of principal and interest upon her public debts. It cannot be otherwise.

I had no intention of speaking upon this subject, but I believe it to be a question of considerable public importance; and I believe if the Constitution goes out to the people with this provision in it, it falls dead. That, of itself, will engender such an opposition as to defeat it. The whole people on the line of the railroad for which this loan of the State credit is now asked, will go against it. In the northern part of Berkshire, in the whole of Franklin, in parts of Hampshire, in the city of Boston, and scattered here and there all over the State, there is a class of men who are determined that the credit of the State shall be lent to that corporation, and if this Convention undertakes to go out of its way to prevent it, they will vote against the Constitution.

Again, I ask the reform members of this Convention if they are ready to put this lump of lead round the neck of your Constitution, which will sink it so deep that you will never be able to find it again? I trust not. I go for the reconsideration of this vote, and for leaving the Constitution precisely where it now stands in regard to this subject. I ask that the people in their representative capacity may decide the matter for themselves, and that this Convention shall not undertake to do that for them.

Mr. BISHOP, of Lenox. Mr. President: On Saturday last, upon the motion of the delegate from Boston, (Mr. Giles,) this Convention resolved that "the legislature shall not have power to grant the credit of the State to any individual or corporation, without a two-thirds vote of the House of Representatives and the Senate in its favor."

The delegate from Charlestown, (Mr. Thompson,) has moved a reconsideration of the vote adopting this resolution. To its general object and policy, I have no disposition, and am not called upon by the motion for reconsideration, to object. The power of the legislature to pledge the credit and good faith of the people, if not a questionable, is, in my opinion, a very limited one. I deny its power, to aid by this mode, enterprises of a merely private character. It has no authority to sign and endorse negotiable notes, or draw and accept bills of exchange, in the name of the State, for the accommodation of individuals, mercantile or manufacturing firms, or corporations, engaged in manufactures, navigation or commerce, for their benefit solely, or to make the people their copartners in business. From this proposition, no well-informed legal gentleman would, I think, dissent. If there be danger of the people's becoming involved, through the act

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of their legislature, in the hazardous enterprises of navigation, manufacturing, banking, &c., it is wise to dispel it at once, by some decisive constitutional restriction. No danger of this sort, however, is apprehended. The sole question is this, shall the State aid by its credit, those improvements of a public character, now made and to be made by corporations for the benefit of the people, and which can be authorized only by the legislature. Improvements of this character, when too vast for individual capitalists, are, in other States, made, owned, and carried on, by the people themselves. It is thus, with the great canals of New York and Pennsylvania. They are the work, and under the administration, of the State. This State has adopted a different policy, whether safe and prudent, wise or unwise, is too late now for discussion. The policy is fixed and settled, and has now gone too far, perhaps, to be arrested. Whether the people should not have retained in their own hands those great and perilous powers which they have imparted to corporations, and have done on their Own account and at their proper charges, what they have employed these corporate bodies to do for them, is a subject past the period of debate and inquiry. The instrumentalities of effecting the great and necessary public facilities, which bring about the intercommunication of Massachusetts with the rest of the world, are established. I can say with truth, to my much respected friend from Taunton, (Governor Morton,) this was no policy of yours or mine. That day may yet turn out to be an evil day, when the legislature of this State carved from the sovereignty of the people, so much thereof, as relates to railroads, and dished it out to corporations. This system of legislation, if pursued in relation to other matters, as it has been in relation to railroads, might, in time, and at some day not very far away in the future, strip the people entirely of that portion of their sovereign power by which they may now plan and execute for themselves, and fatally weaken and abridge the means which they may be required to use hereafter, by the frequently occurring and constantly varying demands and exigencies arising from progressive changes and improvements. Such grants, fixed and rendered irrevocable by the doctrine of vested rights, as that doctrine has been expounded and enforced, may leave the people mere spectators of the achievements of their own delegated strength, and like Sampson, shorn and shaven, they may wake up and find their strength departed, and themselves bound down by Philistines, which their own charters have made.

The people demanded these improvements.

The world demanded them. In space, they are local. In usefulness, however, as parts of a great system, they are world-wide. The people have chosen to make them by chartered companies, giving to these companies, for their hazards and investments, an equivalent in special benefits and exclusive privileges. It is solely upon the ground of their having undertaken the State's business, that they are entitled to the State's aid and favorable regard and care-upon the ground, that having assumed the people's obligations, they are entitled to their encouragement and support. Now, Sir, I am opposed to the restriction of this encouragement and aid, which the resolution proposes. I regard it as thoroughly prohibitory; and, if not so, as partial, inequitable, unjustdefeating the reasonable expectations which have been raised. No system of public improvements should be adopted by the State, which is not general; and in considering the question before the Convention, the relative claims and present condition of the several sections of the State, should be regarded. If the system, in order to its completion, ought to be farther extended, if certain parts of the State are not provided with the railroad facilities accorded to others, whose claims are no better, some sound reason should be adduced for withholding them. Impracticable schemes and embarrassed finances would unquestionably be good cause for prohibiting future, or withholding present assistance. If the past shows recklessness, and improvidence, or wastefulness, limitations should be placed upon the exercise of legislative power. With the present influence of railroad corporations over legislative proceedings—an influence, not peculiar, but common to them and all men, and bodies of men of great means and control, I regard the vote passed, not as a restriction, not as a limitation, but as a full inhibition. It is proposed that the Senate consist of forty members. Fourteen only are required to stifle all action upon this subject. It is the interest of existing railroads to prevent their multiplication-to monopolize, if I may use the word, and secure to themselves the entire transportation of men and merchandise; and can they not, with all convenient ease, without apparent activity, or semblance of trick or artifice, throw into that body, of those personally interested, enough to prevent competition by new roads, and defeat every project, which, if carried out, might diminish their profits? The answer is obvious. It would place the enlargement and multiplication of this branch of public improvements, entirely under the control of existing corporations, and to them, in the first instance, would the people have to apply, to extend these

[July 15th.

great facilities, now made necessary to all departments of industry. In short, upon this great subject, intimately interwoven with the leading interests and prosperity of the country, corporations virtually would legislate, and not the people, through their representatives. Is not this, by indirection, to be sure, but substantially and effectually, a grant by the people, through their legislature, of a part of their sovereign power and right of eminent domain? The grant may hereafter be revoked, if it does not get to be too strong, but while in force, are not that power and that right suspended. I am confident, that such would be the effect of the proposed restriction-that while it takes a measure of power from the legislature, it imparts exactly the same measure to existing corporations. Sir, I am not for such a limitation of legislative action. I am not for a prohibition, which passes over all, which is prohibited to bodies which have had their full share of legislative succor-which have had all they could ask-all, which is necessary to the completion and success of their enterprises. I am for no such constitutional restriction upon the government, as shall operate as a grant of the patronage and aid left to it-to those, to whom aid and patronage have been meted out in generous and abundant measure. "To him that hath shall be given," may be sound theology, but "from him, that hath not, shall be taken away even that which he hath," certainly requires to be examined, before being adopted, as a rule in the distribution of legislative favors. If the chartered powers and immunities, through which we have chosen to construct our public works, operate safely and beneficially, make them general, as the public good requires. If they prove productive of evil, should not that evil come to us diluted by diffusion. I discuss this question by itself, disconnected entirely from any of the other modes proposed to abridge legislative authority over public credit. I look at it, as an abstract proposition, apart from any particular railroad, which now is, or is proposed to be made.

Much has been said about the Western Railroad, and the Hoosac Tunnel. They are entitled to no specific consideration in the debate upon the proposed limitation. They may be parts of a whole, which may have relation to it. I certainly entertain no hostility to the first, and would not favor the execution of the other, if it be impracticable, or not called for by the general welfare, and whether it be practicable, or would be of public benefit, I certainly am not advised. These questions require more close and accurate investigation than one not specially concerned is inclined to give, or can give. If those mountain barriers can

be perforated, so as to admit to a passage through, a locomotive and its train, without great and disproportional expenditures, and the voice of the people call for it, and they can be assured by the severest inquiry which they may make, that no loss will be incurred, let the mountains be tunnelled. Pledges, as solid as the bonds of the "solid men of Boston," should be required, if the State, by her credit, gives aid. It is right that such pledges be required, for although a public work, it is to be executed mainly upon the judgment of individuals, and largely by their capital, who carefully compare and balance the privileges granted with the risks assumed, and should stand by them.

It is said that the Western Railroad is not only an exhibition of the active, intelligent enterprise, but a standing monument of the munificent wisdom of the State. It has, indeed, thus far accomplished all the purposes of its creation; all that it promised, it has doubly fulfilled, and more. Its security is pronounced ample, firm as "terra firma "-subject to diminution only by earthquakes or volcanoes. Stripped of it, the State would be without one of its greatest sources of prosperity, and, so long as it shall be administered as it has been, with reference to the public accommodation and wants, and economically and efficiently; so long as it shall, as it has done, appoint for its conducting officers gentlemen, courteous, kind, and attentive, to whom we can commit our wives, our children, ourselves, assured of exposure to those casualties only, which come in spite of human vigilance and forecast, it will retain, as it holds, the special favor and regards of the people, and their government. It has, however, been created for special purposes. Its rights and its powers are limited and defined. Other rights, it cannot claim, other powers it cannot exercise, without transcending and violating its charter, and exposing it to forfeiture. It is said that this corporation is here in the Convention-that it sat with the last legislature, during its protracted session. It has no business here. It had no business there. It has no power to make constitutions or laws, except for "the orderly conducting of its own business." It has a legal existence only-is a legal person, with specific functions, created for determinate purposes, and should it assume other offices, or attempt other purposes, its claim to exist would and should cease. It is enough that its stockholders have and retain their several individual rights, and can defend and protect their interest, as others may, whether that interest be in lands, chattels, or stocks. Its officers, like other men, are eligible as delegates and legislators, and if, like others,

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they are jealous and watchful of their rights, the corporate body, of which they are members, would hardly be obnoxious to censure. When corporations shall appear voluntarily, as such, in either department of the government, expending their funds and using their powers to control its proceedings in matters not within their charters, and attempt to arrest public improvements, cripple private enterprises, or get rid of lawful competition, the time will have come, either for their entire disfranchisement, or for severely stringent circumscriptions, for the world is old enough to have learned, that if there be such a thing as a legal conscience, it has no sting to it. To those who see imminent perils in the factitious powers created by special legislation-powers which set at defiance individual competition, and are strong and dangerous because they can do so, this consolation, at least, is left: that thus far they have been employed, with few exceptions, by honorable men, who know as well their obligations as their rights, and are willing to fulfil them. May a wholesome jealousy watch and guard them, till men, single-handed, with private capital, shall be able to cope with them, as I trust in the revolutions of business they may be, or until a system of general laws, by their impartial operation, shall have placed them upon common ground.

That the inhibitory restriction proposed, should have found an advocate among the delegates from this city is most wonderful. That every one of them should be found prudent, cautious, in favor of a reasonable, and even a stringent limitation, is not surprising. They are "solid men," so all believe-so said the oracle. The industry and prosperity of city and country are compactly interwoven. The interest of mart and field are almost identical. They should be brought, if possible, into close proximity. The heart beats, not for itself alone, but for the extremities, and their twenty terminals. Boston is not Boston, for her own sake only, but also for every mountain, where the chopper builds his cabin-for every hoof-trod hill-side-for every corn-clad valley. Her citizens should coöperate with those of the country, in all reasonable ways, to enable the latter to come here, at the least expense, and in the shortest time. Fears are expressed of centralization. Centralization of government is, indeed, to be feared, and stout resistance to it should be made. No man, unless it be constitutionally delegated, should have more political control, than belongs to him individually. He is one only of many equal parts, a unit in the whole number; and no municipality or city should be suffered to exercise any more of legislative or administrative influence, than its just popular dividend. Busi

ness centres, however, have been, and always will be, so long as streams unite and form navigable rivers, and there are found upon the shores of the ocean, at wide intervals only, secure retreats from its storms. Boston is one of these central points, where land meets sea, in safe and commodious harbor-where landsmen meet seamen, and will always meet them-where they interchange the necessities, conveniencies, and luxuries of life, and where, I hope, there will always be an interchange of material things not only, but of the sentiments of kindness, respect, confidence, and hearty good-will. Conventionalities may obstruct the ease and frankness of intercourse, may generate castes and classes, may canker the hearts of the exclusives with pride, and tincture the spirits of the excluded with envy. Conventionality and jealousy are everywhere. They are incident to humanity, and among the diversified forms in which human folly and human weakness show themselves. Those who institute invidious comparisons between city and country, claiming for the one all the wealth and munificence, for the other all the solid intelligence and stern virtue, do a positive evil, by postponing the day, when wellbred intercourse and cordial good fellowship will convict each of mistake, and lead to the mutual correction of errors. Away with all factitious social distinctions. There is no place for them among the serious actualities of life-no time for them with those, who by steam and railroad would bring the world into one neighborhoodinto one common feeling of mutual confidence and love. Leave such silly matters to brainless men and idle women. An avenue from every section and corner of the State, if it be called for, and will pay, should be opened to her great commercial capital; and it should no longer be complained of by the dwellers on the western mountains, that it costs double to reach their own cherished commercial capital, to what it does to go to that of a neighboring State, at a greater distance from them. Sir, what can be done, with full assurance of no consequent loss to the State, in the way of reaching this city cheaply and quickly, should find no obstacles here or anywhere.

Why, Sir, from the western part of Massachusetts, we come to Boston, thank Heaven, much more readily than we did; but it is a fact, that in order to reach our own commercial capital, we pay four hundred per cent. more than we are obliged to pay in order to reach a great commercial capital of another State, at a greater distance from us. There may be physical difficulties in the way, which cannot be removed; and all that we ask is the removal of every obstacle, the filling up of every valley that can be filled, the lowering |

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of every mountain which can be brought down, that we may reach our own commercial capital, transact business with our own citizens, and derive our full benefit from the fact that we have a great commercial city which we love, whose interests we shall cultivate, and with which we shall forever be connected.

Mr. SUMNER, for Marshfield. Mr. President: I have no desire to enter upon the broad discussion which has been opened by the question now before the Convention. There are considerations, of clear and palpable force, which will determine my vote, and which are as simple as they ought to be decisive. These, with your permission, Sir, I will briefly indicate.

It is proposed, by a permanent provision of the Constitution, to tie the hands of the legislature, so that it cannot hereafter, as in times past, lend the credit of the State in aid of any private corporation; and an amendment has been introduced by my friend from Boston, on the other side of the House, (Mr. Giles,) allowing such loan; but only on the difficult and almost impossible condition of a vote of two-thirds of the legislature. Both of these provisions-the original proposition and the amendment-though differing in form and degree, are identical in principle. They both contemplate a restraint upon the existing powers of the legislature in this regard.

Now, Sir, waiving all question of the propriety of such restraint on grounds of abstract policy, or on grounds suggested by the experience of other States, I believe I may assume, without fear of contradiction, that in times past no crying evil has occurred in Massachusetts from its absence. The credit of the Commonwealth has been rarely lent; and when lent, it has been on sufficient security, and for the general good. Witness the instances which have been adduced in this debate. We are not, then, pressed to this measure by any special experience of evil. We have in no respect suffered from the want of it. No such urgency exists. This is something, and, of itself, in the absence of any commanding principle, may well make us hesitate to depart from the established policy of the Commonwealth. But there is another consideration, to which reference has been already made by gentlemen who have preceded me, which completely disposes of the whole question.

Sir, it is notorious that an application has been recently made to the legislature-in conformity with usage in similar cases-for aid in an important, and, as I believe, practicable work of Internal Improvement, which, when completed, will be a glory to the Commonwealth, and a mighty channel of trade and travel. This application, after

ample discussion, found favor in the House of Representatives, but was rejected, on a very close division, in the Senate-I think by a single vote. But the parties having this grand enterprise at heart, avow their determination to renew it at another session. It is, therefore, at this moment, in the nature of a Pending Question of Internal Improvement, of which the legislature, under the existing Constitution, has jurisdiction. But this is not all. At the very time honorable members were chosen to this Convention, it was then a Pending Question before the legislature. Under these circumstances, and in the absence of any besetting evil, or controlling principle, it seems to me highly impolitic and meddlesome for the Convention to undertake, directly or indirectly, to deal with it. Directly, you would not; indirectly, you should not. On a question thus peculiarly circumstanced-standing by itself, and unlike any other now before the Convention-Public Opinion should be left to operate in its customary channel, without any impediment or breakwater from us.

Sir, I am against the proposition on two grounds; first, because it is not vindicated by any obvious principle, or by any ruling necessity, or even expediency, founded upon the experience of our Commonwealth; and, secondly and chiefly, because, notwithstanding its generality of form, it is practically an offensive interference with a Pending Question of Internal Improvement, which we were not summoned to determine.

Mr GILES, of Boston. I ask the indulgence of the Convention for a few moments, to express some of the sentiments which I have in relation to the resolution now before the Convention. It so happened, the other day, that I found this question up and under discussion. The general drift of the motions before the Convention, was to place a limit upon the legislative power to grant the credit of the State. With that intention I concurred, but I did not assent to the various propositions to obtain that object. During the vote upon one of them, I framed the amendment which is now before the Convention, and with reference to which, as I understand, a motion has been made, and is now the immediate question before us, to reconsider, and which was offered by my friend from Charlestown, (Mr. Thompson). The object which I had in view in framing that resolution, which was done on the spur of the moment, was two-fold; first, to make it intelligible, and second, to make it in a form which would admit of being easily amended. It therefore provides that the legislature shall not have power to grant the credit of the State, to any private corporation without two-thirds of the House, and two-thirds

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of the Senate agree to it; and it so stands, that if any gentleman wishes to strike out the provision requiring a two-thirds vote of the Senate, and insert one requiring a majority only, or to strike out the provision requiring a two-thirds vote of the House, and insert a majority, it may be easily done.

I wish now to suggest some reasons upon which I found the expediency of some limitation, and make a few remarks with reference to the points which have been started this morning, in the debate. Mr. President, what is the foundation of this resolution? Is it baseless as a vision or a dream in the night; or has it a foundation in reason? If so, what is it? I say it does stand on a foundation; and that foundation is, first, that the granting of the State credit is no part of governmental action; it is an exception, an extraordinary act, and it is no part of ordinary governmental action to grant the credit of the State to private corporations.

That being one corner-stone of the resolve, I say that the act of granting the State credit, should be guarded farther than the ordinary acts of the legislature, which simply require a majority. The other foundation is, that the history of these grants of the State credit to individuals and corporations in this country, including the government of the Union, and the government of each State in the Union, shows that there is danger of abuse. I am not going into any particulars; I am not going to assert that any particular instance is an abuse; but I do say that it is the conviction of the public mind in this country, and not only in this country, but in other countries, that there is danger of abuse from this power of the legislature.

Then, this being an extraordinary act, and one which is in danger of being abused, it does call for more guards than ordinary legislation, to wit: the majority vote.

The proposition the other day, was to put the question to the people. I opposed it; not upon the ground of any distrust of the people. I said then, and I say now, that if I thought there was not sufficient intelligence in the people to enable them to pass upon any proposition which this Convention should put to them, I would vote to double the school fund again and again till there was. But the reason why I would not put it to the people, was this. I am in favor of internal improvements, as well as my friend for Erving, (Mr. Griswold); I go for them, heart and hand. I always have and always will. I wish these improvements to have the good will of every man in the Commonwealth; and that is the reason why I would never put one of these great enterprises