The Principles of Psychology, Volum 2D. Appleton, 1882 |
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Side 59
... experiences , refers to two times - to time present and time past . The axiom- " Things which coexist with the same thing coexist with one another , " cannot , however often repeated , help us to any knowledge beyond that of the ...
... experiences , refers to two times - to time present and time past . The axiom- " Things which coexist with the same thing coexist with one another , " cannot , however often repeated , help us to any knowledge beyond that of the ...
Side 71
... experiences by which it is known that fermenting wort gives out carbonic acid , are accompanied by experiences of the quantity given out ; and vague as these may be , they are yet such that when the brewer says a certain vat of ...
... experiences by which it is known that fermenting wort gives out carbonic acid , are accompanied by experiences of the quantity given out ; and vague as these may be , they are yet such that when the brewer says a certain vat of ...
Side 85
... experience of the relation between fire and burning ; and that hence , by the very conditions of its origin , the new ... experiences , the known and unknown relations , instead of being respectively one and one , become many and many ...
... experience of the relation between fire and burning ; and that hence , by the very conditions of its origin , the new ... experiences , the known and unknown relations , instead of being respectively one and one , become many and many ...
Side 96
... experience on which he bases this conclusion ; nor have such cases occurred in the experiences of other men . Yet by a mental act which , though complicated , is not separable into steps , he rightly draws the inference : he recognizes ...
... experience on which he bases this conclusion ; nor have such cases occurred in the experiences of other men . Yet by a mental act which , though complicated , is not separable into steps , he rightly draws the inference : he recognizes ...
Side 159
... experiences of a body by saying that it is hard , what are the experiences im- plied ? First , a sensation of pressure of considerable in- tensity is implied ; and if , as in most cases , this sensation of pressure is given to a finger ...
... experiences of a body by saying that it is hard , what are the experiences im- plied ? First , a sensation of pressure of considerable in- tensity is implied ; and if , as in most cases , this sensation of pressure is given to a finger ...
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Vanlige uttrykk og setninger
accompanying actions æsthetic antecedent arise asserted attri attributes axiom become before-known body cause changes in consciousness chapter classification coexistent positions cognition colour complex conceived conception conclusion connatural connexion consciousness of space considered correlations definite degree developed elements equal established excited existence experiences extension external eyes fact faint feelings further Hence ideas implies impressions induction inference intensive quantities intuition involved kind known less magnitudes manifest mental mind motion muscular tension nature nervous ness nexions objective correlations objective sciences observed pain particular perceived perception phenomena predicated premiss present produced proposition quantitative reasoning recognized reflex action rela relation of coexistence relation of ideas represented resistance respect retina riences sciousness sensations sentiments sequence simultaneously Sir William Hamilton sound structure subject and object successive suppose surface syllogism symbols tactual things thought tion touch truth unlike visual visual perception vivid aggregate words
Populære avsnitt
Side 342 - ALL the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit. Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain.
Side 24 - If a side of any triangle be produced, the exterior angle is equal to the two interior and opposite angles ; and the three interior angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles.
Side 342 - Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality.
Side 199 - The sense of space, and in the end the sense of time, were both powerfully affected. Buildings, landscapes, &c. were exhibited in proportions so vast as the bodily eye is not fitted to receive. Space swelled, and was amplified to an extent of unutterable infinity.
Side 347 - Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe.
Side 321 - I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then, whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour.
Side 329 - By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions of which we are conscious when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned.
Side 404 - Accordingly, no geometrical proposition, as, for instance, that any two sides of a triangle are greater than the third side, can ever be derived from the general conceptions of line and triangle, but only from perception.
Side 357 - Elsewhere he unites these statements, saying — " but space and time are not merely forms of sensuous intuition, but intuitions themselves.
Side 321 - And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear ; and the like may be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever.