there are coexistences which even the adult never knows otherwise than through this test. While writing, I feel in my foot the warmth of the fire; I am aware of the pressure of my arm on the desk; I see the paper on which I write ; and I hear a cart in the street. I find it impossible, however, to think of all these things at the same instant. I cannot join the heat, the sound, the pressure, and the whiteness, in the same state of consciousness; and still less can I be simultaneously conscious of their respective causes. How, then, do I know that I am receiving these various impressions at one time? How do I know that the external objects producing them are coexistent? I know it from the fact that I can be successively conscious of these various feelings in any order with equal facility.

§ 367. The equal facility with which the terms of a relation of coexistence can be thought of in either order, is knowable by us only through an internal feeling. That we habitually notice the feelings accompanying changes in consciousness, cannot be questioned, since we distinguish them by words. When we speak of a thing as hard to think, or easy to believe, we express by these adverbs the presence or absence of mental tension. In the one case, the consequent can be made to follow the antecedent only by a great effort; in the other, by little or no effort. When attempting to remember a forgotten name, or when continuing to puzzle over some calculation, or when trying to form an unusually-complex conception, there is a distinct consciousness of inward strain. Whence it is clear that the states of consciousness constituting a thought, may follow one another without difficulty or with any degree of difficulty; and that the difficulty is known to us by the feeling accompanying the transition.

Consequently, to distinguish the relation of coexistence as one of which the terms will follow one another through consciousness in either order with equal facility, is to say

that there is a likeness or equality of the two feelings of facility which accompany respectively, the change from antecedent to consequent, and the change from consequent to antecedent. There may not be a likeness or equality of the two feelings produced by the contrasts of the terms, for these nearly always differ according to the order in which the terms are contemplated; but there is a likeness or equality of the two feelings of resistance-or rather in this case, non-resistance-which occur at the moments of transition.

So that the relation of coexistence under its primary simple form, is to be defined as a union of two relations of sequence, which are such that while the terms of the one arc exactly like those of the other in kind and degree, and exactly contrary to them in their order of succession, the two relations are exactly like each other in the feeling which accompanies the succession. Or otherwise, it may be defined as consisting of two changes in consciousness, which, though absolutely opposite in other respects, are perfectly alike in the absence of strain. And of course the relation of non-coexistence differs in this, that though one of the two changes occurs without any feeling of tension, the other does not.

§ 368. It may be worth while to point out, that these conclusions are indicated even by à priori considerations. For if, on the one hand, the great mass of external phenomena are statical, or not actively changing; and if, on the other hand, perpetual change is the law of internal phenomena-the condition under which only consciousness can continue; there arises the question-How can outer statical phenomena be represented by inner dynamical phenomena? How can the no-changes outside be symbolized by the changes inside? That changes in the non-ego may be expressed by changes in the ego, is comprehensible enough; but how is it possible for objective rest to be signified by

subjective motion? Evidently there is only one possibility. A consciousness ever in a state of change, can represent to itself a no-change, only by an inversion of one of its changes-by a duplication of consciousness equivalent to an arrest-by a regress which undergoes a previous progressby two changes which exactly neutralize each other.

Finally, the reader should be reminded that this analysis of the relation of cocxistence, showing that it is a relation disclosed by experience, supplies an ultimate disproof of the hypothesis that Space is a form of intuition; since the consciousness of coexistence is the primitive element out of which the consciousness of space is built-is the element without which even tho germ of that consciousness is impossible.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE RELATIONS OF CONNATURE AND NON-CONNATURE.

§ 369. After what has been said concerning it in § 360, but little need here be added respecting the relation of connature. It is of two kinds. In the one, the terms between which it subsists are themselves relations, or changes in consciousness. In the other, they are the primitive states of consciousness between which such changes occur. us first glance at the more complex of these.

Let

When treating of the relation of cointension, it was pointed out that simple changes from one primitive state of consciousness to another are of several classes. There are those in which the antecedent and consequent states are of different orders-as when the transition is from a tone to emotion; those in which they are of different genera-as when the transition is from a flash of light to a bang; those in which they are of the same genera but of different species -as when the transition is from the colour green to the colour red; and those in which they are of the same species, but of different degrees-as when the transition is from a faint sound to a loud one. And these being the different kinds of change between states of consciousness dis tinguished as simple feelings, it is manifest that when the states of consciousness become composite, a great multiplicity of kinds of changes arise-changes from greater to less in magnitude, from slow to quick in velocity, from ascent to descent, &c. Hence those various orders of changes implied by the negations of the relations already treated of the changes indicated by the terms dissimilarity,

non-cointension, non-coextension, non-coexistence.

And

hence also those processes of consciousness through which we class lines with lines, areas with areas, bulks with bulks -all of them distinguished by us as different orders of relations; that is, different orders of changes among the states of consciousness.

Nothing is to be said respecting the connature of relations in its various modes, beyond describing it; for the relation ⚫ of connature is not decomposable into other relations. That two changes in consciousness are of like kind, is a fact of which we can give no account further than that we perceive it to be so. When two transitions in consciousness produce in us two like feelings, we know nothing more than that we have the like feelings. It is true, as will be shown in a subsequent chapter, that it is possible to say specifically what we mean by asserting the likeness of these feelings. But beyond this it is impossible to go.

As subsisting between relations, therefore, the relation of connature must be defined as-likeness of kind between two changes in consciousness.

§ 370. Respecting the relation of connature as subsisting, not between relations, but between primary states of consciousness-feelings or the representations of them— still less is to be said. What is the nature of the feelings which we have of warmth, of blueness, of pressure, of sweetness, no one can say. They are undecomposable elements of thought with which analysis can do nothing. And when we assert the connature of any two such feelings their likeness in kind—we express an intuition of which we can say nothing further than that we have it. Though, as will by and by be seen, the intuition may be otherwise expressed, it cannot be decomposed.

To justify the title of the chapter, it must be added that the relation of non-connature is-unlikeness in kind between either changes in consciousness or the states which they connect.