The Principles of Psychology, Volum 2D. Appleton, 1882 |
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Side 20
... mind . advances from that particular case of it which the demonstration establishes , to the recognition of its general truth . Let us take as an example , the proposition- " The angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal to ...
... mind . advances from that particular case of it which the demonstration establishes , to the recognition of its general truth . Let us take as an example , the proposition- " The angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal to ...
Side 32
... mind may retain an accurate remembrance of a relation , when it is unable to retain an accurate remembrance of the things between which the relation subsisted . To vary the above illustration - suppose a surveyor has had opportunities ...
... mind may retain an accurate remembrance of a relation , when it is unable to retain an accurate remembrance of the things between which the relation subsisted . To vary the above illustration - suppose a surveyor has had opportunities ...
Side 61
... mind as a type of the class ; and which , therefore , cannot be considered as less than one , though it may be considered as more . ( 2 ) . The particular attribute predicated in the major premiss as always accompanying this set of ...
... mind as a type of the class ; and which , therefore , cannot be considered as less than one , though it may be considered as more . ( 2 ) . The particular attribute predicated in the major premiss as always accompanying this set of ...
Side 69
... state the case with greater precision Observe , first , that as the unseen attribute predicated cannot , on the one hand , be supposed - to enter the mind save in some relation to its IMPERFECT QUALITATIVE REASONING . 69.
... state the case with greater precision Observe , first , that as the unseen attribute predicated cannot , on the one hand , be supposed - to enter the mind save in some relation to its IMPERFECT QUALITATIVE REASONING . 69.
Side 70
Herbert Spencer. to enter the mind save in some relation to its subject ; and that as , on the other hand , the relation cannot be thought of without the subject and the predicated attribute being involved as its terms ; it follows that ...
Herbert Spencer. to enter the mind save in some relation to its subject ; and that as , on the other hand , the relation cannot be thought of without the subject and the predicated attribute being involved as its terms ; it follows that ...
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Vanlige uttrykk og setninger
accompanying actions æsthetic antecedent arise asserted attri attributes axiom become before-known body cause changes in consciousness chapter classification coexistent positions cognition colour complex conceived conception conclusion connatural connexion consciousness of space considered correlations definite degree developed elements equal established excited existence experiences extension external eyes fact faint feelings further Hence ideas implies impressions induction inference intensive quantities intuition involved kind known less magnitudes manifest mental mind motion muscular tension nature nervous ness nexions objective correlations objective sciences observed pain particular perceived perception phenomena predicated premiss present produced proposition quantitative reasoning recognized reflex action rela relation of coexistence relation of ideas represented resistance respect retina riences sciousness sensations sentiments sequence simultaneously Sir William Hamilton sound structure subject and object successive suppose surface syllogism symbols tactual things thought tion touch truth unlike visual visual perception vivid aggregate words
Populære avsnitt
Side 342 - ALL the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit. Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain.
Side 24 - If a side of any triangle be produced, the exterior angle is equal to the two interior and opposite angles ; and the three interior angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles.
Side 342 - Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality.
Side 199 - The sense of space, and in the end the sense of time, were both powerfully affected. Buildings, landscapes, &c. were exhibited in proportions so vast as the bodily eye is not fitted to receive. Space swelled, and was amplified to an extent of unutterable infinity.
Side 347 - Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe.
Side 321 - I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then, whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour.
Side 329 - By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions of which we are conscious when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned.
Side 404 - Accordingly, no geometrical proposition, as, for instance, that any two sides of a triangle are greater than the third side, can ever be derived from the general conceptions of line and triangle, but only from perception.
Side 357 - Elsewhere he unites these statements, saying — " but space and time are not merely forms of sensuous intuition, but intuitions themselves.
Side 321 - And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear ; and the like may be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever.