plaintiff are valid and reasonable. This debatable point is to be determined from the voluminous testimony of a four days' trial; hence the added length of the opinion.

The statute assailed must stand or fall under the police powers of the state. That which was legal before its enactment has become illegal and only the exercise of the police powers of the state can justify such a change. In order to stand it must be shown that the legislature had in mind the protection of lives and also that it had sufficient ground for the exercise of its inherent police powers to bring about that protection. This is all made to appear in the history of the "exit" statutes themselves, which is a part of the record in the case.

Immediately after the Triangle Waist Company fire, which occurred on March 25, 1911, resulting in the loss of 146 human lives, the legislature created a commission to investigate the "existing conditions under which manufacturing is carried on, including matters affecting the life and safety of operatives as well as as the security and best interests of the public."

This commission devoted two years of intelligent and conscientious labor to the subject, carrying on extensive investigations and taking a great volume of expert testimony, including testimony on the subject of exits from factories, of which this court may take judicial notice. People v. Charles Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395. The resulting disclosure of conditions existing in the factories of this state brought forth a popular demand for remedial legislation. Aided by the comprehensive report of this commission, the legislature, basing its conclusions on investigation and necessity, forthwith enacted the following measures: (1) Section 79-b of the Labor Law, which establishes the minimum requirements of safety in all factory buildings in this state erected prior to October 1, 1913; (2) Section 94 of the same law, which places upon the owner of a tenement factory the responsibilities for carrying out the provisions of section 79-b, and (3), section 1275 of the Penal Law, which provides for fine and imprisonment in case of violations. In addition to complying with safety requirements, in which he has no alternative under section 79-b of the Labor Law, every owner of a tenement factory building erected prior to October 1, 1913, must also obey all orders issued pursuant thereto, since legal orders issued by virtue of this section have the full force and effect of law. McRickard v. Flint, 114 N. Y. 222; Shields v. Pugh & Co., 122 App. Div. 586.

It is true that these provisions constitute a forward step in remedial legislation quite in advance of anything heretofore undertaken by the legislature in the exercise of its police powers. It is also true that in many instances, clearly so in the case at bar, compliance with these provisions may entail hardship upon the owners of buildings which at the time of their erection fully complied with all existing provisions of law. Hardship, however, does not mean confiscation, and unless it results from the unreasonable exercise of arbitrary power on the part of the legislature no degree of hardship can justify the court in nullifying legislative enactments embodying the will of the people, since the primary duty of the legislature to protect the common interests of the whole people, even at the expense of personal or local interests. The mere fact that the law cannot be enforced without causing expense to the citizen who comes within its provisions furnishes no constitutional obstacle to such enforcement. Dept. of Health v. Trinity Church,

145 N. Y. 32. That the police powers of the state include everything essential to the public safety, justifying the destruction or abatement of public nuisances, even to the demolition of buildings in the path of conflagration, has long been settled law. The fact that the exercise of the power may disturb the enjoyment of individual rights without compensation for such disturbance does not make laws and regulations of a public nature unconstitutional, for they do not appropriate property for public use, but simply regulate its use and enjoyment by the owner. Dept. of Health v. Trinity Church, supra. If the extent of the injury which would be inflicted upon private individuals were controlling upon the constitutionality of the act, then it would be difficult, if not impossible, to have any fixed criterion, since the cost of compliance in some cases might be very small, while in others it might equal, or even exceed, the equity of the owner. Such considerations are proper to address to the legislature, but not to the court. Tenement House Dept. v. Moeschen, 89 App. Div. 526. Even assuming "that the law is mischievous in its tendencies,

the responsibilty there

for rests upon the legislators, not upon the courts. No evils arising from such legislation could be more far-reaching than those that might come to our system of government if the judiciary, abandoning the sphere assigned to it by the fundamental law, should enter the domain of legislation, and upon grounds merely upon justice or reason or wisdom, annul statutes that had received the sanction of the people's representatives. It is the to guard the constitutional rights of the citizen against merely arbitrary power, it is equally their duty to recognize and enforce legislative enactments embodying the will of the people, unless they are plainly and palpably, beyond all question, in violation of the fundamental law of the Constitution." Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207-223.

solemn duty of the courts

Merely because it is a step in advance, section 79-b of the Labor Law cannot be said to be plainly and palpably in violation of the Constitution. It is rather one of those amendments to the structure of the law now being made with increasing frequency by a legislature which recognizes the trend of modern thought with respect to social justice. When the legislature created the factory investigating commission it sought light upon "matters affecting the health and safety of operatives as well as the security and best interests of the public." It seems obvious, particularly at this crucial time in the affairs of the nation, that "the health and safety of operatives" are identical with "the security and interests of the public." Moreover, in its application to this case the "safety of operatives" necessarily includes the safety of any members of the community who have occasion to go into the building as well as of the factory operatives and other persons who are employed therein.

Until the occurrence of the Triangle Waist Company fire, in which the "exit" law may be said to have had its genesis, the legislature had apparently given no thought to the grave dangers to human life that were lurking factories, and the lesson taught by the lamentable disaster made quick disposition of any technical barrier which might be placed in the way of the lawmakers, on the ground of class legislation. Certainly the constitutional inhibition against class legislation cannot be deemed to relate to a particular class of people who are compelled to provide safeguards for the public.

"Neither is it an effective objection to a statute if some of those who will be protected by its provisions oppose such protection, for the state has such an interest in the welfare of its citizens that it may if necessary protect them even against their own indifference, error or recklessness." People v. Charles Schweinler Press, supra, 407. When the legislature made this wise provision for the safety of operatives it did not more than give recognition to a necessary inference from a universally known fact, namely, that there is grave danger to human life, not only in fire itself, but also in that instinctive fear which is born of fire in the form of panic. This to my mind is the one new and most beneficial element in the law under discussion.

Some of the cases cited by plaintiff in my opinion sustain the law he impugns. Quoted fragments of opinion therefrom are either misleading when detached from their context or unnecessary to the decision reached. Included in this class are the following: Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133; Board of Health v. Trinity Church, supra; Atchinson, Topeka & Sante Fe R. R. Co. 7. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96; Tenement House Dept. v. Moeschen, supra; Coe 7. Schultz, 47 Barb. 64; Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368.

The other decision relied on by plaintiff involve facts and present questions which are foreign to the present inquiry. They are so lacking in any basis of relevant inference as to be unavailable even for purposes of analogy. They deal with statutes which, under the guise of legislative police power, aim to deprive persons of their property or their business without due process of law by declaring vested interests therein obnoxious to the public, or with statutes assumed to be for the public health, safety or morals, but which, without accomplishing that purpose, direct the confiscation or curtailment of private property or business, or finally with statutes which seek to impose regulations so unreasonable as to be in violation of the right of personal liberty. They all hold, and necessarily so, that such legislation is unconstitutional. They have no bearing here because the statute under consideration was passed for the better safety and protection of the public. its operation in this case through the orders of the state industrial commission is valid and reasonable, and the orders themselves were issued in pursuance of the design for which the law was enacted, namely, the safety and protection of a large body of citizens of the state. Without setting forth the analysis of them which I have made in detail, suffice it to say the cases relied on by the plaintiff that are inapplicable or distinguishable on one or more of the foregoing grounds are comprised in the following list: People v. Hawkins, 157 N. Y. 1; Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co., 201 id. 271; › Litchfield v. Bond, 186 id. 66; People ex rel. Wineburgh Co. v. Murphy, 195 id. 126; People ex rel. Standard Bill Posting Co. v. Hastings, 77 Misc. Rep. -453; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378; People ex rel. McPike v. Van De Carr, 178 id. 425; Matter of Cheeseborough, 78 id. 232; Grossman v. Caminez, 79 App. Div. 15; Signell v. Wallace, 35 Misc. Rep. 656. In none of these cases was the statute assailed enacted for the public health and public safety, nor in any one does it appear that the statute upset was based upon any investigation or reason other than the arbitrary action of the legislators. Certain clauses in some of the opinions quoted in plaintiff's brief sound in harmony with his contention, but in each instance a careful examination into the facts and the scope of the decision, as distinguished from the opinion of the individual judge uttering the decision, fails to disclose any

solid ground upon which to base a successful attack against the constitutionality of the law.

Leaving his authorities and coming now to the plaintiffs argument it will be seen that it is based chiefly on those familiar grounds commonly availed of when the constitutionality of a remedial statute is the object of attack, namely, that the provisions of the exit law under consideration deprive him of his property without due process of law, threaten to destroy his vested rights and deny him equal protection of the laws. But the inferences from which these conclusions are drawn are based upon assumed facts not established by the evidence. I am not convinced, for example, that the expenditure necessary to comply with the exit law in this case, under the modified plan of the orders involved, would have been, if complied with when issued, or, for that matter, will be now, either confiscatory or unreasonable. As to what it would have cost to comply with the original plan of the orders and whether such cost would have amounted to confiscation, these I regard as academic questions whose decision has already been obviated by the commission in the liberal exercise of its powers of modification, under the terms of the law itself.

The same consideration of unsubstantiality apply to the plaintiff's contention that, because he has complied with all laws at the time of the construction of the building, the new exit law threatens a destruction of his vested property rights. If such a contention were to prevail it would make an end of all remedial legislation. Examples constantly occur, as in the case of our Tenement House Law, where individual owners are compelled to suffer similar hardships in order that a rule for the common good shall be observed. Dept. of Health v. Trinity Church, supra; Tenement House Department v. Moeschen, supra; Matter of City of Brooklyn, 8 App. Div. 54; Coe v. Shultz, supra.

For final objection to the constitutionality of the statute in question the plaintiff urges that the definitions of the terms "labor" and "factory building" therein constitute an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination against other classes of owners and employees, and that the law itself is too broad because it fails to classify buildings in which labor is performed, thereby denying him equal protection of the laws. The answer to this is, that the primary purpose of the legislature was to protect the lives of "factory operatives," as a means to better securing public safety and in defining the word "labor" as applied to buildings affected it had in mind labor engaged in the manufacture of some material product as distinguished from the employment of those engaged in business or professional pursuits. Nor can the term be so construed as to apply to mechanical or manual labor which is necessary and incidental to the repair and maintenance of a building.

The ingenious illustration offered by the plaintiff to show that under the act even two employees engaged in manufacturing would make the place of their employment a "factory building," while two partners doing the same work would not, is not convincing; the latter would not create fire hazard to the same extent as the former. It is inherent in human nature that, assuming the instinct of self-preservation to be equally strong in both, the employee with only his wage at stake will create more fire hazard than the employer with his property and business at stake.

On the question of arbitrary classification of buildings, there is no analogy to be found in the custom of fire insurance companies, under which different premium rates are charged for insuring different buildings, according to risk classification, since it ignores the distinction between loss of property and loss of life. Further classification of buildings is not required by the facts where it appears that the danger of panic as distinguished from fire itself is common to all buildings whose type of occupancy is that of laborers. I reach the conclusion that that statute is a valid exercise of the police power of the state and therefore constitutional.

The law being upheld as constitutional, it becomes necessary to consider the second proposition, as to whether the orders involved are valid and reasonable. Here I may state that the question of the orders would have to abide by the decision of the law's constitutionality, and I should decline to review the discretion of the commission, in the absence of proof showing bad faith, as a matter outside the province of the court, were it not for the express provisions of the statute which call for such review. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 701.

The evidence shows that the building in question is a factory building and that it is not equipped in accordance with the statutory requirements for factory buildings. The state industrial commission is a legally constituted body, clothed with certain delegated legislative powers. Under the plain wording of the statute, which applies to all buildings used for factory purposes, there can be no question but that said commission had jurisdiction of the subject matter, and was acting well within the scope of its authority in issuing the orders complained of. Therefore, plaintiff's argument that the orders are invalid does not call for serious refutation, unless indeed it be based on the claim that they are unreasonable, which must in turn be proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

Bearing in mind the purpose of the legislature in enacting the "exit" law, the question of the reasonableness of the orders involved must be determined, not alone by standards of dollars and cents, but as well by the broader standard of humanity, in the light of its weaknesses and in the light of past experience and catastrophies, as disclosed in the evidence in the case.

It cannot be too often emphasized that the law is primarily as “exit” statute rather than merely a fire statute. The clause “adequate and safe means of escape for the occupants in case of fire" must be so construed as to give practical effect to the legislative intent which was to safeguard the lives of factory operatives. The words "in case of fire" must be so interpreted as to include all danger from fire, and it is notorious that danger from fire includes panic. Panic may result from causes not confined to a factory building itself nor affected by its fireproof character. It may be caused by smoke alone, or by fire in a building adjoining or in the immediate neighborhood, or by a conflagration, or by hostile attack in time of war from land, sea or air, or by earthquake, or even by a false alarm.

The reasonableness of the orders, therefore, depends directly on the answer to the question, "Is the building safe from the danger of panic?" As already pointed out, it is a sixteen-story structure 193 feet in height, used for factory purposes, with an occupancy of over 600 persons, of whom nearly 400 are engaged in factory work. Its sole interior stairway used as a means of