The Principles of Psychology, Volum 2D. Appleton, 1882 |
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... RELATIONS OF SIMILARITY AND DISSIMILARITY XX . THE RELATIONS OF COINTENSION 136 ... ... 154 164 ... ... 178 ... ... ... 207 216 ... 232 ... 244 256 TENSION ... 261 TENSION ... 267 ISTENCE ... 271 TURE ... ... ... XXIV . THE RELATIONS OF ...
... RELATIONS OF SIMILARITY AND DISSIMILARITY XX . THE RELATIONS OF COINTENSION 136 ... ... 154 164 ... ... 178 ... ... ... 207 216 ... 232 ... 244 256 TENSION ... 261 TENSION ... 267 ISTENCE ... 271 TURE ... ... ... XXIV . THE RELATIONS OF ...
Side 10
... relation G to L equals the relation H to M ; and that the relation K to N also equals it ; it is said that therefore the relation G to L equals the relation K to N. Which therefore , involves the assumption that relations which are ...
... relation G to L equals the relation H to M ; and that the relation K to N also equals it ; it is said that therefore the relation G to L equals the relation K to N. Which therefore , involves the assumption that relations which are ...
Side 11
... relation must be like the third in this particular . The same argument is applicable to any other particular ; and therefore to all particulars . Whence the implication is that relations that are like the same relation in all ...
... relation must be like the third in this particular . The same argument is applicable to any other particular ; and therefore to all particulars . Whence the implication is that relations that are like the same relation in all ...
Side 12
... relations that are equal to the same relation are perceived to be equal to each other , the concepts dealt with are the rela- tions , and not the objects between which the relations subsist ; that the equality of these relations can be ...
... relations that are equal to the same relation are perceived to be equal to each other , the concepts dealt with are the rela- tions , and not the objects between which the relations subsist ; that the equality of these relations can be ...
Side 15
... relations , the equality of the first and last can be shown only by means of the axiom - Relations that are equal to the same relation are equal to each other . But It is true that in this case the relations dealt with are relations of ...
... relations , the equality of the first and last can be shown only by means of the axiom - Relations that are equal to the same relation are equal to each other . But It is true that in this case the relations dealt with are relations of ...
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Vanlige uttrykk og setninger
accompanying actions æsthetic antecedent arise asserted attri attributes axiom become before-known body cause changes in consciousness chapter classification coexistent positions cognition colour complex conceived conception conclusion connatural connexion consciousness of space considered correlations definite degree developed elements equal established excited existence experiences extension external eyes fact faint feelings further Hence ideas implies impressions induction inference intensive quantities intuition involved kind known less magnitudes manifest mental mind motion muscular tension nature nervous ness nexions objective correlations objective sciences observed pain particular perceived perception phenomena predicated premiss present produced proposition quantitative reasoning recognized reflex action rela relation of coexistence relation of ideas represented resistance respect retina riences sciousness sensations sentiments sequence simultaneously Sir William Hamilton sound structure subject and object successive suppose surface syllogism symbols tactual things thought tion touch truth unlike visual visual perception vivid aggregate words
Populære avsnitt
Side 342 - ALL the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit. Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain.
Side 24 - If a side of any triangle be produced, the exterior angle is equal to the two interior and opposite angles ; and the three interior angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles.
Side 342 - Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality.
Side 199 - The sense of space, and in the end the sense of time, were both powerfully affected. Buildings, landscapes, &c. were exhibited in proportions so vast as the bodily eye is not fitted to receive. Space swelled, and was amplified to an extent of unutterable infinity.
Side 347 - Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe.
Side 321 - I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then, whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour.
Side 329 - By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions of which we are conscious when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned.
Side 404 - Accordingly, no geometrical proposition, as, for instance, that any two sides of a triangle are greater than the third side, can ever be derived from the general conceptions of line and triangle, but only from perception.
Side 357 - Elsewhere he unites these statements, saying — " but space and time are not merely forms of sensuous intuition, but intuitions themselves.
Side 321 - And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear ; and the like may be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever.