless men, whom they could not feed? Pompeius had with him besides most of the Greeks, men from nearly all parts of the Mediterranean coast to the east, even Hebrews and Arabs; Deiotarus also the tetrarch of the eastern Galatians, and Ariarathes king of the Cappadocians, but Appian ought to have said Ariobarzanes; Armenians west of the Euphrates under Taxiles, and Armenians from beyond the Euphrates under Megabates, a satrap of king Artapes, as Appian names him. This rabble must have come with Scipio from the east, and the fact explains a passage in Caesar (B. C. iii. 81) where he speaks of Scipio occupying Larisa with large armies (magnis exercitibus). Appian (B. C. ii. 75) describes the auxiliaries of Pompeius as consisting of many tongues, but his auxiliaries and Caesar's also were only used for show. Pompeius placed the Macedonians, and Peloponnesians and Boeotians left in the camp and forts, and the fifteen at Dyrrhachium, he obtains one hundred and ten cohorts, the number which Caesar gives. and Athenians, who were accustomed to discipline and could keep silent, on a line with his Italian troops, but the rest he placed apart according to their tribes to look on, and when the battle was begun to get round the enemy and to pursue and to seize Caesar's camp. These facts will help to explain the dreadful confusion and loss on the side of Pompeius, who must have known that this motley force of auxiliaries could do no good, and might only make a defeat worse. Caesar, observing his former practice, placed on the right his favourite tenth legion, and on the left he placed the ninth, which had been greatly diminished in the fights at Dyrrhachium, but he joined to it the eighth legion, and out of the two made nearly one complete legion, each part of which was ordered to support the other. He had seventy-five cohorts' in line of battle which contained 22,000 men, and two cohorts were left to protect the camp. M. Antonius commanded the left wing, P. Sulla the right, and Cn. Domitius Calvinus was in the centre. Caesar stood opposite to Pompeius. As soon as he saw the order of Pompeius' battle, being afraid that the right wing might be turned by the enemy's numerous cavalry, he drew six cohorts (c. 89, 93), one from the third line of each of the six legions, for the junction of the ninth and eighth legions reduced the number of seven legions practically to six, and made of these six cohorts a fourth line or a reserve, which he opposed to the enemy's cavalry, and he told them that the victory depended on their courage. The six cohorts were 5 4 Kraner remarks that Caesar had ten legions, six of which he brought over the sea, and M. Antonius (iii. c. 29) brought over four more; in all he had a hundred cohorts. He had left eight cohorts at Apollonia, Oricum and Lissus; fifteen had been sent into Achaia, and two were left in the camp. Accordingly there were seventy-five in the battle. Appian (B. C. ii. 70) estimates Caesar's force in the battle at 22,000, and his cavalry at about 1000. He estimates Pompeius' force at more than twice this number, the cavalry included, which was 7000. Plutarch (Caesar, c. 42, Pompeius, c. 69) has the same numbers. Orosius (vi. 15) makes the number of Caesar's cohorts eighty, and so it is in Oudendorp's text of Caesar, which Goeler has followed. Caesar's auxiliary troops (Appian, B. C. ii. 70) were Gallic horsemen, and some from Gallia Cisalpina, and lightarmed Greeks, Dolopes, Acarnanians and Aetolians. Appian dees not here speak of the Germans, who, as he has told us, got drunk at the sack of Gomphi. 5 Frontinus, Strat. ii. 3. 22, mentions these six cohorts; and Lucan, vii. 521, speaks of this reserve. placed behind the right wing, where Caesar's cavalry also was, but he has not mentioned this fact. The third line and the army generally were directed not to make the onset without his orders: when the time came, he would give the signal by hoisting the purple flag (vexillum). Caesar according to military usage encouraged his men to battle and while speaking of his uninterrupted care of the army, especially reminded them that they were witnesses to the eagerness with which he had sought peace, to what he had attempted in the conference through Vatinius, his negotiations with Scipio through A. Clodius and to his urgent request at Oricum to Libo about sending commissioners to Pompeius. He said that he had always tried to spare the blood of his soldiers and to save for the republic one of the armies. After this address his soldiers showed their eagerness for battle and he gave the signal with the trumpet." There was in Caesar's army an Evocatus, named Crastinus, who in the previous year had been first centurion in the tenth legion, a man of unusual courage. When the signal was given, he said, " Follow me you who have been of my company (manipulares mei), and render to your commander the service which you owe. We have only one battle more, and then he will recover his proper dignity and we shall have our freedom." At the same time turning to Caesar he said, " General, I shall have your thanks to-day either living or dead." With these words he sprang forward before the rest from the right wing, followed by about a hundred and twenty volunteers, picked soldiers of the first century (c. 91). Between the two lines there was only room enough for both armies to make the charge. Pompeius however had given orders to his men to wait for Caesar's attack; and this, it is said, was done by the advice of C. Triarius (B. C. iii. 5, 92). The design of Pompeius was to allow the force of the first rush of the enemy and the strength of Caesar's soldiers to be weakened, and the line to be thrown into disorder, so that his own men keeping their ranks should attack the enemy who would be dispersed. 6 Appian (B. C. ii. 78) says that Pompeius, seeing that the delay disturbed his auxiliaries, and fearing that they might set the example of disorder before the fight began, gave the signal first, and Caesar followed. He also expected that the javelins (pila) of the enemy would fall with less force, if his men held their ground, than if they should meet the discharge of these missiles; and further, that Caesar's men having double the distance to run would be out of breath and exhausted. But Caesar says that in his opinion Pompeius had no good reason for giving such orders; for every man naturally has a certain mental excitement and readiness, which are roused by the ardour for battle, and a commander ought to encourage and not to repress these feelings. Accordingly from ancient times it had been the Roman practice for the signals to be made through the army by the trumpets and for the men to give a universal shout, by which it was supposed that the enemy would be terrified and the Romans encouraged.' As soon as the signal was given, Caesar's men rushed forward; but when they saw that the enemy did not stir, they halted without the word of command about half way, that they might not come to close quarters with their strength exhausted. After a short pause they renewed the charge, threw the javelins (pila), and quickly, according to Caesar's orders, drew the sword. The soldiers of Pompeius received the discharge of the missiles, stood the onset of the legions, maintained their ranks, and after throwing their javelins took to the sword. At the same time the cavalry of Pompeius, following orders, sprang forward in one mass from the left wing, and all the archers spread themselves out. Caesar's cavalry did not stand the attack, but gradually gave way, which 7 "A ringing cheer is inseparable from charging. I do not believe it possible to get a line in action to charge in silence; and were it possible, the general who would deprive himself of the moral assistance it gives the assailants, would be an idiot. It encourages, lends nerve and confidence to an assailant: its very clamour makes men feel their strength as they realize the numbers that are charging with them. Nothing serves more to strike terror into a force that is charged than a loud ringing cheer bespeaking confidence. It doubtless brings with it a certain amount of disorder, but that is an unavoidable attendant upon the meeting of two hostile forces.-To await in the open an advancing enemy and depend upon driving him back by your fire, is to court danger."—Colonel Wolseley's Soldier's Pocket Book, p. 249. Plutarch (Caesar, c. 44) quotes Caesar's opinion about the order of Pompeius, and Appian (B. C. ii. 79) also; but Appian refers to Caesar's Letters as if there was a collection of them, and does not refer to the Books of the Civil War. caused the enemy's cavalry to press them more vigorously, and to deploy in squadrons and surround Caesar's right flank which was exposed. As soon as Caesar saw this, he gave the signal to the six cohorts which formed his reserve, who made so furious an assault on the cavalry of Pompeius that not a single man stood his ground, and the whole body turning round quitted the field and in hasty flight made for the highest part of the hills. When the cavalry were routed, all the archers and slingers being unprotected were cut down. The six cohorts kept up their impetuous attack, and as the infantry of Pompeius on his left wing still fought and resisted, they turned this flank and attacked them in the rear." At this critical time, while Caesar's first and second lines. were engaged with the enemy, he ordered the third line which had stood still (c. 94) to advance to the attack; which it might do by passing between the intervals, which as usual were left between the cohorts of the first and second line. Thus these fresh troops relieved those who were exhausted, while others were falling on the enemy in the rear, and the men of Pompeius being unable to resist any longer, turned round and took to flight. Caesar then was not mistaken when he said, as he had done when he addressed his men, that the way to victory would be shown by the six cohorts, which had been placed in the fourth line; for it was they who in the first place repulsed the cavalry, it was they who slaughtered the archers and slingers, and got on the rear of the enemy's left wing and made their adversaries take to flight." 8 Goeler (p. 89) says, "the reserve or fourth line marched forward in column and then turned to the right, so that their front being at right angles to the line of the other troops of Caesar, would cover the right flank which was threatened by the cavalry of Pompeius." Goeler adds in a note that Caesar does not describe correctly the position taken up by the reserve, but that his own explanation agrees with the other circumstances of the battle. Lucan, he says, (vii. 521,) gives a hint of the position of the reserve:— "Tum Caesar metuens ne frons sibi prima labaret, This strange circumstance of a few infantry, supported, we must suppose, by |