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other manufacturing establishment and all buildings, sheds, structures or other places used for or in connection therewith, where one or more persons are employed at manufacturing, including making, altering, repairing, finishing, any article or thing, in whole or in part, except dry dock plants engaged in making repairs to ships," etc. Further, that work shall be deemed to be done for a factory within the meaning of this chapter [Labor Law] whenever it is done at any place, upon the work of a factory or upon any of the materials entering into the product of the factory, whether under contract or arrangement with any person in charge of or connected with such factory directly or indirectly through the instrumentality of one or more contractors or other third persons." The courts have defined a factory as a structure or plant where something is made or manufactured from raw or partly wrought materials into forms suitable for use. This is the primary definition which was extended by the statute so as to include any “mill, workshop, or other manufacturing establishment one or more persons are employed at manufacturing." Engineering Corp., 204 N. Y. 543; O'Connor v. Webber, 163 App. Div. 175.) It seems to me that the Legislature by using the term "for a factory intended to mean thereby and to include any person or individual, company or corporation engaged in the manufacture of the goods in question. In the case at bar there can be no question but that the defendant did conduct a factory, and interpreting the statute as including in the words "for a factory " any person or individual engaged in manufacturing, the statute becomes comprehensible and applicable to all cases where the articles mentioned are manufactured.

*

*

*

where

(Shannahan v. Empire

I think that a statute of this sort should be most liberally construed to carry out the evident purpose of the Legislature, and that it is our duty if possible in the interest of justice and of humanity to affirm the conviction of the defendant.

It is also the claim of the appellant that section 104 of the Labor Law should read in connection with section 100 (as amd. by Laws of 1913, chap. 260) which provides that no tenement house nor any part thereof shall be used for manufacturing, altering, repairing or finishing any articles except for the sole and exclusive use of the person so using any part of such tenement house or the members of his household, without a license therefor as provided in article 7 of the statute, but that nothing therein contained shall apply to collars, cuffs, shirts or shirt waists made of cotton or linen fabrics that are subjected to the laundering process before being offered for sale. Defendant contends that this section should be read in connection with section 104, and where it appears that the articles have been laundered that such laundry relieves defendant from the charge of violating the statute. Section 100 is entirely separate and distinct from section 104, and clearly refers to collars, cuffs, shirts and shirt waists used by adults. Section 104 is complete in itself.

I do not think there is anything in appellant's point that the statute (Labor Law, § 104) deprives the defendant, appellant, of liberty or property without due process of law. (U. S. Const. 14th Amendt. § 1. See, also, State Const. art. 1, § 6.) As before stated, the statute was a legitimate exercise of the legislative power for the purpose of protecting the health of

infants. (People ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden, etc., 144 N. Y. 529.) "When the sole object and general tendncy of legislation is to promote the public health, there is no invasion of the Constitution, even if the enforcement of the law interferes to some extent with liberty or property." (Matter of Viemeister, 179 N. Y. 235, 238; Health Department v. Rector, etc., 145 id. 32.)

The argument of the appellant that the statute discriminates against citizens of New York in favor of those of foreign states is without force. (Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. [U. S.] 591; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Slaughter House Cases, 16 id. 36.)

It seems to me that section 104 of the Labor Law is a valid exercise of the police power by the Legislature. The bibs in question were wearing apparel within the meaning of the statute. The defendant should not be permitted to escape or the statute to be circumvented through technicalities in the nature of those raised by the appellant.

The judgment of conviction should be affirmed.

XVI. EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT

A. EXTRATERRITORIALITY

CASSIN V. STILLMAN, DELEHANTY-FERRIS Co., 185 App. Div. 63 (Nov. 22, 1918), abstract.

The New York Labor Law has no application in an action by the employee of a subcontractor injured by the breaking of a ladder furnished by the general contractor, where the injury was sustained while engaged in the performance of his duties on a job in New Jersey.

B. NOT APPLICABLE WHERE COMPENSATION LAW APPLIES NULLE V. HARDMAN, PECK & Co., 185 App. Div. 351 (Dec. 13, 1918). It has been held that an action under the Employers' Liability Act cannot be maintained where the case falls within the Workmen's Compensation Law, when there are no allegations that the employer failed to secure compensation for injured employees and their dependents as provided by the Workmen's Compensation Law, and that the plaintiff is not limited to the exclusive remedy provided by the statute.

In this connection, see "Minors Illegally Employed," page 89.

C. APPLICABILITY TO CEDED TERRITORY

KAUFMAN V. HOPPER, 220 N. Y. 184 (Feb. 27, 1917), abstract.

In this case the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division (163 App. Div. 863), Second Department, and held that the Labor Law had no application to an accident happening in the Brooklyn Navy Yards after the same had been ceded to the United States; but that the common law and statutes passed prior to the cession of the territory governed in such action.

D. "OPERATOR" OF AUTOMOBILE AND "WASHER" AS

FELLOW-SERVANTS

GILPIN V. RUPPERT, 170 App. Div. 405 (Dec. 3, 1915), abstract [aff'd, without opinion, 223 N. Y. 613].

Defendant brewery maintained a room where its automobile trucks were washed. There was an "operator" for the trucks, who placed them, and two washers. It was customary for the

operator when he desired to move a truck into or out of the room to direct one of the washers to open the door. This was usually done by the washer who was nearest the door when the request was made. One of the washers, in obedience to the direction of the operator attempted to open the door and was crushed and fatally injured by the backing truck. The Appellate Division, First Department, held that as the operator was intrusted with the authority to direct, control or command the employees who were engaged as washers, the case fell within subdivision 2 of section 200.

E. "PLANT" AS INCLUDING “SKID" USED IN UNLOADING CAR

The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a skid reaching from a car door to a pier is a part of the "plant" of the defendant railroad company.

DELAWARE, L. & W. R. Co. v. PERROTTA, 238 Fed. 78, 151 C. C. A. 154 (Nov. 14, 1916), abstract.

Plaintiff, a longshoreman, was employed by the defendant in loading and unloading cars. These cars were brought to the pier on lighters or floats. The skids were placed from the pier or lighter to the float. On the morning of the accident resulting in the injury for which damages are sought plaintiff and his gang found the car partially unloaded and the skid in place. The goods were unloaded by means of hand trucks. The incline down which the trucks were operated was steep. The skid was not fastened by ropes or otherwise. By reason of the action of the tide which varied the height of the lighter or float, ropes were required to hold the skids. The testimony was conflicting, but the jury found that the skid was not equipped with ropes, and rendered a verdict for the plaintiff. There was a large number of skids belonging to the defendant, which were in proper condition and safe, and it was the custom of workmen to select any one of this number thought to be safe. In the instant case the skid had been selected and placed by another gang. The court held that the "skid" was a part of defendant's plant, and that defendant could not claim that it was not liable because it furnished proper skids, in the light of the testimony of the assistant foreman that he was supposed to inspect the skids and also to see that proper ones were used, which he admitted he had not done in this case.

1. IMPROPER PROPPING OF FLOOR INJURING CONTRACTOR'S EMPLOYEE

O'CONNOR V. LOESCH, 223 N. Y. 527 (Feb. 26, 1918), abstract.

It appears that a general contractor will be liable for an injury to one of his employees caused by the fall of part of a floor which was left propped up after the removal of part thereof by a subcontractor, although the condition of the floor was created only a few minutes before the accident happened, and although the employee injured only crossed the floor to get his coat from a place where he had hung it.

2. UNSAFE BATTERY FOR FIRING SHOT DURATIO V. JACKSON, 174 App. Div. 88 (June 15, 1916), abstract [aff'd without opinion, 223 N. Y. 692 (May 12, 1918)].

In blasting operations it appeared that the battery consisted of three dry cells, connected by a bare wire, and not inclosed. The wires were about seventy-five feet long. One wire was connected at the battery, while the other was unattached. The blast consisted of a third of a stick of dynamite in which was inserted a cap or exploder, from which ran two strands of wire about four feet long. When the blast was ready to be fired, one strand was connected to the lead wire attached to the battery and the other strand to the unconnected lead wire. After these connections were made the loose end of the unattached wire was touched. to the bare or uninsulated wire connecting the three cells. In the process of preparing the blast the loose end of the unattached wire came into contact with the exposed battery, and a premature explosion followed seriously injuring the plaintiff. There was evidence tending to show that the batteries used in blasting were usually covered so as to prevent the forming of circuits accidentally. The contention that the batteries were not properly protected was sustained and a verdict for $17,500 was held not to be excessive.

3. CONDUCT OF FOREMAN NEGLIGENT

PELLEGRINO V. CLARENCE L. SMITH CO., 226 N. Y. 165 (Apr. 18, 1919), abstract.

Plaintiff was engaged in excavating for the foundation of a building. He noticed cracks about a stone and called the foreman's attention to them. The foreman, without inspection, told