the eastern and western sides the walls follow the steep slope of the mountain. The northern walls at the base of the triangle are not much elevated above the plain. The eastern walls are separated by a deep ravine from another mountain similar to that of Pharsalus. It was on the northern side of this mountain that the camp of Pompeius was situated." But there is nothing in the walls which furnishes an infallible testimony. If the camp of Pompeius was on this northern side, it faced the north, and he made his escape from it by the south gate, the Decumana. Leake therefore, as his plan shows, supposes that when the two armies were drawn up along the south bank of the Enipeus, the face of Pompeius was turned to the west, and Caesar's face to the east.

The battle was fought during great heat and continued to midday (B. C. iii. 95), and therefore it began much earlier than midday. Lucan (vii. 214) when he is describing the position of the army of Pompeius writes,

"Miles ut adverso Phoebi radiatus ab ictu

Descendens totos profudit lumine colles,

Non temere immissus campis: stetit ordine certo
Infelix acies."

He therefore supposed that the army of Pompeius faced the
morning sun. On this passage there is a note by Lambertus
Hortensius (ed. Oudendorp), " radiatus: hoc est radiis solaribus
a fronte percussus, quod incommodum non parum obfuit
Pompeio, et aversus sol non mediocriter Caesarem juvit.
Ordinaturus enim aciem tria debet ante prospicere Solem,
Pulverem, et Ventum, juxta praecepta rei militaris."

On the morning when Pompeius offered Caesar an opportunity of fighting, Caesar was just breaking up his camp (B. C. iii. 85) to march towards Scotussa, as Plutarch says (Caesar, c. 68). Leake observes in a note: "This name is supplied by Plutarch: its situation on the map will be found to agree perfectly with the circumstances of the narrative." But Scotussa is not marked on the map which accompanies Leake's essay; nor is it marked on the map which contains a "Delineation of the marches of the contending armies prior to the battle of Pharsalia." However the site of Scotussa is fixed by Leake himself in his Northern Greece. It is north of

the Apidanus (Enipeus), north-east of Pharsalus (Férsala); and in the territory of Scotussa are the hills of Cynoscephalae. Caesar then being a few miles west of the camp of Pompeius was going to cross the Apidanus (Enipeus) in the face of the army of Pompeius in order to reach Scotussa, if Leake's view is correct. Caesar was a daring man and wished to fight, but who will believe that he was going to run this unnecessary risk in the sight of an enemy who was so near and had seven thousand horsemen ?

Leake further says: "Mr. Merivale is at a loss to understand how the army of Pompeius could have effected its retreat in safety to Larisa. What was there to hinder them? The same route by which they came was still open to them: they had begun their retreat before Caesar attacked and took the fortified camp, which attack with its consequences must have occupied some hours. After such a battle the legionaries of Caesar were not in the best condition to begin a long chase, even were it likely that Caesar should have permitted them to do so, after he had issued his command that the adverse legionaries should be spared. It was different with regard to the cohorts, who, when the camp was taken, had ascended the mountain which rises immediately above the position of the Pompeian camp. These cohorts were still in a state of resistance to Caesar; for which reason when he found that they had taken a road to Larisa, which was naturally, for the purpose of avoiding him, somewhat circuitous, there could be nothing more consistent with the other facts, related by him, than that he should have resolved upon endeavouring to intercept them by a more direct line."

Leake asks what was there to hinder a safe retreat to Larisa? Nothing except the impossibility of a defeated army retreating under such circumstances. But there was no

retreat to Larisa even under the more favourable circumstances which existed on the real field of battle north of the Enipeus. When Caesar's third line advanced, the men of Pompeius could resist no longer, and they all turned and fled (B. C. iii. 94). This is what Leake names a retreat, but it

This is only in Appian (B. C. ii. 80), and it is told in an absurd and incredible way, quite inconsistent with Caesar's narrative.

was a disorderly flight, and across a river, if the battle was fought south of the Apidanus (Enipeus). Leake has been led to form his ill-connected theory by mixing up the statements of Appian, a blundering compiler, with the clear description of the battle by the victorious general.

Some time in the year 1856 I received from my friend the late Henry L. Long a letter on the battle of Pharsalia addressed to him by General W. Napier. I made some remarks on it, which were forwarded to General Napier; and there was a letter or two more on the matter. Napier placed the battle on the right bank of the Apidanus (Enipeus), as Goeler does.

Napier's objections to the place for the battle assigned by Leake are these: it seems impossible that a great general like Caesar should allow Pompeius to pass the Apidanus (Enipeus) before him and cut him off from Pharsalus and Scotussa and also from one of the roads to Thermopylae, which endangered Caesar's troops in Greece. It is also impossible that so great a general as Pompeius would pass the Apidanus (Enipeus) in the face of Caesar's army, leaving his own place of arms Larisa open to his enemy: moreover Caesar does not mention Pompeius' passage of the river; he does not indeed mention his own, but there was no need of that: it was part of his march when no enemy was near him.

Napier asks how could Pompeius fly to Larisa by the Decuman gate, if the battle was fought where Leake places it? Caesar's troops were between him and Larisa. Also, how could the flying men of Pompeius cross the Apidanus (Enipeus) and make for Larisa? They would have been cut to pieces before they could cross the river. Napier makes some other objections.

By placing the battle ground on the north side or on the right bank of the Apidanus (Enipeus) Napier finds all difficulties removed. Caesar of course before Pompeius advanced from Larisa would cross the Apidanus (Enipeus) to communicate with Scotussa and other neighbouring places: from his position he also menaced Larisa and covered one road to 3 He was a very accomplished man and a good geographer. He had examined Caesar's campaigns carefully and Alexander's Indian campaign.

Thermopylae. Pompeius would naturally advance from Larisa and "post himself on the mountains overhanging the Apidanus (Enipeus)." Napier places Caesar with Scotussa in his rear and of course his camp faced west. He places the camp of Pompeius facing the east at the foot of some heights which border the Apidanus (Enipeus). He sent with his remarks a plan of the battle field, which exhibited the position of the armies south of the Enipeus according to Leake; and the position of the armies north of the Apidanus (Enipeus) according to his own opinion. I do not know whether he had any authority for the heights marked on this map, except Leake, or whether he added something from conjecture. Goeler's plan (Tafel iii. fig. 1), I assume, is founded on the Austrian survey. Whether it is quite correct, future travellers may determine. There may still be some difficulties about the battle and the pursuit after the battle; but I maintain that the arguments for placing the field north of the Apidanus (Enipeus) cannot be answered, and that the arguments for placing it south of this river are, I would say, almost absurd.

Leake did not examine Caesar's narrative by itself, but he took other evidence as of equal authority with Caesar, and neglected those strategical reasons which must determine the field of battle chosen by two skilful generals. Leake was an excellent geographer and a most honest and laborious inquirer. Every scholar knows how much we are indebted to him. He cannot now defend himself, but others may defend him, if they choose.

:

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE DEATH OF POMPEIUS.

B.C. 48.

DION CASSIUS begins his forty-second book with certain reflections, which are in the style of some modern historians and such as are much approved by some critics. Pompeius, he says, had not provided for the possible case of a defeat, and when it came, there was no longer time to consider what he ought to do. The historian truly remarks that there can be no prudent deliberation when a man is under the influence of fear if he has thought of possible danger before it comes, he is able to drive away fear, but if danger comes first and deliberation follows, fear prevails over prudent counsel. This was the reason then why Pompeius was so helpless; and he might perhaps, if he had exercised sufficient foresight, have soon recovered from his defeat, for many of his soldiers had escaped from the disastrous fight, and he had still great forces at his command. He had also abundance of money, and was master of all the seas.

The historian's speculation about the possibility of Pompeius still making successful resistance, if he had acted more wisely than he did before the battle, is one of those foolish remarks made after an event which we often hear from the silliest of men. We cannot tell what would have happened if certain antecedents had been different from what they were, though we may certainly see, when great mistakes have been followed by bad consequences, that it will be prudent not to make the same mistakes again under similar circuinstances. If we may form conjectures in the present case, it seems probable that no foresight could have saved Pompeius